Learning

Use in the book

Socrates reports learning the charm from a Thracian doctor and being taught both remedy and incantations (156d, 157a–b). This claimed transmission gives the ensuing conversation an educational frame without establishing the historical existence of that teacher. Later Socrates wonders whether his painstaking learning was for nothing if temperance has no value (175e).

At 159e easy learning is equated with quick learning, difficult learning with quiet and slow learning. Teaching quickly and vigorously is also judged finer. These are agreed comparisons within the argument against identifying virtue with quietness; they are not an independently defended theory of pedagogy. At 168a Socrates describes Critias' knowledge as knowledge of no mathēma, no ordinary subject of learning. Translating mathēma here as “mathematics” would destroy the point: the purported knowledge excludes all ordinary subject matters.

The crucial constructive possibility occurs at 172b. Someone who possesses knowledge of knowledge might learn another subject more easily and see more clearly because he also observes the knowledge involved. He might examine others better about what he himself has learned. This is explicitly a proposal, greeted by “perhaps”, and the dialogue soon moves to stronger concessions. Nevertheless, it identifies a possible educational benefit distinct from universal certification of expertise.

At 173d Socrates asks Critias to teach him one small thing more: knowledgeable about what? The request invites him to specify the content missing from the abstract praise of knowledgeable living. It dramatizes the difference between deference to claimed wisdom and demanding an answer one can inspect.

Places to read

1. 156d–157bSocrates’ reported learning and the Thracian’s teaching
2. 159eEasy and difficult learning, vigorous teaching
3. 168aNo ordinary subject of learning assigned to reflexive knowledge
4. 172b–cTentative improvement in learning and examination
5. 173d–e“Teach me” introduces the question about knowledge’s specific field
6. 175eLearning the charm reconsidered in light of the failed account

Translation in this edition

The edition renders manthanein by “understand” where Socrates cannot follow an asserted identity (170a) and “learn” where acquisition is at issue. This contextual variation should not be erased for mechanical consistency.

διδάσκω

Attested: διδάσκων / διδάσκειν (didaskōn / didaskein). To teach; the Thracian teaches Socrates the remedy and charms, while school lessons supply examples of teaching quickly and of writing names belonging to others. References: 157b, 159e, 161d. Lexical identification: lemma: διδάσκω. See Learning and teaching.

δυσμαθία

Attested: δυσμαθία (dysmathia). Difficulty or slowness in learning; Socrates identifies it with learning quietly and slowly, as the inferior alternative to easy learning. References: 159e. Lexical identification: lemma: δυσμαθία. See Learning and teaching.

εὐμαθία

Attested: εὐμαθία (eumathia). Ease or facility in learning; judged finer than difficulty in learning and identified by Socrates with learning quickly. References: 159e. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐμαθία. See Learning and teaching.

μάθημα

Attested: μαθήματος (mathēmatos). A subject or object of learning; the imagined knowledge of knowledge would know none of the ordinary subjects of learning, only knowledge itself and other knowledges. References: 168a. Lexical identification: lemma: μάθημα. See Learning and teaching.

μανθάνω

Attested: μανθάνειν / μανθάνω / μανθάνῃ / μαθήσεται / μάθῃ (manthanein / manthanō / manthanēi / mathēsetai / mathēi). To learn or understand; quick learning is praised, Socrates says he does not understand Critias’ claimed equivalence, and the later discussion considers whether knowledge of knowledge would make learning easier. References: 159e, 170a, 172b. Lexical identification: lemma: μανθάνω. See Learning and teaching.

προσδιδάσκω

Attested: προσδίδαξον (prosdidaxon). Teach me in addition; Socrates asks Critias for the further specification of what one must know, rather than accepting “living knowledgeably” as sufficient. References: 173d. Lexical identification: lemma: προσδιδάσκω. See Learning and teaching.

προσκαθοράω

Attested: προσκαθορῶντι (proskathorōnti). Seeing or surveying in addition; the tentative learning benefit is that a learner sees the knowledge as well as each particular thing learned. References: 172b. Lexical identification: lemma: προσκαθοράω. See Learning and teaching.

