Inquiry

Use in the book

Inquiry begins as a shared alternative to forcing Charmides to praise or condemn himself. Socrates proposes that they look together into whether he has temperance (158d–e). The willingness of both participants matters: he offers to leave it if the boy does not wish to proceed. Once the method is chosen, Charmides supplies opinions for testing.

The inquiry's stated criterion is truth rather than authorship. When Charmides asks why it matters who originated the third definition, Socrates agrees that what must be inspected is whether it is true (161c). Critias' entry tests that commitment because intellectual ownership, reputation and anger increasingly matter to him. Socrates insists at 165b–c2 that he does not question from concealed possession of the answer; he seeks because he does not know. At 166d–e2 he asks both men to attend to the argument rather than whose reputation suffers.

The investigation has an explicit order at 167b: first whether the proposed reflective knowledge is possible, then whether it benefits. The first question is not resolved, so Socrates provisionally suspends it at 169d to advance the second. Inquiry here includes revisiting assumptions, distinguishing questions and admitting a blocked route. The later dream is another controlled alteration of assumptions rather than a report of settled doctrine.

Finally zētēsis is personified as an insolent agent that defeats its accommodating partners (175c–d). Socrates calls himself a poor inquirer (175e), refusing to identify the disappointing result with the worthlessness of temperance. This is a limit upon both dogmatic and purely skeptical readings. The dialogue shows an inquiry failing to secure its definition while displaying reasons to continue examining oneself and the argument.

Places to read

1. 158d–159aShared inquiry and its initial method
2. 161cTruth rather than the identity of the speaker
3. 165b–166e234Socrates explains why and how he inquires
4. 167b–169d2345Two questions distinguished; possibility provisionally conceded
5. 172c–173a2Renewed scrutiny despite an initially strange result
6. 175b–176b23Failure of the inquiry and desire for further conversation

Translation in this edition

The edition generally keeps “look into” for the skop-/skep- family and “inquire” for zēt-. At 172c “our search has been to no useful purpose” criticizes their procedure or result; it does not simply designate temperance itself as useless.

ἀσκέπτως

Attested: ἀσκέπτως (askeptōs). Without examination; Socrates refuses to proceed to medical treatment before investigating whether Charmides possesses temperance. References: 158e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀσκέπτως. See Inquiry.

διασκέπτομαι

Attested: διασκεψάμενος (diaskepsamenos). Having considered or thought it over; Charmides pauses and reflects to himself before proposing that temperance is modesty. References: 160e. Lexical identification: lemma: διασκέπτομαι. See Inquiry.

εἰκῇ

Attested: εἰκῇ (eikēi). At random or without due consideration; Socrates says an apparent difficulty must be examined rather than casually passed over if one cares for oneself. References: 173a. Lexical identification: lemma: εἰκῇ. See Inquiry.

ἐπισκέπτομαι

Attested: ἐπισκεψώμεθα / ἐπισκέψεται / ἐπισκεψάμενοι (episkepsōmetha / episkepsetai / episkepsamenoi). Examine or consider; used for testing possibility, benefit and the consistency of concessions. References: 167b, 171b, 175c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπισκέπτομαι. See Inquiry.

ἐρευνάω

Attested: ἐρευνῶν (ereunōn). Search or investigate; Critias says Socrates has reached the feature that distinguishes temperance from other knowledges. References: 166b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐρευνάω. See Inquiry.

ζητέω

Attested: ζητῶ / ζητοῦμεν / ζητεῖν (zētō / zētoumen / zētein). To inquire or search for an answer; Socrates presents himself as a co-inquirer who does not know, then questions whether their search has achieved anything useful and finally doubts his own ability to inquire by argument. References: 165b, 172c, 175b, 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: ζητέω. See Inquiry.

ζήτησις

Attested: ζητήσεσιν / ζήτησιν / ζήτησις (zētēsesin / zētēsin / zētēsis). Inquiry or search; includes the soul’s investigations, Critias’ complaint about Socrates’ method, and the personified inquiry that mocks their concessions and fails to find the truth. References: 160a, 165e, 175d. Lexical identification: lemma: ζήτησις. See Inquiry.

ζητητής

Attested: ζητητήν (zētētēn). An inquirer or searcher; Socrates calls himself a poor one, assigning the failure to his investigation rather than concluding that temperance is worthless. References: 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: ζητητής. See Inquiry.

