Philosophy

Use in the book

Socrates returns from campaign and asks how philosophy is doing and whether the young have become outstanding in wisdom, beauty or both (153d). The pairing establishes an evaluative contrast that the drama immediately tests: Charmides' visible beauty is readily attested, while his soul must be encountered through discussion. Critias calls him philosophos and poetically gifted (154e–155a). The claim is a characterization to be explored, not proof that he possesses a philosopher's settled knowledge.

Socrates' description of Cydias as most wise in erotic matters (155d) gives wisdom a pointedly local object. The poet's warning suddenly seems apt to Socrates' own predicament. Later the person from whom Charmides heard the third definition is reputedly wise (161b–162b23); that reputation makes Socrates infer, teasingly, that the words must conceal a riddle rather than a crude absurdity. Charmides then asks whether their author understands them at all.

The movement is from socially attributed wisdom to an examined account. Socrates' own willingness to admit ignorance and uncertainty suggests one possible contrast with Critias' intellectual prestige, but the dialogue supplies no final lexical definition of sophia. A reader should not equate every occurrence of “wise” with perfect moral knowledge or read “philosopher” as a professional institutional title.

Places to read

1. 153dPhilosophy and the question about wisdom and beauty
2. 154e–155aCharmides described as philosophical and poetic
3. 155dCydias’ expertise in erotic matters
4. 161b–162b23Reputed wisdom and the enigmatic third answer

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps “wisdom”, “wise” and “philosopher” distinct from “knowledge”. The affectionate or ironic settings qualify the praise but do not make sophos invariably sarcastic.

σοφία

Attested: σοφίᾳ (sophiai). Wisdom; one of the excellences Socrates asks whether the young men have acquired during his absence, paired with beauty. References: 153d. Lexical identification: lemma: σοφία. See Philosophy and wisdom.

σοφός

Attested: σοφῶν / σοφὸς (sophōn / sophos). Wise; describes the supposed source of the formula “doing one’s own business,” with Socrates’ attribution and Charmides’ reply carrying a teasing reference to Critias. References: 161c, 162b. Lexical identification: lemma: σοφός. See Philosophy and wisdom.

φιλοσοφία

Attested: φιλοσοφίας (philosophias). Philosophy, the cultivation or pursuit of wisdom, among the pursuits Socrates asks about on returning. References: 153d. Lexical identification: lemma: φιλοσοφία. See Philosophy and wisdom.

φιλόσοφος

Attested: φιλόσοφός (philosophos). Philosophically inclined; Critias praises Charmides’ disposition toward philosophy and poetry. References: 154e. Lexical identification: lemma: φιλόσοφος. See Philosophy and wisdom.

φρόνιμος

Attested: φρόνιμος (phronimos). Sensible or prudent; Critias invokes Hesiod and anyone sensible as people who would call the doer of his own business temperate. References: 163c. Lexical identification: lemma: φρόνιμος. See Philosophy and wisdom.

Use in the book

At 132b the athlete attaches philosophizing to prattle about the heavens. His rival answers that he would hardly count himself, or anyone else with that opinion, a human being if he regarded philosophizing as shameful. These opposed evaluations precede an account of the activity. Socrates reverses the order at 133b–c2: first ask what it is, then what makes it fine or shameful. The dialogue thus tests not only a definition but the authority of people who confidently praise or blame philosophy.

The educated lover first offers lifelong learning on Solon’s model, which Socrates condenses as much learning. The bodily training analogy dislodges quantity as a sufficient criterion: moderate inputs benefit, and someone must judge their kind and amount. At 135a–d2 the lover replaces quantity with cultivated breadth across crafts. His philosopher need not be a precise specialist but must follow a specialist’s speech and contribute a judgement better than the surrounding non-specialists. The pentathlete image gives this position a flattering social shape.

The test of use turns the compliment into a difficulty. A doctor is preferred in illness and a pilot in a storm. Under the lover’s account, Socrates says, the philosopher becomes useless wherever experts exist. The qualification “under your account” is crucial: this is a challenge to the accepted model, not the narrator’s final verdict that philosophers have no value. At 137b Socrates expressly suspects that philosophers are not as the argument has made them appear and says that philosophizing must be something else.

