Soul

Use in the book

The soul first interrupts a competition in bodily praise. Socrates says that Charmides would be irresistible if one small thing were added: a good natural constitution of soul. Critias assures him that the youth is beautiful and good in that respect too. Socrates proposes undressing this very aspect before the body's form, a metaphor whose practical realization is conversation. Soul is therefore not introduced as an invisible substance requiring an independent metaphysical demonstration; it names what must be examined if a beautiful person's excellence is not to be assessed only by sight.

In the healing story, soul becomes the indispensable condition of whole-person treatment. The Thracian says that everything good and bad for the body and for the entire human being starts from it and flows onward. Eyes, head, and body provide an analogy for this priority. The account gives the soul causal and therapeutic prominence, but its sweeping claim remains part of reported instruction. The dialogue does not present clinical evidence, and the stated dependence should not be turned into a modern claim that every bodily illness is caused by the patient's moral defects.

Treatment of the soul is verbal: beautiful words generate temperance in it. The youth is asked to submit it to charming before receiving the remedy for his head. This requirement differs from simply assenting to a teacher's authority, because the next step is a joint inquiry into whether the virtue is present and what it is. The relation between a soul's being well constituted, its possessing temperance, and its ability to explain temperance is placed under examination rather than settled by the initial compliments.

The first refutation then distinguishes activities of soul from activities of body. Quick learning, teaching, recollection, understanding, inquiry, and deliberation are taken as cases in which speed or sharpness can be fine. Quick-wittedness is called a sharpness of the soul. This is a functional contrast within ordinary capacities. It does not establish separate spatial parts, a hierarchy of rational and appetitive substances, or a doctrine of recollection from a previous existence.

At the end Socrates speaks conditionally of Charmides as beautiful in appearance and supremely temperate in soul, protesting the apparent lack of benefit from such an endowment. Charmides' reply withdraws any certainty that he has the virtue. The continuation of charming consequently preserves care of the soul as an open practical task despite definitional failure.

The relation between soul and body is neither an invitation to ignore the body nor an identification of the two. The body is the occasion for treatment and remains an acknowledged good of medical expertise. The philosophical problem is how bodily and technical success relate to a person's good as a whole. This is why health can remain a genuine product of medicine at 174c even when knowledge of good and bad is absent.

Places to read

1. 154d–155aThe soul’s natural quality and its metaphorical stripping are distinguished from visible bodily beauty
2. 156e–157c2The Thracian doctrine places soul before body in treatment and makes beautiful words its remedy
3. 159e–160bLearning, understanding, and deliberation supply activities and excellences of soul
4. 175d–176b2The claimed temperance of Charmides’ soul is revisited and continued charming requested

Translation in this edition

The edition generally renders psychē as “soul.” At 157c–d Critias instead uses dianoia, rendered “mind,” when he welcomes the prospect that the headache will improve the youth mentally. That local change of word should not be hidden by treating every mental term as an interchangeable synonym.

διάνοια

Attested: διάνοιαν (dianoian). Mind or mental disposition; Critias welcomes the headache because it may force Charmides to improve this as well as his physical condition. References: 157c. Lexical identification: lemma: διάνοια. See Soul.

ψυχή

Attested: ψυχήν / ψυχὴν / ψυχῆς (psychēn / psychēn / psychēs). Soul, the bearer of character and mental activity; it is examined, praised and treated through words. References: 154e, 157a, 160b, 175d, 156e. Lexical identification: lemma: ψυχή. See Soul.

βελτίων (beltiōn)

Better; Critias imagines that treatment of the head will improve the boy's mind as well. References: 157d. Lemma: βελτίων. See Soul.

ἐπιρρεῖν (epirrein)

Flow upon or into; the metaphor presents good and bad conditions as flowing from soul to body. References: 156e. Lemma: ἐπιρρέω. See Soul.

προσὸν (proson)

Present in addition; Socrates asks whether Charmides’ beauty is accompanied by a further quality of soul. References: 154d. Lemma: πρόσειμι (be present). See Soul.

ὡρμῆσθαι (hōrmēsthai)

Have originated or set out; the healer says bodily goods and harms start from the soul. References: 156e. Lemma: ὁρμάω. See Soul.

Use in the book

Socrates initially describes Alcibiades' supposed advantages as extending from body to soul. The young man's “nature of soul” subsequently appears among the assets on which he wrongly relies in competition with the kings. Soul can therefore designate the character or capacities he already possesses, before philosophical care has transformed them. At 117b the soul's wandering names instability of judgment; at 120b its uncultivated condition is pictured as still bearing a slave's hair. Neither passage is a developed psychology, but both make the state of soul relevant to practical competence.

The argument at 129b–130c234 begins from agency. A speaker uses speech; a craftsman uses tools, hands, and eyes; a human being uses the whole body. The user and the used are conceded to be different. Soul is then accepted as what uses the body and does so by ruling it. Since the human being has been identified as the bodily ruler, body is excluded, and the composite is excluded on the further assumption that a whole cannot count as ruling if one of its components does not share the rule. Soul remains.

This identification is not presented without reservation. At 130c–d Socrates calls the result adequate rather than precise and postpones the question of the self itself. His practical justification is that nothing of ourselves has greater authority than soul. The passage thus authorizes a working identification for the inquiry into care, while preserving a gap between that result and a complete account of selfhood. It does not prove that soul can exist separately after death, nor does it offer a classification of its parts like those familiar from other dialogues.

Conversation immediately provides the human application. Socrates is not addressing Alcibiades' face; he is addressing Alcibiades, identified as his soul. The Delphic command consequently directs one to come to know soul. Bodily expertise does not by itself amount to this knowledge, and material prosperity lies still farther from it. The comparison of lovers then tests what they value: someone attached to the body loves something belonging to Alcibiades; the lover of soul loves Alcibiades himself and stays while that soul develops toward the better.

At 132b–c the practical object of care is now expressly soul. But knowing that label is not yet knowing how to know it. The eye analogy directs soul toward soul, especially the region in which its excellence, wisdom, comes to be. At 133c knowing and intelligence characterize this most divine region. One should not convert the local term “region” into a fully articulated theory of separate psychic faculties. What matters for the argument is a functional center: soul becomes intelligible through its best activity, rather than through bodily appearance or external possessions.

The end gives that inward focus public consequences. To know soul and oneself is to be temperate; without such knowledge a person cannot identify his own good or competently manage other people's affairs. Justice and temperance, rather than unrestricted power, must guide action. Soul is therefore not an excuse to ignore embodied and civic life. Its primacy supplies the proposed basis for ordering them, and its continuing susceptibility to corruption explains why Socrates' final confidence remains qualified.

Places to read

1. 104aSoul appears in the initial catalogue of supposed advantages
2. 117bWandering is predicated of soul
3. 129e–130d2Soul is identified as user and ruler; the proof is expressly qualified
4. 130d–132c234Conversation, love, and care are redirected to soul
5. 133b–133cWisdom and intelligence identify the soul’s best and most divine region

Translation in this edition

“Soul” consistently renders ψυχή. At 133c1 the printed comparative is θειότερον, “more divine”; B instead reads νοερώτερον, “more intellectual,” and Cobet proposes κυριώτερον, “having more authority.” These are alternative readings, not three cumulative descriptions asserted at that line.

κυριώτερος

Attested: κυριώτερόν (kyriōteron; 130d); κυριώτερον (kyriōteron; 133c1; apparatus). At 130d: Having greater authority: Socrates says nothing of ourselves has more authority than soul, supporting the practical adequacy of the identification. At 133c1: Having more authority: Cobet’s conjecture in place of the printed more divine, echoing the authoritative soul at 130d but not adopted by Burnet. Lexical identification: comparative of κύριος. See Soul.

ψυχή

Attested: ψυχή (psychē; 130a); τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν (tēi psychēi pros tēn psychēn; 130d). At 130a: What uses the body and rules it; accepted as the candidate remaining after body and composite are excluded. At 130d: Soul to soul: the persons conversing are distinguished from the words they use and the faces they possess. Lexical identification: lemma: ψυχή. See Soul.

Use in the book

At 141c the choice is stark: dominion over the land of Greeks and barbarians is unacceptable in exchange for Alcibiades’ psychē. His explanation is that he would not be able to use the acquisition at all. This answer favours the sense life in context. The passage does not independently establish an immortal soul or a preference for an afterlife over political power.

The following question extends the test beyond bare survival: harmful use would also make the gift unacceptable. At 146e soul and city are both said to require knowledge of the best, as a patient requires a doctor and a sailor a pilot. The soul is thus a bearer of direction and a subject of right living; a mere inventory of information or advantages is insufficient.

At 149e the gods’ proper focus is the soul rather than gifts and sacrifices. They attend to whether the person is holy and just. At 150e the educator must remove the present mist from Alcibiades’ soul before applying what will enable him to know good and bad. The religious and educational uses converge on the condition of the agent, but the dialogue leaves the nature and acquisition of the highest knowledge largely undeveloped.

