Definition

Use in the book

The opening move connects a definition to examination of a person: by hearing Charmides' opinion Socrates hopes to estimate whether temperance is present in him (159a). The connection is provisional. Neither the ability to say a definition nor inability to defend one is independently proved equivalent to possessing or lacking the virtue.

Charmides' first two answers identify temperance with a kind of quietness and with shame. The arguments compare the proposed definiens with agreed features of temperance, especially its fineness and goodness. Critias' revision at 163d–e is more explicit about naming: he may use words as he pleases, but must say clearly to what he applies them. A verbal stipulation is therefore allowed; obscurity about the referent or consequences is not.

At 171a the definition of a particular knowledge turns on its objects. Medicine is this knowledge rather than another because it concerns the healthy and diseased. That principle explains why abstract identification of knowledge cannot by itself identify medical knowledge.

At the end Charmides reasons that he cannot know whether he has the virtue when its identity has not been discovered (176a). This expresses the unresolved dependence of self-assessment on an adequate account, rather than retrospectively proving that the boy lacks temperance. The dialogue asks what makes a definition adequate while declining to provide a final successful one.

Places to read

1. 159a–bInitial what-is question and first answer
2. 163d–eClear definition requested after lexical distinctions
3. 171aKnowledge individuated by its field
4. 175b–176a2Failure to identify the named virtue and its personal consequence

Translation in this edition

At 159a the edition's “what it is, and what sort of thing” reflects the combination of identity and character in the preliminary proposal. Neither expression requires a reference to separately existing Platonic Forms in this dialogue.

ἀφορίζω

Attested: ἀφορίζεσθαι (aphorizesthai). Delimit or distinguish; narrows the question to which kind of knowledge makes its possessor happy. References: 173e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀφορίζω. See Definition.

διορίζω

Attested: διορίζομαι (diorizomai). I define or delimit explicitly; Critias restates his position that temperance is the doing of good things. References: 163e. Lexical identification: lemma: διορίζω. See Definition.

ὁρίζω

Attested: ὅρισαι / ὡρίσθη / ὁριζόμεθα (horisai / hōristhē / horizometha). Delimit or define; specify what temperance is or what makes a field of knowledge distinct. References: 163d, 171a, 173a. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁρίζω. See Definition.

ἀρχῆς (archēs)

Beginning; ‘from the beginning’ calls for a fresh statement of the definition. References: 163d. Lemma: ἀρχή. See Definition.

δίδωμι (didōmi)

I allow or grant; Socrates permits Critias to assign words as he wishes, provided their reference is made clear. References: 163d. Lemma: δίδωμι. See Definition.

συλλήβδην (syllēbdēn)

In summary or taken together; introduces the compact formulation of quietness, and at 167d gathers the senses under a single test. References: 159b. Lemma: συλλήβδην. See Definition.

Use in the book

At 108b–109a2 Socrates asks Alcibiades to name the better in the several activities. Gymnastic and musical provide examples of a governing standard; the corresponding political standard proves harder. The request is not satisfied by repeating “better.” Alcibiades must say in what respect the activity is better and toward what it is directed.

At 124e–125e234 the same method unpacks “good men,” “managing affairs,” and “ruling.” Each broad expression must be specified by its object and the knowledge relevant to it. A civic title cannot secure the competence it claims. At 126d–127d23 “friendship” and “concord” similarly need an account of what they are, what they concern, and which craft produces them. The failure is exposed through conflicting applications rather than by a definition merely declared incorrect.

At 127e the explicit “what is caring for oneself?” begins a more constructive inquiry. At 129b–130d234 it leads from the object of care to what we ourselves are. Socrates nevertheless distinguishes the account achieved from the fuller question of the self itself. The dialogue thus repeatedly demands intelligible content while acknowledging that one practical identification can fall short of a fully precise definition.

The Greek forms listed are ordinary question and naming expressions, not an attested technical noun for definition. Their importance lies in how they force words of approval, authority, and identity to bear a determinate meaning.

Places to read

1. 108b–109a2Naming the better requires specification of its governing standard
2. 124e–125e234Goodness and rule are clarified by their objects
3. 126d–127d23Friendship and concord fail to receive a coherent account
4. 127e–130d234567The definition of care leads to the self, with an explicit limit on precision

Translation in this edition

The edition alternates “what is,” “what do you mean,” and “what do you call” according to the Greek construction. These are not interchangeable everywhere: naming an activity and identifying what the person actually is are related but distinct questions.

δηλόω

Attested: δηλῶσαι (dēlōsai; 125c). At 125c: Make clear what activity the men governed by civic rule perform, rather than leave the object of rule unspecified. Lexical identification: lemma: δηλόω. See Account and definition.

