Recognition and discrimination

Use in the book

The “great man” of 169a would need to discriminate which powers can apply to themselves and whether knowledge belongs among them. Socrates' admitted inability is a failure to settle that classification, not a denial that distinctions can be made at all.

At 170a the proposed knowledge of knowledge is restricted to discriminating knowledge from what is not knowledge. It cannot thereby distinguish one specialized knowledge from another. At 170e the point is operationalized as telling a true doctor from someone who merely presents himself as one. Correct identification requires following the relevant claims and acts about health and disease (171a–b).

There are therefore two levels of discrimination: generic epistemic status and a specific kind of expertise. The argument's force depends on showing why the first is not yet the second. The exception at 171c, one's own fellow expert, reinforces rather than abolishes the field requirement. Expertise can recognize expertise within its own domain; a universal certifying power requires more than the generic name of knowledge.

Two smaller verbs specify the competence required. At 170e epaiein means understand or have expert acquaintance: the doctor understands the healthy and diseased. At 171b epakolouthein means follow, here follow and assess the relevant claims and performances. These are neither mere auditory following nor a complete theory of demonstration. They explain why recognizing an expert is tied to substantive grasp. Dielesthai at 169a–b2 is the aorist infinitive of diairein, marking the classification Socrates cannot settle; it should not be confused with diakrinein and diagignōskein in the later certification problem.

Places to read

1. 169a–b2Classification of self-relating powers left unresolved
2. 170aKnowledge/nonknowledge discrimination delimited
3. 170e–171c2Recognizing a genuine practitioner requires the relevant field

Translation in this edition

At 170a7 Burnet prints διαιρεῖν from a correcting hand in T against διευρεῖν reported in the principal witnesses. The adopted verb supports “distinguish”; it should not be cited as though the transmission were uniform.

διαγιγνώσκω

Attested: διαγνώσεσθαι (diagnōsesthai). To recognize or distinguish correctly; identifying the genuine doctor as opposed to a pretender requires testing the appropriate subject matter. References: 170e. Lexical identification: lemma: διαγιγνώσκω. See Recognition and discrimination.

διαιρέω

Attested: διαιροῦντος / διαιρήσεται / διελέσθαι / διαιρεῖν (diairountos / diairēsetai / dielesthai / diairein). To distinguish or separate: Prodicus distinguishes words, an adequate thinker must distinguish kinds of self-related powers, and knowledge of knowledge can at most distinguish knowledge from what is not knowledge. References: 163d, 169a, 169c, 170a. Lexical identification: lemma: διαιρέω. See Recognition and discrimination.

διακρίνω

Attested: διακρίνειν / διακρῖναι (diakrinein / diakrinai). To discriminate between; the issue is whether temperance alone can tell a genuine expert from a person who lacks expertise but pretends to have it. References: 170e, 171c. Lexical identification: lemma: διακρίνω. See Recognition and discrimination.

Use in the book

The power to discriminate appears as the cognitive partner of making best and punishing rightly. Someone who cannot recognize good and bad quality would lack the basis for successful correction. At 137d this competence is extended to humans alongside improvement and punishment. The argument gives judgment a standard, even though it does not explain that standard’s substantive content.

At 138b the object expands to “both oneself and others.” What had been expert evaluation of subjects now includes the evaluator. Socrates identifies the capacity with temperance, just as right punishment is identified with justice. The subsequent identity claim depends on both belonging to the same knowledge. The important transition is not merely from one English synonym to another, but from outward assessment to a knowledge in which the self is also an object.

The final civic commission makes discrimination practical. The city may direct the philosopher to decide or judge something. This is no longer a display of informed opinion in the presence of a craftsman. The person must render a decision and is expected to lead. Discernment has become the basis of an entrusted action.

A possible reading is that the whole closing sequence demands reflective, well-grounded practical judgment. That captures its direction, but the passage never offers a separate definition of philosophical judgment or a procedure for deciding difficult cases. It asserts a unity between corrective, evaluative and governing knowledge and then challenges the proposed philosopher to meet its standard.

Places to read

1. 137dδιαγιγνώσκουσαν τοὺς χρηστούς τε καὶ μοχθηρούς — The same craft is said to distinguish good and bad human quality.
2. 138bδιαγιγνώσκειν καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους — Self and others are brought under one discerning capacity.
3. 138eπροστάττῃ διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν — Civic discernment issues in an assigned decision or judgment.

Translation in this edition

“Distinguish” and “decide” in the translation preserve different contexts without requiring a strict philosophical opposition between the Greek verbs. The wording “oneself and others” is essential: an abridgment to introspective self-awareness would lose the interpersonal reach on which the identity with justice relies.