Places to read

1. 141c–141dSoul or life limits the worth of universal dominion and harmful possession.
2. 146e–147a2A soul and a city need the directing knowledge required for right living.
3. 149eThe soul, not sacrificial wealth, is the gods’ proper object of attention.
4. 150eMist must be removed from the soul before further instruction.

Translation in this edition

Note 9 expressly marks the life-sense at 141c while retaining soul for consistency. At 147a Burnet’s fortune, tychē, is Stallbaum’s conjecture where the principal manuscripts have psychē. That rejected reading should not be imported into an interpretation of the printed wind-of-fortune image.

Use in the book

The soul appears after the interlocutors agree that moderation benefits the body. Socrates asks whether moderate or immoderate amounts of what is supplied benefit the soul. Once moderation is conceded, subjects of learning are counted among those supplies. An educational account based solely on accumulating as much as possible is thereby brought under the same test as diet and exercise.

The subsequent planting and sowing metaphor introduces cultivation rather than passive storage. Learning has to be selected and apportioned so that it develops well in its recipient. The question asks both how many subjects and what kind are appropriate, and who is competent to judge. It is therefore more than a recommendation that everyone learn a middling amount. A measure has to answer to the nature and good of what is cultivated.

All three adults fail to identify the required adviser. The difficulty can be read as the central educational problem the opening has uncovered: they can name authorities for familiar bodily and agricultural practices, but cannot yet identify the knowledge by which education becomes beneficial. The remainder of the dialogue moves through general learning and crafts toward self-knowledge and right judgment. That development suggests a possible answer, but the speaker never explicitly returns to name a “farmer of souls” or to give a complete curriculum.

Nothing in this passage establishes that body and soul are enemies or that bodily pursuits are intrinsically inferior. The athlete’s bodily experience has made the educational problem visible. The analogy depends on both as possible recipients of beneficial and inappropriate treatment.

Places to read

1. 134dτὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν — The argument moves from bodily matters to the soul.
2. 134dτῶν προσφερομένων ψυχῇ — Learning is considered among what is supplied to the soul.
3. 134eπερὶ μαθημάτων εἰς ψυχὴν φυτεύσεώς τε καὶ σπορᾶς — The educational question becomes one of planting and sowing in a soul.

Translation in this edition

The translation keeps “soul” through the supply and planting images and consistently calls mathēmata “subjects of learning.” The edition’s introduction links the eventual positive direction to knowledge of oneself and ordering of household and city, while emphasizing that the dialogue reaches identifications rather than an explicit final definition of philosophy. That caution applies especially here: the soul’s good motivates the inquiry without receiving a separate systematic account.

Use in the book

At 218b the proposed account of friendship is extended to soul as well as body. At 222a the possible affinity is in the soul, in some character of the soul, in ways, or in figure. The edition treats the last item as visible figure; the list need not consist solely of psychic attributes.

The noun does not come with a developed psychology in this dialogue. Its local function is to ensure that the inquiry is not confined to bodily need and to indicate possible dimensions of affinity between people. The list at 222a should not be inflated into a formal set of faculties.

Places to read

1. 222aἢ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν — Either in respect of the soul.
2. 218b–c
3. 220c

Use in the book

The opening reports juxtapose continual or self-originating motion, number, harmony, actuality, breath, and other descriptions. Aristotle’s first actuality and the Stoic warm breath belong to different accounts. Reading the collection requires following the attribution as carefully as the recurring term.

Places to read

1. I.49.1a.1Several reports connect soul with continual motion or self-motion.
2. I.49.1a.3Aristotle’s definition describes first actuality.
3. I.49.1b.1The Stoics define soul as intelligent, warm breath.
4. I.49.11.5Plato’s Phaedrus offers a likeness of soul, the winged team and charioteer.
5. I.49.30.4Reason and appetite are distinguished through their activities.
6. I.49.31.1Spirit is considered as a third element and an ally of reason.
7. I.49.41.5Helmsman and rider illustrate different relations to body.
8. I.49.16.4Indestructibility is an additional condition in the argument.
9. I.49.60.5Porphyry interprets Circe as the circuit of rebirth.
10. I.49.39.3The universal soul is paired with the whole cosmos.

Translation in this edition

“Soul” preserves psychē in these comparisons. “Intellect” or “mind” usually renders nous, and “breath” pneuma; keeping the terms distinct lets the ancient identifications remain visible.

Images and comparisons

The Phaedrus extract explicitly distinguishes what soul is from what it resembles. Its winged team and charioteer are a likeness offered in place of a longer divine account.

The Platonists

The discussion at I.49.65.3 separately asks about judgment, punishment, and purification. These are attributed positions in the anthology, not an undifferentiated doctrine of the soul’s fate.

Powers and embodiment

The Republic excerpts distinguish reason, appetite, and spirit by their activities and conflicts. That division concerns powers within soul; it is different from the question whether plants count as ensouled animals or whether soul itself is a bodily substance. The anthology also preserves arguments about soul’s relation to an instrument or vehicle. The helmsman can be considered apart from a ship, while a rider’s journey emphasizes shared movement. Each comparison selects a relation rather than defining everything that soul is.

Death and continued existence

The Phaedo’s argument explicitly distinguishes refusing death from being indestructible. Its conclusion depends on the additional condition that the immortal cannot be destroyed. The accounts of rebirth and Hades use further arguments, mythical speeches, and interpretations of poetry. A definition of soul as a principle of life cannot on its own establish every later claim about survival, judgment, or renewed embodiment.

The universal soul

The phrase holē psuchē means the whole or universal soul. I.49.39.3 uses an abbreviated construction, “the whole,” with soul understood, and pairs it with the whole cosmos as its recipient. The passage distinguishes this relation from those of other souls to heavenly spheres and elements. The elliptical grammar should not obscure those different assignments.

Use in the book

The compressed formula calling virtue the soul’s health applies a bodily measure to moral condition. In a discussion of style, Joubert accepts Dussault’s description of a habit of mind, then wishes for a habit of soul: the change of noun gives expression a more comprehensive inward origin. The fragment describing a soul in harmony joins friendship, sorrow, business, study and leisure in one field. Soul therefore reaches beyond exceptional spiritual experiences into the ordinary divisions of a life.

Its relation to the senses is equally precise. Senses are described as places where the soul experiences pleasures and pains. Age or illness destroys those places; recollection and prayer make the soul absent from them. Joubert does not say that contemplative practice destroys the senses. The program separating history, politics, morals, literature and religion nevertheless assigns politics needs of both soul and body. These different relations should remain visible rather than being reduced to a single definition of an immaterial substance.

Places to read

1. I, p. 44, entry begun p. 43, no. 1, ¶10Virtue figured as the soul’s health.
2. II, p. 517, entry 10, ¶3Style as a habit of mind is extended to a habit of soul.
3. II, p. 557, entry 8, ¶1Harmony embraces sorrow and ordinary activities as well as love.
4. II, p. 700–701, entry 11, ¶1Destruction of sensory places is distinguished from inward absence.
5. II, p. 808, entry 1, ¶2Political needs include soul and body; moral work is self-perfection.

Translation in this edition

The English translation keeps soul distinct from mind in the style passage and preserves the spatial places/points language in the passage on the senses. The harmony fragment has no finite governing verb; the translation leaves it a fragment.

Use in the book

The soul’s greatness cannot be measured by the bodily room it occupies. It can understand a hemisphere, attend to ages before its birth, and love persons at a distance. Traherne accordingly describes its capacity as infinite, but the descriptions concern several related claims: unbounded scope, inexhaustible depth, and the ability to receive God’s gifts. They should not be flattened into the single notion of an infinitely large body.

The language of presence is especially strong. An act of understanding is the presence of the soul with its object. Objects are not simply stored as dead pieces of information; their apprehension gives the soul form, beauty, and employment. As light becomes manifest upon what it illuminates, the powers of the soul become known in their exercise. An empty extension through space is insufficient: the world’s actual beings and the love directed toward them complete the soul’s living stature.

Other souls introduce an extraordinary multiplication. One soul can consider another whose powers are also vast, and can follow its relations to still others. This makes communion more than the sharing of a limited stock. Persons enrich one another through distinct acts of knowing and loving, and every additional person provides further objects and witnesses of joy. The claim is difficult and deliberately presented as a wonder; its force lies in the power of spiritual participation that ordinary measures fail to exhaust.

Traherne also safeguards agency. The soul is not merely a mirror in which divine action happens without a creaturely answer. Its ability to love irregularly proves that its acts are genuinely its own; rightly directed love is therefore a real return to God. The soul can be a fountain, freely communicating what its created power makes possible. Reception and activity must be held together.

This exalted account remains an account of a creature. The soul is made, depends upon God, and requires enlightenment and redemption. Calling it a temple of omnipresence does not mean that it becomes a second independent deity. Its perfected end is indwelling communion: God known and loved within it, and itself present with the treasures and persons God loves. The resulting grandeur demands conduct proportionate to it. A great capacity left unused is not yet the full life for which that capacity was given.

