Question and answer

Use in the book

Ordinary questions about the battle open the dialogue, followed by Socrates' questions about philosophy and the young men (153c–d2). Questioning is thus an exchange between people before it becomes a test of definitions. Charmides initially cannot answer whether he is temperate without either boasting or discrediting his admirers (158c–d2). Socrates shifts from that socially loaded alternative to examining what temperance is.

The short answers in the argument record assent, uncertainty, resistance or a request for clarification. They are not interchangeable ticks in a logical proof. Critias' “what's to stop them?” at 163a resists an alleged consequence; his agreement that reflective knowledge has only a generic discriminating function at 170a materially narrows the proposal.

Socrates explicitly asks for an answer according to how things appear to the respondent, independent of who is being refuted (166d–e2). Conversely Critias often suspects that the questioner knows an answer he is withholding (165b). This tension concerns the authority of the question itself: does it invite shared inquiry or display superior knowledge? The text states Socrates' preferred understanding but also dramatizes how hard it is to sustain.

Places to read

1. 153c–d2Reciprocal questioning before the philosophical discussion
2. 158c–159b2Difficulty answering and reformulation of the question
3. 163a–bResistance to the question’s assumed equivalence
4. 165b–166e234Questioning without claimed possession of the answer

Translation in this edition

The edition's repeated “he said” and brief affirmative replies preserve the conversational pacing. Their repetition should not be treated as evidence that every premise has received independent support beyond local assent.

ἀνερωτάω

Attested: ἀνηρώτων (anērōtōn). Ask or inquire; the opening transition from campaign news to questions about philosophy and the young. References: 153d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνερωτάω. See Question and answer.

ἀποκρίνομαι

Attested: ἀποκρινόμενος / ἀποκρίνωμαι (apokrinomenos / apokrinōmai). Answer or respond; distinguishes the respondent’s task from the questioner’s claim to knowledge. References: 153b, 158d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποκρίνομαι. See Question and answer.

ἀπόκρισις

Attested: ἀπόκρισιν / ἀποκρίσεως (apokrisin / apokriseōs). An answer or reply; Critias is drawn into defending the answer that Charmides has borrowed from him. References: 162c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπόκρισις. See Question and answer.

ὀκνέω

Attested: ὤκνει (ōknei). He hesitated or hung back before answering; marks the boy's reluctance. References: 159b. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀκνέω. See Question and answer.

πυνθάνομαι

Attested: πεπυσμένοι (pepysmenoi). Having learned or heard news; the Athenians have only recently received the report of the battle at Potidaea, unlike Socrates’ firsthand experience. References: 153b. Lexical identification: lemma: πυνθάνομαι. See Question and answer.

ἀνέροιτο (aneroito)

Asked or inquired; relates to Socrates’ answering each person’s questions about the campaign. References: 153d. Lemma: ἀνέρομαι. See Question and answer.

ἔροιο (eroio)

You might ask; a form of asking used in Socrates’ hypothetical question about medicine’s usefulness. References: 165c. Lemma: ἔρομαι. See Question and answer.

προσφέρῃ (prospherēi)

You treat or approach; Socrates objects that Critias addresses him as though he already knew the answer. References: 165b. Lemma: προσφέρω. See Question and answer.

Use in the book

At 106b Socrates replaces the expectation of a long speech with one short service: Alcibiades is to answer what he is asked. The demand gives the conversation its working form. Socrates can test Alcibiades' own claims rather than merely deliver an assessment for him to accept or reject.

The method becomes its own object at 112e–113c2. Alcibiades attributes the verdict of ignorance to Socrates. Socrates counters with elementary examples: if asked whether two exceeds one and by how much, Alcibiades supplies the answer; the same is true when asked to spell Socrates' name. In question and answer, the respondent is the one saying the proposition. The political diagnosis has accordingly come from Alcibiades' commitments.

At 114b Socrates offers Alcibiades either role: prove his claim through questions or make a speech. Alcibiades declines. Socrates returns to answering because hearing the conclusion from himself is supposed to persuade him most fully. That explanation exposes the positive point of the procedure: the goal is ownership of a reasoned judgment, not passive submission to a speaker's authority.

The same instruction recurs at 127e after Alcibiades recognizes his predicament. Continued response is the immediate path toward improvement, with divine permission explicitly acknowledged. The conversation later identifies its own activity as soul speaking to soul through words. Questioning thereby becomes an instance of the care under investigation.

None of this absolves the questioner from scrutiny. Socrates chooses analogies and obtains premises that may be challenged, including those in the composite argument. The dialogue itself shows that agreements can require correction. The reader should therefore track both the respondent's commitments and the reasoning that connects them.