The final movement connects improvement, right punishment, discrimination of character, self-knowledge, temperance, justice and rule. It concludes that the philosopher cannot remain second in ordering his own household or responding to friends and city. This gives a positive direction to the inquiry, but the last sentence about philosophizing is negative: it is far from much learning and occupation with crafts. The text does not explicitly decide whether philosophy is the common governing craft, knowledge of that craft, or the pursuit of it. A reading that sees responsible self-knowledge as the intended answer has substantial support; it remains an interpretation of the movement rather than a quotation of a completed definition.

Places to read

1. 132bφλυαροῦσι φιλοσοφοῦντες — The athlete joins philosophizing to talking nonsense, making the word part of the dramatic dispute.
2. 133cὅτι ἔστιν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν — The inquiry now asks what philosophizing is before accepting its value.
3. 135eοἷον λέγεις τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα — The focus becomes what sort of person the proposed education produces.
4. 137aκατά γε τὸν σὸν λόγον — The adverse conclusion is expressly tied to the interlocutor’s account.
5. 137bμηδ’ ᾖ τοῦτο φιλοσοφεῖν — Socrates reopens the account instead of accepting philosophy’s alleged uselessness.
6. 139aτὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμαθία τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία — Within the governing “far from”, the closing words reject the two accounts rather than state an explicit positive definition.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps “philosophy”, “philosophize” and “philosopher” as stable equivalents. At 136a the perfect participle πεφιλοσοφηκότα becomes “the man who has philosophized”, preserving the activity that has produced the supposed generalist. The translation does not routinely replace the family with “love of wisdom”, so the lexical relationship has to be heard through the other loves of the dialogue: honour, exercise and victory.

The ending is rendered “far from being either much learning or busying oneself with the crafts”. This wording prevents an English “not both” reading that would leave one rejected account intact. At 137b the plural “they are not so” concerns the philosophers just called base and useless. Both details matter to the transition from refutation toward the final demand.

Use in the book

At 218a–b2 neither the already wise nor those made bad by ignorance are said to philosophize. Those remaining have ignorance but are not yet without judgment or unlearned through it: they still believe that they do not know what they do not know. The verb describes an active orientation toward a good not yet possessed.

The distinction is not between education and no education in a merely social sense. What matters is the relation to one’s own ignorance. Awareness of not knowing keeps desire for wisdom possible; presumed possession and disabling ignorance close off that desire in the model being tested.

This application supports the proposal that what is neither good nor bad loves the good because of badness present within it. Socrates’ apparent discovery at 218b is immediately reopened at 218c. The account is important without being exempt from the dialogue’s ensuing examination.

Places to read

1. 218aτοὺς ἤδη σοφοὺς μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν — those already wise no longer love wisdom.
2. 218a–b2

Use in the book

Socrates is pleased with Lysis’ φιλοσοφία at 213d, after the boy has followed the argument closely and involuntarily offered a judgment about its failure. The noun here praises an intellectual disposition displayed in conversation, not membership in a school or possession of a body of doctrines.

It belongs with the “friends of wisdom” at 212d and the account of who loves wisdom at 218a–b2, but those passages use different members of the same word family.

Places to read

1. 213dἐκείνου ἡσθεὶς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ — pleased with his love of wisdom.

Use in the book

The Hermetic narrative places philosophy alongside magic as nourishment for the soul, while medicine heals the body. The Phaedo instead emphasizes philosophy’s preparation for separation and purification. These passages locate philosophy within distinct accounts of human improvement and should retain their respective settings.

Places to read

1. I.49.44.80Philosophy and magic are associated with the soul’s nurture.
2. I.49.57.2Philosophy is interpreted as practice for separation from the body.

Translation in this edition

“Philosophy” is appropriate, with explanation of its local practical and religious dimensions.

Use in the book

The two-philosophies passage refuses a choice between material and inward inquiry: senses and experiments suit matter, inward sight and experience of oneself suit spirit. Its inventory of instruments includes reasoning but also imagination, feeling, patience and enthusiasm. The soul’s wings and feet suggest that truth requires more than a single intellectual procedure. The instruction to philosophize with the soul accordingly distinguishes soul, mind and reason rather than treating them as interchangeable names.

The word philosopher is also explicitly disputed through its uses. In the French sense described on I.131, he erects his own tribunal and prefers private judgments to established customs. In the “old sense” on II.889, his mind and reason make him upright without those external supports. The shared independence therefore receives different emphasis, and the first criticism should not be turned into a blanket rejection of philosophical reason.

