Argument and language

The unnamed companion

ἑταῖρος (hetairos); φίλος (philos)

Ἑταῖρος means companion or associate.

From the book

Hipparchus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordἙταῖρος means companion or associate.
  • In HipparchusThe companion begins with a socially recognisable target: unscrupulous people who pursue even worthless returns.
  • In this editionThe edition translates ΕΤ.
  • A place to readἢ οὐ φίλον με — The companion challenges Socrates’ claim to friendship.

Meaning

Ἑταῖρος means companion or associate. It identifies Socrates’ interlocutor in the transmitted list of speakers and underlies the abbreviation ΕΤ.; no personal name is supplied. Φίλος means friend or dear, and in the exchange over the inscription designates a relationship between the two men. Being labelled a companion in the dramatis personae does not settle the substantive question of friendship debated at 229b–e2.

Use in the book

The companion begins with a socially recognisable target: unscrupulous people who pursue even worthless returns. His first response is not a random lexical guess but an attempt to identify a discreditable disposition. He repeatedly resists conclusions that flatten the difference between decent and base conduct. The successive definitions shift from worthless things, to insatiable craving, to gains that decent people will not dare pursue. Their instability is part of the inquiry.

He is also capable of diagnosing a difficulty without possessing its complete technical explanation. Twice he says that Socrates deceives him while admitting that he does not know exactly how. The text gives readers reasons to take that suspicion seriously, including Socrates’ strengthened recollection of what was agreed at 227d. Conversely, suspicion alone cannot supply the missing distinction between profit that appears advantageous and gain understood as genuine benefit. His difficulty is both argumentative and ethical.

The response to Hipparchus is particularly active. Socrates has invoked the command not to deceive a friend; the companion turns that justification into a dilemma. Either Socrates does not regard him as a friend, or he fails to obey the very authority he praises. The story has given the interlocutor a standard rather than simply silenced him.

At 230a he selects the agreement that all gaining is good for withdrawal. Later he admits being at a loss and finally says he has been compelled rather than persuaded. These are not interchangeable forms of assent. The ending records compliance with an argument whose persuasive success remains expressly incomplete. His anonymity helps keep the moral question general, but the text does not say that he represents the average Athenian, a sophist, a merchant or a particular political group.

Places to read

  1. 229dἢ οὐ φίλον με — The companion challenges Socrates’ claim to friendship.
  2. 229eοὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι — His refusal of conviction survives the cultural narrative.
  3. 230aτουτί μοι ἀνάθου — He chooses the proposition to be withdrawn.

Translation in this edition

The edition translates ΕΤ. as “Comp.” and explicitly notes that no setting or occasion is given. Calling the speaker “the unnamed companion” preserves what is known without inventing an identity. His speeches should not be reduced to answers of assent; the accusations, revised definition and closing reservation are essential evidence for how the dialogue expects its reasoning to be heard.