Τ Tau

by its being of particular things

τῷ τινῶν εἶναι

The principle that each knowledge is defined by its objects, by which medicine is told from the other kinds of knowledge · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The phraseBy its being of certain things: the dative of the articular infinitive, “by being”, with the genitive plural of the indefinite τις, “some”, “certain”.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, at 171a: “Or isn’t each kind of knowledge defined, not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge, by its being of particular things?” “By that, yes.”
  • In this edition“By its being of particular things”.
  • A place to read170e–171c.
English renderings
τῷ τινῶν εἶναι, tōi tinōn einai, “by its being of particular things”

Meaning

Τινός, “of something”, is the genitive of relation that every knowledge takes: knowledge is knowledge of something (see ἐπιστήμη τινός). The plural τινῶν, “of certain things”, and the dative of means, τῷ … εἶναι, “by its being”, turn that grammar into a criterion of definition. A knowledge is told from other knowledges not by being knowledge, which all of them are, but by what it is knowledge of.

Use in the book

The phrase comes in the test of the doctor. Socrates has shown that the temperate man, knowing only knowledge, can know that a doctor has some knowledge but not which. “That the doctor has some knowledge, then, the temperate man will know; but when he has to test what knowledge it is, won’t he look into what it is of? Or isn’t each kind of knowledge defined, not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge, by its being of particular things?” “By that, yes.” “And medicine was defined as different from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased.” “Yes” (171a; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ὁρίζω). So the examiner must look in the field where medicine is found, and only medicine can look there (171b–c; see ὁμότεχνος; τὰ ἔξω).

The principle has been at work since 165c, where Socrates first asked what temperance was knowledge of (see ἐπιστήμη τινός), and at 166a, where calculation’s object, the odd and the even, was “something distinct from the knowledge itself” (see λογιστική). At 171a it is stated as a rule of definition, and it settles the question. Temperance, as Critias defines it, is a knowledge of knowledge “and of nothing else”; it has no particular things to be of, and so, by the principle, it cannot tell what any other knowledge is of, nor a knower from a pretender (171c). The phrase can be read as the dialogue’s sharpest statement of why the knowledge of knowledge fails: what makes a knowledge this knowledge is exactly what Critias’ temperance lacks.

Places to read

The phrase’s place, with the definition of medicine that applies it.

  1. 171aEach kind of knowledge is defined, as a particular knowledge, by its being of particular things.
  2. 171aMedicine was defined by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased.

Translation in this edition

“By its being of particular things” renders τῷ τινῶν εἶναι (171a6); “not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge” renders μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τίς (171a5–6), the English rendering the interrogative τίς, “which”, as “a particular knowledge”.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Republic gives the principle its fullest statement, in the division of the soul. Its rule that knowledge itself is of learning itself and a particular knowledge of a particular object is told elsewhere (4.438b–d; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). When there came to be a knowledge of making houses, it differed from the others and was called house-building, because it was of a particular kind. This does not mean that a knowledge is like its object, that the knowledge of the healthy and the diseased is healthy and diseased, or the knowledge of good and bad things good and bad; but because it came to be of a particular object, the healthy and the diseased, it became a particular knowledge and was called no longer simply knowledge but medicine (4.438d–e). The Republic’s example is the Charmides’. Its knowledge itself, of learning itself, has a general object; Critias’ knowledge of knowledge was to have none.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle places the principle among relatives. Some things are called relative because something else is related to them, as the measurable, the knowable and the thinkable are; and some things are relative because their genus is, “as medicine is among relatives because its genus, knowledge, is thought to be relative”.1 On his account medicine is relative to its object only by belonging to knowledge, which is relative to the knowable; the Charmides and the Republic say that it is medicine, not knowledge, by being of its particular object.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a29–b6.