Places to read

1. I, p. 259, entry 6, ¶1Two necessary inquiries use different but cooperating instruments.
2. II, p. 752, entry 10, ¶1Philosophizing with the soul exceeds exclusive reliance on mind or reason.
3. I, p. 131, entry 4, ¶1A specifically French sense of philosopher is contrasted with a Greek one.
4. II, p. 889, entry 4, ¶1An expressly old sense makes reason the source of uprightness.

Translation in this edition

The English translation distinguishes experiments from experience of oneself within I.259. In II.889 the printed Latin ratiosinandi is not silently corrected: [reasoning] is an English-only contextual emendation, not a recovered missing word or authenticated Latin maxim. These local distinctions establish neither a complete history of philosophy nor a single final system.

Philantosophy

French: philantosophie; philantosophe.

The rare formations philantosophie and philantosophes become philantosophy and philantosophers in the English translation. The following paragraph contrasts philosophy as love of wisdom and duties with philantosophy as love of knowledge of rights or forgetting duties. Crucially, the printed gloss is exposé, exposition, not opposé, opposite; the apparently tempting correction is not made. The coinage carries Joubert’s polemical distinction, but its history and etymology are not independently established here.

Places to read: II, p. 882, entry 3, ¶1; II, p. 882, entry 4, ¶1.

Peripatetic

French: péripatéticien.

The Peripatetics appear through several judgments rather than one blanket approval. Joubert rejects their indivisible-point account using musical resonance and swelling contact; a reported older characterization nonetheless assigns them subtlety, finesse and delicacy. The light paragraph proposes an improved formulation in their language, then adds outside the eye to satisfy genus and difference. It must not be mistaken for an exact quotation from Aristotle. The Lyon classification makes logic Peripatetic while assigning other fields to other traditions. The English translation retains the school name and all local qualifications; these witnesses do not establish an independently verified history of the school.

Places to read: I, p. 196, entry 8, ¶1; I, p. 393, entry 3, ¶1; II, p. 696, entry 5, ¶1; II, p. 699–700, entry 12, ¶1.

Stoic

French: stoïcien.

The compressed judgment “Slaves of definitions” attaches to the Stoics in a separate paragraph. A later note calls Diderot’s reduction of a thing to matter and form Stoic analysis recommended by Marcus Aurelius. The criticism belongs to Joubert and is not an externally authenticated account of either author. The English translation retains Stoic and the opaque fr-tt-m-nt and inst-st-ns without expanding those codes or importing a fuller passage.

Places to read: I, p. 393, entry 2, ¶2; II, p. 676, entry 6, ¶1.

Use in the book

Vain philosophy is genuinely vain, but that does not make all philosophy an obstacle to Christianity. IV.4 finds the highest philosophy in scriptural teachings about creation, divine likeness, spiritual dignity, and the laws of virtue. Without understanding these goods, devotion remains immature.

Natural philosophy has an equally valuable subordinate role in revealing the causes, relations, and uses of corporeal things. Extended beyond its customary boundary, it can investigate all natures. Yet philosophical identity depends on practice: the philosopher orders desire, governs passion, and lives toward the end discovered. Mere fluency about happiness fails the standard. The integration of Christian faith, inquiry, and formed conduct is the central claim.

Places to read

1. III.44Natural philosophy reveals bodily creation and can be extended into inquiry about all natures.
2. IV.3Philosopher, Christian, and divine are presented as mutually implicating vocations.
3. IV.4Vain philosophy is distinguished from the divine philosophy of scriptural truth.
4. IV.8The philosopher must practise virtue and live by reason.

In this edition

Traherne’s divine philosophy is a programme of integrated understanding and life. It is not simply the modern academic discipline supplemented with religious examples.

Use in the book

The educational critique of February 1833 values a broad philosophy that lets literature, religion, art, landscape, and civilization illuminate one another. Philosophy here gives study an intelligible whole and an affective attraction; it is the remedy for mechanical attachment to the dead letter.

Guérin's later relation to philosophical system is more ambivalent. His deliberately expansive definition of imagination departs from received psychologies, whose arrangements he breaks in order to rebuild a soul and world freely. He can nevertheless desire logical discipline and acknowledge progress in practical philosophy. Freedom from a classificatory system does not amount to freedom from the need to live coherently.

