Reputation and ambition

Use in the book

Charmides arrives already thought the most beautiful, and Critias insists he is also thought exceptionally temperate (154a,157d). The repeated language of being thought something ensures that the inquiry begins with reputation, not verified possession. Charmides later makes that distinction himself when he cannot comfortably confirm or deny the account others give of him.

Critias' concern with standing becomes explicit at 162c. He is tense and eager to distinguish himself before the boy and the company, and finally takes over the defence of his definition. At 169c his habitual public esteem helps explain why he is ashamed to acknowledge perplexity. Socrates reports a conflict between preserving a reputation for understanding and honestly admitting that understanding has run out.

The vocabulary should not be made uniformly pejorative. Wishing to do well before others can prompt serious engagement, and public esteem can be deserved. The local problem is that concern for being admired obstructs a truthful account of one's present knowledge. That makes Critias' reaction especially relevant to his definition of temperance as self-knowledge.

Places to read

1. 154aCharmides is introduced through his reputation for beauty; the claim about exceptional temperance comes later at 157d.
2. 157dCharmides’ beauty and temperance are initially given as reputations
3. 156aCharmides says Socrates is much talked about among his peers
4. 162c–dCritias’ eagerness to shine contributes to his intervention
5. 169c–dEstablished esteem and shame help explain concealed perplexity

Translation in this edition

“Eager to shine” translates φιλοτίμως rather than a noun for vanity. “Used to being admired” interprets εὐδοκιμῶν ἑκάστοτε. Calling this simply “pride” is an explanatory English label and should not be mistaken for the separate Greek vocabulary of hubris.

ἀγωνιάω

Attested: ἀγωνιῶν (agōniōn). Be anxiously engaged or on edge; Critias’ competitive concern over the answer is visible before he joins the debate. References: 162c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀγωνιάω. See Reputation and ambition.

εὐδοκιμέω

Attested: εὐδοκιμῶν (eudokimōn). Enjoying esteem or being well regarded; Critias’ accustomed reputation makes him ashamed to admit before the gathering that he cannot answer Socrates’ challenge. References: 169c. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐδοκιμέω. See Reputation and ambition.

κατέχω

Attested: κατέχων (katechōn). Holding himself back or restraining himself; Critias struggles to contain his competitive eagerness before intervening in the discussion. References: 162c. Lexical identification: lemma: κατέχω. See Reputation and ambition.

σπουδή

Attested: σπουδῇ / σπουδῆς (spoudēi / spoudēs). Eagerness or earnest effort; the admirers shove energetically to seat Charmides beside them, while Socrates later recalls taking great pains to learn the charm. References: 155c, 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: σπουδή. See Reputation and ambition.

φιλοτίμως

Attested: φιλοτίμως (philotimōs). With concern for honour or reputation; describes Critias’ tense investment in Charmides’ answer and the audience’s judgment. References: 162c. Lexical identification: lemma: φιλοτίμως. See Reputation and ambition.

Use in the book

The youths’ move from disputants to listeners changes the conditions under which the adults speak. Socrates says he is dazzled and judges that the cultured lover is no less on edge. The latter nevertheless responds very ambitiously, declaring that he would not count himself, or anyone else with the contrary view, as a man if he thought philosophy shameful. His gesture makes “anyone else” point at the athlete. A general claim about a pursuit becomes a public challenge to one person.

This motive remains relevant when the definition changes. The cultured lover later selects subjects likely to confer the greatest reputation for philosophy and imagines outshining whoever happens to be present. The early theatrical details thus anticipate a substantive weakness: an educational program chosen to secure a reputation may not supply the competence needed when a real task arises.

Yet the characterization is not a complete psychological diagnosis. Socrates reports appearances and leaves some reactions unknown. The man also agrees against his immediate advantage and participates in a sustained inquiry. Ambition makes those concessions harder and dramatically more consequential; it does not prove that he never cares about truth.

At the end, shame and silence answer the loud beginning. The audience’s approval cannot by itself demonstrate the final reasoning, but it shows that the lover’s chosen arena has judged him on terms he did not control.

Places to read

1. 133aοὐχ ἧττον ἐμοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν — Socrates judges the lover to be no less on edge than himself.
2. 133aκαὶ μάλα φιλοτίμως — The answer is delivered very ambitiously.
3. 133bκαὶ λέγων μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ — The volume of the speech makes the social audience explicit.