ἡττάομαι

Attested: ἡττώμεθα (hēttōmetha). We are defeated; Socrates describes the inquiry's failure as a collective defeat. References: 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡττάομαι. See Inquiry.

θαυμάζω

Attested: θαυμάζω (thaumazō). I wonder or find it surprising; Socrates challenges whether Critias really thinks people can be temperate without knowing that they are. References: 164a. Lexical identification: lemma: θαυμάζω. See Inquiry.

προσποθέω

Attested: προσποθῶ (prospothō). I still desire or long to know; Socrates asks which among an all-knowing person’s kinds of knowledge actually makes that person happy. References: 174a. Lexical identification: lemma: προσποθέω. See Inquiry.

σκέπτομαι

Attested: σκεπτέον / σκέψαι / σκεψάμενος / σκέψωμαι (skepteon / skepsai / skepsamenos / skepsōmai). To consider or examine; Socrates and Charmides investigate possession and definitions of temperance, and Socrates postpones agreement with Critias until he has considered the proposal. References: 158d, 161b, 161c, 165c. Lexical identification: lemma: σκέπτομαι; includes the related verbal adjective σκεπτέος. See Inquiry.

σκέψις

Attested: σκέψις (skepsis). Examination or method of inquiry; Socrates proposes eliciting Charmides’ own opinion as the best way to investigate the temperance supposedly present in him. References: 158e. Lexical identification: lemma: σκέψις. See Inquiry.

σκοπέω

Attested: σκοπεῖν / σκόπει / σκοποίμην / σκοπῶμεν / σκοπῶ / σκοπούμενος / σκοποῖμεν (skopein / skopei / skopoimēn / skopōmen / skopō / skopoumenos / skopoimen). To look into or examine; the repeated direction keeps attention on the truth of definitions, the grounds for agreement, the doctor’s competence and the usefulness of the proposed virtue. References: 158e, 161b, 162e, 163e, 165c, 166d, 171a, 171b, 172e, 175a. Lexical identification: lemma: σκοπέω. See Inquiry.

συλλήβδην

Attested: συλλήβδην (syllēbdēn). Summarily or taking together; Charmides compresses his examples into “a kind of quietness,” while Socrates later considers all the senses together. References: 159b, 167d. Lexical identification: lemma: συλλήβδην. See Inquiry.

συλλογίζομαι

Attested: συλλογισάμενος (syllogisamenos). Having put together or reckoned up the considerations; Charmides is asked to combine his reflections on what temperance makes him before stating its nature. References: 160d. Lexical identification: lemma: συλλογίζομαι. See Inquiry.

βλέπομεν (blepomen)

Look toward or have in view; Socrates suggests that they may be expecting an exaggerated benefit from temperance. References: 172c. Lemma: βλέπω. See Inquiry.

διεληλύθαμεν (dielēlythamen)

Have gone through; summarizes the examples already examined before separating the impossible from the doubtful. References: 168e. Lemma: διέρχομαι. See Inquiry.

ἐδεδοίκη (ededoikē)

I had been afraid; Socrates recalls his misgiving about the adequacy of his inquiry. References: 175a. Lemma: δέδοικα. See Inquiry.

εἰκῇ (eikēi)

At random or heedlessly; one should not dismiss an emerging doubt without scrutiny. References: 173a. Lemma: εἰκῇ. See Inquiry.

ἐπισχὼν (epischōn)

Having paused; Charmides stops to reflect before giving the second definition. References: 160e. Lemma: ἐπέχω. See Inquiry.

ᾐτιώμην (ēitiōmēn)

I blamed or found fault with; Socrates turns the failed inquiry's blame on himself. References: 175a. Lemma: αἰτιάομαι. See Inquiry.

κοινῇ (koinēi)

Together or jointly; Socrates proposes a shared examination rather than forcing a self-assessment. References: 158d. Lemma: κοινῇ. See Inquiry.

προΐοι (proioi)

Go forward or make progress; the inquiry tentatively advances by granting the disputed possibility. References: 169d. Lemma: πρόειμι. See Inquiry.

συλλογισάμενος (syllogisamenos)

Having reckoned or considered the points together; an invitation to gather one's observations, not a technical Aristotelian syllogism. References: 160d. Lemma: συλλογίζομαι. See Inquiry.

