From the book
Meditations
Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΠροαίρεσις, from προαιρεῖσθαι, "to take one thing before another", is choice, which Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, made the name of what in a man is his own. Ἐλευθερία is the condition of the free man, ἐλεύθερος, as against the slave, δοῦλος.
- In the MeditationsThe noun comes once, in a saying Marcus gives to Epictetus: "There comes to be no robber of choice" (11.36). Marcus' own words are the adjectives, which divide what "belongs to choice" from what "is outside choice" (12.33). Freedom stands beside justice, self-control and courage (8.1) and gives a manner, "simply and freely" (5.7); slavery is the state of those who serve what others can take, conquerors first (8.3).
- In this editionΠροαίρεσις is "choice" (11.36); τὸ προαιρετικόν is "faculty of choice" (8.56), and προαιρετικά "belongs to choice" (12.33); ἀπροαίρετος is "outside choice" or "outside your choice", and its adverb "without choice" (3.6.1). Ἐλευθερία is "freedom", ἐλεύθερος "free" (with the article "freedom") and ἐλευθέρως "freely"; δοῦλος is "slave" and once "servile" (3.8), δουλεύειν "be a slave" and δουλεία "slavery".
- A place to read9.40, where Marcus asks whether it is not better "to use what is in your power with freedom than to be at odds with what is not in your power with slavery and abasement".
Meaning
Προαιρεῖσθαι (proaireisthai), the middle of αἱρεῖν (hairein), "to take", with πρό (pro), "before", is to take one thing before another, to prefer, to choose, and προαίρεσις (proairesis) is the choosing. In the Meditations the noun stands only in a saying of Epictetus (11.36); Marcus' own words are the adjectives προαιρετικός (proairetikos), "belonging to choice", and ἀπροαίρετος (aproairetos), "outside choice", and the edition's note at 8.56 calls τὸ προαιρετικόν "formed from Epictetus' προαίρεσις". Ἐλευθερία (eleutheria) is first a status, the free man's as against the slave's and the free city's; ἐλεύθερος (eleutheros) also names the bearing that befits a free man, open and unservile, and the adverb ἐλευθέρως (eleutherōs) its manner. Δοῦλος (doulos) is the slave, δουλεύειν (douleuein) to be one, and δουλεία (douleia) slavery.
Use in the book
What Marcus takes from Epictetus is a dividing line. The noun stands once, in a saying he copies: "There comes to be no robber of choice: the saying of Epictetus" (11.36). Elsewhere the adjectives draw the line between what belongs to choice and what lies outside it. Whoever sets up anything "of the things outside your choice" as good or bad must, on falling into the one or failing of the other, blame the gods and hate men (6.41; see Good, bad and indifference). If Marcus separates from his understanding all that "attaches outside choice", he will be able to live out what remains untroubled (12.3.1–2; see Mind and reason); and near the end of the book everything lies in how the ruling centre uses itself, and "the rest either belongs to choice or is outside choice: corpses and smoke" (12.33; see Ruling centre), where "belongs to choice" is the reading of A, the Vatican manuscript. Only once does Marcus name the faculty: "To my faculty of choice my neighbour's faculty of choice makes no difference, equally with his little breath and poor flesh" (8.56). However much men have come to be for one another, each ruling centre has its own sovereignty, or a neighbour's vice would be bad for Marcus, "which God did not decide, so that my being unlucky should not be in another's power" (see Ruling centre). Προαιρεῖσθαι is used of the choice of a life (3.7; see Daimon), of vice (9.2) and of a simplicity announced and so counterfeit (11.15; see Simplicity and sincerity).
