From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordA knowledge “of something”: the genitive of the object that every knowledge must have.
- In the CharmidesSocrates’ first step when Critias makes temperance knowing oneself: “then clearly it would be a kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something, wouldn’t it?” (165c). The question returns as “what is temperance knowledge of?” (166a–b), and as the premise of the relatives: “this knowledge is knowledge of something, and has a certain power such that it is of something” (168b).
- In this edition“Knowledge of something”.
- A place to read165c–166c.
- English renderings
- ἐπιστήμη τις … καὶ τινός, epistēmē tis … kai tinos, “a kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something”; τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, tinos estin epistēmē, “what (each …) is knowledge of”; τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, tinos epistēmē, “knowledge of something”
Meaning
The Greek states the axiom with the indefinite τις twice, ἐπιστήμη τις … καὶ τινός, “a knowledge of some kind, and of something”. The genitive is the genitive of the object, as in “knowledge of the healthy”. Knowledge, on this axiom, is a relative: it is what it is in relation to what it is of.
Use in the book
Socrates introduces the axiom as obvious. “If temperance is knowing something, then clearly it would be a kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something, wouldn’t it?” “It is … knowledge of oneself” (165c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ). The axiom brings its examples with it: medicine is of the healthy and produces health (165c–d; see ἀπεργάζομαι), and when Critias objects that calculation and geometry produce nothing one could point to, Socrates keeps the object and lets the product go: “But I can point out to you what each of these kinds of knowledge is knowledge of, which is something distinct from the knowledge itself.” Calculation is of the odd and the even, weighing of the heavier and the lighter weight, and then comes the question: “Tell me, then: what is temperance knowledge of, that is something other than temperance itself?” (166a–b; see ἕτερος; λογιστική; στατική). The axiom has two clauses now: of something, and of something other than itself.
Critias’ answer keeps the first clause and breaks the second: temperance is of the other knowledges, and of itself (166c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς). Socrates returns to the axiom as the premise of the relatives: “Come then: this knowledge is knowledge of something, and has a certain power such that it is of something, doesn’t it?” “Certainly.” The greater follows, as a power that is greater than something (168b; see δύναμις; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). At 171a it decides the test of the doctor: each knowledge is defined by the particular things it is of, medicine by the healthy and the diseased (see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ὁρίζω; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι).
The axiom can be read as doing the whole of the argument’s work. Once knowledge must be of something, a knowledge of knowledge is a knowledge whose something is knowledge, and the question becomes what that something can give it. The answer, that it can give only the bare fact that a man knows, follows from the axiom applied twice: the knowledge of knowledge is of knowledges, and each of those is of its own objects, which the knowledge of knowledge does not reach.
Places to read
The passages in which the axiom is stated.
- 165cIf temperance is knowing something, it is a knowledge, and of something.
- 166a–b2Each knowledge is of something distinct from itself; what is temperance knowledge of?
- 168bThis knowledge is knowledge of something, with a power to be of something, as the greater is greater than something.
- 171aEach knowledge is defined by being of particular things.
Translation in this edition
“A kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something” renders ἐπιστήμη τις ἂν εἴη καὶ τινός (165c5–6), the English repeating “knowledge” where the Greek lets one noun serve both genitives; “what each of these kinds of knowledge is knowledge of” renders τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἑκάστη (166a4); “knowledge of something” renders τινὸς ἐπιστήμη (168b2).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Gorgias opens on the same question, asked of rhetoric. As weaving is concerned with the making of clothes and music with the making of songs, Socrates asks Gorgias, about which of the things that are is rhetoric a knowledge? “About speeches,” says Gorgias. But medicine too makes people able to speak about the sick, and gymnastics about the good and bad condition of bodies, so every craft is about speeches of its own (449d–450b). The Charmides asks of temperance what the Gorgias asks of rhetoric, and can be read as getting an answer of the same kind: a knowledge whose object seems to be found in every other knowledge. The Republic states the axiom as a rule of relatives, knowledge itself being of learning itself and a particular knowledge of a particular thing (438c–e; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle counts knowledge among relatives, and adds an asymmetry the Charmides does not draw. Most relatives are by nature together, the double and the half; but the knowable seems prior to knowledge, since we mostly acquire knowledge of things that already exist, and if the knowable is taken away, knowledge is taken away with it, while knowledge taken away leaves the knowable.1 A knowledge of knowledge would, on this account, depend on knowledges that depend in turn on things; the object of the Charmides’ temperance is two steps from anything there is.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Categories 7, 7b15–35.