ᾗ

Attested: ᾗ γε καλόν (hēi ge kalon; 115c). At 115c: Insofar as it is fine, restricting the predicate to the aspect under examination rather than the whole act without qualification. Lexical identification: lemma: ᾗ. See Account and definition.

καθ’ ὅσον

Attested: καθ’ ὅσον καλόν (kath’ hoson kalon; 116a). At 116a: To the extent that it is fine, the scope restriction preserved when excluding the bad from the fine as fine. Lexical identification: phrase label: καθ’ ὅσον. See Account and definition.

καλέω

Attested: καλεῖς (kaleis; 108b). At 108b: Name the better in a specified activity, requiring Alcibiades to identify the relevant standard. Lexical identification: lemma: καλέω. See Account and definition.

κατὰ ταὐτόν

Attested: κατὰ ταὐτόν (kata tauton; 115c). At 115c: In the same respect: helping friends is not fine and bad under the identical aspect, since courage and death differ. Lexical identification: phrase label: κατὰ ταὐτόν. See Account and definition.

μιμέομαι

Attested: μιμεῖσθαι (mimeisthai; 108b). At 108b: Imitate Socrates' model answer by naming the craft-relative better, a pedagogical use of analogy in questioning. Lexical identification: lemma: μιμέομαι. See Account and definition.

ὀνομάζω

Attested: ὀνομάζεις (onomazeis; 108e). At 108e: Give the name for the better in war and peace, analogous to the musical and gymnastic standards. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀνομάζω. See Account and definition.

ὑπολαμβάνω

Attested: ὑπελάβομεν (hypelabomen; 132d). At 132d: Understand what the hypothetical instruction to an eye recommends, turning a command into a question about its practical meaning. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑπολαμβάνω. See Account and definition.

Use in the book

The opening asks both what love of gain is and who lovers of gain are (225a). Most early answers describe people and their conduct. At 230d–231a2 the inquiry turns more directly to the object named gain. Having provisionally allowed good and bad gains, Socrates asks what remains the same in them. This separates a thing’s kind from its evaluation, at least long enough to make a fresh definition possible.

The food example gives the desired shape: good food and bad food are both dry nourishment of the body. Drink is wet nourishment of the body, whether decent or base. A successful answer states something common to the instances, rather than merely repeating that one is good and one bad. These are local working descriptions. Nothing in the passage establishes that every borderline case of nutrition has been considered.

The companion then accepts “every possession” acquired without spending or by spending less and receiving more. This answer introduces two alternative routes to gain under one account of acquisition. The first is tested by illness obtained at a feast, the second by an exchange of gold for a larger quantity of silver. The examples expose an omitted evaluative condition: an acquisition can be free or physically greater and still leave its recipient worse off.

The final appeal to worth and benefit restores goodness to the definition. That return may clarify what genuine gain means. It may also evade the original social category: a discreditable financial profit can still be called a gain even if it harms the person overall. The lexicon must keep these readings available. The definitions are not neutral labels that settle the ethical problem by themselves; choosing what counts as gain carries the dispute.

The most vulnerable preceding step should be kept separate from the legitimate demand for a definition. Both examples being equally gains does not establish that their possessors gain equally much. Socrates can reasonably ask for a common account even if that quantitative inference fails.

Places to read

1. 225aτί ποτέ ἐστιν — The opening question requests an account of what love of gain is.
2. 230dτί ταὐτὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὁρῶν — Socrates asks what sameness warrants the common designation.
3. 231aτοῦτο τὸ ὄνομά ἐστι, ποτόν — The name drink is attached to wet bodily nourishment.
4. 231aκέρδος λέγεις πᾶν κτῆμα — The proposed definition applies gain to every possession meeting the conditions.

Translation in this edition

The edition repeatedly renders καλεῖν as “call.” Retaining this ordinary language matters: the passage concerns why speakers apply a word, not an explicitly formulated theory of universals. Its descriptions of food and drink are translated with “nourishment,” preserving the functional term that allows qualitative differences within the kind.

Use in the book

The remark about conceiving God makes ease of conception conditional on not forcing a definition. A definition is therefore not presented as the universal prerequisite of understanding. In another setting, Joubert drafts an account of jargon and immediately asks for a better definition, including a distinction from technical words. The practice remains useful but unfinished. His remark on the Theaetetus describes a dialogue refuting earlier definitions of knowledge and the meaning of “to know”; that description belongs to Joubert’s reading, not an independently established account of the entire dialogue.

Places to read

1. I, p. 447, entry 4, ¶1Forcing a definition can hinder conception.
2. II, p. 671, entry 5, ¶1A provisional definition of jargon calls for further refinement.
3. II, p. 747, entry 8, ¶1Joubert describes the refutation of definitions of knowing.

Translation in this edition

The English translation preserves the future question, the injunction to improve the jargon definition, and the source editor’s brackets around [the Theaetetus]. Defining is not silently made synonymous with proving.