Divine opposition

Use in the book

The opening explicitly contrasts a human cause with a certain divine opposition. Socrates says Alcibiades will discover its power later as well; now it no longer opposes him, and he has come forward with hope that it will not oppose him in future. The account authorizes the timing of this particular encounter, not a claim that every subsequent assertion is exempt from examination.

At 105d–106a2 Socrates describes the restraining agency as the god. He thinks he was not permitted to converse earlier because Alcibiades was too young and not yet filled with the ambition that now makes him ready to listen. The sign’s role is thus connected to a pedagogical opportunity. Socrates’ own explanation contains “I think” and “as it seems to me”; the lexicon should preserve the difference between his experience of restraint and his interpretation of why it occurred.

At 124c the god becomes Socrates’ guardian, better and wiser than Pericles. This comparison does not eliminate Socrates’ stated need for care and education; it identifies the support on which he relies in saying Alcibiades’ distinction will come through him. Alcibiades answers that he is joking, and Socrates allows “perhaps” while insisting on their shared need. The divine claim belongs inside the interplay of solemnity and irony rather than outside the drama as a narrator’s certified fact.

The framing returns through divine-will clauses at 127e and 135d. Socrates predicts improvement if Alcibiades answers and the god wills; at the end he corrects the young man’s dependence on Socrates’ wish alone. This does not undo the value of the promised relationship. It prevents the lover or teacher from being treated as the sole controller of its success. The last fear of the city completes the qualification: permission to begin is not a narrated guarantee of perseverance or a secure future.

The dialogue never calls the opposition a voice or describes its childhood origin. Those features belong to the edition’s comparison with the Apology. They may illuminate the allusion but should not silently replace the specific presentation here.

Places to read

1. 103a–103bDivine restraint and its cessation explain the opening approach.
2. 105d–106a2Socrates calls the agency the god and interprets the earlier prohibition pedagogically.
3. 124c–124dThe god becomes the better guardian; Alcibiades detects joking.
4. 127eImprovement is qualified by divine willing and Socrates’ divination.
5. 135d–135eDivine willing and fear prevent a guarantee of success.

Translation in this edition

The edition calls this Socrates’ sign in explanatory prose, but the actual initial phrase is divine opposition. Its notes compare the Apology; this entry does not import that dialogue’s detailed account as if repeated here.

δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα

Attested: δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα (daimonion enantiōma; 103a). Divine opposition, the restraint Socrates says delayed his approach. Lexical identification: phrase label: δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα. See Divine opposition.

δαιμόνιος

Attested: δαιμόνιον (daimonion; 103a). Divine or supernatural, qualifying the opposition rather than naming a separate demon. Lexical identification: lemma: δαιμόνιος. See Divine opposition.

ἐναντιόομαι

Attested: ἐναντιοῦται (enantioutai; 103b). To oppose, of the divine restraint now no longer preventing speech. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐναντιόομαι. See Divine opposition.

ἐναντίωμα

Attested: ἐναντίωμα (enantiōma; 103a). An opposition or impediment, the restraint that prevented Socrates from speaking. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐναντίωμα. See Divine opposition.

ἐφίημι

Attested: ἐφῆκεν (ephēken; 106a). To permit or let someone proceed; the god has now allowed the approach because Alcibiades would listen. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐφίημι. See Divine opposition.

Use in the book

Socrates’ first definition is unusually exact: whenever the voice comes, it signals a turning away from what he is about to do, and never turns him towards anything. The qualification “whenever it comes” matters. He does not claim that every projected action produces a sign, and a silent occasion is not expressly an instruction to proceed. Friends’ consultations can occasion the same prohibition. The narrative therefore extends the sign’s practical bearing beyond Socrates while retaining its negative form.

The anecdotes distinguish occurrence from interpretation. Charmides hears Socrates report the voice and supposes that it predicts failure to win. That supposition is Charmides’ interpretation; Socrates’ reported warning was simply not to train. In the Timarchus episode, the voice occurs on two attempted departures. Socrates conveys prohibitions, although the murderous plan is known only to the conspirators. The narrative attributes preventive significance to the sign without saying that it revealed their secret purpose in words.

At 129d the sign prompts Socrates’ fear for Sannion and the army. “I think” and “I am afraid” introduce Socrates’ forecast. His description does not collapse the occurrence of the sign into an explicit divine statement of all its predicted consequences. Likewise, the later educational account says that the daimonic power sometimes helps an association. This positive efficacy should not be rewritten as a newly reported encouraging voice: the text retains a distinction between the voice’s prohibitive signalling and the power’s broader effects.

Places to read

1. 128dἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή — Socrates identifies the daimonic occurrence as a voice
2. 128dσημαίνει … ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε — its stated direction is away, never towards
3. 128dἀποτρέπει καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ πράττειν — the same prevention extends to a consulting friend
4. 128eἐγένετο ἡ φωνή; σημαίνει σοι — an occurrence and Charmides’ proposed interpretation are distinguished
5. 129bτὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον — the voice is redescribed as the familiar sign
6. 129dπεῖραν … τοῦ σημείου — the sign’s significance is offered for a prospective test

Translation in this edition

“Voice”, “sign”, “signal” and “turning away” preserve the lexical sequence. The opening account is compared with the Apology in note 29, but the edition’s Introduction cautions against transferring all the broader powers described here into that other dialogue. The report gives no account of timbre, volume or private sensory mechanism.

Allow — ἐᾶν

Allow. To permit; its negation here describes the sign’s refusal to let a consulting friend proceed. Attested: ἐᾷ (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away.

Come; occur — γίγνεσθαι

Come; occur. To occur or come into being; here the occurrence of the voice, not an asserted physical movement into Socrates. Attested: γένηται (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away.

Consult — ἀνακοινοῦσθαι

Consult. To communicate a matter for another’s consideration; a friend’s consultation can occasion the voice. Attested: ἀνακοινῶται (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away.

Customary; familiar — εἰωθέναι

Customary; familiar. Perfect participle used adjectivally for the habitual sign, identifying it as a familiar experience. Attested: εἰωθὸς (129b). Voice, sign, and turning away.

Sign — σημεῖον

Sign. An indication carrying practical significance; here the familiar daimonic occurrence that occasions a warning against departure. Attested: σημεῖον (129b). Voice, sign, and turning away.

Signal — σημαίνειν

Signal. To indicate or signify; the voice signals a turning away from the contemplated act. Attested: σημαίνει (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away.

Turn away — ἀποτρέπειν

Turn away. To divert someone from an action; the sign’s prohibition can concern a friend consulting Socrates. Attested: ἀποτρέπει (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away.

Turn towards; urge — προτρέπειν

Turn towards; urge. To encourage movement towards an action; Socrates explicitly denies that the voice ever does this. Attested: προτρέπει (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away.

Turning away — ἀποτροπή

Turning away. A deterrent direction away from something about to be done; the stated content of the voice’s signal. Attested: ἀποτροπήν (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away.

Voice — φωνή

Voice. The occurrence through which Socrates receives a preventive signal; the text supplies no quoted divine sentence or sensory mechanics. Attested: φωνή (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away.

Turning away never turning toward (contextual phrase)

128d: προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε. The voice never prompts Socrates toward an action. This contrasts with its stated signaling of a turning away. It does not mean the larger daimonic power never assists anyone: the account of association later includes positive assistance. The voice's directive function and the power's effect on progress should be described separately. See Voice and sign and Power.