By 1835 ancient philosophy offers elevated refuges of serenity. The sage imagined as a rooted tree transforms philosophical self-possession into a bodily, vegetative condition: selected nourishment, silence, depth, and resistance to daily fortune. Yet a later appeal to the Portico asks whether any philosophy can cure suffering in existence itself, beyond particular misfortunes. The hoped-for refuge is tested and found insufficient, or at least unproven.

The notebook consequently contains several philosophies of living rather than an articulated doctrine. The word may introduce a noble aspiration, an ironic name for self-confinement, or a small competence acquired through hardship. Its value is measured not only by explanation but by the kind of strength, calm, or freedom it enables.

Places to read

1. 6 February 1833 · ¶1Broad philosophy restores relations among the separated parts of literary education.
2. 10 December 1834 · ¶2The definition of imagination deliberately breaks with existing arrangements of the faculties.
3. 26 January 1835 · ¶1Practical philosophy has advanced while the government of thought remains elusive.
4. 14 May 1835 · ¶1Ancient wisdom becomes an elevated refuge and a model of rooted, tree-like calm.
5. 5 June 1835 · ¶1The appeal to the Portico tests philosophy against the pain of existence rather than isolated accidents.

Translation in this edition

The supplied English retains “philosophy” across these contexts. Readers should distinguish “un peu de philosophie,” a capacity to bear ordinary troubles, from the organized “systèmes philosophiques” of the educational essay.

Use in the book

Page 7 interprets Philosophers as wisdom-lovers who should pursue the Stone as a mirror of God, Nature, and themselves. Their desired good already exceeds a metallic effect. Page 86 makes the identity more exact: recognize the world-spirit's catholic dwelling and seek it in that place, rather than imagining an arbitrary way to catch it from the air, and one is a Philosopher. The name here depends upon discriminating the proper subject and being prepared to work upon it.

The later defence makes the distinction from the successful operator explicit. A person with an acquired tincture can display transmutation without possessing the knowledge to prepare it. Conversely, someone with grounded recognition may not yet have achieved the finished Stone. Page 154 returns to the definition of wisdom-lover and orders the Philosopher's work toward true wisdom through the art of fire; transmutation belongs among the other benefits that may follow. Pages 155–15723 then make a claimant answer through the coherence and natural grounding of his speech.

Khunrath's personal use culminates at page 162. Even if perfect preparation never came, he would retain recognition and remain a true Philosopher. This is not a dismissal of labour: the next page couples his admitted incompleteness with prayer and continued working. It is a defence of the identity's principal object and epistemic ground. The closing door-image similarly insists that entry must be through the right matter. Wisdom-loving is therefore neither vague benevolence nor mere intellectual refinement; it requires a right beginning, an account of causes, and a proper ordering of ends.

Places to read

1. 1599 p. 7Khunrath explicitly glosses Philosophers as lovers of Wisdom and relates their inquiry to recognition of God, Nature, and self.
2. 1599 p. 86Recognition and pursuit of the world-spirit in its proper catholic dwelling define the Philosopher in the local dispute.
3. 1599 p. 154Wisdom-loving is distinguished from loving silver or gold, and the labour’s chief end is stated.
4. 1599 p. 157A true Philosopher should accept examination of his Nature-conforming account.
5. 1599 p. 162Khunrath claims that he would remain a true Philosopher without perfect preparation.
6. 1599 p. 183The Philosopher must enter the Art by its right pri-material door.

Translation in this edition

Capitalized Philosopher preserves the translation's distinction of the claimed identity without authenticating everyone Khunrath includes or excludes. His definition is given within a polemical argument; this lexicon records its criteria rather than deciding historically who actually possessed the Stone.

Use in the book

The Proem presents philosophical inquiry as directed toward knowledge and worship of God. Ficino praises Plato for bringing moral, dialectical, mathematical, and natural questions back to divine contemplation, and explains why his teaching could accordingly be called theology. The relation is not merely a decorative religious preface to an otherwise unrelated argument. Purification prepares the soul to perceive divine light, investigation seeks the cause of causes, and self-knowledge becomes a route toward knowledge of God. Ficino also states a conciliatory purpose: Platonic arguments may support religion for people not readily moved by scriptural authority alone. His project relies on Augustine's authority as he reports it and seeks a likeness of Plato close to Christian truth. The Proem subjects the work's claims to divine law; Book I's prefatory reservation also invokes Church approval. These qualifications distinguish Ficino's conciliatory project from a simple identification of every Platonic doctrine with Christian teaching.