Translation in this edition

The note at 133a translates agōnian as the anxiety of a competitor and compares Charmides 162c. The note on philosophizing includes philotimōs among the dialogue’s love-compounds, alongside love of exercise and love of winning. Those lexical connections are a useful guide, while “display” in this article remains a description of the combined dramatic action rather than the translation of every occurrence of endeiknynai.

Use in the book

Asked which subjects the philosopher should learn after unrestricted much learning has been rejected, the lover answers with those that produce the greatest reputation. The question was educational; his criterion is social. He proposes experience in all crafts, if possible, and especially the ones worth mentioning. The audience and the prestige of the subject help determine the desired achievement before its use has been considered.

The dramatic scene makes this significant. Earlier the lover speaks loudly so that his beloved will hear him, and his confidence must survive an audience that has laughed at the athlete’s counterattack. At 135d the aim is again to rank above the people present. Socrates’ pentathlete translates this social distinction into a technical hierarchy: below specialists but above everybody else. The lover welcomes the translation because second place among experts can still mean first place in an ordinary gathering.

The usefulness test changes the relevant audience. A sick friend or a person on a storm-tossed ship needs an outcome, not a display of cultivated superiority. Reputation alone cannot establish the necessary competence. Still, the argument should not be summarized as exposing a mere impostor: the lover’s proposal includes genuine understanding and the ability to contribute a judgment. Its problem is the adequacy and purpose of that understanding.

Appearance also survives in the ending. It is shameful to “appear second or third” in judging for friends or the city. Socrates does not simply replace all concern for how one appears with an invisible inner virtue. Public performance remains a test, now attached to a task for which one must take responsibility. The shift concerns what deserves recognition and what sort of knowledge can justify it.

Places to read

1. 135bπλείστην δόξαν ἔχοι τις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν — Reputation for philosophy is the lover’s stated selection criterion.
2. 135dὥστε δοκεῖν χαριέστατον εἶναι καὶ σοφώτατον — Cultivated superiority is measured against those present.
3. 139aδεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον — The closing demand still concerns one’s manifest standing in a task.

Translation in this edition

The edition distinguishes “reputation” here from “opinion” in the lover’s earlier refusal to compete against his own belief (134c). That distinction prevents a single mechanical translation of doxa from obscuring two different pressures: fidelity to what one thinks and pursuit of what others think of one.

Use in the book

Theages names the reputable men of the city as the model of rule he desires (126a). Socrates offers an introduction to Athenians fine and good in political matters and says such company will improve the boy's standing among the many (127a). The advice offers both a proposed route to competence and a reputational advantage. Those goods are not proved identical.

Theages turns the evaluative phrase back on Socrates: is he not one of the fine and good men too? This moves from a politically specified class to a broader personal appraisal. Socrates' question “What do you mean?” allows the shift to stand as something requiring explanation. Demodocus then urges his own confidence and desire rather than producing a curriculum Socrates has promised.

At 127e Socrates recalls the father's age, high offices and exceptional honor among his fellow demesmen. These are reasons why the preference for Socrates is puzzling on ordinary civic criteria. The Greek says neither father nor son sees those things in Socrates. It does not, by itself, establish the sweeping historical proposition that Socrates has never held any office. The distinction is important because an inference more absolute than the speech would turn rhetorical self-deprecation into an inaccurate biographical rule.

The wellborn and wealthy sophistic clients provide a related test: prominent social position gives them many free associations, yet the paid teachers can attract them away (128a). Prestige, wealth, choice and educational benefit are connected in the scene, but no one of them supplies a sufficient criterion for the others.

Places to read

1. 126aοἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλλόγιμοι ἄνδρες — Theages' exemplars are men of civic repute
2. 127aτῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν τὰ πολιτικά — Socrates specifies political respectability or excellence
3. 127aεὐδοκιμήσεις παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις — Association promises a better reputation among the many
4. 127eἐμοὶ δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ἐνορᾷ οὐδέτερος ὑμῶν — Socrates says they discern none of the listed distinctions in him

Translation in this edition

“Fine and good” is retained rather than reduced to “aristocratic”. At 127a the Greek page preserves Burnet's εἰ misprint where the sense requires εἶ, “you are”; the English renders the intended question. This is a printed accent error, not an interpretive choice between a question and a conditional sentence.

