From the book
Meditations
Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΑἰτία is responsibility, blame, and so cause; ὕλη is woodland and timber, and so the stuff a thing is made of. The Stoics made the pair the two principles of everything: matter, which is acted on, and cause, the reason that shapes it.
- In the MeditationsMarcus tells himself to divide the underlying thing "into the causal and the material" (7.29); in the case of the dead such a division is "the inquiry into the truth" (4.21.2), and he makes it of himself: "I am composed of the causal and the material" (5.13). Αἰτία also names the one answerable: his falling short is "my own fault" (1.17.6), and he sets what happens "from the cause outside" against what is done "by reason of the cause from you" (9.31). Matter is the stuff of action too: Marcus asks what prevents use from saying to whatever presents itself, "for to me the present is always material for rational and civic virtue" (7.68).
- In this editionΑἰτία and αἴτιος are "cause", except at 1.17.6, "fault"; τὸ αἰτιῶδες is "the causal" or "causal part"; ὕλη is "material", except "forest" in the line from Homer at 10.34; τὸ ὑλικόν is "the material".
- A place to read5.13, where Marcus finds that neither the causal nor the material in him will perish into what is not, as neither came to subsist out of what is not.
Meaning
Αἰτία (aitia) is in ordinary Greek responsibility, mostly blame, the charge laid against a man; the adjective αἴτιος (aitios) is "answerable", and its neuter τὸ αἴτιον (to aition), what is answerable for a thing, its cause. The sense of blame survives once, of himself: that he still falls short of the life according to nature "is my own fault" (1.17.6). Ὕλη (hylē) is woodland, as in Homer's lines on the leaves, which Marcus abridges at 10.34, then timber, then any stuff from which a thing is made. Τὸ αἰτιῶδες (to aitiōdes), "the causal", and τὸ ὑλικόν (to hylikon), "the material", are adjectives made nouns: in a thing, what acts and what is acted on.
The pair is Stoic physics. The Stoics held two principles of the whole, matter, which is acted on, and the reason in it, God, which acts (see Mind and reason), and the edition's note at 4.21.2 calls Marcus' division "the Stoic analysis of every thing into matter and cause, the active reason that shapes it".
Use in the book
The division is first a way of seeing truly. After asking where the dead and the living beings eaten each day find room, Marcus asks, "What, in this case, is the inquiry into the truth? A division into the material and the causal" (4.21.2). Among seven commands he tells himself, "Divide and distribute the underlying thing into the causal and the material" (7.29); among questions, "What is its substantial and material part, what its causal part, what does it do in the universe, how long a time does it subsist?" (8.11). In Book XII the division grows: things are divided "into material, cause, reference" (12.10), the reference being the end to which a thing is referred (9.23), and what produces an impression "into the cause, the material, the reference, the time within which it will have to have ceased" (12.17). "The preservation of life: to see each thing through and through, what it is in itself, what is its material, what its causal part" (12.29). Marcus asks what Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Pompey are beside Diogenes the Cynic, Heraclitus of Ephesus and Socrates, for "these saw things, and their causes and their materials" (8.3).
So seen, a thing loses its power to unsettle. "What unsettles you? The cause? Look at it. But the material? Look at it. And outside these there is nothing" (9.37; see Simplicity and sincerity). Marcus is to "go to the quality of the cause, and look at it, having circumscribed it from the material" (9.25), and to look at "the causal parts naked of the husks" (12.8). Seen bare, matter is mean: things are "filthy in material" (9.14), and Marcus is to consider "the weakness of all material" (12.7).
Applied to himself, the division answers the fear of ending. "I am composed of the causal and the material, and neither of these will perish into what is not, as neither did it come to subsist out of what is not. So every part of me will be posted by change to some part of the universe" (5.13). Nothing prevents saying so, he adds, "even if the universe is governed by limited periods" (5.13). Each part goes back to its own: "Everything material vanishes very quickly into the substance of the whole; and every cause is very quickly taken back into the reason of the whole" (7.10).
The cause is hidden, and known by its work. A man lets seed go into a womb and goes away, "and then another cause takes it over and works and completes an infant"; food goes down the throat, and "another cause" makes sensation, impulse, life and vigour. That power is to be seen "not with the eyes, but no less plainly" (10.26). In a man the body's parts are instruments, of no use without "the cause that moves and checks them", as the shuttle needs the weaver and the pen the writer (10.38; see Body and flesh). In the whole the causes are one web: "from all causes fate is completed as such a cause" (5.8.2; see Fate and allotment), and Marcus is to conceive "how all things are joint causes of all that happens" (4.40; see Cosmos and order).