Use in the book

Socrates begins as an observer who has watched Alcibiades' conduct toward his lovers. He repeatedly invites examination: of what “better” means, of the time when Alcibiades thought himself ignorant, of courage as a good, and of the belief that rival kings are ordinary competitors. These imperatives slow assertion into a test of its content.

At 124d examination is explicitly shared. Both need care, and they must look into the matter together. At 130c–d much further examination is the reason the self itself has been passed over. The term consequently marks both the work actually performed and the depth still outstanding.

In the eye analogy the literal direction of looking becomes the model for knowledge. Soul must look into soul; action later looks toward the divine or toward the godless and dark. This is not merely a decorative metaphor added to a finished account. The choice of object is the argument: one cannot expect to find oneself by attending indiscriminately to anything whatever.

The reader should nevertheless preserve the different verbs. Examining whether an argument follows is not literally gazing, and seeing a reflected face does not itself establish a psychology of introspection. The translation's repeated “look into” makes the connection audible while the Greek register shows where the analogy crosses from inquiry to sight.

Places to read

1. 103bSocrates’ prior observation grounds his account of Alcibiades
2. 109a–110c234Examination seeks the standard of better action and a history of learning
3. 124dThe partners undertake inquiry together
4. 130c–130dThe omitted self itself requires extensive examination
5. 132d–134e2345Directed visual looking models knowledge and ethical orientation

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “look into” for both the inquiry family and βλέπειν εἰς in the eye passage. At 132d5, where the families meet, Σκόπει becomes “Consider.” This local adjustment should not conceal which Greek verb is operating.

σκέπτομαι

Attested: σκέψαι (skepsai; 116b). At 116b: Consider another line of reasoning connecting doing finely with doing well. Lexical identification: lemma: σκέπτομαι. See Looking and examining.

σκέψις

Attested: σκέψεως (skepseōs; 130d). At 130d: The extensive inquiry needed by the self itself, explaining why exact knowledge has been postponed. Lexical identification: lemma: σκέψις. See Looking and examining.

σκοπέω

Attested: σκόπει (skopei; 109a). At 109a: Look into what the better in war and peace tends toward, rather than repeat a confident unexamined judgment. Lexical identification: lemma: σκοπέω. See Looking and examining.

Use in the book

The acquisition argument puts a motivational condition on seeking. Alcibiades agrees that he would not have been willing to seek what he thought he knew. Socrates later uses that concession to ask when he searched for justice. His inability to name a period of acknowledged ignorance deprives him of the claimed discovery. The obstacle is therefore conviction of completed knowledge, not lack of intelligence or the impossibility of the subject.

This condition is not the paradox that inquiry cannot begin without already knowing its object. The dialogue does not develop that problem. It asks whether Alcibiades recognized enough of a lack to undertake a search. The requirement is modest but disruptive: he must stop confusing confident judgments with an acquired understanding of their standard.

The word recurs within the constructive account. At 130b the body is rejected as “what we are seeking.” Here the sought object has been specified as the authoritative human self, and successive candidates are tested. The search can make progress without yet achieving the fuller precision postponed at 130c–d.

At 107c the Athenians “will seek” a doctor as adviser. This ordinary practical use complements the philosophical one: recognizing the limit of one's own competence directs one toward the right source rather than toward unsupported personal pronouncement.

Places to read

1. 106d–106eWillingness to seek is blocked by thinking one already knows
2. 107cThe city seeks a doctor for medical advice
3. 109e–110c2Alcibiades cannot identify the search preceding his supposed discovery
4. 130bThe body is not the self being sought

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps “seek” for ζητεῖν. The word should not be replaced everywhere by “research,” which suggests institutions and procedures not present in the text, or by “doubt,” which describes a different state from active inquiry.

ζητέω

Attested: ζητεῖν (zētein; 106d); ζητοῦμεν (zētoumen; 130b). At 106d: Search for what one lacks; willingness to do so is blocked when one already thinks one knows. At 130b: What we are seeking: the authoritative self, from which body is excluded under the agreed criterion. Lexical identification: lemma: ζητέω. See Seeking.

Use in the book

The initial invitation at 138d is to examine who the intelligent and unintelligent people are. The first approach fails, so at 139d Socrates says that they must look at matters another way. Disease and craftsmanship are then examined, and at 140d the original question is deliberately resumed. This sequence presents inquiry as revisable: a plausible beginning does not acquire authority merely because the conversation has already passed through it.