Use in the book

At 106d Socrates divides Alcibiades' claimed knowledge into what he learned from others and what he discovered himself. He then asks whether either could occur without willingness to learn or seek. The question is directed at this young man's entitlement to advise, rather than offered as a complete theory of every possible route to human knowledge. His known schooling in letters, lyre-playing, and wrestling does not cover the justice on which political decisions depend.

At 110d Alcibiades revises his earlier claim to discovery and says he learned as others did, from the many. His example of Greek speech is a serious answer. It shows that inability to name one teacher does not prove absence of learning. Socrates accepts that example and tests the competence of the proposed teachers in each domain. What fails is the inference from their teaching language to their teaching justice.

The need to learn returns after the diagnosis of ignorance. Alcibiades initially treats learning as unnecessary trouble because the local politicians are uneducated. Socrates counters with more demanding rivals, and at 123d preparation requires learning, care, and training together. At 132b learning is an antidote against political corruption. The word thus links acquisition of understanding to a disciplined change in readiness for action.

Its conversational uses should remain distinct. Alcibiades' “I don't understand” at 128a–b reports failure to follow Socrates' immediate question about feet and shoes, not a biographical denial of education. Socrates' inability to “learn” what Alcibiades means by friendship at 127d likewise concerns the missing content of the answer. These moments show that learning can take place in the present dialogue, while preserving the different issue of who taught a claimed expertise.

Places to read

1. 106d–107a2The acquisition dilemma and Alcibiades’ schooling
2. 110d–111c23Learning from the many is valid for Greek but must be tested by subject
3. 119b–120b23Alcibiades resists the trouble of learning; Socrates rebukes neglect
4. 127d–128b2The verb also expresses understanding a speaker’s meaning
5. 132bRequired learning protects the prospective politician

Translation in this edition

The edition normally uses “learn” but renders μανθάνω by “understand” when conversational comprehension is meant. It keeps πυνθάνεσθαι as “find out,” preventing an ordinary inquiry for information from being confused with this acquisition argument.

μάθημα

Attested: μάθημα (mathēma; 126e). At 126e: A subject of instruction, here wool-working, assigned within the interlocutors' gendered division of household skills. Lexical identification: lemma: μάθημα. See Learning.

μάθησις

Attested: μαθήσεως (mathēseōs; 120b). At 120b: Learning as required preparation; Socrates' ironic speech rebukes neglect of matters needing it. Lexical identification: lemma: μάθησις. See Learning.

μανθάνω

Attested: μανθάνειν (manthanein; 106d); μανθάνω (manthanō; 128a). At 106d: Learning from another, one branch of the proposed account of how Alcibiades could have acquired knowledge. At 128a: Understand the immediate question about feet and their belongings; not a claim about one's entire educational history. Lexical identification: lemma: μανθάνω. See Learning.

πυνθάνομαι

Attested: πυθοίμην (pythoimēn; 104d). At 104d: Find out what Socrates' persistent attendance means; an inquiry for information distinct from the technical learning–discovery dilemma. Lexical identification: lemma: πυνθάνομαι. See Learning.

Use in the book

After Aristides says that his former power left him gradually, Socrates asks how it had arrived: by learning something from him, or in another way? The question separates the occurrence of improvement from an explanation through instruction. Aristides denies ever learning anything from Socrates and appeals to Socrates’ own knowledge of this. He nevertheless says he progressed whenever they were together. The denial and positive claim are placed side by side, not reconciled through an account of unconscious lessons.

The subsequent account grades benefit by shared location, looking at Socrates while he speaks, and finally bodily proximity and touch. Because speech occurs within that sequence, the story does not portray a wholly mute relation. But it does deny, in Aristides’ own description, that his progress came from learning something from Socrates. It would be equally distorting to remove all conversation from the scene or to translate his statement into a standard lesson narrative.

The claim also remains a self-report. Aristides says “as I seemed to myself” when comparing degrees of progress. Socrates does not supply an independent measurement or spell out a hidden causal explanation. He generalises only that his association is of this sort and that Theages’ rapid progress would depend upon the god. The encounter thus challenges the expectation that a reliable educational gain must be available through a teacher’s controlled transmission, without establishing a general theory that proximity alone produces knowledge.

The earlier craft examples explain why this question matters. They make it natural to seek a practitioner who can teach what he knows. The final story preserves desired improvement while putting pressure on that familiar model. Yet it does not prove that instruction is worthless or that every successful Socratic companion has precisely Aristides’ experience.