The same word asks who is answerable, and there Marcus draws his line: "Freedom from trouble about what happens from the cause outside; justness in what is done by reason of the cause from you" (9.31; see Justice). When something stronger stands in the way, "the cause of its not being done does not lie with you" (8.47; see Assent and judgement). What is complete is determined by "him who was then the cause of the compounding and now of the dissolution; but you are the cause of neither" (12.36; see Citizenship). Marcus is also to look at "who is the cause of his own busyness" (12.8).
Matter, last, is what reason works on. That which rules within "makes material for itself of whatever is brought in to replace" what it sought, as a bright fire feeds on what falls on it (4.1; see Impulse); the rational being "can make every hindrance material for itself" (8.35; see Obstacle and reservation); and he asks what prevents use from saying to whatever presents itself that the present is "always material for rational and civic virtue" (7.68; see Tranquillity). Marcus reproaches himself, "What material and what occasion you flee!" (10.31), and asks what, "in this material, can be done or said in the soundest way" (10.33.1; see Obstacle and reservation). The governing reason of the whole, likewise, knows "on what material" it works (6.5). The two uses can be read as one doctrine: as the reason of the whole shapes passive matter, the ruling centre shapes whatever befalls it, and only the shaping is its own.
Places to read
Every chapter in which αἰτία, αἴτιος, ἀναίτιος, συναίτιος, αἰτιώδης, ὕλη, ὑλικός and ἔνυλος occur, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The verbs of blaming, αἰτιᾶσθαι (aitiasthai) and καταιτιᾶσθαι (kataitiasthai), and the noun καταιτίασις (kataitiasis) are left out (see Fault and ignorance).
- 1.17.6GreekAs far as depends on the gods, nothing prevents Marcus from living according to nature, and that he still falls short of it is his own fault.
- 4.1GreekThat which rules within loves no fixed material, but makes material for itself of whatever is brought in to replace what it sought, as a bright fire does (see Impulse).
- 4.20GreekThings called beautiful in the more ordinary sense, such as things of matter and works of art, are made neither worse nor better by praise.
- 4.21.2GreekConsidering the multitude of the dead and of the living beings eaten each day, Marcus finds the inquiry into the truth to be a division into the material and the causal.
- 4.40GreekMarcus is to conceive the universe as one living being, and how all things are joint causes of all that happens (see Cosmos and order).
- 5.8.2GreekAs from all bodies the universe is completed as such a body, so from all causes fate is completed as such a cause (see Fate and allotment).
- 5.8.5GreekWhat happens to each was spun together out of the most ancient causes and is a cause of the good journey of that which governs the whole; discontent cuts something off from the continuity of the causes (see Fate and allotment).
- 5.13GreekMarcus is composed of the causal and the material, neither of which will perish into what is not, and every part of him will be posted by change to some part of the universe.
- 5.23GreekSubstance is like a river in perpetual flow, the activities in continual changes and the causes in countless turnings (see Change).
- 6.1GreekThe reason that governs the substance of the whole has no cause in itself for doing ill (see Substance).
- 6.5GreekThe governing reason knows how it is disposed, what it does and on what material.
- 6.41GreekWhoever sets up things outside his choice as good or bad must blame the gods and hate men as the causes of his failure; if only what is in our power counts as good and bad, no cause is left to accuse God or to stand against a man as an enemy (see Good, bad and indifference).
- 6.44.1GreekIf the gods took counsel about Marcus, they took good counsel, and he asks for what cause they would have had an impulse to do him ill (see Gods).
- 7.10GreekEverything material vanishes very quickly into the substance of the whole, and every cause is very quickly taken back into the reason of the whole.
- 7.23GreekThe nature of the whole moulds a little horse out of substance as out of wax, then melts it down and uses its material for a little tree (see Substance).
- 7.24GreekIf even the awareness of doing wrong is going to depart, Marcus asks, what cause is there still for living?
- 7.29GreekAmong seven commands, Marcus is to divide and distribute the underlying thing into the causal and the material.
- 7.58GreekLeaving others' turnings to them, Marcus is to be intent on how to use what happens, for he will use it well and it will be material for him.
- 7.68GreekMarcus asks what prevents use from saying to what presents itself that the present is always material for rational and civic virtue (see Tranquillity).
- 8.3GreekBeside Alexander, Gaius and Pompey, slaves to many things, Diogenes, Heraclitus and Socrates saw things, and their causes and their materials.