The same movement appears when Alcibiades condemns ignorance generally. Socrates asks them to look further at 143e and constructs the case of a would-be attacker who fails to recognise his victim. At 144d a further invitation introduces the startling thesis about other knowledge without the best. The inquiry progresses through increasingly precise conditions on judgments such as “ignorance is bad” and “knowledge is beneficial”.

The practical end is neither endless questioning nor a completed curriculum. The Spartans may have arrived at their restrained prayer by examining matters for themselves at 148c. At 149c Socrates explicitly joins caution with examination of what should and should not be spoken. Alcibiades’ postponement therefore grows out of inquiry into the safety of action, while the promised education remains future.

Places to read

1. 138dThe inquiry asks who the intelligent and unintelligent are.
2. 139d; 140a; 140dA failed approach is replaced, pursued jointly and returned to the starting question.
3. 143e; 144dFurther examination qualifies the valuation of ignorance and knowledge.
4. 148cThe Spartans may have reached their prayer through their own examination.
5. 149cExamination is directly required for deciding what to say.

Translation in this edition

The edition generally uses “look into” for this family and “look at” for athrein at 139d. Ordinary “see” and “look” exhortations need not be translated instances of skepsis. No separate doctrine of scepticism should be inferred from the noun.

Use in the book

At 230d Socrates says that “we” must look into why the companion calls both decent and base gain gain. The question is not initially which sort he prefers. It is what he sees that is the same in both. Food and drink provide models: each can be good or bad while retaining a common description, respectively dry or wet nourishment of the body. Socrates exhibits an answer to a question of kind before requiring an answer about gain.

“Try ... to imitate me” then gives the companion a manageable assignment (231a). He need not invent the format as well as the definition. He is to say what the contrasted examples possess in common. The instruction is pedagogical: abstract inquiry proceeds through familiar cases, and a model answer reduces the difficulty of moving from examples to an account.

Yet the companion does not produce the proposed definition independently. Socrates immediately adds that if he cannot answer, he should examine what Socrates says, and offers acquisition without expenditure or acquisition of more for less. The companion replies “I think I call that gain.” This tentative endorsement differs from a confident exposition of his own theory. Socrates subsequently tests the proposal he has supplied, first with disease acquired at a feast, then with metal exchange. Responsibility for the formulation is consequently shared, even though the final conclusion is called the companion’s argument.

The sequence helps explain both the effectiveness and the strain of the dialogue. Socrates makes an unclear claim testable and offers tools for answering. He also determines the choice of examples and the vocabulary in which the answer develops. Readers should therefore distinguish an invitation to participate from evidence of equal control over the inquiry. The final “compelled ... rather than persuaded” is consistent with the companion’s having followed each local question without fully owning the account that emerges.

Places to read

1. 230dδεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκέψασθαι — Inquiry is presented as a task for both speakers.
2. 231aπειρῶ οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ μιμεῖσθαι — The companion is asked to imitate Socrates’ form of answer.
3. 231aἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει — If unable to formulate an answer, he is to inspect Socrates’ proposal.
4. 231bἜμοιγε δοκῶ τοῦτο καλεῖν κέρδος — His assent to the proposed definition is qualified as what he thinks he calls gain.

Translation in this edition

“Imitate” belongs to a single, explicit conversational instruction; it should not be inflated into a claim about a developed doctrine of mimesis. The edition’s “look into it as I speak” preserves an active role for the listener even while Socrates supplies the words. This is more exact than presenting the episode as either pure joint discovery or mere dictation.

Use in the book

Socrates' first instruction is already to look into what he is asking (313a). The companion must distinguish a question about a particular law from a question about law as a whole. After the sensory analogies Socrates again proposes that they examine the matter in a particular way (313c). Inquiry is therefore not simply an open exchange of examples: it includes attention to the form of the question and to what an answer is supposed to explain.

At 315d the companion has made his most substantial speech. Human sacrifice and earlier Athenian burial customs support a claim of difference across peoples and periods. Socrates does not answer each instance. He says that the companion may be speaking rightly and that he himself may have missed it, but that separate long speeches will not bring them to agreement. Making the skemma common may do so. The concession is provisional, yet it keeps the proposal from being a bare assertion of superior knowledge.

