Prophecy interpretation and knowing whether a saying is true

Use in the book

Prophecy and interpretation are denied the title of wisdom because the relevant competence knows only what is said, not whether it is true (975c). The contrast is epistemic and precise. Transmission or exposition of an utterance does not amount to justified knowledge of its truth. The clause does not assert that every prophecy is false; the stated defect is that truth has not been learned.

The criticism follows hunting and precedes imitation. It should not be absorbed into a general denunciation of all religion. The ensuing positive account identifies a god as giver of number and requires reverence for the gods. The dialogue can reject a human claim to wisdom based on handling oracles while defending divine instruction through the order of the heavens.

Earlier, the soul “divines” that it has wisdom's capacity by some nature (974b–c). This is suggestive rather than self-contradictory: strong expectation of a power is distinguished from discovery of its identity, occasion, and method. The soul's divining therefore belongs to the problem that inquiry must resolve. It does not make every inward conviction a completed source of knowledge.

Later, beings of ether and air are credited with knowing human thought and interpreting between men and the highest gods (984e–985b). Their assigned mediation is supported within the dialogue by a description of their nature and cognition. It is not identical to the human art criticized at 975c. The lexicon should make the recurrence visible without quietly turning the later intermediaries into human prophets or attributing their knowledge to every interpreter.

The text at 978a is especially important. Burnet prints ἄν τις, “just anyone,” where the apparatus records μάντις, “prophet,” as a manuscript reading. The printed argument about number therefore contains no further spoken occurrence of mantis at that point. An apparatus reading can illuminate an editorial choice without becoming an attestation in the adopted text.

Places to read

1. 974b–cτῆς δὲ ψυχῆς … μαντευομένης — The soul divines its capacity without yet finding its determinate content
2. 975cοὐδὲ μαντική γε οὐδ’ ἑρμηνευτική — Both prophecy and interpretation are excluded as sufficient wisdom
3. 975cτὸ λεγόμενον γὰρ οἶδεν μόνον — The known object is what has been said
4. 975cεἰ δ’ ἀληθές, οὐκ ἔμαθεν — The truth of the saying has not been learned
5. 984eτῆς ἑρμηνείας αἴτιον — Interpretation later belongs to the account of middle beings
6. 985bἑρμηνεύεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τοὺς ἀκροτάτους θεούς — Their mediation reaches one another and the highest gods

Translation in this edition

The note identifies the local interpretation as interpretation of signs and oracles. Its comparisons with Statesman and Symposium are explanatory background. The reading ἄν τις at 978a must remain separate from μάντις in the apparatus; no register entry here counts that rejected alternative as dialogue vocabulary.

Intimation of a capacity — μαντεύεσθαι (manteuesthai)

μαντεύεσθαι (manteuesthai)

Intimation of a capacity. The soul divines that it has wisdom by some nature. This anticipatory confidence remains short of discovering what, when, and how. Attested: μαντευομένης (974b). Prophecy interpretation and knowing whether a saying is true.

Exposition of signs and oracles — ἑρμηνευτική (hermēneutikē)

ἑρμηνευτική (hermēneutikē)

Exposition of signs and oracles. The human art handles what is said but, in the Athenian’s criticism, does not know its truth. It is not identical to later divine mediation. Attested: ἑρμηνευτικὴ (975c). Prophecy interpretation and knowing whether a saying is true.

Limited object of knowledge — εἰδέναι (eidenai)

εἰδέναι (eidenai)

Limited object of knowledge. The interpreter knows the thing said, but not whether it is true; the limitation concerns the object and warrant of the knowledge. Attested: οἶδεν (975c). Prophecy interpretation and knowing whether a saying is true.

Truth not learned — μανθάνειν (manthanein)

μανθάνειν (manthanein)

Truth not learned. The human interpreter’s defect is not having learned whether the saying is true. Attested: ἔμαθεν (975c). Prophecy interpretation and knowing whether a saying is true.

Knowing a saying without its truth — μαντική (mantikē)

μαντική (mantikē)

Knowing a saying without its truth. Prophecy is excluded with interpretation because the competence knows only what is said and has not learned whether it is true. Attested: μαντική (975c). Prophecy interpretation and knowing whether a saying is true.

Truth of an utterance — ἀληθής (alēthēs)

ἀληθής (alēthēs)

Truth of an utterance. The criterion prophecy and interpretation have not learned: whether what is said is true, beyond knowing the saying itself. Attested: ἀληθές (975c). Prophecy interpretation and knowing whether a saying is true.

Knowing what is said not whether it is true (contextual phrase)

τὸ λεγόμενον γὰρ οἶδεν μόνον, εἰ δ’ ἀληθές, οὐκ ἔμαθεν (975c)

The art’s known object is the utterance; the indirect question εἰ ἀληθές makes its truth a further object of learning. The distinction does not say that every oracle is false. It denies that handling or interpreting the saying alone gives the truth-knowledge required for wisdom. Prophecy interpretation and knowing whether a saying is true.