- 8.7GreekThe common nature is just, if indeed it makes the portions of times, substance, cause, activity and conjuncture equal and according to worth for each (see Assent and judgement).
- 8.11GreekMarcus asks of a thing what is its substantial and material part, what its causal part, what it does in the universe and how long it subsists.
- 8.27GreekOf a man's three relations, one is to the divine cause, from which all things happen to all.
- 8.35GreekThe rational living being can make every hindrance material for itself and use it for whatever it had its impulse towards (see Obstacle and reservation).
- 8.47GreekIf something stronger stands in the way of an act, the cause of its not being done does not lie with Marcus (see Assent and judgement).
- 8.50GreekThe nature of the whole has nothing outside, and is content with its own space, its own material and its own art (see Nature).
- 9.1.1GreekThe nature of the whole is also named Truth, and is the first cause of all things true (see Justice).
- 9.6GreekEnough is the present opinion firmly grasping, the present action social, and the present disposition well pleased with all that happens from the cause outside.
- 9.9.1GreekFire is so ready to be kindled together with all fire that even material a little drier is easily kindled (see Kinship and cooperation).
- 9.14GreekAll these things are usual in experience, of a day in time, filthy in material.
- 9.25GreekMarcus is to go to the quality of the cause and look at it, having circumscribed it from the material, and then mark the longest time this individually qualified thing can subsist.
- 9.31GreekFreedom from trouble belongs to what happens from the cause outside, justness to what is done by reason of the cause from oneself (see Justice).
- 9.36GreekThe material underlying each thing is rottenness: water, dust, little bones, stink (see Body and flesh).
- 9.37GreekTo whatever troubles him Marcus answers that he is to look at the cause and at the material, for outside these there is nothing (see Simplicity and sincerity).
- 10.5GreekThe interweaving of causes was spinning together from everlasting both a man's subsistence and what happens to him (see Fate and allotment).
- 10.6.1GreekThe nature of the universe is not compelled even by any cause from outside to generate anything harmful to itself (see Whole and part).
- 10.26GreekAfter seed and after food, another cause takes over and completes an infant or makes sensation and impulse, a power to be seen not with the eyes but no less plainly.
- 10.31GreekMarcus exclaims at the material and the occasion he flees, for all these things are exercises for a reason that has seen the things in life exactly, as one who studies nature.
- 10.33.1GreekIt is open to Marcus to do or say what in this material can be done or said in the soundest way, and doing what is proper to a man in the material laid before him is to be for him what luxury is to those who live delicately (see Obstacle and reservation).
- 10.34GreekIn lines from Homer on the leaves, the wind throws them down and the forest puts forth others in their place.
- 10.38GreekWhat moves the puppet is hidden within; the body's parts, like the weaver's shuttle and the writer's pen, are of no use without the cause that moves and checks them (see Body and flesh).
- 12.2GreekGod sees all ruling centres naked of the material vessels and husks and dross (see Gods).
- 12.7GreekMarcus is to consider the shortness of life, the gulf of eternity and the weakness of all material.
- 12.8GreekMarcus is to look at the causal parts naked of the husks, and at who is the cause of his own busyness.
- 12.10GreekThings are to be seen by dividing them into material, cause and reference.
- 12.17GreekMarcus' impulse is to be towards seeing what produces each impression, dividing it into the cause, the material, the reference and the time within which it will have ceased.
- 12.27GreekIt is more philosophical, in the material given, to show oneself just, self-controlled and following the gods, artlessly (see Simplicity and sincerity).
- 12.29GreekThe preservation of life is to see each thing through and through, what is its material and what its causal part, and to do what is just and say what is true with the whole soul.
- 12.36GreekThe complete is determined by him who was the cause of the compounding and now of the dissolution; the man himself is the cause of neither (see Citizenship).