Places to read

1. II.70The soul’s understanding and love exceed bodily measures, while other persons complete its communion.
2. II.76An act of understanding is defined as the soul’s presence.
3. II.78Objects disclose, employ, and give form to the soul’s powers.
4. IV.85The soul’s distinct acts of love make it more than a passive mirror.
5. IV.100Infinite understanding and affection culminate in mutual indwelling and communion.

In this edition

Capital Soul is often emphatic, not a new technical entity. Distinguish actual exercise from capacity, and metaphorical dimensions from bodily extension; Traherne’s own claims are stronger than a casual figure of speech but do not make the soul material.

Use in the book

The soul is both the notebook’s observing instrument and its principal observed object. In March 1833 it is a divine mirror: outward eyes alone perceive forms, while inward attention discloses nature’s intimate language and participation in God. This inwardness is therefore meant to establish contact with the world, rather than cancel it. Its failure appears in August 1834 as a retreat of the faculties from their usual traffic between nature and the self. Isolation is then a loss of relation, not merely the absence of company.

The soul also resists the person who calls it his own. It may gather contradictory impulses, evade the will, or carry a reserve of life untouched by daily labor. Guérin’s account of imagination openly breaks with received psychological classifications, grouping together his most beautiful inward powers. The resulting vocabulary is mobile because the experience it records is mobile. Near the end, however, he insists on a distinction with ethical force: intellectual mediocrity need not entail mediocrity of soul. Moral greatness may remain possible even when the mind cannot achieve its ambitions. Reading every self-accusation as an objective measure of his gifts would obscure this increasingly explicit distinction. After Marie’s death, her absence is figured as absorption in an ocean of spiritual substance. The surviving friend’s thought can form her inward presence only through the same faculty that once shaped their shared dreams. The image concerns the conditions of mourning and access to an absent person; it does not by itself establish a settled theory of the soul’s substance.

Places to read

1. 15 March 1833 · ¶1The inward eye and divine mirror make the soul a medium of knowledge and adoration, not a sealed private chamber.
2. 26 August 1834 · ¶1Contraction imprisons the soul’s outward messengers and interrupts participation in universal life.
3. 10 December 1834 · ¶2The deliberately enlarged definition of imagination rejects a ready-made taxonomy of the soul.
4. 4 June 1835 · ¶1The distinction between the soul’s moral beauty and the mind’s achievements prevents intellectual failure from settling human worth.
5. 2 February 1835 · ¶4Marie’s absorption in spiritual substance belongs to a grieving account of how thought can now approach her.

Translation in this edition

The English keeps âme as “soul” in these passages, but renders esprit as “mind” in the contrast between moral and intellectual mediocrity. Elsewhere esprit becomes “spirit,” as in the troubled “spirit of man” at 19 September 1834 · ¶1; English variation should not be mistaken for a new French technical category.

Use in the book

A96 identifies soul and mind in a report grouping Empedocles with two other thinkers. Its consequence about animal rationality belongs to the doxographer's reasoning. Other passages complicate rather than automatically explain that equation. Aëtius at A85 says death is common to body and soul insofar as the compound's constituents separate. At A32 he calls souls divine and those sharing in them purely divine as well. Caelius Aurelianus records followers distinguishing soul-purgation from bodily caused mental disturbance.

Aristotle's questions about soul as the ratio of mixture at A782 must be kept conditional. Different tissues have different ratios; if each ratio were soul, an animal would have many souls. The questions do not supply a settled Empedoclean definition accepted across all witnesses. A4 likewise attacks unnamed thinkers who identify soul with blood; the identification of Empedocles as target is editorial, even if strongly urged by the edition.

The dossier thus preserves several ways of locating soul within bodily composition, cognition, divinity, and purification. It does not itself reconcile bodily death with transmigration, nor prove that one set of testimonies makes the other impossible. Those are interpretive problems requiring the differences in source and argumentative level to remain visible.

Places to read

1. A 96 (testimony)Aëtius. Identifies mind and soul and draws a qualified consequence about animals.
2. A 85 (testimony)Aëtius, second notice. States that death is common to body and soul in the described respect.
3. A 78 (polemical)2Aristotle, On the Soul. Tests rather than straightforwardly endorses soul as a mixture’s ratio.
4. A 32 (testimony)Aëtius I 7,28. Calls souls divine and associates purity with divine status.
5. A 98 (testimony)Caelius Aurelianus, On Chronic Diseases. Reports followers’ distinction involving purgation of the soul.
6. A 4 (polemical)Aristotle, On the Soul. Reports Hippo’s objection to unnamed thinkers who identify soul with blood: seed is not blood. The identification of Empedocles as target is the edition’s.

Translation in this edition

The A85 account contains substantial elemental supplements. Neither it nor A96 says verbatim “soul is the ratio of a mixture”; that identification is an interpretive synthesis which the edition's commentary too readily treats as given.

Use in the book

The frame announces ‘the secret feelings of his soul’ rather than adventures (p. 140). This gives inward events the weight of a life-history, but does not make René the final authority on their meaning. His first words confess agitation before the listeners’ peaceful hearts. At his father’s death he reasons from the lifeless body to another source of thought; the sublime face in the coffin becomes further evidence, for him, of immortality. These are a bereaved son’s convictions and questions, not a detached demonstration supplied by the frame.

Chactas’s claim that a great soul contains greater sorrows (p. 155) recognizes René’s exceptional intensity while asking him to moderate it. Souël later alters the criterion: solitude doubles the soul’s powers while depriving them of employment, and strength must serve others (p. 190). Read together, the speeches distinguish amplitude from achievement. The text allows the reader to value inward richness without treating suffering as proof of virtue.

Amélie’s soul likewise cannot be reduced to either criminal passion or disembodied purity. Her profession puts it figuratively in heaven while her eyes face earthly dust (p. 180); her later letter describes a sensitive soul gradually redirected, retaining turmoil and pleasure (p. 186). The superior’s report of nursing the sick gives that redirection a practical measure (p. 188). Religious language acquires its strongest ethical support through conduct rather than through elevation alone.

Places to read

1. p. 140les sentiments secrets de son âme — The frame’s description establishes inward feeling as the announced subject of the confession.
2. p. 145l'immortalité de l'âme — René makes his father’s death the first clear disclosure of spiritual survival to himself.
3. p. 155une grande âme doit contenir plus de douleurs qu'une petite — Chactas joins recognition of capacity to an injunction to moderation.
4. p. 190elle redouble les puissances de l'âme — Souël turns the language of inner power into an account of unused energies and responsibility.

Translation in this edition

The supplied translation consistently uses ‘soul’. The 1802 wording at p. 152 extends the architect–poet analogy with ‘comme l'autre à l'ame’: architecture touches the senses, poetry the soul. Its omission in the 1826 text reduces an explicit formulation, not the many remaining links between inward experience and sensory form.

Use in the book

Soul is the third and middle grade in the fivefold order, below God and angel and above quality and body. It joins intellectual life to the inward communication of life and motion to bodies. The rational soul is an incorporeal, indivisible, self-subsisting form, yet unlike angel it is not immobile in every respect. Its essence remains while its operations change; its power has both enduring natural vigor and a changeable acquired aspect. Mind is within soul without exhausting its functions, which also include sensation, imagination, and generation. Ficino further describes an irrational soul accompanying rational soul as a shadow accompanies a body. Animus is prominent in the title, Proem, and exhortations, while anima dominates the technical hierarchy; the local uses do not establish an absolute system-wide separation of their meanings.

Book III defines rational soul as a life understanding discursively and vivifying body in time. Neither consciousness considered alone nor bodily animation alone captures its mediating role. It knows higher realities through spiritual union and gives life to lower ones through inward motion, maintaining both relations at once. The names center of nature, middle of the universe, chain of the world, countenance of all things, knot, and bond of the world describe these powers and relations rather than additional entities. Soul contains images and gifts of higher realities and exemplary productive principles of lower ones. Its presence is whole in each bodily part: it is neither a spatial point lodged in one place nor a quality partitioned with bodily extension. Self-motion does not make it independent of God; it supplies the temporal manner of activity while receiving higher actuality and direction.

Book IV subdivides this middle grade into three ranks of rational souls: one world-soul; twelve sphere-souls; and the many souls living within particular spheres. Thus a star can possess its own soul within a sphere, and a human has a proper soul within the earth's region. This threefold subdivision does not replace the fivefold hierarchy. The intervening Pythagorean numerical scheme adds principal governing souls, while the concluding classification preserves the distinction among world, spheres, and inhabitants. Ficino subjects the narrated account of sphere-souls to examination and approval by Christian theologians.

A further qualification concerns activity within celestial souls. IV.2.10 says that their highest minds possess all Ideas together both habitually and actually; their lowest bodily motive powers possess all productive seeds but actualize them successively. Their middle reason can become stable through absorption in mind because their bodies require little administration. Human reason, by contrast, is drawn into the laborious governance of a needy body. Consequently, the general description of soul's successive operation does not mean every activity of every soul must be successive. IV.2.11 even reports an ordered rational return completed in one moment as “eternal motion.”

