Writing, teaching and memory

Memory and reminding

μνήμη, mnēmē, “memory”; ὑπόμνησις, hypomnēsis, “reminding”; ὑπόμνημα, hypomnēma, “reminder; thing that prompts memory”

Writing can prompt someone who knows, but prompting is not the same as teaching knowledge. The distinction is about the use and possessor of the reminder, not an absolute rule that external reminders are bad.

From the book

Phaedrus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Browse this book’s lexicon →

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordWriting can prompt someone who knows, but prompting is not the same as teaching knowledge. The distinction is about the use and possessor of the reminder, not an absolute rule that external reminders are bad.
  • In the PhaedrusThe opening scene is a comedy of memory. Phaedrus wants to reproduce Lysias’ composition worthily, and Socrates imagines repeated hearing and reading until he knows it by heart (228a–b). Phaedrus then says he did not learn the precise expressions but can summarize the thought (228d). The book interrupts the proposed memory performance. Socrates himself later claims to have forgotten the sources from which he was filled, though he feels able to make a rival speech (235c–d). These local claims concern remembered words, ideas and sources, not necessarily the recollection of pre-embodied reality.
  • In this editionThe edition’s “recollect” at 275a preserves the same verbal family as the palinode’s recollection. Its note explicitly points to that relation. “Reminding” at 275a belongs to Thamus’ corrective phrase, while “reminders” at 249c and 276d have positive uses. No exclusive rule equating reminding with external falsehood is supported by these passages.
  • A place to readMemorized wording, summarized thought and forgotten sources.

Meaning

Memory is the ability to retain or recover understanding; a reminder supplies an occasion to bring something back to mind. Thamus warns that reliance on external marks can leave memory unpractised (275a). Socrates nevertheless allows a knowledgeable writer to store reminders for forgetful old age and for people following the same path (276d). The distinction concerns what a reminder can do for its reader, rather than making every reminder useless.

Use in the book

The opening scene is a comedy of memory. Phaedrus wants to reproduce Lysias’ composition worthily, and Socrates imagines repeated hearing and reading until he knows it by heart (228a–b). Phaedrus then says he did not learn the precise expressions but can summarize the thought (228d). The book interrupts the proposed memory performance. Socrates himself later claims to have forgotten the sources from which he was filled, though he feels able to make a rival speech (235c–d). These local claims concern remembered words, ideas and sources, not necessarily the recollection of pre-embodied reality.

The palinode gives memory a deeper setting: the philosophical soul remains near the realities it once saw, as far as it can, by memory and right use of reminders (249c). The charioteer’s memory carries him back to beauty with temperance when he sees the beloved (254b). That important account is treated under Recollection; its positive reminders prevent the later criticism of writing from making every ὑπόμνημα intrinsically inferior or corrupting.

Reminding is also an ordinary pedagogical service. The handbook recapitulation reminds listeners in summary of what has been said (267d). Phaedrus asks Socrates to remind him of the requirements for craft after the seed analogy (277b). These requests are part of an inquiry, not proof that inquiry has failed.

Theuth calls letters a drug of memory and wisdom; Thamus replies that they are a drug of reminding, not memory (274e–275a). His reason is that trust in outside marks belonging to others will leave memory unpractised. He contrasts recollecting from outside with doing so from within, oneself by oneself. The same recollecting verb occurs on both sides of the contrast.

Socrates’ qualified permission for writing gives the distinction its practical shape. Written accounts can remind the person who knows of their subject (275c–d). The writer may store reminders against the possibility of an old age of forgetfulness and for anyone following the same path (276d). This leaves writing a real benefit while denying that possession of a reminder supplies the learning and defensible understanding it presupposes.

Places to read

  1. 228a–d2Memorized wording, summarized thought and forgotten sources.
  2. 235c–dMemorized wording, summarized thought and forgotten sources.
  3. 249cPhilosophical memory and the charioteer’s recovery of beauty.
  4. 254bPhilosophical memory and the charioteer’s recovery of beauty.
  5. 267dRecapitulation and the distinction made by Thamus.
  6. 274e–275d23Recapitulation and the distinction made by Thamus.
  7. 276dReminders for old age and fellow seekers; reminders for those who know.
  8. 277b–278a2Reminders for old age and fellow seekers; reminders for those who know.