Translation in this edition
Αἰτία is "cause" at all its places (5.8.2, 6.1, 6.41, 6.44.1, 7.24, 8.3, 8.27, 8.47, 9.1.1, 9.6, 9.31 twice, 10.6.1, 10.26 twice, 10.38) except 1.17.6, "my own fault", as the Glossary records; with prepositions it is "for what cause" (6.44.1), "from the cause outside" (9.6, 9.31), "by reason of the cause from you" (9.31) and "any cause from outside" (10.6.1). The neuter τὸ αἴτιον is "cause" (5.8.2, 5.8.5, 5.23, 7.10, 8.7, 9.25, 9.37, 10.5, 12.10, 12.17), and the adjective αἴτιος, of persons, "the causes of" (6.41) and "the cause of" (12.8, 12.36); ἀναίτιος is "the cause of neither" (12.36), συναίτια "joint causes" (4.40). Τὸ αἰτιῶδες is "the causal" (4.21.2, 5.13, 7.29) and "causal part" (8.11, 12.29), the plural "the causal parts" (12.8). Ὕλη is "material" (4.1 twice, 6.5, 7.23, 7.58, 7.68, 8.35, 8.50, 9.14, 9.36, 9.37, 10.31, 10.33.1 twice, 12.7, 12.10, 12.27), "materials" in the plural (8.3), and "forest" in Homer's line at 10.34, as the Glossary records. Τὸ ὑλικόν is "the material" (4.21.2, 5.13, 7.29, 9.25, 12.17), "its material" (12.29), "material part" (8.11) and "material" (9.9.1); the adjective is "material" in "the material vessels" (12.2), and τὰ ὑλικά are "things of matter" (4.20), the one place where "matter" renders a word of the family. Ἔνυλος is "material" in "Everything material" (7.10). At 8.11 "substantial and material" render οὐσιῶδες (ousiōdes) and ὑλικόν under one article, one side of the question, with "causal" the other (see Substance). "Cause" in the English renders no other noun, and "material" no other word. The verbs of blaming are rendered by sense: αἰτιᾶσθαι "complaint" (1.13, twice) and "accuse" (10.4), καταιτιᾶσθαι "blame" (5.5), and καταιτίασις "accusations" (1.16.3).
Greek forms and English renderings
The causal and the material · Meditations
αἰτία, aitia, "cause", "fault"; αἴτιος, aitios, "the cause of", "the causes of"; τὸ αἴτιον, to aition, "cause"; ἀναίτιος, anaitios, "the cause of neither"; συναίτιος, synaitios, "joint causes"; τὸ αἰτιῶδες, to aitiōdes, "the causal", "causal part"; ὕλη, hylē, "material", "materials", "forest"; τὸ ὑλικόν, to hylikon, "the material", "material part", "material"; ὑλικός, hylikos, "material", "things of matter"; ἔνυλος, enylos, "material"
Epictetus and the Stoics
Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, sets out the doctrine behind Marcus' division in a letter on causes to his friend Lucilius. Our Stoics, he says, hold that there are two things in nature from which everything comes, cause and matter. Matter lies inert, a thing ready for any use and idle if nothing moves it; the cause, which is reason, gives matter its form, turns it whichever way it will, and brings out of it works of every kind. Art copies nature: a statue had matter that suffered the artist and an artist who gave the matter a face, the bronze its matter and the craftsman its cause.1 The Stoics, he goes on, allow one cause only, that which makes; Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, counts the matter, the maker, the form and the end, and Plato, the Athenian philosopher and Aristotle's teacher, adds the pattern. Seneca replies that such a list is either too long or too short, for if whatever a thing cannot come to be without is a cause, time, place and motion must be counted too; what is sought is the first and general cause, which must be simple, as matter is simple, and that is the reason that makes, God.2 Marcus' fuller divisions, which add the reference and the time to the cause and the material (12.10, 12.17), can be read beside this argument. The letter ends with a man, and can be read beside 5.13: the universe consists of matter and of God; the place God holds in the world the mind holds in man, and what matter is there the body is in us; and death is either an end or a passing over.3 The two principles themselves, the passive and the active, are reported in the summary of the school by Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers (see Mind and reason).4
Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, gives matter its moral sense. Asked how he might persuade his brother to stop being angry with him, he answers that philosophy does not undertake to secure anything outside a man; it would be taking on something beyond its own material. The carpenter works on timber and the sculptor on bronze; the art of living works on each man's own life, and the brother's life belongs to the brother's own art.5 The materials are indifferent, but the use made of them is not.6 External things are materials for choice, which gains its own good or bad in dealing with them, and gains the good by not admiring them.7 Marcus' "material for rational and civic virtue" (7.68), his hindrance made "material for itself" (8.35) and his "What material and what occasion you flee!" (10.31) can be read as this teaching.