The opening program announces common reasons, arguments proper to soul, signs, and solutions to questions in support of immortality. These first four books establish and develop the hierarchy and mediation within that larger project; they do not contain all the specialized demonstrations promised for the work.

Further passage references. Proem.2, Proem.4–Proem.7234; I.1.1–I.1.7234567; I.3.33; I.4.1–I.4.52345; I.5.1, I.5.11–I.5.14234; I.6.14; II.13.25–3023456; III.1.1–32234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132; III.2.1–3023456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930; Book IV title; IV.123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596 heading and IV.1.1; IV.1.37; IV.1.50–IV.1.5223; IV.1.96; IV.2.9–1123

Places to read

1. I.1.7The five-grade program places rational soul in the middle and announces the larger demonstration.
2. III.2.8 and III.2.28–3023Soul joins knowing higher realities with inwardly vivifying bodies and is defined through discursive cognition.
3. IV.1.37 and IV.1.96Proper creature-souls are distinguished from sphere-souls and world-soul; the cosmic account receives a theological condition.
4. IV.2.9–1123Celestial mind, reason, and lower motive powers qualify the broad description of soul’s temporal activity.

Translation in this edition

Anima is not synonymous with only conscious thought, and animalis in Book IV means animating or belonging to bodily life. The general account of successive operation is qualified by celestial mind’s simultaneous possession and by the explicit discussion of eternal motion.

anima / animus

anima / animus. Printed forms: anima; animae; animam; animi; animorumque; animos.

Soul or animate psychic subject, not invariably equivalent to intellectual mind. Soul gives life without choosing every act, while its deliberate choices also arise from its being. References: II.3.4, II.4.6, II.8.3. See Soul.

Soul. Animus is used for souls whose free judgment providence preserves; anima names the self-moving, temporally knowing middle essence. References: II.13.26, III.2.23. See Soul.

anima rationalis

anima rationalis. Printed forms: animae; rationalem animam; rationalis animae.

Rational soul, the third or middle essence. It mediates higher and lower grades and is later distinguished by stable essence with successive operation. References: I.1.4, I.1.7, I.3.33, I.5.1. See Soul.

definitio

definitio. Printed forms: definitio; definitione; definitionem.

A definition or delimiting account. The reported definition of form as that by which something actually exists and acts is examined for whether it includes dimension or a subject. References: I.3.28. See Naming and defining.

Definition or account of what something is. The definition of rational soul is matched to the previously established third essence through life, discourse, and temporal animation. References: III.2.23, III.2.29, III.2.30. See Soul.

domina / comes

domina / comes. Printed forms: comes; domina.

Mistress or ruler / companion. Soul rules bodies while retaining divine attachment; the contrast denies that it simply shares every bodily fate. References: III.2.22. See Soul.

irrationalis anima

irrationalis anima. Printed forms: irrationalis anima.

Irrational soul, accompanying rational soul in a comparison. It accompanies the higher soul as a shadow accompanies a body; the apparatus explains the Latin’s elliptical comparison without making the two souls identical. References: I.3.33. See Soul.

miraculum

miraculum. Printed forms: miraculum.

Wonder or extraordinary marvel. Soul’s simultaneous mediating powers make it the greatest wonder in nature in Ficino’s exposition, not a separately narrated supernatural event. References: III.2.22. See Soul.

perscrutari

perscrutari. Printed forms: perscrutabimur.

To investigate thoroughly or search into. The announced investigation concerns grades within rational soul after the earlier five-grade ascent and comparison. References: IV.1.1. See Soul.

sedes / regio

sedes / regio. Printed forms: regionem; sedem.

Seat or assigned place / region. Rational soul occupies the middle grade of nature; this is hierarchical placement, not a physical address for an incorporeal substance. References: III.2.30. See Soul.

tertia essentia

tertia essentia. Printed forms: essentia; tertia.

The third essence, identified prospectively as rational soul. Its independence from bodily parts and material subject is argued here; subsequent chapters distinguish its stable essence from changing operation. References: I.3.33. See Soul.

Heraclitus (authorities and cited works)

Heraclitus. Grouped with Marcus Varro and Marcus Manilius as reaching rational soul in the ascent. I.1.4; I.5.2. See Ascent; Soul.

Plato and the Platonists (authorities and cited works)

Plato and the Platonists. The principal philosophical authorities and interlocutors. Ficino presents their account in relation to Christian truth but also marks specific attributed doctrines, numerical excursions, and reservations. Proem.1–11234567891011; I.6.1; III.1–2; IV.1.40–522345678910111213, IV.1.96. See Philosophy and theology; Ascent; Soul; God.

On the Soul (authorities and cited works)

On the Soul. Named in the series of Aristotelian references supporting celestial animation. IV.1.88. See Soul; Spheres and stars.

Use in the book

The opening “all souls” is explicitly limited in V.2.1: Ficino says that by soul he means the class of rational souls, while irrational lives are properly images and likenesses. This restriction controls the universality of the fifteen proofs. Their conclusions should not automatically be extended to every biological life-principle.

V.14.8 supplies the grounds of the distinction. True soul is subsistent life, source of motion and bodily animation, while irrational life acts with bodily instruments and is drawn by objects offered to sense. The rational soul’s approach to body pours out an irrational life as a shadow. Ficino thus distinguishes the abiding giver from its derivative animation of an organism; “image” need not mean a wholly unreal appearance.

The chapter then records an actual dispute rather than inventing agreement among Platonists. Xenocrates, Speusippus, Numenius and Plotinus are said to affirm the irrational soul’s immortality, while Porphyry, Proclus and many others deny it. The subsequent descent-of-souls explanation is attributed and set aside. V.13.18 separately reports a distinction between life impressed on a perpetual ethereal vehicle and life impressed on a perishable elemental body.

The life argument in V.14.1 and V.15.7–82 sharpens anima/animatum: a thing whose life departs is an ensouled recipient, whereas the life that departs is the soul. Ficino is arguing for the source’s persistence, not saying the abandoned body remains alive. V.15.27 finally refuses a conversion of rational soul into its own lower derivative life.

Places to read

1. V.2.1Ficino explicitly states the rational scope of anima in these proofs.
2. V.13.18Reported distinctions between rational source, irrational life and different vehicles.
3. V.14.1, V.14.8, V.14.9Life, ensouled recipient and disagreements about lower souls are distinguished.
4. V.15.7, V.15.8, V.15.27Departing life is distinguished from its recipient, and rational identity from lower animation.

Translation in this edition

The source deliberately preserves irrationales vitas as “irrational lives” and idola et simulacra as two image words. At V.14.8 the relative quam concerns irrational soul: the named disagreement is not a disagreement over rational immortality. Animus rendered “mind” does not create an additional soul alongside anima.

anima rationalis

anima rationalis. Printed forms: anima; anima rationalis; animae; animam; animarum; animas; rationalem; rationales; rationali; rationalis anima; rationalium.

The rational, self-subsisting source of life and self-directed motion; anima is expressly restricted to this class in the opening proofs. V.2 states the scope so the immortality conclusion is not silently extended to every lower life-principle. References: V.1.1, V.1.2, V.2.1, V.4.10, V.12.7, V.12.14, V.13.18. See Rational soul and irrational life.

animus

animus. Printed forms: animi; animis; animo; Animo; animum; Animus; animus.

Mind, often the rational soul considered in its understanding, willing and individual identity. The return-to-God argument preserves mind as mind; the final conversion argument similarly protects rational identity rather than mere survival of some substance. References: V.11.6, V.15.19, V.15.20, V.15.21. See Rational soul and irrational life.

Soul or mind, with local emphasis on inward rational identity rather than a different physical constituent. The rational soul’s location, self-discovery and enduring memory are often expressed through animus; local sense determines whether English uses mind or soul. References: VI.1.1, VI.2.9, VI.2.23, VI.13.6. See Persistence, memory and recognition.

Soul or mind with emphasis on inward cognitive and affective life. The food argument concerns its desire, intellectual strengthening and distinction from bodily growth; no rigid opposition to anima is imposed here. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.8. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

irrationalis vita

irrationalis vita. Printed forms: irrationalem; irrationales vitas; irrationali anima vel vita; Irrationalis.

Irrational or derivative life associated with bodily animation and sense rather than independent rational activity. Ficino distinguishes this from true soul and reports disagreement over its immortality; the final chapter denies that rational soul becomes such lower life. References: V.2.1, V.14.8, V.15.27. See Rational soul and irrational life.

tertius

tertius. Printed forms: tertia; tertiae.

Third, identifying soul's intermediate essence in the established five-level hierarchy. The numeral is a rank, not a count of parts within a soul or an assertion that there are only three kinds of being. References: V.1.2, V.3.1, V.5.4, V.10.3. See Rational soul and irrational life.

Xenocrates, Speusippus and Numenius (authorities and interlocutors)

Xenocrates, Speusippus and Numenius. With Plotinus, they are reported on the side of immortality for irrational souls; Porphyry, Proclus and others are placed on the other side. Ficino’s rational-soul scope prevents this report from being read as his undifferentiated assertion about every form of animal life. References: V.14.8. See Platonist disagreement and descent; Rational soul and irrational life.