Translation in this edition

The edition’s “recollect” at 275a preserves the same verbal family as the palinode’s recollection. Its note explicitly points to that relation. “Reminding” at 275a belongs to Thamus’ corrective phrase, while “reminders” at 249c and 276d have positive uses. No exclusive rule equating reminding with external falsehood is supported by these passages.

Lexical detail

Μνήμη is memory, while ὑπόμνησις is reminding and ὑπόμνημα a reminder. The related verbs describe remembering, recalling something to oneself or bringing it to someone’s attention. The dialogue does not enforce a single rigid taxonomy across every occurrence. In particular, ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι, the verb associated with recollection in the palinode, also describes the externally prompted recollecting criticized by Thamus (275a).

The central local distinction is therefore functional: retaining and exercising knowledge within oneself differs from relying on marks to prompt an appearance of knowledge that one has not learned.

Attested forms

μνήμης (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “of memory”. Memory is weakened through lack of its exercise in Thamus’ account.

ὑπομνήσεως (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “of reminding”. Thamus revises Theuth’s claim for the drug.

ὑπομνήματα (276d · Burnet p. 69) — “reminders”. A knowledgeable writer stores them for himself and fellow seekers.

Research and interpretation

LSJ gives reminder and memorial for hypomnēma and cites 249c, where reminders of divine things are positive. Native 275a also uses the verb of recollecting for dependence on external marks. The vocabulary therefore resists an absolute equation of recollection with good and reminding with bad.

Liddell, Scott and Jones, Greek–English Lexicon, ὑπόμνημα.

ἀγγεῖον

An angeion is a container, here the jar to which Socrates compares himself. He says that hearing other people has filled his breast from their streams, although he cannot remember whose. The image presents his proposed speech as received material rather than a discovery he can confidently claim as his own.

Read: 235d.

angeion · Jar or vessel · lemma

A container into which something is poured.

Socrates claims his breast is full of material heard from others, as if he were a jar filled from their streams. He is conscious of his own lack of learning and cannot name the remembered source. The image marks dependence on hearing; it is not proof that the proposed speech is an independent discovery.

Attested: ἀγγείου (235d · Burnet p. 12) — “jar”. Genitive in the comparison “like a jar”.

See: Knowledge and ignorance; Memory and reminding; Socrates

Research and sources for this word.

Ἀνακρέων

Anacreon is one possible source Socrates names for the thoughts filling his breast. He mentions the wise Anacreon beside Sappho while admitting that he cannot remember exactly what he heard or from whom. His suggestion is tentative, rather than an identification of a particular borrowed poem.

Read: 235c.

Anakreōn · Anacreon · lemma

The poet named beside Sappho in Socrates’ uncertain account of his sources.

Socrates calls Anacreon wise while suggesting where the contents of his full breast may have originated. Phaedrus is more interested in hearing the new speech than in establishing its source. The edition identifies Anacreon as a lyric poet of love; no poem has been independently consulted for this record.

Attested: Ἀνακρέοντος (235c · Burnet p. 12) — “Anacreon”. Genitive with the epithet wise.

See: Love and the lover; Memory and reminding; Socrates

Research and sources for this word.

ἅτε

This connective presents a circumstance as a cause or explanation. In Thamus’ judgement, learners neglect inward remembering because they trust external written marks. The connection belongs to his diagnosis in Socrates’ story; the same particle can also occur in Socrates’ teasing remarks without making their tone identical.

Read: 275a.

hate · As being; since · causal particle

A connective giving the circumstances as the speaker’s explanation or cause.

Thamus says forgetfulness will result from unpractised memory, since trust in writing leads learners to recollect through alien marks from outside. The causal force belongs to his diagnosis within the story. At 275b Socrates uses the same word in a teasing description of the supposedly unwise ancients: its occurrence does not remove the need to distinguish speaker and tone.

Attested: ἅτε (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “since”.

See: Memory and reminding; Writing and letters

The 275 witness preserves Thamus’ causal explanation and Socrates’ subsequent teasing contrast.

Plato, Phaedrus 275, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

διδαχή

Teaching is instruction that develops understanding, beyond exposure to many words. In Thamus’ criticism, pupils become hearers of much without teaching and therefore appear wiser than they are. The contrast concerns how knowledge is formed, rather than simply how much language someone has encountered.

Read: 275a; 277e.

didachē · Teaching · dictionary headword

Instruction that makes extensive hearing into informed understanding.