αἰτία
Attested: αἰτίαν (aitian; 1.17.6, 6.1, 6.44.1, 8.27, 9.31), αἰτία (aitia; 5.8.2, 6.41, 7.24, 8.47, 9.1.1, 10.26 twice), αἰτίας (aitias; 8.3, 9.6, 9.31, 10.6.1, 10.38). Responsibility, blame; a reason or ground; a cause. Of Marcus' own shortfall, "my own fault" (1.17.6); as a ground, "what cause is there still for living?" (7.24); of the whole, "the divine cause, from which all things happen to all" (8.27) and "the first cause of all things true" (9.1.1); of conduct, "the cause outside" and "the cause from you" (9.31). At 9.6 "from the cause outside" is the correction of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts for the manuscripts' τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας, "from the cause"; at 9.31 the phrase is transmitted. At 9.29 the manuscripts have αἰτία where Leopold prints Reiske's οὐσία, "substance" (see Substance). At 6.41 "no cause is left" stands under a condition, "if we judge only what is in our power to be good and bad", whose verb is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, κρίνωμεν, for the manuscripts' κινῶμεν. Lemma: αἰτία.
αἴτιος
Attested: αἰτίων (aitiōn; 5.8.2, 5.8.5 twice, 10.5), αἴτιον (aition; 5.8.5, 7.10, 9.37, 12.10, 12.17), αἴτια (aitia; 5.23), αἰτίους (aitious; 6.41), αἰτίου (aitiou; 8.7, 9.25), αἴτιος (aitios; 12.8, 12.36). Answerable for; as a neuter noun, a cause. "so from all causes fate is completed as such a cause" (5.8.2); "The cause? Look at it" (9.37); "who is the cause of his own busyness" (12.8). In the genitive plural P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, accents αἰτιῶν, of αἰτία, at 5.8.2, and A, the Vatican manuscript, at 5.8.5 and 10.5. At 8.27 the manuscripts have αἴτιον where Leopold prints ἀγγεῖον, "vessel", the correction of Lodewijk Caspar Valckenaer, the eighteenth-century Dutch scholar. Lemma: αἴτιος.
αἰτιώδης
Attested: αἰτιῶδες (aitiōdes; 4.21.2, 7.29, 8.11, 12.29), αἰτιώδους (aitiōdous; 5.13), αἰτιώδη (aitiōdē; 12.8). Causal; with the article, the causal part of a thing, its active principle, set against the material. "A division into the material and the causal" (4.21.2); "I am composed of the causal and the material" (5.13); "Look at the causal parts naked of the husks" (12.8). Lemma: αἰτιώδης.
ἀναίτιος
Attested: ἀναίτιος (anaitios; 12.36). Not answerable, without part in a thing. Nature determines the end of the play, "him who was then the cause of the compounding and now of the dissolution; but you are the cause of neither" (12.36; see Citizenship). Lemma: ἀναίτιος.
ἔνυλος
Attested: ἔνυλον (enylon; 7.10). Material, having matter in it. "Everything material vanishes very quickly into the substance of the whole" (7.10). Lemma: ἔνυλος.
συναίτιος
Attested: συναίτια (synaitia; 4.40). Sharing in a cause, a joint cause. Marcus is to conceive the universe as one living being, and "how all things are joint causes of all that happens" (4.40; see Cosmos and order). Lemma: συναίτιος.
ὕλη
Attested: ὕλην (hylēn; 4.1 twice, 8.35, 10.31, 12.10), ὕλης (hylēs; 6.5, 9.36, 10.33.1 twice, 12.7, 12.27), ὕλῃ (hylēi; 7.23, 8.50, 9.14), ὕλη (hylē; 7.58, 7.68, 9.37, 10.34), ὕλας (hylas; 8.3). Woodland, timber; the stuff a thing is made of; for Marcus also the stuff of action. "it loves no fixed material" (4.1); use may say to what presents itself, "for to me the present is always material for rational and civic virtue" (7.68); "But the material? Look at it" (9.37). In Homer's line at 10.34 it is "the forest" that "puts forth others in place of these". Lemma: ὕλη.
ὑλικός
Attested: ὑλικῶν (hylikōn; 4.20, 12.2), ὑλικόν (hylikon; 4.21.2, 7.29, 8.11, 9.9.1, 12.17, 12.29), ὑλικοῦ (hylikou; 5.13, 9.25). Of matter, material; with the article, the material part of a thing, set against the causal. "Divide and distribute the underlying thing into the causal and the material" (7.29); "having circumscribed it from the material" (9.25); "things called beautiful in the more ordinary sense, such as things of matter and works of art" (4.20). Lemma: ὑλικός.
Source note
1. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 65.2–3.
2. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 65.4–12.
3. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 65.23–24.
4. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.134.
5. Epictetus, Discourses 1.15.1–3.
6. Epictetus, Discourses 2.5.1.
7. Epictetus, Discourses 1.29.2–3.