The companion is offered a real grammatical choice: he can ask Socrates questions or answer Socrates' questions. He chooses to answer. Shared inquiry thus concerns reciprocal access to the object, not merely the identity of the questioner. Nevertheless, the actual questioning strongly shapes the issue. Socrates replaces the disputed classification of practices with questions about calling just things just and heavier things heavier. The method secures shared propositions while leaving open whether those propositions meet the objection.

The dialogue itself later contains a long Socratic account of Minos, poets, and education. The criticism at 315d cannot therefore be flattened into a prohibition on length, a claim that only one-line responses count as philosophy, or a guarantee that questioning always reaches truth. Its local target is the uncoordinated alternation of private assertions. A substantial speech can contribute to the inquiry, and a series of short answers can fail to persuade, as the companion explicitly says at 316c.

The final challenge revives the shared pronouns: what could “we” answer, and what do the souls of “each of us” fail to know? Socrates does not leave the companion alone with the shame. Shared inquiry eventually produces a shared recognition of an unanswered question concerning the soul.

Places to read

1. 313aσκόπει γὰρ δὴ ὃ τυγχάνω ἐρωτῶν σε — Attend to what is actually being asked
2. 313cἐπισκεψώμεθ’ αὐτὸ ὧδε — A proposal to examine the matter in a specified way
3. 315dκατὰ σαυτὸν λέγῃς ἅ σοι δοκεῖ μακρῷ λόγῳ — Speaking separately at length about what seems so to oneself
4. 315eἐὰν δὲ κοινὸν τεθῇ τὸ σκέμμα — Making the examined matter common
5. 315eκοινῇ μετ’ ἐμοῦ σκόπει — An invitation to examine together, by asking or answering
6. 321dτῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἑκατέρου — The final deficiency concerns the soul of each participant

Translation in this edition

“What is looked into” keeps skemma close to the recurring verbs of looking and examining. “Long speech” retains logos in its conversational sense; it should not be read as a separate technical category called “the Long Discourse.”

Be put — τιθέναι (tithenai)

τιθέναι (tithenai)

Be put. Passive subjunctive in making the object of inquiry common; not here the later enactment of laws. Attested: τεθῇ (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech.

Common or shared — κοινός (koinos)

κοινός (koinos)

Common or shared. The condition in which the object under examination is made available to both speakers. Attested: κοινὸν (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech.

Finding out by asking — πυνθάνεσθαι (pynthanesthai)

πυνθάνεσθαι (pynthanesthai)

Finding out by asking. One of the roles offered to the companion: ask Socrates questions in the common examination. Attested: πυνθανόμενός (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech.

In common — κοινῇ (koinēi)

κοινῇ (koinēi)

In common. The manner of the proposed inquiry, whether the companion questions or answers. Attested: κοινῇ (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech.

Let us examine — ἐπισκέπτεσθαι (episkeptesthai)

ἐπισκέπτεσθαι (episkeptesthai)

Let us examine. The shared proposal to investigate what law might be through the perception examples. Attested: ἐπισκεψώμεθ’ (313c). Common inquiry and the long speech.

Long — μακρός (makros)

μακρός (makros)

Long. Qualifies the speech each person might give separately without jointly examining the matter. Attested: μακρῷ (315d). Common inquiry and the long speech.

Look closely at — ἀθρεῖν (athrein)

ἀθρεῖν (athrein)

Look closely at. Socrates invites a renewed examination together, now through a medical writing. Attested: ἄθρει (316c). Common inquiry and the long speech.

Look into or examine — σκοπεῖν (skopein)

σκοπεῖν (skopein)

Look into or examine. The companion is told to examine what Socrates is actually asking. Attested: σκόπει (313a). Common inquiry and the long speech.

My excellent friend — βέλτιστος (beltistos)

βέλτιστος (beltistos)

My excellent friend. Socrates' courteous form of address to the unnamed companion, not a verified ranking of his virtue. Attested: βέλτιστε (315d). Common inquiry and the long speech.

Rightly — ὀρθῶς (orthōs) · ὀρθῶς (315d).

ὀρθῶς (orthōs)

Rightly. Socrates provisionally allows that the companion's account of variation may be right and have escaped him. Attested: ὀρθῶς (315d). Common inquiry and the long speech.