Further passage references. Proem.1–Proem.11234567891011; authorial reservation

Places to read

1. Proem.1The analogy of sight and sunlight directs the human mind toward its divine source.
2. Proem.4Self-knowledge is presented as a route toward divine knowledge.
3. Proem.8–92Platonic arguments are assigned a conciliatory religious function.
4. Proem.11The dedication connects philosophical leisure with Lorenzo’s support and public authority.

Translation in this edition

The English “theology” preserves the author’s theological designation of Plato’s teaching without certifying all attributed Platonic claims as Christian doctrine. The authorial reservations belong to the work’s framing and must remain distinct from the continuous philosophical proofs.

attingere / tetigit

attingere / tetigit. Printed forms: tetigit.

To touch on an idea rather than physically contact an object. Zoroaster is said mystically to have touched on common origin in the one-fire saying. References: II.7.7. See Philosophy and theology.

auctor / auctoritas role

auctor / auctoritas role. Printed forms: auctorem; auctorum.

An authority for a doctrine or a source that originates something, depending on context. The names of divine authorities introduce reported Orphic nomenclature in IV.1.94. By contrast the angel understands and loves its author or originating source in IV.2.21. Identical family membership does not fix one causal sense. References: IV.1.94, IV.2.21. See Philosophy and theology.

contemplor / contemplatio

contemplor / contemplatio. Printed forms: contemplabimur; contemplationem; contemplemur; contemplentur.

To contemplate, or the activity of contemplating. Contemplation returns inquiry to God and later moves beyond sensory shadows; it is paired with worship rather than substituted for it. References: Proem.3, Proem.7, Proem.9, I.1.2. See Philosophy and theology.

dialecticum / mathematicum / physicum

dialecticum / mathematicum / physicum. Printed forms: dialecticum; mathematicum; physicum.

Dialectical, mathematical and natural subjects of inquiry. Ficino’s programme makes each route return to contemplation and worship; the list does not identify their methods or subject matters as one discipline. References: Proem.3. See Philosophy and theology.

doctrina / tracto

doctrina / tracto. Printed forms: doctrina; tractavimus; tractet.

Teaching, and to treat a subject in exposition. Plato’s teaching is called theology because of its religious orientation; Ficino later hopes his own treatment matches the truth he reveres. References: Proem.3, Proem.10. See Philosophy and theology.

error / impius / profanus

error / impius / profanus. Printed forms: condemnatur; error; impie; impius; profana.

Error, impious, or profane, as Ficino’s polemical evaluations. The reader should attribute these judgments to Ficino rather than adopting them as neutral descriptions of opponents. References: II.7.15, II.9.21, II.10.8. See Philosophy and theology.

hymnus / theologia / sacerdos

hymnus / theologia / sacerdos. Printed forms: Aegyptii; apostoli; cecinit; hymno; mystice; sacerdotes; Saturni; theologia; theologorum.

Hymn, theology, priest, and source-identifying terms. These labels locate quoted or reported authorities and should not be mistaken for independent verification of their historical provenance. References: II.3.10, II.6.11, II.6.14, II.7.7, II.9.22. See Philosophy and theology.

inscribo / opus

inscribo / opus. Printed forms: inscribendum; opus.

To give a work its title; a work or undertaking. The title names Platonic theology and immortality, while the later repeated “this” gathers the enterprise into an authorial account of effort and divine aid. References: Proem.7, Proem.10. See Philosophy and theology.

institutio vitae

institutio vitae. Printed forms: institutio vitae.

The ordering or formation of life. Ficino joins it with apprehension of things and happiness as depending on knowledge of God and the divinity of souls. References: Proem.6. See Philosophy and theology.

leges / respublica / regnum / Critias (titles)

leges / respublica / regnum / Critias (titles). Printed forms: Critia; Legibus; Legum; regno; republica.

Dialogue titles cited through Latin words for laws, republic, rule, and Critias. Ficino cites these works in arguing that providence preserves free judgment; the titles must be read as citations rather than ordinary political nouns here. References: II.13.24, III.1.26. See Philosophy and theology.

lego / diligentia

lego / diligentia. Printed forms: diligenter; diligentissime; legerit.

To read, with the greatest care or attentively. The promised benefits of reading Plato are conditional on careful reading, while inquiry traces God diligently; the adverbs describe attentive engagement, not a new faculty. References: Proem.4, Proem.5. See Philosophy and theology.

molior / perficio

molior / perficio. Printed forms: moliti; perfecerimus.