Use in the book

A shared object of medicine and theology

The soul is part of the book’s subject from the address to the reader. Burton compares physicians and divines: one treats the body, the other the soul, while each can act upon one through the other. Melancholy is a shared infirmity requiring bodily and spiritual treatment, and the “whole physician” combines their help. Soul therefore includes the passions and disturbances that the anatomy studies as well as the spiritual concerns of the final partition. The argument does not permit either medical explanation or religious counsel to replace the other in every case.

The opening anatomy invokes Aristotle’s definition of soul as the fulfilment or first actuality of an organized body capable of life. Burton prints “ἐντελέχεια” and “actus primus” before his English explanation. The terms concern the living body’s constituted capacity, rather than only a currently performed action. He immediately opens questions about essence, seat, divisions and subordinate powers. We understand things through the soul, he says, yet cannot apprehend what it is. A definition has introduced the inquiry; it has not ended disagreement.

One soul, several powers, and reported alternatives

Some writers distinguish one soul with three principal faculties; others three souls. Paracelsus adds a fourth, spiritual soul, while Campanella is said to defend the view with claims about a murdered corpse bleeding before the murderer. Another group allows one kind of soul to all creatures and gives beasts reason in a smaller measure because of their organs. Burton presents these as competing positions. The original margin describes the distinct spiritual soul as remaining in the corpse for several months after death. This limited persistence belongs to the reported fourth-soul account; it should not be substituted for the later doctrine of an immortal created human soul. The report about bleeding is an argument those writers employ, not an independently verified event.

The common working division is vegetal, sensitive and rational. Nutrition, growth and generation belong to the first; the sensitive includes these and adds sensation and movement; the rational includes both lower levels. The lower can exist without the higher, but the higher cannot exist without the lower. The triangle-in-quadrilateral comparison illustrates inclusion. The later exposition says imagination is all the reason beasts have, whereas the earlier report had allowed beasts reason properly so called. Retaining the speakers and the change of explanatory scheme is more faithful than silently harmonizing the two.

When Burton defines the “Reasonable Soul,” Augustine’s “spiritual substance moving it self” stands beside the philosophers’ first substantial actuality of a human organized body. This soul lives, perceives and understands, acting freely and by choice. Burton gathers all three faculties into one soul, incorporeal and “inorganical of it self,” yet present in every part, using organs and working through them. Inorganical here means independent of organs in itself; it does not mean that bodily instruments have no bearing on its operations. Understanding and will then differ in office rather than essence.

Origin, mortality and return

Before that definition, the rational-soul subsection surveys disputed origins. “Ex traduce” means propagation from the parent: one person begets body and soul, like one candle lighting another. Burton reports the defenders’ argument that otherwise a human parent produces only half a person, while an animal produces matter and form. Galen’s alternative makes the soul the bodily mixture or temperament. These are distinct accounts, not premises that Burton unreservedly combines.

His catalogue then separates immortality from transmigration. Several named ancient traditions affirm immortality; the Pythagorean account adds “Metempsychosis” and “Palingenesia,” passage into another body and rebirth. Its examples link a former person’s inclinations with the animal form entered. Burton’s account of Plato combines prior knowledge, forgetting in the body, recollection, punishment and later returns. The supplied notes identify a composite use of several dialogues and warn that the ten-thousand-year return is not precisely a return to the same former body in the cited Phaedrus passage. This is Burton’s history of doctrines as presented in this edition, not a verified uniform teaching of all the authors he names.

Others deny immortality. Burton quotes Lucretius’s mind growing and aging with the body, reports disputes involving Pomponazzi and other writers, and relates the polemical story that Leo X had the question debated before him. A further position allows the soul to last only until the body has decayed, wandering meanwhile and then vanishing. The sequence distinguishes permanent survival, transmigration, limited survival and extinction. It would be misleading to treat the whole catalogue as a simple opposition between Burton and a single ancient “materialism.”

Burton’s own alignment becomes clearer when he refers doubters to Scripture, the Fathers and arguments for immortality. He reports the Fathers as teaching an immortal human soul created from nothing and infused into the embryo, contrasted with beasts’ propagated and perishing souls. The body text gives six months after conception, but Burton’s margin supplies competing timings, including three days and six weeks. The timing is therefore a disputed historical theological claim, not a single agreed chronology or a present-day biological fact. His later list of alleged deniers in the religious partition is again polemical, bringing distinct positions together under an accusation rather than freshly proving their equivalence.

Belief in the soul’s survival does not make Burton claim knowledge of every person’s fate. At the end of the First Partition he mitigates harsh judgments on people who take their own lives while deprived of reason, allows the possibility of divine mercy, and says that God alone can tell what becomes of their souls. He ends by urging charitable judgment and hope.

Bodily instruments and reciprocal injury

The physiological spirit is introduced as the soul’s instrument and a mediating tie between soul and body; Paracelsus’s fourth-soul theory is separately reported. The later causal discussion explicitly asks how material body acts on immaterial soul through humours, spirits and ill-disposed organs. The account is historically composite: mediation is its proposed answer, not the elimination of the distinction.

An earlier passage gives the soul the governor’s responsibility. Burton calls the selected claim from Plato’s Charmides, that bodily evils proceed from the soul, “most true,” then compares its use of the body to a smith’s use of a hammer. The later weighing of bodily compulsion therefore belongs to a book that has also pressed the soul’s culpability strongly; it does not simply repeat one unchanged assignment of blame.

Burton weighs arguments blaming soul or body for the other’s disorder. Some excuse the body and fault its governor; others excuse the soul from being the principal agent because character follows bodily temperament. He then says that the soul seems to have the better plea against bodily compulsion, while preserving the broader reciprocal claim that it is hard to decide which harms the other more. The passage’s direction of blame matters. “As a principal agent” belongs to the question of excusing the soul from chief responsibility in the second account; it does not quietly restore that responsibility to it.

The soul’s “domicilium,” its dwelling, supplies an explanatory image. A torch’s quality depends on its material; wine takes flavour from its cask; likewise the soul’s operations vary with its organs’ condition. These comparisons preserve dependence in operation without making the soul literally wine, flame or house. Elsewhere soul-as-stranger in the body serves a different purpose: a consolation for exile gathers familiar instances of foreignness and makes strangeness less shameful. Metaphors carry local arguments, not one automatically interchangeable anatomy.

The consolations for bodily impairment use a different emphasis. Lameness, blindness or an unimpressive appearance do not, Burton says, blemish the soul or prevent a person from being good and wise. His still stronger claims that impairment helps the soul’s operations belong to this consolatory argument and its examples. They should be read beside, rather than silently substituted for, the physiological account of disordered organs.

Departed souls, spirits and divine union

The demonological passages sharply distinguish reports from endorsement. Burton calls foolish the opinion that angels and devils are merely departed human souls helping friends or persecuting enemies. He reports Bodin’s argument that separated souls and other spirits are corporeal and round; he also reports Thyraeus’s alternatives for hauntings, including devils, damned souls seeking revenge and souls from purgatory seeking relief. These differing accounts occur within the same anthology. Their presence does not mean Burton accepts every identification.

The alleged feeding of demons on human or animal souls receives explicit rejection as vain. In the later discussion of deified souls, Maximus of Tyre’s good dead become intermediate guardian beings, helping kin and punishing wrongdoing. Burton intervenes in the next paragraph by allowing that the reported apparition was the devil in another’s likeness. The ancient intermediary being, Burton’s Christian gloss and his hostile reinterpretation must retain separate voices.

The optical explanation offers a pointed negative use. In Agrippa’s quoted margin, frightening projected or reflected figures are “simulacra animæ expertia,” images devoid of a soul, which inexperienced viewers mistake for demons or shades. Here “animæ” is soul, whereas the wives’ joke later uses the same printed form for breaths. The following passage says deception is mostly in the brain but expressly continues to allow diabolical agency. A lifeless manufactured likeness in this instance is therefore no general denial of spirits.

Cosmic speculation adds another scale: the aerial digression asks whether the earth is animate and reports souls deriving from and returning to it, as well as souls or intelligences animating stars. This is a question among controversies, assembled from disparate traditions. Religious contemplation supplies a further, explicitly positive use: sobriety and contemplation can unite souls with God, and ecstasy can taste future happiness. Burton immediately distinguishes beneficial use from abuse that becomes religious melancholy. His accounts of deception and bodily disorder do not erase that concession.

A praise of love uses “mundi anima,” literally the soul of the world. Love builds cities, invents arts, unites and gives life; the continuation connects creation with redemption and providence. The phrase belongs to that expansive account of love, rather than simply repeating the aerial digression’s question about an animate earth.

The same discussion of love also speaks positively of angels and “living souls” loving one another and praying for those still in the Church on earth. Its heavenly community belongs to a Christian account of charity; the next paragraph turns to love proper to mortal human beings. This adds a distinct context to the hostile treatment of deified human souls elsewhere.

