Τ Tau

craft, art

τέχνη

Craft: the model of knowledge against which temperance is measured, and the field each knowledge keeps for itself · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordArt, craft, skill; the trained know-how of the doctor, the builder, the weaver, the pilot, and the body of rules by which each works.
  • In the CharmidesNine times. Crafts are “doing something” against doing one’s own business (161e), the model of a knowledge with a work (165d–166a), the field only a practitioner can judge (171c), and at the end the knowledges to which health and benefit belong, so that temperance is “the craftsman of no benefit” (174e–175a).
  • In this edition“Craft”; “art” at 165e, “the art of calculation”. The Key Words: “the argument treats crafts such as medicine and house-building as epistēmai (165c–d).”
  • A place to read165c–166b and 174c–175a.
English renderings
τέχνῃ, technēi, “(by any) craft”, “(to another) craft”; τέχνης, technēs, “(of) craft”, “(to another) craft”, “(of his) craft”; τεχνῶν, technōn, “(the other) crafts”, “(many) crafts”; τέχνης, technēs, “(the) art (of calculation)”

Meaning

Τέχνη is the skill of making or doing something according to rules that can be taught: the doctor’s, the carpenter’s, the potter’s, the orator’s. A craft has a field and a product, and its practitioner can give an account of what he does. Greek used ἐπιστήμη, “knowledge”, and τέχνη of the same expertises, and the Charmides passes between them without comment (see ἐπιστήμη). Aristotle later pulled them apart, defining craft as a state concerned with making, accompanied by true reasoning, and setting it apart from science and from prudence; both distinctions are told elsewhere (Nicomachean Ethics 6.3–5; see ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

Use in the book

The crafts first serve Socrates against doing one’s own business. If writing and reading are doing something, “Yes, and healing, my friend, and building houses and weaving, and producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft, are surely doing something” (161e; see ἀπεργάζομαι; πράττω), and a city in which each man practised every craft for himself would not be well managed (161e–162a; see νόμος). Here the craft is simply activity, the plainest case of doing.

Then the crafts become the model of knowledge. If temperance is knowledge of oneself, it should produce something, as medicine, knowledge of the healthy, produces health, and house-building houses, “and the same with the other crafts” (165c–d; see καλὸν ἔργον; οἰκοδομική). Critias objects with crafts that have no product: “what work does the art of calculation have, or geometry, in the way that a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving, or the many other works of the kind that one could point to for many crafts?” (165e–166a; see γεωμετρική; λογιστική). Socrates concedes the point and moves the model from product to object: each knowledge is of something other than itself, calculation of the even and the odd (166a–b; see ἐπιστήμη τινός). From then on the craft is defined by its field.

The field is what shuts temperance out. To examine a doctor one must look at what is healthy and diseased, which only a doctor can do, and so temperance, if it is only knowledge of knowledge, could tell a doctor who knows “the things of his craft” from a pretender no better than any other knower, except its own fellow craftsman (171b–c; see ἀληθινός; ὁμότεχνος; τὰ ἔξω). Each craft judges its own, and a knowledge with no field of its own judges none.

The end returns the crafts their work. Without the knowledge of good and bad, medicine still makes us healthy, cobbling shod and weaving clothed, but nothing is done “well and beneficially” (174c–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). Critias proposes that temperance, ruling all knowledge, would rule this too; Socrates answers that it would not do “the other things belonging to the crafts” in place of each craft’s own work, since health, Critias agrees, belonged “to another craft”, and benefit too had been assigned “to another craft”, so that temperance is the craftsman of no benefit (174e–175a; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The dialogue can be read as testing whether temperance can be a craft among crafts, and finding that, defined as Critias defines it, it is a craft with neither a work nor a field.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

  1. 161eHealing, building and weaving, producing any of the works of craft by any craft, are doing something.
  2. 165dMedicine produces health, house-building houses, and the same with the other crafts.
  3. 165e–166aWhat work does the art of calculation have, or geometry, as many crafts have works?
  4. 171cTemperance could not tell a doctor who knows the things of his craft from one who does not.
  5. 174eWould temperance do the things belonging to the crafts, and not each craft its own work?
  6. 175aHealth belonged to another craft, and benefit was assigned to another craft too.

Translation in this edition

“Craft” at 161e7, 165d6, 165e8, 171c6, 174e4 and 175a1–4, as the Glossary has it, “craft, τέχνη (technē): 161e, 165d, 171c, 174e–175a”; “art” only at 165e6, “the art of calculation”, where the English idiom requires it. The family is kept together: “craftsman” for δημιουργός (see δημιουργός), “fellow craftsman” for ὁμότεχνος (see ὁμότεχνος), and “expertly” for τεχνικῶς (see τεχνικῶς).

Elsewhere in Plato

Protagoras’ myth in the dialogue named after him separates craft from the art of living together. When the gods made mortal creatures, Epimetheus, Prometheus’ brother, spent all the powers on the beasts and left man naked, barefoot, without bedding or weapons; Prometheus, at a loss how to preserve him, stole the skilled wisdom of Hephaestus and Athena, and fire with it, and gave it to man. So man had the wisdom for staying alive, but not political wisdom, which was with Zeus. With craft men made speech and names, houses, clothes, shoes, bedding and food; but living scattered they were destroyed by beasts, and when they gathered into cities they wronged one another, not having the political art, and scattered again (321c–322b). The Charmides’ dream can be read as ending in the same place: equipment, clothing and footwear expertly made, health and safety secured, and still no knowledge of what would make us happy (173b–174c; see σκεῦος; τεχνικῶς). The principle that a craft knows its own work and no other’s is told elsewhere (Ion 537c–d; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός), as is the Gorgias’ rule that a craft must be able to give an account of what it does (465a; see ἄλογος).