To undertake with effort, and to bring to completion. Ficino distinguishes his laborious undertaking from the hope that it has been completed truthfully; effort alone is not offered as a guarantee of truth. References: Proem.10. See Philosophy and theology.

mores / morale

mores / morale. Printed forms: morale; mores.

Conduct and inquiry concerned with conduct. Ethical philosophy prepares soul for illumination; the later list places moral study alongside dialectical, mathematical and natural inquiry, all directed toward worship in Ficino’s account. References: Proem.2, Proem.3. See Philosophy and theology.

ostendere / monstrare / probare

ostendere / monstrare / probare. Printed forms: monstravimus; ostendemus; ostendimus; probabimus; probare.

To show, demonstrate, or prove, with completed and promised arguments distinguished. Retrospective proofs introduce new claims; what Ficino says he will show later is not already established in the present unit. References: II.1.1, II.5.1, II.6.1, II.7.1. See Philosophy and theology.

pater philosophorum

pater philosophorum. Printed forms: pater.

Father or originating authority in an intellectual lineage. Calling Plato the father of philosophers establishes Ficino’s reverential point of departure; it is an honorific genealogy, not a literal parenthood claim. References: Proem.1. See Philosophy and theology.

Phaedo / Philebus / Politicus / Phaedrus

Phaedo / Philebus / Politicus / Phaedrus. Printed forms: Phaedone; Phaedro; Philebo; Politico.

Names of Platonic dialogues in Ficino’s source claims. They support reported claims about purposive explanation, limit and infinite, and soul as the fountain of motion; their mere naming is not a fresh source collation. References: II.11.26, III.1.11, III.1.26. See Philosophy and theology.

Plato / Platonici

Plato / Platonici. Printed forms: Plato; Platonici; Platonicorumque; Platonis.

Plato / the Platonists, as attributed authorities. Claims about ideas, providence, and graded being are explicitly assigned to these authorities; Ficino’s representation is distinct from independent source verification. References: II.11.22, II.13.24, III.2.2. See Philosophy and theology.

Plato / Platonici / philosophi / physici

Plato / Platonici / philosophi / physici. Printed forms: metaphysici; physicis; Platonici; Platonis.

Named or grouped philosophical authorities, not a single unanimous voice. Ficino sometimes adopts, sometimes reports, and sometimes rejects positions attributed to these groups; attribution must be preserved. References: II.1.7, II.2.4, II.4.8, II.6.6. See Philosophy and theology.

Platonica / Latina facere

Platonica / Latina facere. Printed forms: Latina feci; Platonica.

Platonic works, and making them Latin by translation. Ficino claims to have translated all the Platonic works long before; this is his authorial statement, not an independent bibliographical audit. References: Proem.5. See Philosophy and theology.

seiungo / disiungo

seiungo / disiungo. Printed forms: disiunxerit; seiungunt.

To separate or sever things conceptually or practically. Ficino condemns separating philosophy from religion by comparing it with separating love of wisdom from its honour and true understanding from right will. References: Proem.8. See Philosophy and theology.

studium / incumbo

studium / incumbo. Printed forms: incubui; studium.

Study or sustained pursuit, and to apply oneself closely. Ficino devotes himself to worship and the soul’s divinity, while censuring a pursuit of philosophy severed from religion. References: Proem.7, Proem.8. See Philosophy and theology.

Augustine; Aurelius Augustine (authorities and cited works)

Augustine; Aurelius Augustine. The Proem invokes his authority for the proximity of Plato to Christian truth. Later he is cited concerning the doctrinal permissibility of celestial animation. Aureliana auctoritas in Proem.7 refers back to this Augustine. Proem.6–72; IV.1.88. See Philosophy and theology; Spheres and stars.

Lorenzo de’ Medici (authorities and cited works)

Lorenzo de’ Medici. The dedicatee, addressed as magnanimous and praised for joining philosophy with authority in public affairs. Ficino credits his beneficence with providing philosophical leisure. Proem heading; Proem.11. See Philosophy and theology.

Plato and the Platonists (authorities and cited works)

Plato and the Platonists. The principal philosophical authorities and interlocutors. Ficino presents their account in relation to Christian truth but also marks specific attributed doctrines, numerical excursions, and reservations. Proem.1–11234567891011; I.6.1; III.1–2; IV.1.40–522345678910111213, IV.1.96. See Philosophy and theology; Ascent; Soul; God.