Anagyrasians — Ἀναγυράσιος (Anagyrasios)

Ἀναγυράσιος (Anagyrasios)

Anagyrasians. Demodocus' fellow demesmen, identified by the deme Anagyrus in the edition's note. Attested: Ἀναγυρασίων (127e). Reputation honor and the fine and good.

Be honored — τιμᾶσθαι (timasthai)

τιμᾶσθαι (timasthai)

Be honored. The passive honor Demodocus receives from his fellow demesmen and the wider city; not a claim that honor proves teaching ability. Attested: τιμᾷ (127e). Reputation honor and the fine and good.

Be well thought of — εὐδοκιμεῖν (eudokimein)

εὐδοκιμεῖν (eudokimein)

Be well thought of. The reputational advantage Socrates says would follow association with an established Athenian. Attested: εὐδοκιμήσεις (127a). Reputation honor and the fine and good.

Discern in — ἐνορᾶν (enoran)

ἐνορᾶν (enoran)

Discern in. What neither interlocutor sees in Socrates: the listed distinctions attributed to Demodocus. Attested: ἐνορᾷ (127e). Reputation honor and the fine and good.

Fine and good — καλὸς κἀγαθός (kalos kagathos) · καλῶν κἀγαθῶν (122e).

καλὸς κἀγαθός (kalos kagathos)

Fine and good. The socially esteemed fathers whose sons receive the conventional curriculum. Attested: καλῶν κἀγαθῶν (122e). Reputation honor and the fine and good.

Fine and good — καλὸς κἀγαθός (kalos kagathos) · καλῶν κἀγαθῶν (127a).

καλὸς κἀγαθός (kalos kagathos)

Fine and good. The evaluative expression first specified for civic affairs and then applied more broadly by Theages to Socrates. Attested: καλῶν κἀγαθῶν (127a). Reputation honor and the fine and good.

Most wellborn — γενναῖος (gennaios)

γενναῖος (gennaios)

Most wellborn. The privileged birth of the young men attracted by paid sophistic association. Attested: γενναιοτάτους (128a). Reputation honor and the fine and good.

Of repute — ἐλλόγιμος (ellogimos)

ἐλλόγιμος (ellogimos)

Of repute. The civic standing of the leaders Theages wishes to emulate through voluntary rule. Attested: ἐλλόγιμοι (126a). Reputation honor and the fine and good.

Use in the book

The companion's first defense of his view of Minos is simply that this is what people say (318e). After Socrates has developed the educational portrait, the companion turns the discrepancy into a question: why has the report of an uneducated and harsh Minos spread abroad? The question acknowledges the existence of both accounts rather than yet deciding how the hostile one arose (320d–e2).

Socrates answers through the poets' capacity to shape opinion. They can work in either direction, praising or speaking ill of the people they portray. Minos incurred the hostility of Athens, a city rich in wisdom and poets of many kinds, by waging war against it. Tragedy then provides the medium of revenge. The explanation makes public evaluation responsive to power, emotion and the interests of those controlling a memorable representation.

This late use of doxa recalls the opening attempt to identify law with political opinion, but its immediate object is different. At 314c–315a2 opinion concerns what a city accepts or judges; at 320e it concerns how persons stand in public estimation. The edition's repeated “opinion” makes the connection audible while preserving the need to distinguish the senses. Socrates' attempt to find truth beneath variable accepted usages is now joined by an attempt to find a man's worth beneath his public image.

The explanation is itself part of Socrates' argument. The work does not give independent testimony from a tragedian admitting a propaganda program. Nor does the fact that a hostile party can influence reputation alone prove the complete falsity of every adverse depiction. The strongest separate sign Socrates adduces is the stability of Minos' laws. His account offers a reason to distrust an apparently obvious consensus and then directs attention to a different kind of evidence.

The advice to avoid the hatred of poetic men has a wry practical force. Someone concerned with being well thought of should reckon with their influence. That does not make the concern a sufficient ethical standard, or turn the dialogue into advice to flatter poets. The gap between good character and favorable report is precisely what makes the warning possible.

