From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordA knowledge whose object is itself: the reflexive of a knowledge, not of a person.
- In the CharmidesCritias’ answer at 166c: “All the others are knowledge of something else, not of themselves, but this alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself.” The reflexive returns in every statement of the formula (166e, 167c, 168a).
- In this edition“Of itself”.
- A place to read166b–c.
- English renderings
- ἐπιστήμη … αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς, epistēmē … autē heautēs, “knowledge … of itself”
Meaning
Ἑαυτῆς is the feminine reflexive genitive, agreeing with ἐπιστήμη: “of itself”, the knowledge’s own self. It is not ἑαυτοῦ, the reflexive of a person, which Critias used a page earlier when he said that temperance is knowledge “of oneself” (165c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ), and it is not the knowing knowledge of 169e1, where knowledge is the subject that knows itself, though at 169e4 Critias returns to the genitive, γνῶσιν αὐτὴν αὑτῆς, “knowledge that is knowledge of itself” (see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει). Here knowledge is the object of knowledge. Burnet’s text has the emphatic αὐτή beside it: “itself, of itself”.
Use in the book
The reflexive enters as the answer to a question that seemed to require the opposite. Socrates had asked what temperance is knowledge of, other than itself (166a–b; see ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἕτερος), as the odd and the even are other than calculation. Critias answers that this is precisely where temperance differs: the others are knowledge “of something else, not of themselves”, and temperance alone is knowledge “of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself” (166c; see διαφέρω). The difference Socrates was looking for is located in the self-reference.
The dialogue never refutes this half. The procession of powers makes it strange (167c–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς), and the principle of 168d says what it would require: what has its power in relation to itself must have the character its power is directed at (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Applied to knowledge, the principle requires only that knowledge be itself something to be known, and that is no contradiction. Socrates says he does not trust himself to decide whether any knowledge relates to itself and leaves it to “a great man” (169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ); the argument that defeats Critias proceeds on the other half of the formula (see ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν).
The reflexive can be read as the point at which the Charmides hands its question on. Plato does not return to a knowledge of itself by that name; Aristotle does, in more than one form.
Places to read
The passages in which the reflexive is said of knowledge.
- 166cThe others are of something else, not of themselves; this alone is of the others and of itself.
- 166eCritias restates it, putting “itself” first.
- 167cOne single knowledge, of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge.
- 168aKnowledge of no subject of learning, but of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.
- 169eCritias: whoever has knowledge that is knowledge of itself will know himself.
Translation in this edition
“Of itself” for αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς (166c3), the English keeping the order of the Greek, the others first and itself last; at 166e6 Critias reverses it, and the English follows (see ἐπιστήμη αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). The edition’s Key Words record the shift from the reflexive of a person to the reflexive of a knowledge; it is told under γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν.
Other ancient sources
Aristotle takes up the self-reference three ways. Of the divine mind he says that it thinks itself, since it is the best of things, and its thinking is a thinking of thinking (Metaphysics 12.9, 1074b33–35; see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει). Of perception he asks whether it is by sight that we perceive that we see (On the Soul 3.2, 425b12–25; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). And in the Ethics he makes the awareness an accompaniment of every activity: the man who sees perceives that he sees, the man who hears that he hears, the man who walks that he walks, and in every case something in us perceives that we are active, so that we perceive that we perceive and think that we think; and to perceive this is to perceive that we exist.1 The third is the nearest to Critias’ claim and the furthest from it: an awareness of one’s own knowing that goes with all knowing, not a separate knowledge set over the rest.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.9, 1170a29–b1.