Thamus says the new pupils will become hearers of much “without teaching”, which explains why their apparent judgement exceeds their actual judgement. The omission concerns formation of knowledge, not merely lack of exposure to words. At 277e teaching is paired with questioning in the criticism of unexamined recitation.

Attested: διδαχῆς (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “teaching”.

Attested: διδαχῆς (277e · Burnet p. 71) — “teaching”. Questioning and teaching are absent from the recitation under criticism.

See: Knowledge and ignorance; Living speech and defence; Memory and reminding

Research and sources for this word.

ἔξωθεν · ἔνδοθεν

From outside and from within distinguish the sources prompting recollection. Thamus says reliance on other people’s written marks produces remembering from outside instead of exercising memory from within oneself. The same spatial words can also describe self-motion or inner and outer goods, with different objects in each argument.

Read: 275a; 275a.

exōthen · endothen · From outside and from within · paired adverbs

Contrasting sources from which recollecting is prompted.

In Thamus’ claim, reliance on alien written marks produces outwardly prompted recollection instead of inward exercise. The same spatial contrast also has different roles elsewhere: self-motion’s source at 245e and the final prayer’s inner and outer goods at 279b. Those are contextual connections, not identical lexical arguments.

Attested: ἔξωθεν (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “from outside”.

Attested: ἔνδοθεν (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “from within”. Contrasted with prompting from alien written marks.

See: Memory and reminding; Writing and letters

The 275 witness preserves the external-character versus internal-memory contrast.

Plato, Phaedrus 275, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

ἐπάνοδος

Recapitulation is returning over the main points at a speech’s end. Phaedrus explains it as reminding the audience, in summary, of each thing said. The example gives reminding a legitimate practical function, even though reminding is later distinguished from the fuller achievement of knowledge.

Read: 267d.

epanodos · Recapitulation · dictionary headword

A return over what has been said at the speech’s end.

Phaedrus explains it as reminding the listeners in summary of each point. Different teachers give the ending different names, but Socrates treats the function as shared. The example supplies an ordinary and legitimate use of reminding before the writing myth’s more demanding distinction.

Attested: ἐπάνοδον (267d · Burnet p. 57) — “recapitulation”.

See: Craft and expertise; Memory and reminding

Research and sources for this word.

Εὐηνός

Evenus is the Parian teacher named in the survey of rhetorical devices. Socrates credits him with insinuation and incidental praise, but says only that some people attribute verse censures to him as aids to memory. The report’s different degrees of certainty matter.

Read: 267a.

Euēnos · Evenus · proper name

The Parian credited with insinuation and incidental praises.

Socrates adds that some say he composed incidental censures in metre to help memory, and calls him wise. The shift from direct attribution to “some say” is part of the source’s evidential wording. The list is a dramatic survey of named techniques, not independent historical verification of inventions.

Attested: Εὐηνὸν (267a · Burnet p. 56) — “Evenus”.

See: Craft and expertise; Memory and reminding

Research and sources for this word.

Θαμοῦς

Thamus is the king who evaluates Theuth’s inventions in Socrates’ Egyptian story. He asks what each is good for and disputes the promise that letters will produce memory and wisdom, allowing them a role in reminding instead. His clear judging role does not require settling the difficult nearby reference to Ammon.

Read: 274d.

Thamous · Thamus · proper name

The judging king in the Egyptian story.

He asks each invention’s benefit and evaluates Theuth’s claims. His corrective judgement gives letters a role in reminding while disputing their promised production of memory and wisdom. The nearby reference to Ammon is textually and interpretively difficult; the king’s spoken role is clear without forcing that identification.

Attested: Θαμοῦ (274d · Burnet p. 66) — “Thamus”.

See: Drug, remedy and enchantment; Memory and reminding; Writing and letters

Research and sources for this word.

Θεύθ

Theuth is the inventor who presents letters and other discoveries to the Egyptian king in Socrates’ story. He claims that letters will improve memory and wisdom, but Thamus challenges this account of their effects. The example distinguishes producing an invention from judging what it will do to its users.

Read: 274c.

Theuth · Theuth · proper name

The inventor in Socrates’ Egyptian story, father of letters.

He presents number, calculation, geometry, astronomy, draughts, dice and letters to the king. His claim that letters confer memory and wisdom is challenged by Thamus. The dialogue distinguishes the power to invent from the ability to judge effects on future users, rather than treating paternal goodwill as reliable evaluation.