Freedom is most often one of a list. Marcus is to act with "dignity, affection, freedom and justness" (2.5; see Present action); freedom is among the qualities "wholly in your power" (5.5). At 8.1 "free" closes a list where the school's fourth virtue, wisdom, would stand (see Virtue and excellence). The adverb gives the manner: to "choose the better simply and freely" (3.6.3), to pray, if at all, "simply and freely" (5.7); if he cannot keep the mastery, to go into some corner or out of life, "not in anger, but simply and freely and with self-respect" (10.8.3; see Death); and to say what is true "freely and without circumlocution" (12.1.1; see Present action). This can be read as the free man's old bearing, open and unservile. From Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic summoned to teach him, Marcus learned "freedom, and a steadiness that unmistakably takes no chances" (1.8.1); from Severus, whom he calls his brother, the impression of "a kingship that honours above all things the freedom of the governed" (1.14.1; see Citizenship).
The other freedom can be read as Epictetus', of the man whom nothing outside can compel: "so long as nothing of the kind leads me out, I remain free, and no one will prevent me doing what I want; and I want according to the nature of a rational and social living being" (5.29; see Obstacle and reservation). It is lost by honouring what others can take away: "Then you will be neither free nor self-sufficient nor free from passion" (6.16.4; see Contentment and self-sufficiency). The understanding "free from passions" is a citadel (8.48; see Inner retreat and citadel). Nor is this freedom obstinacy: "Remember that both to shift position and to follow the one who sets right are likewise free; for it is your activity, brought to its end according to your impulse and judgement, and indeed according to your mind" (8.16). An act is free because it is one's own, not because it never changes, provided the change comes "from something convincing, as that it is just or for the common good" (4.12).
Marcus finds slavery, the service of what is not one's own, first among the great. Of Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Pompey, beside Diogenes the Cynic, Heraclitus and Socrates: "but there, forethought for how many things, and slavery to how many!" (8.3); of men who lord it and swagger, "a little before they were slaves to how many, and for what" (10.19); and he asks, "without a change of principles, what else is there but slavery of men groaning and making a show of obeying?" (9.29; see Philosophy). He is to make himself "neither tyrant nor slave of any man" (4.31), and his ruling centre is no longer to be a slave (2.2; see Ruling centre).
At 9.40 what is in one's power, freedom and slavery meet. Marcus imagines the objection, "The gods have put these in my power", and answers: "Then is it not better to use what is in your power with freedom than to be at odds with what is not in your power with slavery and abasement? And who told you that the gods do not lend a hand even in what is in our power?" (see Desire and aversion). Freedom goes with the use of what lies within the line, slavery with a quarrel against what lies beyond it, and the gods are not shut out of the first. Marcus never asks whether the will is free. He asks what belongs to choice, and calls free the man who wants only that, and slave the man, conqueror or courtier, who wants anything else.
Places to read
Every chapter in which προαίρεσις, προαιρεῖσθαι, προαιρετικός or ἀπροαίρετος occurs, or ἐλευθερία, ἐλεύθερος or ἐλευθέρως, or δοῦλος, δουλεύειν or δουλεία, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with 4.12, on shifting position at another's correction. The phrases of what is "in our power", ἐφ' ἡμῖν (eph' hēmin) and ἐπὶ σοί (epi soi), are left out where none of these words stands with them, and so are ἀνδράποδον (andrapodon), "slaves" (6.14), οἰκέτης (oiketēs), "household slaves" (5.31), οὐερνάκλος (ouernaklos), "house-slave" (1.16.4), and λατρεύειν (latreuein), "slave for" (3.3). Λῃστής (lēistēs), "robber", is listed only at 11.36; its other places are given in its sub-entry. The places of ἐφ' ἡμῖν are given in its sub-entry.
- 1.8.1GreekFrom Apollonius Marcus learned freedom, and a steadiness that unmistakably takes no chances.
- 1.14.1GreekFrom Severus Marcus received the impression of a kingship that honours above all things the freedom of the governed.
- 2.2GreekThe ruling centre is no longer to be a slave, nor to be jerked like a puppet by unsocial impulse.
- 2.5GreekMarcus is to do what is in hand with dignity, affection, freedom and justness, and will have leisure from other impressions if he does each act as the last of his life.
- 3.6.1GreekIf Marcus finds anything better than justice, truth, self-control, courage, and an understanding content with itself where it makes him act by right reason and in what is allotted without choice, he is to turn to it with his whole soul.
- 3.6.3GreekNothing of another kind may be set against the rational good; Marcus is to choose the better simply and freely and hold fast to it.
- 3.7GreekA man by whom his own mind and daimon have been chosen before all else makes no tragedy and will live neither pursuing nor fleeing.
- 3.8GreekIn the understanding of a man chastened and purified there is nothing servile.
- 4.3.4GreekIn the withdrawal into his little field Marcus is to be free and look at things as a man, a citizen and a mortal.
- 4.12GreekMarcus is to be ready to shift position if someone sets him right, provided the change comes from something convincing, as that it is just or for the common good.
- 4.31GreekMarcus is to make himself neither tyrant nor slave of any man.
- 4.49.2GreekMarcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-controlled, sensible, self-respecting, free.
- 5.5GreekAmong the qualities wholly in Marcus' power are genuineness, dignity, needing little, kindliness and freedom.
- 5.7GreekOne must either not pray, or pray simply and freely, as the Athenians pray for rain.
- 5.9GreekMarcus is to look whether greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, fair-mindedness and holiness are more agreeable than pleasure.
- 5.29GreekSo long as nothing leads him out of life, Marcus remains free, and no one will prevent him doing what he wants, which is according to the nature of a rational and social living being.
- 6.16.4GreekIf Marcus goes on honouring many other things, he will be neither free nor self-sufficient nor free from passion.
- 6.23GreekMarcus is to use irrational beings and things with greatness of mind and freely, and men socially.
- 6.41GreekWhoever sets up things outside his choice as good or bad must, when he fails of them, blame the gods and hate men; if only what is in our power counts as good and bad, no cause is left to accuse God or to take an enemy's stand against a man.
- 7.66GreekSocrates is to be judged by whether he could be content to be just and holy, neither indignant at random at vice nor a slave to anyone's ignorance.
- 7.67GreekMarcus is not to give up hope of being free and self-respecting and social and obedient to God because he has despaired of dialectic and natural philosophy.
- 8.1GreekAmong the principles from which living well comes is that nothing is good for a man which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous, free.
- 8.3GreekBeside Diogenes, Heraclitus and Socrates, Alexander, Caesar and Pompey had forethought for how many things, and slavery to how many.
- 8.16GreekBoth to shift position and to follow the one who sets right are free, for the activity is one's own.
- 8.48GreekThe understanding free from passions is a citadel to which a man can flee.
- 8.51GreekMarcus will have an ever-flowing spring if he guards himself every hour for freedom, together with kindliness, simplicity and self-respect.
- 8.56GreekA neighbour's faculty of choice makes no difference to Marcus' own, since each ruling centre has its own sovereignty.
- 9.2GreekMarcus asks whether he has chosen to sit fast by vice, and calls corruption of the understanding the plague of men as men.
- 9.29GreekMarcus asks what there is, without a change of principles, but the slavery of men groaning and making a show of obeying.
- 9.40GreekMarcus asks whether it is not better to use what is in one's power with freedom than to be at odds with what is not with slavery and abasement, and who said that the gods do not lend a hand even in what is in our power.
- 10.8.3GreekIf he cannot stay on these few names of the virtues, Marcus is to go into some corner where he will have the mastery, or else out of life, simply and freely and with self-respect.
- 10.9GreekAmid mime, war, flutter, torpor and slavery, Marcus' principles are wiped away day by day.
- 10.19GreekMen who now lord it and swagger were a little before slaves to how many, and for what.
- 11.15GreekThe man who announces "I have chosen to deal with you simply" is rotten and counterfeit.
- 11.30GreekIn a line of tragedy: "You are by nature a slave: you have no share in reason."
- 11.36GreekThere comes to be no robber of choice: the saying of Epictetus.
- 12.1.1GreekMarcus is to direct the present towards justice, so that he says what is true freely and without circumlocution and does what accords with law and worth.
- 12.3.1GreekIf Marcus separates from his understanding all that attaches to body and breath outside choice, he will be able to live out what remains untroubled.
- 12.23GreekThe ending of life is not bad, if indeed it is both outside choice and not unsocial.
- 12.33GreekEverything lies in how the ruling centre uses itself; the rest either belongs to choice or is outside choice.
Translation in this edition
Προαίρεσις is "choice" at its one place (11.36). Προαιρετικός is "faculty of choice" for the neuter with the article (8.56, twice) and "belongs to choice" (12.33). Ἀπροαίρετος is "outside your choice" (6.41) and "outside choice" (12.3.1, 12.23, 12.33), and the adverb ἀπροαιρέτως (aproairetōs) "without choice" (3.6.1). Προαιρεῖσθαι is "choose": "have been chosen before all else" (3.7), "have you chosen" (9.2) and "I have chosen" (11.15); the "choose" of 3.6.3 renders ἑλοῦ (helou), of the simple verb. Ἐλευθερία is "freedom" at all five of its places (1.14.1, 2.5, 5.9, 8.51, 9.40), and so is the neuter of ἐλεύθερος with the article (1.8.1, 5.5); ἐλεύθερος is otherwise "free" (4.3.4, 4.49.2, 5.29, 6.16.4, 7.67, 8.1, 8.16, 8.48), and ἐλευθέρως "freely" (3.6.3, 5.7, 6.23, 10.8.3, 12.1.1). Elsewhere "free" and "freedom" render privative words, as in "freedom from anger" (1.1), "free from passion" (1.9.3, 6.16.4), "free from distress" (4.49.1, 6.50) and "free of need" (7.16), and a few others: ἀπηλλαγμένος (apēllagmenos), "free of" (2.5), ἐκτενῶς (ektenōs) in "spend freely" (1.4) and "share freely" (1.14.2), ἐφεῖσθαι (epheisthai) in "leaving his friends free" (1.16.2), and ἀπό (apo) in "free of this schoolmaster" (10.36). "Equal freedom of speech" renders ἰσηγορία (isēgoria; 1.14.1; see Citizenship). Δοῦλος is "slave" (4.31, 11.30) and, of the understanding, "servile" (3.8); δουλεύειν is "be a slave" (2.2), "a slave to" (7.66) and "were slaves to" (10.19); δουλεία is "slavery" at all four places (8.3, 9.29, 9.40, 10.9). "Slaves" renders ἀνδράποδα (andrapoda; 6.14), "household slaves" οἰκέται (oiketai; 5.31), "house-slave" οὐερνάκλος (ouernaklos), the Latin vernaculus (1.16.4), and "slave for" λατρεύειν (3.3). Every "in our power", "in your power" and the like renders ἐπί (epi) with the dative: τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν is "what is in our power" (6.41, 9.40) and "the things in our power" (8.7, 11.37); ἐπὶ σοί is "in your power" (5.33, 7.2, 7.54, 8.17, 8.47, 9.40, 10.32, 12.22) and "wholly in your power" with ὅλα (hola; 5.5); ἐπ' ἐμοί (ep' emoi) is "in my power" (8.29, 9.40), ἐπ' αὐτῇ (ep' autēi) "in its power" (6.32), ἐπ' αὐτῷ (ep' autōi) "in his power" (8.34), ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ (eph' heautōi) "in its own power" (9.7), and ἐπ' ἄλλῳ (ep' allōi) "in another's power" (8.56) and "in another's" (8.17); ὅσον ἐπὶ σοί (hoson epi soi) is "as far as lies in you" (5.8.5), and ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ (hoson eph' heautōi) "so far as in it lies" (7.16) and "so far as in him lies" (8.34). At 4.3.3 "who seem to speak good words" is the εὐφημεῖν (euphēmein) of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, for the manuscripts' ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Ἀκύβευτος (akybeutos), literally "not dicing", is rendered with "a steadiness that unmistakably takes no chances" (1.8.1), as the edition's note explains.
Greek forms and English renderings
What belongs to choice, and the free man · Meditations
προαίρεσις, proairesis, "choice"; προαιρεῖσθαι, proaireisthai, "choose"; προαιρετικός, proairetikos, "faculty of choice", "belongs to choice"; ἀπροαίρετος, aproairetos, "outside choice", "outside your choice", "without choice"; ἐλευθερία, eleutheria, "freedom"; ἐλεύθερος, eleutheros, "free", "freedom", "freely"; δοῦλος, doulos, "slave", "servile"; δουλεύειν, douleuein, "be a slave"; δουλεία, douleia, "slavery"; ἐφ' ἡμῖν, eph' hēmin, "in our power"; λῃστής, lēistēs, "robber"
Epictetus and the Stoics
Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, gives the Stoic paradox: only the wise man is free and the bad are slaves, for freedom is "the power of acting for oneself", ἐξουσία αὐτοπραγίας (exousia autopragias), and slavery the want of it; there is also a slavery of subordination, and a third of ownership with subordination, whose opposite, mastery, is itself bad; and the wise are kings as well as free.1 Epictetus made προαίρεσις the centre of his teaching. A man, he says, is first of all one who has nothing more authoritative than choice, everything else being subject to it, and choice itself "unenslaved and unsubordinated", ἀδούλευτον καὶ ἀνυπότακτον (adouleuton kai anypotakton).2 To a threat he answers, "You will chain my leg, but my choice not even Zeus can overcome", and nothing can overcome choice but choice itself.3 The good, in its being, is a choice of a certain kind, and so is the bad.4 His daily exercise turns on the pair of adjectives that Marcus uses. At each thing seen from dawn to night one asks, "Outside choice or belonging to choice?", ἀπροαίρετον ἢ προαιρετικόν (aproaireton ē proairetikon): a death is outside choice, a consulship is outside choice, and both are to be put away; for lamenting, misfortune, faction, blame and impiety are only judgements about things outside choice as though they were goods and bads, and whoever moves these judgements over to what belongs to choice will stand firm, however things are around him.5 Marcus' "either belongs to choice or is outside choice" (12.33) uses the same pair. The saying of 11.36 comes from the discourse On Cynicism: the Cynic keeps all his watchfulness for choice and the use of impressions and sleeps soundly about the rest, for "there comes to be no robber of choice, no tyrant"; of the body and of property, yes, and of offices and honours.6 Marcus copies only the first half. The discourse On Freedom opens with a definition of the free man (see Obstacle and reservation) and pulls down the citadel of the tyrants within (see Inner retreat and citadel); it also draws a consequence that Marcus' 8.3 and 10.19 can be read as applying. A man twice consul, who says he cannot be a slave because his parents were free and he is a senator and Caesar's friend with many slaves of his own, and who asks who can compel him but Caesar, lord of all, is told that he has owned a master and is a slave from a great household;7 the senator serves "the handsomest and glossiest slavery";8 and whoever will not give back to God what he has given will be a slave among slaves, though he be consul ten thousand times and go up to the Palace.9 What belongs to choice, Epictetus says, God has given him and put in his power, unimpeded and unhindered,10 and freedom is won "not by fulfilling what one desires, but by doing away with desire".11
Other ancient sources
Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, made προαίρεσις a term of ethics in the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics. Choice is voluntary, but the voluntary is wider: children and the other animals share in the voluntary, not in choice. It is not opinion, for it is by choosing good or bad things, not by opining, that we are of a certain kind; it goes with reason and thought, and "even the name seems to hint" that it is what is taken before other things. Since what is chosen is something deliberated and desired among the things in our power, choice is "a desire guided by deliberation, of things in our power".12 In Epictetus the word names not the single act that ends a deliberation but the faculty itself, and the man: to a young student of rhetoric with elaborately dressed hair he says, "you are not flesh, nor hair, but choice"; if he keeps that beautiful, then he is beautiful.13
ἀπροαίρετος
Attested: ἀπροαιρέτων (aproairetōn; 6.41), ἀπροαίρετα (aproaireta; 12.3.1, 12.33), ἀπροαίρετον (aproaireton; 12.23); the adverb ἀπροαιρέτως (aproairetōs; 3.6.1). Not subject to choice; outside choice. "Whatever of the things outside your choice you set up for yourself as good or bad" (6.41; see Good, bad and indifference); "all that, belonging to the poor body that surrounds you or to the little breath grown with it, attaches outside choice" (12.3.1); "if indeed it is both outside choice and not unsocial" (12.23); "the rest either belongs to choice or is outside choice" (12.33); the understanding content "with fate in what is allotted without choice" (3.6.1), where the adverb stands in the manuscripts and the correction of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the Meditations in 1802, concerns the words "with fate" (see Contentment and self-sufficiency). Lemma: ἀπροαίρετος.
δουλεία
Attested: δουλεία (douleia; 8.3, 9.29, 10.9), δουλείας (douleias; 9.40). Slavery. "but there, forethought for how many things, and slavery to how many!" (8.3); "And without a change of principles, what else is there but slavery of men groaning and making a show of obeying?" (9.29); "Mime, war, flutter, torpor, slavery" (10.9); "to be at odds with what is not in your power with slavery and abasement" (9.40). Lemma: δουλεία.
δουλεύω
Attested: δουλεῦσαι (douleusai; 2.2), δουλεύων (douleuōn; 7.66), ἐδούλευον (edouleuon; 10.19). To be a slave, to serve. Of the ruling centre, "no longer let it be a slave" (2.2; see Ruling centre); of Socrates, "neither indignant at random at vice nor indeed a slave to anyone's ignorance" (7.66; see Body and flesh); of the great, "but a little before they were slaves to how many, and for what" (10.19). Lemma: δουλεύω.
δοῦλος
Attested: δοῦλον (doulon; 3.8, 4.31), δοῦλος (doulos; 11.30). A slave; as an adjective, slavish. "Further, there is nothing servile in it" (3.8); "making yourself neither tyrant nor slave of any man" (4.31); "You are by nature a slave: you have no share in reason" (11.30), a line from an unknown tragedy, as the edition's note records. Lemma: δοῦλος.
ἐλευθερία
Attested: ἐλευθερίαν (eleutherian; 1.14.1, 8.51), ἐλευθερίας (eleutherias; 2.5, 9.40), ἐλευθερία (eleutheria; 5.9). Freedom, the condition of the free man and of the free state. "a kingship that honours above all things the freedom of the governed" (1.14.1; see Citizenship); "with exact and unaffected dignity, affection, freedom and justness" (2.5); "greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity …" (5.9); "If you guard yourself every hour for freedom" (8.51), where A and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have ἐλεύθερον (eleutheron), "free"; "to use what is in your power with freedom" (9.40). Lemma: ἐλευθερία.
ἐλεύθερος
Attested: ἐλεύθερον (eleutheron; 1.8.1, 4.49.2, 5.5, 8.1, 8.16), ἐλεύθερος (eleutheros; 4.3.4, 5.29, 6.16.4, 7.67), ἐλευθέρα (eleuthera; 8.48); the adverb ἐλευθέρως (eleutherōs; 3.6.3, 5.7, 6.23, 10.8.3, 12.1.1). Free; of a man's bearing, open and unservile; with the article, freedom. "From Apollonius: freedom" (1.8.1); "do not be dragged about or strained, but be free" (4.3.4); "I remain free, and no one will prevent me doing what I want" (5.29); "both to shift position and to follow the one who sets right are likewise free" (8.16); "the understanding free from passions is a citadel" (8.48); "simply and freely" (5.7, 10.8.3). At 8.1 A has ἐλευθέριον (eleutherion), "liberal", and at 3.6.3 P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has ἐλευθερίως (eleutheriōs), "liberally". Lemma: ἐλεύθερος.
ἐφ' ἡμῖν
Attested: ἐφ' ἡμῖν (eph' hēmin; 6.41, 8.7, 9.40, 11.37). In our power, literally "upon us"; with the article, the things in our power, which Epictetus divides from those not in our power (see Obstacle and reservation). If only "what is in our power" counts as good and bad, "no cause is left either to accuse God or to take an enemy's stand against a man" (6.41); a rational nature journeys well when, among other things, it "has made its desires and avoidances of the things in our power only" (8.7); and Epictetus' rule is to "use avoidance towards none of the things not in our power" (11.37). At 9.40 Marcus asks, "And who told you that the gods do not lend a hand even in what is in our power?" At 4.3.3 the manuscripts have ἐφ' ἡμῖν where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts Gataker's εὐφημεῖν, "speak good words". Lemma: ἐφ' ἡμῖν.
λῃστής
Attested: λῃστοῦ (lēistou; 5.10.1), λῃσταί (lēistai; 6.34, 10.10), λῃστήν (lēistēn; 11.18.3), λῃστής (lēistēs; 11.36). A robber, a bandit. Underlying things can be "in the possession of a catamite or a whore or a robber" (5.10.1); "What pleasures robbers, catamites, parricides, tyrants have felt!" (6.34); of those who hunt men, "For are these not robbers, if you examine the principles?" (10.10); "you too must necessarily do much wrong and become a robber and anything whatever" (11.18.3; see Anger); "There comes to be no robber of choice: the saying of Epictetus" (11.36). Lemma: λῃστής.
προαίρεσις
Attested: προαιρέσεως (proaireseōs; 11.36). Choice; in Epictetus, the faculty by which a man chooses, and so what is his own. "There comes to be no robber of choice: the saying of Epictetus" (11.36). The saying is from Epictetus, Discourses 3.22.105, as the edition's note at 11.33 records, where it goes on "no tyrant". G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the Meditations, bracketed "the saying of Epictetus", as Leopold's apparatus records; Leopold prints the words. Lemma: προαίρεσις.
προαιρετικός
Attested: προαιρετικῷ (proairetikōi; 8.56), προαιρετικόν (proairetikon; 8.56), προαιρετικά (proairetika; 12.33). Belonging to choice; with the article, the faculty of choice. "To my faculty of choice my neighbour's faculty of choice makes no difference" (8.56); "the rest either belongs to choice or is outside choice" (12.33; see Ruling centre), where Leopold prints the ἢ προαιρετικά (ē proairetika) of A, and P has εἰ προαιρετά (ei proaireta). Lemma: προαιρετικός.
προαιρέω
Attested: προελόμενος (proelomenos; 3.7), προῄρησαι (proēirēsai; 9.2), προῄρημαι (proēirēmai; 11.15). In the middle, to take one thing before another, to prefer, to choose. "For a man by whom his own mind and daimon and the rites of its virtue have been chosen before all else makes no tragedy" (3.7; see Daimon); "Or have you chosen to sit fast by vice …?" (9.2); "I have chosen to deal with you simply" (11.15; see Simplicity and sincerity). At 3.7 A has προσελόμενος (proselomenos); at 9.2 "have you chosen" is the correction of Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus, the eighteenth-century German scholar who edited the Meditations at Leipzig, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' infinitive προῃρῆσθαι (proēirēsthai). Lemma: προαιρέω.
Source note
1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.121–122.
2. Epictetus, Discourses 2.10.1.
3. Epictetus, Discourses 1.1.23 and 1.29.12.
4. Epictetus, Discourses 1.29.1.
5. Epictetus, Discourses 3.3.14–19.
6. Epictetus, Discourses 3.22 (title) and 3.22.103–106.
7. Epictetus, Discourses 4.1 (title) and 4.1.6–13.
8. Epictetus, Discourses 4.1.40.
9. Epictetus, Discourses 4.1.172–173.
10. Epictetus, Discourses 4.1.100.
11. Epictetus, Discourses 4.1.175.
12. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, 1111b6–10 and 1112a1–17; 3.3, 1113a9–12.
13. Epictetus, Discourses 3.1 (title), 3.1.1 and 3.1.39–40.