A long speech — λόγος (logos)

λόγος (logos)

A long speech. An extended statement of one's own view, criticized when it alternates with another separate speech without common examination. Attested: μακρῷ λόγῳ (315d). Common inquiry and the long speech.

Answer — ἀποκρίνεσθαι (apokrinesthai)

ἀποκρίνεσθαι (apokrinesthai)

Answer. The companion chooses to answer Socrates' questions in the common inquiry. Attested: ἀποκρίνεσθαι (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech.

What is looked into — σκέμμα (skemma)

σκέμμα (skemma)

What is looked into. The matter jointly examined, rather than one speaker's private long account. Attested: σκέμμα (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech.

Wonderful or surprising — θαυμαστός (thaumastos)

θαυμαστός (thaumastos)

Wonderful or surprising. Socrates says there is nothing surprising if the companion is right and the point has escaped him. Attested: θαυμαστόν (315d). Common inquiry and the long speech.

Countless examples and room for proof (contextual phrase)

315d: μυρία δ’ ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν. The potential construction says that one could cite countless examples of this kind. It is the companion's claim of evidential abundance, not an actual presentation of every case. His following phrase about room for proof reinforces confidence in the divergence objection. Socrates' change of method answers the manner of inquiry before it answers the individual cases. See Common inquiry.

Putting the inquiry in common (contextual phrase)

315e: ἐὰν δὲ κοινὸν τεθῇ τὸ σκέμμα. The passive subjunctive makes the shared placement of what is examined a condition for possible agreement. The continuation τάχ’ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιμεν remains modest: “we might perhaps agree.” The common object and the possible agreement are related but not identical; making an inquiry collaborative is not itself proof of its conclusion. See Common inquiry.

Use in the book

At 213d, the failure of the first alternatives leads to the question whether they were seeking in the right way at all. Lysis’ spontaneous assent and blush show that he has been actively following the inquiry. The verb directs attention to method, not simply to the absence of an answer.

Compare the final ἐξευρεῖν, “find out”, at 223b: seeking has occurred, but discovery has not yet been achieved. A search-word should not be turned into a guarantee that the last proposal is the intended solution.

Places to read

1. 213dοὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐζητοῦμεν — we were not seeking rightly.
2. 213d–e
3. 223b

Use in the book

Forms such as σκεψώμεθα and σκέψασθε invite joint consideration or ask the boys to attend to a distinction. At 217c the latter introduces the question whether the presence of a quality makes its bearer that same kind of thing.

The compound ἐπισκέπτομαι occurs at 222b when Socrates wants to inspect the argument after the flattering result about the genuine lover. Examination reopens an apparently attractive conclusion; it is not reserved for positions already known to be false.

Places to read

1. 217cΣκέψασθε δὴ ὃ λέγω — Now consider what I am saying.
2. 216c
3. 219b
4. 222b

Use in the book

The noun occurs in the comparison of inquiry to a difficult road. It denotes their present investigation, including the possibility of having taken an unhelpful route.

It should not be loaded with the meaning of a later philosophical school or a general commitment to disbelief. Socrates’ practical response to the difficult σκέψις is to turn towards another source of possible answers, the poets, and examine their claims.

Places to read

1. 213eὥσπερ ὁδὸς ἡ σκέψις — The examination is like a road.

Use in the book

At 206b Σκόπει δή is a warning, “look to it”, addressed to Hippothales about his poetry’s effects. Later the verb directs philosophical attention.

The verb turns looking into the activity of inquiry. At 213e Socrates says that correct examination would not have left them wandering, and redirects the inquiry towards the poets. At 218d σκοπῶμεν introduces a fresh examination of the apparent solution.

The emphasis is on the act and direction of attention, not on the possession of a doctrine. Its road imagery at 213e connects examining with choosing a route that may succeed or mislead. The related σκέψις there names the examination itself.

Places to read

1. 213eεἰ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκοποῦμεν — If we had been examining correctly.
2. 213e–214a
3. 218d
4. 206b

Use in the book

Isis calls the inquiry into souls’ places necessary, then begins from the proposition that what has established existence and does not vanish has a place. The term marks a deliberate explanatory investigation. The first proposition is the basis offered by the speaker, not a result already established by the word “inquiry.”

Places to read

1. I.49.68.2The investigation begins from a claim about subsistence and place.

Translation in this edition

“Inquiry” is preferable to “search” where an argument rather than a physical hunt is intended.