Places to read

1. 318eοὐ ταῦτα λέγεται περὶ Μίνω; — The companion appeals to current report
2. 320d–e2αὕτη ἡ φήμη κατεσκέδασται — He asks why the report has been spread abroad
3. 320eτοῦ εὐδόκιμον εἶναι — Being well thought of is the concern named in Socrates' practical warning
4. 320eοἱ γὰρ ποιηταὶ μέγα δύνανται εἰς δόξαν — The poets' power acts upon opinion
5. 320eἢ εὐλογοῦντες ἢ κακηγοροῦντες — Their influence can produce praise or ill report
6. 321a–bκακοδοξότερος γέγονεν — Minos has acquired worse standing in opinion

Translation in this edition

“Report,” “opinion,” “well thought of,” and “held in worse opinion” distinguish the family without losing its relations. “Speaking ill” translates the reading κακηγοροῦντες printed by Burnet; κατηγοροῦντες is an apparatus variant and should not generate a separate attested accusation here.

Are temperate — σωφρονεῖν (sōphronein)

σωφρονεῖν (sōphronein)

Are temperate. To be sound-minded or temperate; the condition introduces Socrates' practical warning to avoid a poet's hatred. Attested: σωφρονῇς (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Cares — μέλειν (melein)

μέλειν (melein)

Cares. To be a concern to someone, with a dative; the person's concern here is being well thought of. Attested: μέλει (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Greatly — μέγας (megas)

μέγας (megas)

Greatly. The neuter form is used adverbially with being able: the poets have great power over opinion, whether praising or speaking ill of a person. Attested: μέγα (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Has been spread abroad — κατασκεδάννυσθαι (kataskedannysthai)

κατασκεδάννυσθαι (kataskedannysthai)

Has been spread abroad. To be scattered or spread widely; the perfect describes the established circulation of the report about Minos. Attested: κατεσκέδασται (320d–e2). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Held in worse opinion — κακόδοξος (kakodoxos)

κακόδοξος (kakodoxos)

Held in worse opinion. Ill reputed; its comparative expresses Minos' worsened public standing, not a demonstrated worsening of his character. Attested: κακοδοξότερος (321a). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Incur hatred — ἀπεχθάνεσθαι (apechthanesthai)

ἀπεχθάνεσθαι (apechthanesthai)

Incur hatred. To become hated or make an enemy of someone; Minos' hostility with Athens explains his adverse poetic reputation in Socrates' account. Attested: ἀπεχθάνεσθαι (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Of every sort — παντοδαπός (pantodapos)

παντοδαπός (pantodapos)

Of every sort. Of many kinds or sorts; describes the poets in Athens and the range of its capacity to influence reputation. Attested: παντοδαποὶ (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Opinion; reputation — δόξα (doxa)

δόξα (doxa)

Opinion; reputation. Public estimation of a person, which poets can influence favorably or adversely; distinguish this reputational sense from the earlier opinion about what is lawful. Attested: δόξαν (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Poetic — ποιητικός (poiētikos)

ποιητικός (poiētikos)

Poetic. Concerned with making poetry; identifies the kind of person whose enmity Socrates warns the reputation-conscious to avoid. Attested: ποιητικῷ (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Poets — ποιητής (poiētēs)

ποιητής (poiētēs)

Poets. Makers of poetry whose praise or hostile portrayal has power over people's opinions and reputations. Attested: ποιηταὶ (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Report — φήμη (phēmē)

φήμη (phēmē)

Report. A saying or reputation spread abroad; the companion asks why the hostile account of Minos persists after Socrates' defense. Attested: φήμη (320d). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Speaking ill — κακηγορεῖν (kakēgorein)

κακηγορεῖν (kakēgorein)

Speaking ill. To speak badly of someone; the reading printed in the dialogue, distinct from the accusation-word reported as an apparatus variant. Attested: κακηγοροῦντες (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Speaking well — εὐλογεῖν (eulogein)

εὐλογεῖν (eulogein)

Speaking well. To speak favorably of someone; one direction in which poets can shape reputation. Attested: εὐλογοῦντες (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Argument; account — λόγος (logos)

λόγος (logos)

Argument; account. An articulated account or argument, here the explanation about Minos that the companion calls reasonable; not an isolated word. Attested: λόγον (321b). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Waging war — πολεμεῖν (polemein)

πολεμεῖν (polemein)

Waging war. To make war; Minos' action toward Athens is acknowledged and made the cause of the city's hostility. Attested: πολεμήσας (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.

Well thought of — εὐδόκιμος (eudokimos)

εὐδόκιμος (eudokimos)

Well thought of. Held in good public estimation; the state sought by people warned against incurring poets' hatred. Attested: εὐδόκιμον (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion.