Reason and account

Use in the book

The charm is identified with beautiful logoi at 157a. That context invites a connection between speech and psychic treatment, but it does not independently demonstrate that every subsequent argument is curative. At 158b Critias' logos is his report about Charmides' character; at 161c the argument under examination is a proposition whose truth should matter more than its author.

When Charmides wants Critias to answer for the third definition, the phrase hypechein logon describes responsibility for defending it (162c). Critias later offers to give an account of self-knowledge (165b), but initially mistakes Socrates' questioning for disagreement with an already known answer. Socrates counters that a logos must be examined before assent is given.

At 166e the logos becomes the shared object of attention: let the outcome of testing determine what happens, rather than the reputations of the speakers. Later it is almost an independent authority that refuses concessions the men nonetheless grant (175b–c2). This personification dramatizes a distinction between what they wish to secure and what follows from their claims. At 176a Socrates even imagines being judged incapable of investigating anything by logos. The continuing desire for his company prevents that self-deprecation from functioning as a simple rejection of rational discussion.

Places to read

1. 157aBeautiful logoi identified with charms
2. 162cResponsibility to answer for a definition
3. 165b–166e234Giving an account and testing it before agreement
4. 175b–176a2The argument’s resistance and Socrates’ ironic self-criticism

Translation in this edition

“Words”, “account” and “argument” translate different local functions of logos. Keeping the Greek family in mind reveals continuities, but forcing one English rendering everywhere would obscure the medical tale, interpersonal testimony and explicit inference.

ἀμφισβητέω

Attested: ἀμφισβητῶ (amphisbētō). Dispute or contest; Socrates distinguishes the point he is not contesting from the further inference he challenges. References: 169e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀμφισβητέω. See Argument and account.

δή

Attested: δὴ (dē). An emphatic or connective particle, here marking steps presented as following or already established in the distinction between possessing knowledge and identifying its specific field. References: 171a. Lexical identification: lemma: δή. See Argument and account.

διηγέομαι

Attested: διήγησαι / διηγούμην (diēgēsai / diēgoumēn). To recount or narrate; Chaerephon asks for the campaign story and Socrates tells the gathering the news from the camp. References: 153c. Lexical identification: lemma: διηγέομαι. See Argument and account.

ἐμμένω

Attested: ἐμμένομεν (emmenomen). We stand by or remain with an account; Socrates notes that Critias has qualified his earlier claim. References: 173e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐμμένω. See Argument and account.

λόγον διδόναι

Attested: διδόναι λόγον (didonai logon). To give an account or reasoned explanation; Critias offers to defend his new definition that temperance is knowing oneself if Socrates does not agree. References: 165b. Lexical identification: phrase template: λόγον διδόναι. See Argument and account.

λόγος

Attested: λόγος / λόγου / λόγον / λόγους / λόγων / λόγῳ (logos / logou / logon / logous / logōn / logōi). Talk, statement, account or argument. Socrates is much talked about at 156a; doctors’ reasoning and therapeutic beautiful words follow; later the term names the propositions, discussion and argumentative constraints that guide or resist their proposed definitions. References: 156a, 156c, 157a, 160b, 162e, 164c, 166c, 166e, 169d, 173e, 175b, 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: λόγος. See Argument and account.

ὑπέχω λόγον

Attested: ὑπέχειν λόγον (hypechein logon). Answer for an account or submit it to questioning; Charmides tries to transfer that responsibility to Critias. References: 162c. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: ὑπέχω λόγον. See Argument and account.

δὴ (dē)

An inferential or emphatic particle; here marks the step now reached in distinguishing having knowledge from identifying its field. References: 171a. Lemma: δή. See Argument and account.

διήγησαι (diēgēsai)

Tell or recount the events; a request for a fuller narrative, before the inquiry about the youths. References: 153c. Lemma: διηγέομαι. See Argument and account.

μέτρια (metria)

Reasonable or measured; Critias accepts the request to attend to the argument. References: 166e. Lemma: μέτριος. See Argument and account.

συμβαίνειν (symbainein)

To follow or result from the concessions; marks inferential consequence, not a mere coincidence. References: 164c. Lemma: συμβαίνω. See Argument and account.

Use in the book

The dialogue repeatedly lets an argument acquire an apparent independence from either participant's personal authority. At 118b Alcibiades' own logos accuses him; at 131c a conclusion about the lover of soul follows “from the argument.” Such expressions make the chain of commitments, rather than the prestige of Socrates, the immediate ground of assent. They do not mean the chain has become infallible.

At 113e–114a Socrates refuses the idea that a previously used argument is worn out. If the same structure bears on another claim, it remains relevant. Alcibiades' attempted shift from justice to advantage does not remove the question of where his knowledge came from. Socrates then chooses to examine a different contention, the supposed opposition of justice and advantage, rather than mechanically repeat every question.

The phrase “by this argument” can also mark a limit. At 125b a shoemaker is good and bad by the same domain-relative reasoning, which exposes the inadequacy of Alcibiades' undifferentiated appeal to good men. At 130c–d the reasoning about soul is retained while its precision is expressly limited. Following a logos requires both attending to its force and tracking its scope.

The range of senses matters for the user argument. Saying that Socrates uses λόγος there means that he uses speech, not that the person must be identical with a detached faculty called Logos. The same Greek word supports the dialogue's reasoning and names the verbal medium through which it occurs, but those uses should not be conflated.

Places to read

1. 104aLogos names Alcibiades’ grounds for superiority
2. 113e–114aAn argument remains usable despite familiarity
3. 118bThe argument accuses its own respondent
4. 125bA domain-relative conclusion is qualified by “this argument”
5. 129b–130e2345Speech is used in conversation and distinguished from its personal user

Translation in this edition

“Argument,” “speech,” and “words” render different local uses of λόγος. The edition's variation is semantically necessary. A lexicon should not replace every occurrence with the philosophical-sounding “reason” or treat every ordinary idiom as a technical doctrine.

ἄρα

Attested: ἄρα (ara; 129e). At 129e: Marks the inference from the user–used distinction to the human being’s difference from his own body. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄρα. See Argument.

λόγος

Attested: τοῦ λόγου (tou logou; 114a); λόγῳ (logōi; 129b). At 114a: The course of reasoning Alcibiades runs ahead of when anticipating the acquisition questions about advantage. At 129b: Speech as the means Socrates uses in talking to Alcibiades, distinguished from the person using it. Lexical identification: lemma: λόγος. See Argument.

Use in the book

The first extended argument turns on opposites and exhaustive alternatives. Its proposed identity of madness and unintelligence is immediately exposed to an awkward consequence: most of the city would be mad in the violent sense presupposed by Socrates’ joke. The subsequent division revises that account. The dialogue is consequently not well represented by extracting the identity at 139c as its final teaching.

Later revisions are not all equivalent. Alcibiades’ claim that ignorance causes bad things is narrowed through the case in which recognition would facilitate murder. The broad thesis about other knowledge is qualified by the knowledge of the best and then expanded into a commonwealth of experts. Socrates’ reinterpretation of the Margites attempts a further confirmation, but it depends on grammatical substitutions explained in the speech itself.

At 147e the uncertainty is dramatised as the interlocutor’s repeated change. This need not mean that every preceding step has been refuted. It shows that assent, argument and stable practical orientation are not automatically one achievement. The return of the god’s imagined offer tests Alcibiades’ readiness to act rather than merely inviting another general “yes.”

The end gives a practical recommendation and an educational promise without presenting a completed definition of the governing knowledge. An argument map should therefore preserve both progress and incompletion. The text moves beyond its opening supposition, but its final wreath is not a certificate that Alcibiades now possesses the knowledge he needs.

Places to read

1. 139b–140d23The initial identity is tested and replaced by a classificatory account.
2. 143b–144c23An undifferentiated condemnation of ignorance is revised by a counterexample.
3. 144d–146e234The central claim is developed and recapitulated with an explicit governing knowledge.
4. 147b–148a2Poetic interpretation leads to unstable assent and a renewed practical question.
5. 150c–151c2The immediate outcome is postponement and readiness to learn.

Translation in this edition

“Look into” keeps the family of inquiry verbs visible, whereas “reason” at 142b renders logos rather than nous. These choices prevent the account of reasoning from being confused with a simple inventory of occurrences of “sense.”

Use in the book

Clinias asks by what account the inquiry into intelligence should be conducted (973a). The Athenian then announces a strange account about human happiness, and later uses what is being sought in the argument as evidence for the difficulty of human life (974a–b). Logos thus names the unfolding discourse before it becomes an explicit criterion of wisdom. The discourse can contain qualifications, requests for assent, and an acknowledged need for more argument.

At 977c–d the word occurs in three closely joined roles. A soul lacking logos cannot attain all virtue. A being ignorant of number cannot “give an account” of things it has merely perceived and remembered. Deprivation of true logos prevents wisdom. The numerical argument therefore distinguishes a rationally accountable understanding from the retention of appearances. It does not simply say that an uncounting animal has no perceptions or no memory; those capacities are explicitly allowed.

The next clause gives a necessary caution: explaining why number must be laid down as a foundation would require an account longer than everything already said (977d). The Athenian supplies a further claim about the crafts' dependence on arithmetic, rather than delivering that complete explanation immediately. A lexicon should preserve this admitted incompleteness. It would be misleading to expand “lay down” into a finished deduction whose omitted premises the dialogue never states.

At 979d an account is still required of whether the person who knows the numerical matters is genuinely wise and good. The demand prevents the first success in identifying a necessary knowledge from becoming the final answer by verbal substitution. Later, the question whether “the account has reason in it” (983d) plays on the same noun. A logos can be put forward without yet being shown to possess logos in the sense of rational validity. The later educational demand for questioning and refutation (991c) gives this distinction practical force.

The mathematical passages add “ratio” as another contextual use of logos (991a). The relation should be noticed, not turned into the claim that every earlier argument is already a numerical ratio. Likewise, the most divine reason that orders the visible cosmos at 986c belongs to the dialogue's cosmic explanation; it should not be smuggled into every casual reference to an account at the opening.

Places to read

1. 973aτίνι ποτὲ χρὴ λόγῳ διεξελθεῖν — Clinias asks for the account by which to proceed
2. 974cδιὰ λόγων πάντων καὶ πάντῃ λεγομένων — Intelligent examination is conducted through arguments
3. 977cὅτου λόγος ἀπείη — A soul's deficiency is described as the absence of reason
4. 977cδιδόναι λόγον — Giving an account exceeds mere perception and memory
5. 977dστερόμενος δὲ ἀληθοῦς λόγου — True reason is necessary for wisdom
6. 979dτούτου δὴ πέρι λόγον δεῖ λαβεῖν — The wise and good status of the knower needs an account
7. 983dπότερον ἔχει λόγον ὁ λόγος — An account must be examined for reason in it

Translation in this edition

The note at 977d explicitly identifies “reason,” “account,” and “reason” as renderings of the same Greek word. This is a translation disclosure rather than a proposal that the English words be collapsed. The article's dictionary-form heading does not imply that λόγος, λόγῳ, and λόγον are separate lemmas.

Plan of inquiry — λόγος (logos)

λόγος (logos)

Plan of inquiry. An account through which the matter of intelligence is to be examined. It names an explanatory discourse, not yet a completed proof. Attested: λόγῳ (973a). Reason account and what an argument must establish.

Means of examination — λόγος (logos)

λόγος (logos)

Means of examination. Arguments by which capable people examine themselves and others intelligently and concordantly. Attested: λόγων (974c). Reason account and what an argument must establish.

Rational capacity — λόγος (logos)

λόγος (logos)

Rational capacity. Reason whose absence prevents the living being’s soul from attaining all virtue. The next clauses link it to giving an account rather than retaining experiences only. Attested: λόγος (977c). Reason account and what an argument must establish.

Give an account — λόγος (logos)

λόγος (logos)

Give an account. An explanation of what has otherwise only been perceived and remembered; total ignorance of number prevents this capacity. Attested: λόγον (977c). Reason account and what an argument must establish.

True reason — λόγος (logos)

λόγος (logos)

True reason. The condition required for wisdom, explicitly qualified as true; courage and temperance are not thereby excluded. Attested: λόγου (977d). Reason account and what an argument must establish.

Required justification — λόγος (logos)

λόγος (logos)

Required justification. The further account still needed to establish whether the person who knows the proposed numerical matters is actually wise and good. Attested: λόγον (979d). Reason account and what an argument must establish.

Lack of true reason — στέρεσθαι (steresthai)

στέρεσθαι (steresthai)

Lack of true reason. The present middle participle of steromai describes the person lacking true reason who therefore cannot become wise. Its stem differs from the regular contracted participle of stereō. Attested: στερόμενος (977d). Reason account and what an argument must establish.

Experience without account — αἴσθησις (aisthēsis)

αἴσθησις (aisthēsis)

Experience without account. Perceptions may be acquired together with memories by a being lacking number, but these possessions do not by themselves allow it to give an account. Attested: αἰσθήσεις (977c). Reason account and what an argument must establish.

Revisiting the argument — ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι (anamimnēiskesthai)

ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι (anamimnēiskesthai)

Revisiting the argument. The speakers are asked to recall their preceding insight by going back a little in the arguments, preparing the explicit number-removal test. Attested: ἀναμνησθῶμεν (977b–c). Reason account and what an argument must establish.

Only perceptions and memories (contextual phrase)

περὶ ὧν αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας … μόνον εἴη κεκτημένον (977c)

The omitted material is Burnet’s bracketed ἔχοι, excluded from the adopted sense. The perfect construction describes the possession of perceptions and memories while the surrounding clause denies the ability to give an account. The distinction is between retained experience and accountable understanding, not between experience and total insensibility. Reason account and what an argument must establish.

Deprived of true reason (contextual phrase)

στερόμενος δὲ ἀληθοῦς λόγου σοφὸς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο (977d)

The deprivation concerns logos qualified as true, and the negative potential construction denies becoming wise. Logos connects rational capacity and the ability to give an account in the preceding lines. The sentence does not independently prove all the steps by which number is necessary for such reason. Reason account and what an argument must establish.

An account still required of the wise and good knower (contextual phrase)

εἰ δ’ ἔστιν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτ’ ἐπιστήμων καὶ ἀγαθός, τούτου δὴ πέρι λόγον δεῖ λαβεῖν (979d)

The indirect issue is whether the knowledgeable person actually has the desired intellectual and moral status. The need to obtain an account expressly preserves a gap between seeming wise after the numerical discussion and being shown wise and good. It is the clearest opening safeguard against treating elementary arithmetic as sufficient wisdom. Reason account and what an argument must establish.

Use in the book

The setting is a place where time is spent largely in talk (204a). Hippothales’ speeches and songs are judged by what they do to the beloved (205a–206c23); Socrates’ questioning offers another kind of speech. The noun therefore has a dramatic and pedagogical life before it names the arguments defining friendship.

In the inquiry, a λόγος can support a proposal, forbid a combination, or be reconsidered. At 218c–d apparently successful arguments become suspect, like boastful people; at 222c the speakers are “drunk” with the argument in Burnet’s adopted reading. At 222d–e earlier arguments return and are counted over.

Translate according to function. “Reason” as a faculty is not automatically intended whenever λόγος appears, and “doctrine” would make these provisional accounts sound more settled than they are.

Places to read

1. 222cὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου — under the influence of the argument.
2. 204a
3. 205a–206c23
4. 216c
5. 218c–d
6. 222b–e

Use in the book

The opening heading associates logos with providential governance. The account of Chrysippus calls an explanation a logos of a cause. In the arithmetic material, numbers stand in a logos to one another. These uses share a vocabulary without necessarily sharing a complete theory.

Places to read

1. I.1.headingLogos is the rational order of providence.
2. I.13.1c.3An explanation is an account of a cause.
3. Arith.6Numbers stand in ratios to one another.
4. I.41.1.11Reason is distinguished from intellect and from reasoning.
5. I.1.12bCommon reason unifies the world in Cleanthes’ hymn.
6. I.47.9.1Reason occupies a place in a hierarchy of human life.

Translation in this edition

Contextual renderings include “reason,” “account,” “ratio,” and “principle.” “Rational order” expresses the opening heading. A single English replacement would conceal important differences.

The Hermetic writings

At I.41.1.11 logos is in nous, while logismos belongs to human beings. The edition gives “reason,” “intellect,” and “reasoning,” allowing the three Greek expressions to remain distinct.

Cosmic and embodied uses

Cleanthes’ hymn calls the reason running through everything common and connects it with the ordering of good and bad. The Hermetic account instead places reason within a hierarchy of intellect, soul, spirit, and body. These are particular relations expressed by logos, not interchangeable definitions. The reader should distinguish the explanatory account offered by a speaker from a rational principle that the account says operates in the world.

Use in the book

B 4 presents logos as something to be sifted through the listener's inward parts before it becomes knowledge. The Muse's pledges accompany that work, so reasoned account and divine authority are not opposed categories in the fragment. B 172 describes the exposition as an undeceiving course of argument after explaining that Love is to be recognized with mind. The account offers a means of reaching what a dazzled gaze alone has not grasped.

B 352 makes a second material image of exposition: one logos is channelled from another. The speaker turns back to an earlier path of songs before resuming the account of cosmic mixing. That movement is simultaneously poetic and explanatory. Logos is not a prose genre defined by the absence of metre, divine names, or figurative language. In B 131, finally, the poet prays to Calliopeia while making manifest a good logos about the blessed gods.

These passages do not support a historical story in which Empedocles replaces mythos with logos as false myth with true reason. He uses both vocabularies for his own instruction, sometimes within the same extended fragment. The important local qualifications are that an account is undeceiving, good, sifted, or explanatory. Its reliability must be considered from how it is offered and what it establishes.

The English word “argument” can suggest a chain of explicit premises more formal than the surviving passage provides. “Account” can sound too neutral to capture its directed persuasive force. Reading the translations together with the Greek keeps both functions in view: logos tells how things are and asks the hearer to follow the telling.

Places to read

1. B 4.2–3An account must be inwardly sifted.
2. B 17.21–262The course of argument is declared undeceiving.
3. B 35.1–2One account is channelled out of another as the song returns.
4. B 131.3–4Prayer introduces a good account concerning the blessed gods.

Translation in this edition

The edition alternates “argument” and “account” according to context. Neither rendering makes logos a later technical name for a cosmic rational principle; no such identification is stated in these cited lines.

Use in the book

Ratio has no single fixed English equivalent. It can mean a reasoning activity, an argument, an intelligible account, a formative principle, a defining character, or the respect under which something is considered. The Proem's Platonic rationes are arguments supporting religion, while successive demonstrations may be introduced as a first or second ratio. In the whiteness example, albedinis ratio is the character of whiteness preserved in each divided part. A ratio generandi is a principle of generation, not an argument verbally pronounced by the thing generating. Similarly, the hypothetical ratio propagandae mentis concerns a principle for producing mind.

The divine discussion gives further local senses. The phrase ratio mensuraque idealis supplies an ideal standard of comparison. In II.3.10 truth is the ratio of the first principle within Ficino's theological alignment. In II.623456789101112131415161718192021222324 reason corrects imagination's spatial misconception of God, whereas in II.9.16 the rationes universales are universal principles that intellect knows and imagination does not. At the end of II.1023456789101112, what is simple in essence is multiple in a certain respect, ratione. This qualifies the plurality of divine knowledge without making God a composite of separate known things.

In the Ideas discussion, the proper rationes of a whole's parts are their intelligible determining patterns, comprehended in the ordering of that whole. The ratio entis in the possibility argument is the intelligible character of being with which contradiction conflicts. The ratio appetendi is the ground or aspect under which something is desired, namely its goodness. In soul's productive and cognitive activity, rationes formarum likewise concern the principles through which forms are known or realized.

These senses belong to a connected vocabulary of intelligibility and determination, but some name what is known while others name an act of knowing, a ground of desire, or the form of an argument. “Rational soul” therefore identifies a capacity and level of life without saying every operation of that soul is explicit inference. The supplied English's alternatives—reason, account, principle, argument—often disclose real contextual differences within the same Latin family.

Further passage references. Proem.8–Proem.92; I.1.7; I.2.17; I.3.9, I.3.13, I.3.22; I.5.12; II.2.7–112345; II.3.5; II.3.10; II.6.13; II.9.16; II.10.10; II.11.17–1923; II.12.2, 16–17; II.13.29; III.2.23, 29

Places to read

1. I.2.17Albedinis ratio is the preserved character of whiteness, not an argument about it.
2. II.3.10Ratio names the principle’s reason within the theological alignment.
3. II.11.17–1923Proper accounts of forms and parts explain distinct exemplary relations.
4. II.12.16–172Ratio entis specifies the character of being opposed by contradiction.
5. II.13.29Ratio appetendi is the aspect of goodness under which desire seeks its objects.

Translation in this edition

The English’s argument/account/principle alternatives reflect contextual differences. The apparatus notes that II.11.17 concerns intelligible principles; explains ratio entis. The difficult III.2.29 wording remains printed as in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque: these semantic glosses do not justify silently emending corporalibus.

argumentum / arguere

argumentum / arguere. Printed forms: arguitur; argumentis; argumento.

An argument or evidential consideration; to expose by reasoning. Traces supply an argument for a source, while the claim limiting divine knowledge is said to be exposed as error. References: II.1.1, II.1.2, II.10.8. See Reason and account.

censeo

censeo. Printed forms: censetur; censui; censuit.

To judge or consider, sometimes to assign evaluative standing. Plato is represented as judging a return to God just and pious; Ficino judges his title appropriate; the Good is judged more precious than mind. References: Proem.1, Proem.7, I.6.19. See Reason and account.

compos rationis / ratione captus

compos rationis / ratione captus. Printed forms: ratione capta; ratione non carent; vitae rationisque compos.

Possessed of life and reason; deprived of reason; not lacking reason. Compos takes a genitive and means possessing or sharing, not composed from parts. Ratione capta is negated of earth-soul, while terrestrial rational creatures supply a premise for attributing reason to it. References: IV.1.39, IV.1.62. See Reason and account.

concludere / colligere

concludere / colligere. Printed forms: colligitur; concludit.

Conclude / gather or infer. The final definition is gathered from life, intelligence, and temporal animation; the inference must not be reduced to physical gathering. References: II.13.9, III.2.29. See Reason and account.

concludere / confirmare / patere

concludere / confirmare / patere. Printed forms: Concludamus; confert; confirmat; confirmatum; patet.

To conclude, confirm, be evident, or contribute to a proof. The verbs distinguish inference, support, and recap; several converging reasons establish divine knowing. References: II.7.1, II.7.32, II.9.5, II.9.13, II.10.10. See Reason and account.

irrationalis

irrationalis. Printed forms: irrationales; irrationalisque.

Without rational cognition in the specified comparison. Lower creatures and blind appetites are contrasted with the rational souls and desires assigned to higher spheres. References: IV.1.39, IV.1.62. See Reason and account.

iudico

iudico. Printed forms: iudicabit; iudicant; iudicavi.

To judge or assess. The dedication is an authorial judgement, the wall example a perceptual assessment, and the final chapter an assessment of what is good for oneself; these are different objects of one family. References: Proem.11, I.2.13, I.6.18. See Reason and account.

memorare / respondere / docere

memorare / respondere / docere. Printed forms: disseremus; Memento; meminisse; respondemus; respondere.

To remind, answer, teach, or explain further. These verbs mark the exposition’s argumentative tasks and postponed elaborations rather than new metaphysical entities. References: II.4.5, II.7.14, II.8.1, II.9.22, II.10.8. See Reason and account.

probare / ostendere / demonstrare

probare / ostendere / demonstrare. Printed forms: demonstrandum; probatum.

Prove, show, or demonstrate. The opening of II.1223456789101112131415161718192021 distinguishes what Ficino judges sufficiently proved from the necessary–free thesis he next proposes to demonstrate. References: II.12.1. See Reason and account.

ratio

ratio. Printed forms: ratio; rationes.

Argument, account, defining character, or determining principle. The chapter’s numbered ratio is an argument; the proper rationes of a building’s parts are intelligible accounts. References: II.11.2, II.11.18. See Reason and account.

ratio / rationalis

ratio / rationalis. Printed forms: rationalis; rationem; rationes.

Account, ground, reason, principle, or rational, according to construction. The ground of desire, ideal measure, reason of the divine principle, and universal cognitive principles are distinct local uses. References: II.1.7, II.3.5, II.3.10, II.9.16. See Reason and account.

stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis

stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis. Printed forms: gratia; idealis; perspicue; stultum; vulgo.

Foolish, wisely, plainly, commonly, for the sake of, and ideal, with differing grammatical functions. These qualify Ficino’s appraisals, evidential confidence, end-directed action, and comparison standard; they are not separate ontological grades. References: II.1.6, II.3.3, II.3.5, II.7.5, II.9.22. See Reason and account.

via / pactum / tractus

via / pactum / tractus. Printed forms: pacto; tractum; via.

Way or manner, and a stretch in the spatial image. Qua via means the route of an explanation, while nullo pacto means in no way; a line’s stretch belongs to imagination’s substitute. References: II.2.2, II.2.13, II.6.13, II.9.1. See Reason and account.

Use in the book

V.15.9–12234 describes purified attention withdrawing from sensory familiarity and attaining unchangeable things without a bodily instrument. Ficino judges these supremely real because they remain in the same condition. He then offers an exhaustive-looking division: intelligibles are in mind, mind is in them, or each subsists in itself. The proof is meant to work under any of these alternatives, so it should not be cited as choosing only the first.

If principles inhere in mind, their immutability is incompatible, Ficino argues, with a mind wholly bound to mutable bodily temperament. Arithmetic and proportion make the claim concrete: two plus four is six, and two to four as four to eight. Their truth does not change with a bodily mixture. The art of reasoning gathers such principles into an ordered possession that cannot vanish or simply transfer away when taught.

If mind is in the principles as its subject, that immaterial subject likewise excludes its identity with bodily temperament. If both independently subsist, the mind’s own subsistence already supplies the desired distinction. V.15.18 supplements all three with philosophical experience: better understanding, calmer desire and fuller enjoyment accompany commerce with stable principles.

This is a metaphysical argument from truth and cognitive perfection. It does not require the reader to pretend that individual people never forget facts or make mathematical mistakes. Ficino is concerned with the status of true rational principles and the subject capable of grasping them.

Places to read

1. V.15.9, V.15.11, V.15.12Withdrawal and unchanging objects introduce three possible relations to mind.
2. V.15.13, V.15.14, V.15.15, V.15.16Immutable mathematics and rational art test the first alternative.
3. V.15.17, V.15.18The other alternatives and the common argument from improved activity.

Translation in this edition

Ratio is not mechanically “reason” everywhere: V.72 uses it for definition, V.11.8 for defining nature, V.13.16 for intelligible plan. The apparatus interprets rationum coetus as an ordered gathering, not a literal social meeting.

alienare / purgare

alienare / purgare. Printed forms: alienato; purgato.

To estrange from and to purify. The philosophical discipline removes habitual bodily preoccupation so that mind can attend to stable intelligibles. References: V.15.9. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

ars ratiocinandi

ars ratiocinandi. Printed forms: ars consistit ratiocinandi; ars rationalis; ratio illa artificiosa; rationum coetus.

The art of reasoning, an organized gathering of intelligible principles. Its alleged inseparability from mind supports the first alternative in the mind/intelligibles division. References: V.15.15. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

ascendere / descendere

ascendere / descendere. Printed forms: ascendamus; ascendere; ascendimus; ascendit; descendit; gradatim; gradibus.

To ascend or descend, spatially in elemental examples and hierarchically in soul's relation to Ideas or body. Natural order and cognitive ascent do not require a literal journey to a physically higher place. References: V.4.4, V.5.4, V.12.14, V.15.6. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

Ascending and descending through ordered grades or levels of generality. Mind moves from many individuals toward divine unity and back toward multiplicity; the process is explanatory rather than bodily travel. References: VIII.16.2. See Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

avertere / subducere

avertere / subducere. Printed forms: avertere; averterit; removere; subducere.

To turn away, remove or withdraw attention. The mind's improved understanding through withdrawal is presented against the claim that it is merely an inseparable bodily form. References: V.15.9, V.15.10, V.15.11. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

comparatio

comparatio. Printed forms: comparatio.

A ratio or relation between quantities. Two to four and four to eight illustrate an immutable proportional truth distinct from the addition example. References: V.15.14. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

disciplina / usus

disciplina / usus. Printed forms: disciplina; usu.

Instruction and practice. The soul is said to produce separate intelligible forms naturally even without these acquired aids, supporting its intrinsic aptitude for Ideas. References: V.12.14. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

divisio / membrum

divisio / membrum. Printed forms: divisionis; membro; membrum.

A logical division and one of its alternatives. The relation between mind and intelligibles has three possibilities; the argument proceeds through each rather than selecting one unannounced. References: V.15.17, V.15.18. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

duo / quattuor / sex / octo

duo / quattuor / sex / octo. Printed forms: duo; duorum; octo; quattuor; sex.

Two, four, six and eight, the actual numbers in the reasoning example. Two plus four equals six; two relates to four as four to eight. These are distinct demonstrations of invariant rational content. References: V.15.14. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

frui

frui. Printed forms: fruitur.

To enjoy or find fulfillment in an attained object. Ficino links intellectual perfection with truer understanding, calmer desire and fuller, safer enjoyment. References: V.15.18. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

incommutabilis / immutabilis

incommutabilis / immutabilis. Printed forms: immutabiles; immutabilibus; immutabilis; incommutabilia; incommutabiliter.

Unchangeable, remaining the same in the relevant rational content. Arithmetic and proportional truths are used to challenge a mind reduced to mutable bodily temperament. References: V.15.9, V.15.15, V.15.16, V.15.18, V.15.24, V.15.25. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

intelligere / intelligentia

intelligere / intelligentia. Printed forms: intellexisse; intelligentia; intelligentiam; intelligit; intelliguntur.

To understand and understanding, an operation directed to intelligibles rather than only sensory appearances. The mind's stable objects and instrument-free contemplation support Ficino's anti-temperament argument. References: V.15.9, V.15.11, V.15.12, V.15.24. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

intueri

intueri. Printed forms: intueri; intuetur.

To contemplate or behold intellectually. The mind's seeing of stable objects is explicitly without a bodily instrument and not a local conjunction. References: V.15.9, V.15.12. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

maxime quae sunt

maxime quae sunt. Printed forms: maxime quae sunt.

Things that are most fully or supremely real. Ficino predicates this of incorporeal intelligibles because they remain unchangeable, not because they are visually largest. References: V.15.11, V.15.12. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

perpetuus

perpetuus. Printed forms: perpetua; perpetuam; perpetuis; perpetuo; perpetuum; perpetuus.

Perpetual or continuous, with the relevant object specifying whether the claim concerns duration or repeated activity. V.1223456789101112131415 distinguishes continual activity toward everlasting objects from perpetual fulfilled activity within them. References: V.1.1, V.4.1, V.12.14, V.15.4. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

philosophari

philosophari. Printed forms: philosophamur.

To philosophize, engage in reflective intellectual inquiry. The mind's eager and fruitful commerce with stable principles while leaving mutable bodily concerns behind supplies an experiential argument. References: V.15.18. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

quiescere

quiescere. Printed forms: quiescendo; quiescere; quiescit.

To rest or remain settled. Rest in Ideas is the proposed fulfillment of natural ascent; matter by contrast never rests permanently under one determinate form. References: V.12.2, V.12.13, V.12.14. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

species absolutae

species absolutae. Printed forms: species absolutas.

Separate or unrestricted forms produced within rational cognition. They provide the nearer route toward eternal Ideas; the phrase does not itself say every human concept is eternally infallible. References: V.12.14. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

verum / bonum

verum / bonum. Printed forms: bonum; verum; Verum.

The true and the good as the objects of understanding and enjoyment. Their scope is at least as wide as being, supporting the distinction between inward operation and the agent's limited mode of existence. References: V.13.11. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.