The lover’s soul, a life at ransom, and a breath joke

Friendship has its own soul-language. “Amicus animæ dimidium,” a friend is half a soul, appears in the original margin beside the account of friends who share wishes, exchange services and honour one another after death. The note cites Augustine and associates Horace’s phrase about preserving half of his soul. It expresses the closeness of friendship; it is not an anatomical division of the rational soul.

In love, the soul can seem to inhabit the beloved: the maxim “Anima non est ubi animat, sed ubi amat” says it is where it loves rather than where it gives life. The surrounding language of constant thinking, breathing in another and longing makes emotional absorption its immediate force. Castiglione’s lovers breathe out souls and spirits through kisses, exchange hearts and mingle affections. These uses draw on physiological and philosophical language but belong locally to the representation of erotic union.

The beloved is also “anima informans,” a form-giving or animating soul. Burton applies the philosophical term to the lover’s dependence on her favour: like a flower opening to the sun or a windmill requiring wind, he seems unable to live or move without her. The following claim that his soul lives in her body continues this emotional and imaginative dependence.

In marriage satire, a wife is accused of refusing to ransom her husband’s soul at the cost of her little dog’s life. Soul here means his life; the following Latin couplet makes the exchange of husband’s death for the dog’s survival explicit. This is hostile satire about a wife’s values, not a statement that a dog can redeem a human soul from damnation.

Finally, “animæ uxorum pessime olent” says that wives’ breaths smell foul. Burton follows the alleged Plautine joke with his own “deformed souls.” The semantic turn from breath to moral character is the point. Translating both pieces as either breath or soul would destroy it. The surrounding counsel also criticizes husbands who deprive their wives and those who give excessive liberty; the wordplay is one part of that gendered argument, not an isolated physiological definition.

The afflicted soul and its relief

In the final treatment of religious despair, “the whole soul, and all the faculties of it” are affected: joy, hope and trust give way to fear and sorrow. This is the destructive kind of despair concerning God and salvation; Burton distinguishes it from other uses of the word, and distinguishes temporary despair from final despair. The movement towards cure matters as much as the diagnosis. Divine mercy becomes a balm for an “afflicted soul,” while medicine and counsel are generally to work together. Burton also requires counsel to suit the person and the cause, and addresses those prepared and examined for comfort. The concluding advice seeks to refresh the distressed soul through suitable recreation, friends and the counsel of physicians and divines.

The inward soul can also attest resistance. When sufferers reject unwanted thoughts, Burton says their own souls testify that they abhor them. He distinguishes this from a settled consenting will, and extends the distinction to some temporary assent later rejected. His account combines humours, imagination and diabolical suggestion while refusing to assign the unwilling sufferer every thought’s moral responsibility.

Related entries

Faculty; Animal and vegetal; Animal faculties; Spirits; Form; Matter; Ex traduce; Metempsychosis; Intellect; Will and nill; Consent and essence; Daemon and genius; Demonic apparitions; Simulacra; Ecstasy; Microcosm; Religious melancholy; Despair; Conscience. Future entry: Actuality

Places to read

1. A person addressed with pity“Poor Soul” addresses the superstitious worshipper as a person
2. Body and soul as a joint concernMedical and spiritual treatment
3. Spirits as instrumentsThe mediating account and Paracelsian alternative
4. Definition and disputed divisionsActuality, unknowability, one or several souls, lower faculties and animal reason
5. The rational soulRead the sequence for propagated, created, mortal, immortal and transmigrating accounts, followed by Burton’s working definition and rational powers
6. Dead souls and supernatural beingsRejected identification, Bodin’s report, soul-feeding and rival haunting explanations
7. The soul as accountable governorThe body’s suit against the soul, the smith and hammer, and the strong claim later reconsidered in the bodily-causation discussion
8. Reciprocal body–soul disorderCompeting assignments of principal responsibility and the dwelling, torch and cask comparisons
9. Likenesses without soulsOptical deception distinguished from the continuation’s allowance for diabolical agency
10. The limits of judging another soul’s fateMitigated censures, possible mercy and charity’s hope
11. Cosmic soulsAn animate earth, return of souls and stellar movers as reported questions
12. Bodily impairment and the soul’s worthConsolatory claims of moral and intellectual value despite physical impairment
13. The soul as a strangerA consolatory catalogue of foreignness
14. The soul of the worldLove’s unifying and life-giving force in a catalogue leading to creation, redemption and providence
15. Heavenly living soulsSouls and angels caring for the Church on earth before the transition to mortal human love
16. A friend as half a soulFriendship, mutual service and remembrance
17. Erotic union and animationExchanged souls and spirits, the beloved as anima informans, and the soul living where it loves
18. Life and breathRansom, the pet comparison and the breath/soul wordplay
19. Spiritual elevation and its abuseBodily precursors, beneficial contemplation and qualified criticism of ecstasy
20. Deified souls and polemical denialsMaximus’s guardian souls and Burton’s intervention; later accusations concerning immortality
21. The whole soul affectedReligious despair distinguished from other senses; temporary and final despair kept distinct
22. Medicine, counsel and mercyCombined treatment, preparation for counsel and balm for the afflicted soul
23. The inward self resisting unwanted thoughtsRejection, unwillingness and temporary assent distinguished from a settled will
24. Concluding reliefRemoving causes, suitable recreation, friends and the advice of physicians and divines

In this edition

“Reasonable Soul” becomes “rational soul”; “inorganical of it self” becomes “In itself it is independent of organs.” The latter rendering preserves both independence and the same passage’s claim that the soul works through organs. “First substantial act” becomes “first substantial actuality.” The Greek, Latin and English explanation are combined in the modern rendering, so its entire phrase should not be assigned to the Greek word alone.

The local equivalents of anima vary. The philosophical noun remains “soul”; the husband’s “soul” becomes “life”; the Latin “animæ” in the wives’ joke becomes “breaths,” followed separately by “ugly souls” for Burton’s “deformed souls.” These are checked local choices, not claims that one equivalent applies throughout. Burton-labelled notes can contain modern translation and explanation: the alternative infusion dates are historical marginal wording, while the warning about embryology is the supplied Editor’s qualification. The lexicon does not claim fresh collation of the philosophical or patristic works Burton cites.

actus primus

Printed “actus primus” (Latin phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording: actus primus

First actuality of an organized body with the capacity for life, distinct from merely exercising an activity.

Context: Philosophical definition reported by Burton.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: actus primus corporis Organici, vitam habentis in potentia

Modern rendering, Modern wording: first actuality

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: first actuality of an organized body with the capacity for life

afflicted soul

Printed “afflicted soul” (English phrase; phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording, Modern rendering, Modern wording: afflicted soul

The inward self suffering distress, addressed as capable of receiving consolation through divine mercy; medicine supplies the figure of balm.

Context: Burton’s pastoral direct address offers mercy as a remedy. The section also says medicine and counsel generally work together; it does not define every melancholy illness as sin alone.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: His mercy is a panacea, a balsom for an afflicted soul

Alignment convention

Qualification: The lexical or phrase alignment is distinguished from the complete local construction. The paired modern rendering is checked as a rendering, not treated as independent evidence.

Modern construction: His mercy is a cure-all, a balm for an afflicted soul

Amicus animæ dimidium

Printed “Amicus animæ dimidium” (Latin sentence; phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Amicus animæ dimidium

A friend is half a soul: a figure of intimate friendship and shared life.

Context: Original marginal maxim cites Augustine and associates Horace’s half-of-my-soul wording; the body describes mutual affection, concord, service and remembrance after death.

Source: Burton original marginal quotation

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: A friend is half one’s soul

Alignment convention

Qualification: The original marginal phrase is aligned with the supplied note’s editorial English translation; that translation is not independent authority.

Supplied words: The English supplies is, as Latin nominal sentences commonly leave the copula understood.; one’s makes the relationship of possession explicit; the first Latin maxim has animæ without a possessive.

Notes: The full mixed note and body context were read; only its original Latin is attested as Burton’s marginal wording. The cited Augustine and Horace works have not been newly collated.

Translation layer: Editorial translation within the supplied Burton-labelled note, not original marginal wording and not paired modern body

anima · animæ · local use 1

Printed “animæ” (Latin genitive singular).

Printed form, Original wording: animæ

Of the soul, in the phrase naming the body its dwelling.

Context: Soul is the inhabitant in the metaphor; body the dwelling.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: domicilium animæ

Modern rendering, Modern wording: soul’s

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: the soul’s dwelling

anima · Anima

Printed “Anima” (Latin nominative singular).

Printed form, Original wording: Anima

Soul in an erotic maxim that locates it where it loves rather than where it animates.

Context: Quoted maxim in a description of persistent erotic absorption.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: Anima non est ubi animat, sed ubi amat

Modern rendering, Modern wording: soul

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: The soul is not where it gives life, but where it loves

anima · animæ · local use 2

Printed “animæ” (Latin nominative plural).

Printed form, Original wording: animæ

Breaths of wives, in the joke Burton attributes to Plautus.

Context: Latin joke about breath precedes Burton’s moralizing gloss about souls.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: animæ uxorum pessime olent

Modern rendering, Modern wording: breaths

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: Wives’ breaths smell very foul

anima · animæ · local use 3

Printed “animæ” (Latin).

Printed form, Original wording: animæ

Soul or animating principle absent from projected likenesses, genitive governed by expertia.

Context: Agrippa quoted in margin; lifeless image mistaken for spirit; 064-29 still allows devil to deceive.

Source: Burton original marginal quotation

Source wording, Original construction: simulacra animæ expertia

Modern rendering, Modern wording: a soul

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original Latin component and editorial English component are separately aligned; wider constructions are retained as context.

Modern construction: images devoid of a soul

Notes: The complete mixed note was consulted, but only its original Latin is used as lexical attestation.

Translation layer: Editorial translation within the supplied Burton-labelled note; not original marginal wording and not paired modern body

anima informans

Printed “anima informans” (Latin phrase; phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording: anima informans

A form-giving or animating soul: the soul giving a body its living form, applied here to the beloved as the lover’s source of animation.

Context: Burton’s account of lovers applies philosophical vocabulary to dependence on the mistress’s favour, illustrated by flower/sun and windmill/wind comparisons.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: she is their Sun, their Primum mobile, or anima informans

Modern rendering, Modern wording: animating soul

Alignment convention

Qualification: The lexical or phrase alignment is distinguished from the complete local construction. The paired modern rendering is checked as a rendering, not treated as independent evidence.

Modern construction: she is their sun, their “first mover” or “animating soul.”

anima mundi

Printed “mundi anima” (Latin phrase; phrase).

Printed form, Original wording: mundi anima

Soul of the world; love named as a life-giving and unifying power in a praise of divine and cosmic love.

Context: Burton’s encomiastic catalogue connects love with creation, social bonds, virtue and quickening; it is a different local argument from the animate-earth question at 075-06.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: Amor mundum fecit, Love built Cities, mundi anima, invented Arts, Sciences, and all good things

Modern rendering, Modern wording: the soul of the world

Alignment convention

Qualification: The lexical or phrase alignment is distinguished from the complete local construction. The paired modern rendering is checked as a rendering, not treated as independent evidence.

Supplied words: The modern construction supplies is to turn the nominal phrase into an explicit predicate of love.

Modern construction: “Love made the world”; love built cities, is “the soul of the world,” invented arts, sciences and all good things

Anima non est ubi animat, sed ubi amat

Printed “Anima non est ubi animat, sed ubi amat” (Latin sentence).

Citation key, Printed form, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Anima non est ubi animat, sed ubi amat

The soul is not where it gives life but where it loves: a play on animating and loving in the context of longing.

Context: Local erotic application; not straightforward transfer of a soul-substance between bodies.

Source: original body

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: The soul is not where it gives life, but where it loves

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

anima spiritualis

Printed “Spiritualem animam” (Latin).

Printed form, Original wording: Spiritualem animam

Spiritual soul distinguished from the other souls and described as remaining temporarily in the corpse.

Context: Margin attached to the reported Paracelsian fourth soul and Campanella defence; no direct endorsement or verified corpse phenomenon.

Source: Burton original marginal quotation

Source wording, Original construction: Spiritualem animam a reliquis distinctam tuetur, etiam in cadavere inhærentem post mortem per aliquot menses.

Modern rendering, Modern wording: a spiritual soul

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original Latin component and editorial English component are separately aligned; wider constructions are retained as context.

Modern construction: He maintains a spiritual soul distinct from the others, remaining even in the corpse for several months after death.

Notes: The complete mixed note was consulted, but only its original Latin is used as lexical attestation.

Translation layer: Editorial translation within the supplied Burton-labelled note; not original marginal wording and not paired modern body

animæ uxorum pessime olent

Printed “animæ uxorum pessime olent” (Latin sentence).

Citation key, Printed form, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: animæ uxorum pessime olent

Wives’ breaths smell very foul; breath/soul ambiguity enables the following moral turn.

Context: Attributed to Plautus, exact locus uncollated in supplied edition.

Source: original body

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: Wives’ breaths smell very foul

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

deformed souls

Printed “deformed souls” (English phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording: deformed souls

Morally ugly souls, Burton’s gloss following the Latin breath joke.

Context: Burton’s authorial moralizing rather than a literal translation of the Latin.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: they have deformed souls

Modern rendering, Modern wording: ugly souls

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: they have ugly souls

domicilium

Printed “domicilium” (Latin).

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording: domicilium

Dwelling, applied to the body as the soul’s habitation; introduces dependence of operations on organs.

Context: Burton’s metaphor, followed by torch and cask comparisons.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: The Body is domicilium animæ, her house, abode, and stay

Modern rendering, Modern wording: dwelling

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: The body is “the soul’s dwelling,” her house, abode and support

entelecheia

Printed “ἐντελέχεια” (Greek).

Printed form, Original wording: ἐντελέχεια

Actuality or fulfilment, rendered in a combined Greek-Latin-English construction.

Context: Burton’s Greek label introduces the Aristotelian definition; the entire modern definition is not assigned to this word.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: ἐντελέχεια, perfectio & actus primus

Modern rendering, Modern wording: fulfilment

Alignment convention

Qualification: The combined modern phrase fulfilment or first actuality renders the Greek, Latin and English restatements together. The lexical alignment of ἐντελέχεια with fulfilment is a component explanation, not an exclusive one-to-one allocation of the combined definition.

Modern construction: fulfilment or first actuality

ex traduce

Printed “ex traduce” (Latin phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording: ex traduce

By propagation from a parent, as opposed to independent creation and infusion.

Context: Some hold: one reported view followed by arguments from its defenders.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: Some holde that it is ex traduce

Modern rendering, Modern wording: propagated from the parent

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: Some hold that it is propagated from the parent

first substantial act

Printed “first substantial act” (English philosophical phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording: first substantial act

Constitutive first actuality of a human organized body.

Context: Philosophers’ definition in Burton’s exposition.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: the first substantial act of a Natural, Humane, Organical Body

Modern rendering, Modern wording: first substantial actuality

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: the first substantial actuality of a natural human body furnished with organs

inorganical of itself

Printed “inorganical of it self” (English phrase).

Printed form, Original wording: inorganical of it self

Independent of organs in itself while using them in its operations; the apparent tension is preserved.

Context: Burton’s gathered definition of one rational soul.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: which is inorganical of it self, although it be in all parts, and incorporeal, using their Organs, and working by them

Modern rendering, Modern wording: In itself it is independent of organs

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: In itself it is independent of organs and incorporeal, although it is present in every part, using the organs and working through them

living soul

Printed “living souls” (English phrase; phrase).

Printed form, Original wording, Modern rendering, Modern wording: living souls

Spiritual beings described as living in the celestial community, loving and praying for believers still on earth.

Context: Positive Christian framing, followed by a transition to love proper to mortal humans at 109-25; this is not the pagan identification of angels and devils with departed humans rejected at 028-29. The phrase itself does not spell out a uniform taxonomy of the blessed.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: The love of Angels and living souls, is mutuall amongst themselves, towards us militant in the Church

Alignment convention

Qualification: The lexical or phrase alignment is distinguished from the complete local construction. The paired modern rendering is checked as a rendering, not treated as independent evidence.

Modern construction: Angels and living souls love one another, and also us who still struggle in the Church on earth

metempsychosis

Printed “Metempsychosis” (Greek-derived learned noun).

Printed form, Original wording: Metempsychosis

Transmigration of souls into another body.

Context: Burton attributes the doctrine to Pythagoreans and connects forms with prior inclinations.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: The Pythagorians defend Metempsychosis, and Palingenesia

Modern rendering, Modern wording: transmigration

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: The Pythagoreans defend transmigration and rebirth

palingenesia

Printed “Palingenesia” (Greek-derived learned noun).

Printed form, Original wording: Palingenesia

Rebirth, paired here with transmigration.

Context: Reported Pythagorean position.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: Metempsychosis, and Palingenesia

Modern rendering, Modern wording: rebirth

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: transmigration and rebirth

reasonable soul

Printed “Reasonable Soul” (English phrase).

Printed form, Original wording: Reasonable Soul

Rational soul that includes the lower powers and acts by understanding and choice.

Context: Burton’s working exposition with a definition attributed to Augustine.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: This Reasonable Soul, which Austin calls a spiritual substance moving it self

Modern rendering, Modern wording: rational soul

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: This rational soul, which Augustine calls a spiritual substance that moves itself

simulacra animæ expertia

Printed “simulacra animæ expertia” (Latin).

Citation key, Printed form, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: simulacra animæ expertia

Lifeless images, distinct from living or spiritual beings they seem to represent.

Context: Agrippa quotation in optical explanation, restricted by the subsequent concession of demonic agency.

Source: Burton original marginal quotation

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: images devoid of a soul

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original Latin component and editorial English component are separately aligned; wider constructions are retained as context.

Notes: The complete mixed note was consulted, but only its original Latin is used as lexical attestation.

Translation layer: Editorial translation within the supplied Burton-labelled note; not original marginal wording and not paired modern body

soul · Soul · local use 1

Printed “Soul” (English).

Principle or first actuality constituting an organized body capable of life.

