Ε Epsilon

know, know how

ἐπίσταμαι

The verb of expertise, from the pretended remedy to the knowing of knowledge · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

Browse this book’s lexicon →

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo know how to do something, to understand, to have a skill; with an object, to know a thing as one who has mastered it. The verb of ἐπιστήμη.
  • In the CharmidesNineteen times. Five in the opening scenes, of knowing a remedy and of knowing how to speak Greek (155b–159a); the rest in the argument, from 170b to 172d, of the man who knows that he knows, of the doctor who knows the things of his craft, of those who know to whom we would hand things over, and of knowing knowledge itself.
  • In this edition“Know”; “know how to speak Greek” (159a).
  • A place to read155b–e with 170d–171c.
English renderings
ἐπίστασθαι, epistasthai, “(pretending) that you know”, “to know”; ἐπιστάμενος, epistamenos, “the one who knew”; ἐπισταίμην, epistaimēn, “(whether) I knew”, “(that) I did”; ἐπίστασαι, epistasai, “you know how (to speak Greek)”; ἐπίσταται, epistatai, “he knows”; ἐπιστάμενον, epistamenon, “who knows”; ἐπισταμένων, epistamenōn, “(anyone else) who knows”; ἠπιστάμεθα, ēpistametha, “we (did not) know”; ἐπισταμένους, epistamenous, “those who did know”; ἐπίσταιντο, epistainto, “(what) we (did not) know”; ἐπισταμένοις, epistamenois, “(others) who did know it”

Meaning

Ἐπίστασθαι is the Greek verb of competence. With an infinitive it is to know how to do something, as one knows how to swim or to speak Greek; with a noun, to know a thing as an expert knows it. Οἶδα is to know a fact, γιγνώσκω to recognise or come to know; ἐπίσταμαι is to have the skill. Its noun, ἐπιστήμη, carries the same sense into the argument (see ἐπιστήμη).

Use in the book

The verb’s first use is a pretence. Critias suggests the ruse: “What’s to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?” (155b; see προσποιέομαι; φάρμακον). Critias then introduces Socrates as “the one who knew the remedy” (155c), and when the boy asks him whether he knew the remedy for the head, Socrates tells us, “I did somehow manage to answer that I did” (155e; see μόγις). The dialogue that will ask whether temperance can tell a real doctor from a pretender opens with a pretended doctor whom no one present can test. Then Socrates asks the boy to say what temperance seems to him to be, “since you know how to speak Greek” (159a; see ἑλληνίζω).

In the argument the verb names the knowledge a man actually has, as it named the boy’s Greek. A man who knows only knowledge would know “that he knows something and that he has some knowledge” (170b; see γιγνώσκω), but would not be able to examine anyone who claims to know something, to see whether he knows what he claims (170d; see ἐξετάζω; φάσκω). So temperance will not be able to tell “a doctor who knows the things of his craft” from a pretender, “nor anyone else who knows anything at all”, except in the temperate man’s own craft (171c; see ἀληθινός; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; ὁμότεχνος). The verb then carries the life without error, in which we would not try to do what we did not know but find those who did and hand things over to them (171e; see ἁμαρτία; ἐξευρίσκω; παραδίδωμι), the premise Socrates withdraws at 172d (see ἀναμάρτητος).

The verb can be read as the dialogue’s measure of every claim. At the beginning Socrates says he knows a remedy he was taught on campaign, and the knowing is never tested; in the middle, a claim to know can be tested only by one who knows the same thing. Between the two stands Critias’ temperance, which would test every claim without knowing anything but knowing. At 172b the verb takes its own noun for object, “knowing knowledge” (see ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην), and the dialogue asks what good that could do.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 155bCritias proposes that Socrates pretend to know a remedy for the head.
  2. 155c–eSocrates is introduced as the one who knew the remedy, and manages to answer that he does.
  3. 159aSince the boy knows how to speak Greek, he can say what temperance seems to be.
  4. 170bA man who knows only knowledge would know that he knows something.
  5. 170dHe could not examine anyone who claims to know, to see whether he knows what he says he knows.
  6. 171cTemperance could not tell a doctor who knows the things of his craft from a pretender, nor anyone else who knows anything.
  7. 171eIn the life without error we would not try to do what we did not know, but find those who did know.
  8. 172b–cPerhaps the good of knowing knowledge is easier learning; they grant that it is possible to know knowledge.
  9. 172dThey agreed too easily that it would be a great good for each to do what he knew and hand over what he did not know to those who did.

Translation in this edition

“Know” at almost every place, “know how to speak Greek” for ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασαι (159a6–7), where the verb has its sense of a skill. At 172d8–9 the Greek uses two verbs for one thought, ἃ μὲν ἴσασιν, “what we knew”, and ἃ δὲ μὴ ἐπίσταιντο, “what we did not know”; the English has “know” for both. The compound προσεπίστασθαι, “to know besides” (170b6), has its own headword (see προσεπίσταμαι).

Elsewhere in Plato

The First Alcibiades states the principle of 171e and the danger it guards against. If Alcibiades were at sea, would he decide for himself whether to move the tiller in or out, and go astray for not knowing, or hand it over to the pilot and keep still? To the pilot. Then he does not go wrong about what he does not know, if he knows that he does not know it. Errors in action, Socrates goes on, come from this ignorance, thinking one knows when one does not: those who know that they do not know hand things over to others and so live without error, and the ignorance of those who do not know but think they do is the cause of evils, and most disgraceful when it concerns the greatest things (117c–118a). The Charmides asks what knowledge would let a man know which kind he is.