Attested: Θεύθ (274c · Burnet p. 66) — “Theuth”.

See: Drug, remedy and enchantment; Memory and reminding; Writing and letters

Research and sources for this word.

νᾶμα

Streams are flowing waters used metaphorically for things Socrates has heard from other people.

At 235c–d he says his hearing has filled him like a jar from others’ streams, although he has forgotten the source.

nama · Streams received through hearing · lemma

Flowing water used as an image for material received from other speakers.

The streams belong to others, and hearing is the channel by which Socrates says he was filled. The qualification that he has forgotten how and from whom he heard prevents the image from identifying a source. Phaedrus wants the performance and dismisses the question of provenance.

Attested: ναμάτων (235c–d · Burnet p. 12) — “streams”. Plural, qualified as other people’s.

See: Memory and reminding; Myth and rationalization; Socrates

Fowler preserves both the reception image and the forgotten provenance. The metaphor does not identify which poet or writer supplied the ensuing argument.

Plato, Phaedrus 235c, 235d — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).

παρέπαινος · παράψογος

Incidental praise and incidental censure are subsidiary evaluative devices associated with Evenus in the rhetorical catalogue.

At 267a Socrates credits Evenus with incidental praise and reports that some also attribute metrical incidental censures to him.

parepainos · parapsogos · Incidental praise and censure · paired technical nouns

Praise or blame introduced alongside the principal material.

Evenus is associated with incidental praise; some also say he puts incidental censures into metre for the sake of memory. The report-status differs between the two claims and is preserved. Metrical memorability is an aid to retaining technique, not evidence that the whole rhetorical craft has been acquired.

Attested: παρεπαίνους (267a · Burnet p. 56) — “incidental praises”.

Attested: παραψόγους (267a · Burnet p. 56) — “incidental censures”. Socrates attributes the metrical practice to what some say of Evenus.

See: Craft and expertise; Memory and reminding

Research and sources for this word.

ῥῆμα

An expression is the particular wording of an account, distinguished from its summarized thought or the method needed to compose it well.

At 228d Phaedrus offers Lysias’ thought in summary rather than the exact expressions.

rhēma · Expression or wording · dictionary headword

A spoken expression or the particular words in which something is said.

Phaedrus distinguishes remembering Lysias’ exact expressions from recounting the thought in summary (228d). At 271c Socrates says stating the expressions themselves is not easy, but offers the requirements for writing by craft. The distinction leaves room for an account of method without pretending to supply every exact formula.

Attested: ῥήματα (228d · Burnet p. 3) — “expressions”.

Attested: ῥήματα (271c · Burnet p. 62) — “expressions”. The exact formulations are distinguished from the requirements for masterly writing.

See: Logos: speech, account and reason; Memory and reminding

Research and sources for this word.

Σαπφώ

Sappho is named as a possible source of things Socrates has heard about love, rather than as the certain author of his coming speech.

At 235c he mentions Sappho, Anacreon and some prose writers while admitting that he cannot identify his source.

Sapphō · Sappho · lemma

The poet named as a possible source of better things about love.

Socrates says he must have heard something from Sappho the beautiful, Anacreon the wise or certain writers, but cannot say precisely from whom. The uncertainty is part of his speech. Naming Sappho does not permit a particular argument in his ensuing performance to be assigned to one of her poems.

Attested: Σαπφοῦς (235c · Burnet p. 12) — “Sappho”. Genitive in the possible-source list.

See: Love and the lover; Memory and reminding; Socrates

Research and sources for this word.

τύπος

Marks are the external written signs on which a reader can rely for reminding. Thamus contrasts this reliance with recollecting from within oneself.

At 275a he says writing prompts recollection through other people’s marks rather than through the learner’s own inward exercise.

typos · Mark or imprint · dictionary headword

A written mark that provides an external prompt.

Thamus speaks of recollection prompted from outside by marks belonging to others, rather than from within by oneself. The verb for recollecting applies on both sides; the distinction concerns the source and exercise of the activity, not two categorically unrelated mental verbs.

Attested: τύπων (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “marks”.

See: Memory and reminding; Writing and letters

Fowler confirms the external/internal contrast. The same Greek verb of recollecting applies in the contrast; it does not name two categorically unrelated mental acts.

Plato, Phaedrus 275a — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).