Context: Definition attributed to Aristotle and accepted by most philosophers according to Burton; questions follow.

Source: original body

Source wording: the Soul is defined to be ἐντελέχεια, perfectio & actus primus corporis Organici, vitam habentis in potentia

soul · local use 1

Printed “soul” (English).

The husband’s life, which the hostile satire says a wife would not save at the cost of a pet.

Context: Burton reports Platina’s accusation; ransom means preserving life in an exchange.

Source: original body

Source wording: whose soul they would not ransome for their little dogs

soul · Soules

Printed “Soules” (English plural).

Printed form, Original wording: Soules

Four souls in Paracelsus’s reported alternative, including a spiritual soul beyond three faculties.

Context: Reported by Burton; not collapsed into his ensuing working definition.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: Paracelsus will have four Soules

Modern rendering, Modern wording: souls

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the supplied construction context.

Modern construction: Paracelsus maintains that there are four souls

soul · local use 2

Printed “soul” (English).

One kind of soul shared by creatures in a reported account allowing beasts reason.

Context: Some again: Burton is reporting an alternative, not erasing the later beast/human distinction.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: one soul of all Creatures whatsoever, differing only in Organs

Original wording: one soul

Modern rendering, Modern wording: the same kind of soul

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the supplied construction context.

Supplied words: kind of clarifies the supplied modern reading of one soul

Modern construction: all creatures have the same kind of soul and differ only in their organs

soul · Soul · local use 2

Printed “Soul” (English).

Immortal human soul independently created and infused, contrasted with beasts’ propagated and mortal souls.

Context: Burton attributes this account broadly to Church Fathers and refers doubters to them and Scripture; margin gives conflicting infusion times.

Source: original body

Source wording: the Soul is immortal, created of nothing

soul · local use 3

Printed “soul” (English).

Soul identified with bodily temperament in the Galenic position Burton reports.

Context: A reported rival account, not a claim that every cited doctrine agrees.

Source: original body

Source wording: Galen suposeth the soul crasin esse, to be the Temperature it self

soul · Soul · local use 3

Printed “Soul” (English).

Soul allowed only temporary postmortem survival before extinction in Burton’s report of Zeno and the Stoics.

Context: Reported and historically uncollated; limited survival distinguished from immortality.

Source: original body

Source wording: supposed the Soul so long to continue, till the Body was fully putrified

soul · souls · local use 1

Printed “souls” (English plural).

Printed form, Original wording, Modern rendering, Modern wording: souls

Souls undergoing purification after death, offered as one alleged cause of haunting.

Context: Thyraeus’s alternative, reported beside devils and damned souls; not automatically Burton’s assent.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: souls out of Purgatory that seek ease

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the supplied construction context.

Modern construction: souls from purgatory seeking relief

soul · souls · local use 2

Printed “souls” (English plural).

Printed form, Original wording, Modern rendering, Modern wording: souls

Human souls as supposed food of demons, within an account Burton rejects.

Context: Cardan’s claim reported in a sequence explicitly dismissed as absurd or vain.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: they feed on mens souls

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the supplied construction context.

Modern construction: they feed on human souls

soul · souls · local use 3

Printed “souls” (English plural).

Printed form, Original wording, Modern rendering, Modern wording: souls

Souls of many beings allegedly deriving from and returning to an animate earth.

Context: Speculative question and reported composite tradition, not a settled doctrine.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: all other souls of men, beasts, divels, plants, fishes

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the supplied construction context.

Modern construction: all other souls—of people, beasts, devils, plants, fishes

soul · Soul · local use 4

Printed “Soul” (English).

Soul as a stranger or guest; a consolation for exile using widespread foreignness.

Context: Local consolatory metaphor, not an independent proof about embodiment.

Source: original body

Locator qualification: Do not remove bracketed or repeated-page qualifier.

Source wording: The Soul is an alien to the body

soul · souls · local use 4

Printed “souls” (English plural).

Printed form, Original wording, Modern rendering, Modern wording: souls

Lovers’ souls exchanged with breath and kisses in an account of erotic union.

Context: Castiglione as reported by Burton; mixing physiological and poetic language.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: They breath out their souls and spirits together with their kisses

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the supplied construction context.

Modern construction: They breathe out their souls and spirits along with their kisses

soul · souls · local use 5

Printed “souls” (English plural).

Printed form, Original wording, Modern rendering, Modern wording: souls

Souls united with God in beneficial contemplation, distinguished from abused ecstasy.

Context: Burton expressly allows the positive use before condemning abuse.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: sobriety and contemplation joyn our souls to God

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the supplied construction context.

Modern construction: Temperance and contemplation unite our souls with God

soul · local use 4

Printed “soul” (English).

The good dead person’s soul becomes an intermediate guardian being in the reported Maximus account.

Context: So they will have it; Burton intervenes in the next paragraph with a demonic alternative to alleged appearances.

Source: original body

Source wording: but his soul ex homine dæmon evadit, becomes forthwith a Demi-god

soul · Soul · local use 5

Printed “Soul” (English; dictionary lemma).

Citation key, Modern rendering, Modern wording: soul

Printed form, Original wording: Soul

A person, here the superstitious worshipper addressed with pity in the frontispiece poem.

Context: The poem addresses the kneeling man as a whole person; the religious and astrological framing remains the poem’s historical voice.

Source: original body

Locator qualification: Source record identifies these leaves as unnumbered; plain numerical passage labels are scan numbers.

Source wording, Original construction: Alas poor Soul, I pitie thee

Alignment convention

Qualification: The lexical or phrase alignment is distinguished from the complete local construction. The paired modern rendering is checked as a rendering, not treated as independent evidence.

Modern construction: Alas, poor soul, I pity you

soul · Souls

Printed “Souls” (English plural; dictionary lemma).

Printed form, Original wording: Souls

Souls considered in their destiny after bodily death; their individual fate is expressly left to God.

Context: Burton qualifies earlier hard censures of self-killing, mitigates judgments where reason is lost, allows mercy and urges charity to hope the best. This is his historical theological argument.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: what shall become of their Souls, God alone can tell

Modern rendering, Modern wording: souls

Alignment convention

Qualification: The lexical or phrase alignment is distinguished from the complete local construction. The paired modern rendering is checked as a rendering, not treated as independent evidence.

Modern construction: what will become of their souls, God alone can tell

soul · local use 5

Printed “soul” (English; dictionary lemma).

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording, Modern rendering, Modern wording: soul

The inward principle of moral and intellectual life, which Burton’s consolation says bodily impairment does not blemish.

Context: A consolatory assertion, expanded by examples of wisdom and goodness despite bodily disability; its stronger claim that impairment enhances operations should not become a general empirical rule.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: those imperfections of the body do not a whit blemish the soul

Alignment convention

Qualification: The lexical or phrase alignment is distinguished from the complete local construction. The paired modern rendering is checked as a rendering, not treated as independent evidence.

Modern construction: these bodily impairments do not blemish the soul in the least

soul · souls · local use 6

Printed “souls” (English plural; dictionary lemma).

Citation key, Modern rendering, Modern wording: soul

Printed form, Original wording: souls

The inward self that testifies to the sufferer’s rejection of unwanted thoughts.

Context: Burton distinguishes a thought’s unwanted occurrence from approval. The next paragraphs locate blame outside the unwilling sufferer and qualify even some temporary assent as different from a confirmed will.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: their own souls truely dictate as much

Alignment convention

Qualification: The lexical or phrase alignment is distinguished from the complete local construction. The paired modern rendering is checked as a rendering, not treated as independent evidence.

Supplied words: The modern construction follows one sufferer in the singular where the source shifts between singular and plural.

Modern construction: his own soul truly tells him the same

souls of men departed

Printed “souls of men departed” (English phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording: souls of men departed

Departed human souls offered as an explanation of angels and devils.

Context: Burton explicitly calls this opinion foolish.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: that they are the souls of men departed

Modern rendering, Modern wording: souls of the dead

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the supplied construction context.

Modern construction: that these spirits are the souls of the dead

spiritual substance

Printed “spiritual substance” (English phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording, Modern rendering, Modern wording: spiritual substance

Incorporeal self-moving soul in the definition Burton attributes to Augustine.

Context: Attribution, not a claim that every reported doctrine in the chapter agrees.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: a spiritual substance moving it self

Alignment convention

Qualification: The aligned lexical component is separate from the checked construction context.

Modern construction: a spiritual substance that moves itself

whole soul

Printed “whole soul” (English phrase; phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording, Modern rendering, Modern wording: whole soul

The entire inward life and all its powers, named as the part afflicted by the destructive religious despair under discussion.

Context: The antecedent restricts the account to religious despair concerning God and salvation; temporary despair is distinguished from final despair, and 166-10–18 turns to recovery and treatment.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original construction: The part affected is the whole soul, and all the faculties of it

Alignment convention

Qualification: The lexical or phrase alignment is distinguished from the complete local construction. The paired modern rendering is checked as a rendering, not treated as independent evidence.

Modern construction: The part affected is the whole soul and all its faculties