Ε Epsilon

who has knowledge

ἐπιστήμων

The man who has knowledge, set against the pretender · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

Browse this book’s lexicon →

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordKnowing, skilled, expert; as a noun, the man who has knowledge of something.
  • In the CharmidesThree times. The man whose temperance knows only knowledge will be able to distinguish neither the pretended doctor from the true one “nor anyone else who has knowledge from anyone who does not” (170e); no one could live “still more knowledgeably” than the all-knowing man (174a); and the concessions of the argument were made so that “our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it” (175c).
  • In this edition“Who has knowledge”, “more knowledgeably”, “know”.
  • A place to read170d–171c.
English renderings
ἐπιστημόνων, epistēmonōn, “(anyone) who has knowledge”; ἐπιστημονέστερον, epistēmonesteron, “(still) more knowledgeably”; ἐπιστήμων, epistēmōn, “(turn out) to know”

Meaning

The adjective belongs to ἐπίσταμαι, “to know how, to understand” (see ἐπίσταμαι): the ἐπιστήμων is the man who has a skill and can be relied on for it, the trained pilot or doctor, and with a genitive he is knowledgeable “of” something. Its opposite is the man who lacks the knowledge, and, in the Charmides, the man who pretends to it (see ἀλαζών). Where ἐπιστήμη names the knowledge, ἐπιστήμων names the person who has it.

Use in the book

The word enters at the point where the argument turns against temperance. Socrates has shown that the knowledge of knowledge would know that a man knows, but not what (170b–d; see γιγνώσκω), and he draws the consequence: “Then he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is, nor anyone else who has knowledge from anyone who does not” (170e). The doctor is one case, and the adjective makes the case general. The test that follows, in which only a doctor can examine a doctor, is told under ἀληθινός (170e–171c).

The man who has knowledge is what the dream needs. If temperance could tell him from the pretender, no false pilot or doctor or general would deceive us, and all our things would be made by genuine craftsmen (173b–c; see ἀλαζών; δημιουργός). The comparative at 174a carries the same figure to its limit, the man who knows past, present and future, and no one would live “still more knowledgeably” than he (see ἐπιστημόνως).

The last use is in Socrates’ review of what was conceded. The argument did not allow that by knowledge of knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge, yet they granted it, “so that, if you please, our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it” (175b–c; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἄλογος). The temperate man was to be the one knower who could recognise all the others. The adjective can be read as the dialogue’s name for what temperance was meant to detect and could not.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective occurs.

  1. 170eThe temperate man will not distinguish the pretended doctor from the true, nor anyone who has knowledge from anyone who does not.
  2. 174aNo one would live more knowledgeably than the man who knew past, present and future.
  3. 175cThe concessions were made so that the temperate man might know, of what he knows, that he knows it.

Translation in this edition

“Anyone else who has knowledge” for ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπιστημόνων, with “anyone who does not” for καὶ μή (170e2–3); “still more knowledgeably” for ἐπιστημονέστερον (174a7), which the edition takes as adverbial with ζῶντα (it could also agree with οὐδένα); and at 175c2 the adjective with its genitive, γένοιτο ὁ σώφρων ἐπιστήμων ὧν τε οἶδεν, is turned into a verb, “our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows”. There γένοιτο is T’s reading; B has γε οιτο, and W γε οἴοιτο.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Statesman states as a principle of rule what the Charmides’ dream hoped temperance would secure. The visitor from Elea holds that the one right constitution is that in which the rulers prove to have real knowledge, ἐπιστήμονας, and not the mere reputation for it, whether they govern by laws or without them, with the consent of the governed or against it, and whether they are themselves poor or wealthy; for we go on calling doctors doctors whether they heal us with our consent or against it, by the knife or the cautery, so long as they take charge of us by their art for the good of our bodies (293a–d). The same passage allows such rulers to purge the city by killing or exiling some, for its good (293d). The Charmides’ picture of a city governed without error (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία) can be read as the same hope, set before two men who would later govern Athens by force (see βιάζομαι). In the myth of Er, the soldier who came back from death to tell what he had seen, the study to be sought above all others is to learn who will make a man able and knowledgeable, ἐπιστήμονα, to tell a good life from a bad one (Republic 618c; see ζητητής).