Places to read

1. 130dμαθόντι παρ’ ἐμοῦ τι — Socrates asks whether learning something from him explains the acquired power
2. 130dἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ — another mode of acquisition is expressly possible
3. 130dἄπιστον … ἀληθές — Aristides presents his account as incredible but true
4. 130dἔμαθον … παρά σου οὐδὲν πώποτε — his denial of having learned from Socrates is emphatic
5. 130dἐπεδίδουν … ὁπότε σοι συνείην — he nevertheless associates progress with being together
6. 130dλέγοντός σου — Socrates’ speaking remains part of the described experience

Translation in this edition

“I never learned anything from you” is preserved without softening it to “I learned no formal lessons”. “By learning something … or in some other way” keeps Socrates’ question open. The edition’s Introduction calls attention to the comic and unexplained character of the account, rather than presenting its reported mechanism as a settled educational doctrine.

Ever — πώποτε

Ever. At any time; with the negation it strengthens Aristides’ denial that he learned anything from Socrates. Attested: πώποτε (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction.

Gods, in an oath — θεός (theos)

θεός (theos)

Gods, in an oath. The plural in Aristides’ oath ‘by the gods’ reinforces his assertion of truth; it does not explain the daimonic mechanism. Attested: θεούς (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction.

True — ἀληθής

True. Truthful or in accordance with what occurred; Aristides’ own assertion about his extraordinary experience. Attested: ἀληθὲς (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction.

Unbelievable — ἄπιστος

Unbelievable. Hard to believe; Aristides acknowledges his report’s implausibility while insisting it is true. Attested: ἄπιστον (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction.

Learn — μανθάνειν (manthanein) · ἔμαθον (130d).

μανθάνειν (manthanein)

Learn. To acquire something through learning; Aristides emphatically denies ever learning anything from Socrates despite his reported progress. Attested: ἔμαθον (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction.

Way; manner — τρόπος

Way; manner. A mode of acquisition; Socrates asks whether the power came through learning or in another way. Attested: τρόπῳ (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction.

No lesson but progress (contextual phrase)

130d: ἔμαθον μὲν παρά σου οὐδὲν πώποτε. Aristides says he never learned anything from Socrates, then contrasts that denial with progress during association. The claim is his self-report within Socrates' story. It does not prove the absence of conversation, and it does not give a general argument that learning has no educational value. See Learning without instruction.

Use in the book

At 211d Socrates presents Lysis as not following part of the talk, a playful pretext for questioning Menexenus. At 217d the boy says οὐ μανθάνω when the first account of a colour’s presence is unclear; Socrates answers with the concrete example of whitening hair.

Both uses concern following or understanding an account. Here a profession of not understanding invites clarification, rather than necessarily admitting blameworthy ignorance.

Places to read

1. 217dΟὐ μανθάνω — I do not understand.
2. 211d
3. 217c–d2

Use in the book

The Phaedo recalls the argument that learning is recollection and uses it to support the soul’s existence before embodiment. Cebes and Simmias reaffirm their acceptance. The excerpt reports their commitment to an earlier argument; it does not reproduce all the steps needed to establish the recollection doctrine.

Places to read

1. I.49.13.1Learning as recollection is invoked in support of the soul’s prior existence.

Translation in this edition

“Learning” preserves the activity and remains distinct from memory, since their relation is what the argument examines.

Use in the book

Traherne can include the learning of universities among the riches available to a comprehending soul while criticizing the way university study was pursued. Its disciplines awakened powers and planted seeds; the defect was their separation from the learner’s felicity. The opposition is not between learned adults and truthful children as fixed classes of people. It is between knowledge ordered toward enjoyment and knowledge handled as someone else’s concern.

Nor is the central lesson quickly finished. I.45 makes awareness of wants and treasures a study for an entire life and a practice for eternity. Learning becomes a sustained formation of attention whose fruit is an increasingly adequate response to what is given.

Places to read

1. I.45Awareness of wants and treasures is a lifelong lesson with an eternal practice.
2. I.54University learning belongs to the soul’s extensive inheritance.
3. III.37Acquired knowledge becomes fruitful when its end is rightly understood.

In this edition

Learned can be appreciative or critical. Its value depends on what the learning apprehends and the end for which it is exercised.