Places to read

1. 106b–106c2The initial pact replaces a long speech with responsive inquiry
2. 112e–113c2Arithmetic and spelling establish responsibility for answers
3. 114b–114e2Both argumentative formats are offered; answering is defended as persuasive
4. 127eThe instruction to answer is renewed as a route to improvement
5. 130d–130e2The exchange is understood as soul-to-soul conversation

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps the recurrence “Answer what you are asked” at 106b and 127e. At 113a7 the two abstract nouns name the very activity being practiced; translating them loosely as “discussion” would conceal the division of roles on which the argument turns.

ἀληθής

Attested: τἀληθῆ (talēthē; 110a). At 110a: True answers about Alcibiades' past self-assessment, required if the conversations are not to be futile. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀληθής. See Question and answer.

ἀποκρίνομαι

Attested: ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος (ho apokrinomenos; 113a). At 113a: The respondent who gives and thereby owns the answer in Socrates' account of dialogue. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποκρίνομαι. See Question and answer.

ἀπόκρισις

Attested: ἀπόκρισις (apokrisis; 113a). An answer or act of replying; the respondent, rather than the questioner, owns the answer in Socrates' account. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπόκρισις. See Question and answer.

ἐρωτάω

Attested: ὁ ἐρωτῶν (ho erōtōn; 113a). At 113a: The questioner, whose selected question elicits but is distinguished from the respondent's asserted proposition. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐρωτάω. See Question and answer.

ἐρώτησις

Attested: ἐρώτησίς (erōtēsis; 113a). A question or act of questioning; paired with response to distinguish the questioner from the person asserting the answer. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐρώτησις. See Question and answer.

πειράομαι

Attested: πειρῶ (peirō; 108b). At 108b: Try to imitate the explanatory answer, an invitation to active effort rather than passive reception. Lexical identification: lemma: πειράομαι. See Question and answer.

πιστεύω

Attested: πιστεύειν (pisteuein; 127e). At 127e: Trust Socrates' tentative divination that continued answering will improve both partners, with divine permission acknowledged. Lexical identification: lemma: πιστεύω. See Question and answer.

Use in the book

At 133b Socrates asks whether one can know that anything is fine or shameful while not knowing at all what it is. His interlocutor denies that possibility and then says he knows what philosophizing is. “What is it, then?” follows. The movement places a burden on evaluative confidence: praise and blame must answer to some understanding of their object. It does not establish, independently and for every possible case, a general epistemological theorem that no partial recognition is possible without a complete definition. The premise is secured by agreement in this conversation.

The first answer quotes Solon and expands his lifelong learning into learning as much as possible. Socrates does not immediately discard it. He says it initially seemed to have substance, thinks it over, and asks whether it amounts to much learning. This restatement gives the interlocutor an opportunity to own the proposition being tested. It also reveals a shift from an admirable life-practice to a quantitative criterion.

As the discussion proceeds, questions ask what produces benefit, whom one should consult, and what sort of subjects should be learned. The inquiry is therefore not confined to dictionary substitution. It probes the conditions under which a proposed account would count as good and useful. When one approach ends in perplexity, Socrates tries another rather than declaring all inquiry impossible.

The closing negative result matters for the opening question. Philosophy is said to be far from much learning and preoccupation with crafts, but no fresh ti estin answer is formally announced. A reader may infer a positive orientation toward self-knowledge and judgment; the textual distinction between an implication and an explicit definition should remain visible.

Places to read

1. 133bὃ μὴ εἰδείη τις τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅτι ἔστιν — Knowing what the thing is becomes a condition of the proposed evaluation.
2. 133cΤί οὖν ἔστιν; — The compressed question initiates the attempt to define philosophizing.
3. 135aἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν — Socrates tries to examine the problem another way after perplexity.

Translation in this edition

At 132d the edition translates Schleiermacher’s erōtōmenon as “the one I had questioned,” supported in Burnet’s apparatus by Ficino’s Latin. The reported manuscript alternatives would refer to “the beloved” or “the one who asked.” This affects who is being released from questioning. At 133c the printed question is direct and short; retaining that simplicity avoids making Socrates ask for a modern academic theory more elaborate than the text requires.

Use in the book

The future ἀποκρινούμεθα at 216b asks how the group will answer the imagined masters of contradiction. It makes the boys responsible for defending the proposal that opposites are friends, rather than merely agreeing with its attractive examples.

The response is constrained by the accepted opposition between friendship and enmity. In this context answering is a public argumentative obligation: a claim must withstand an interlocutor’s question, even when that interlocutor is only being imagined.

Places to read

1. 216bοἷς τί ἀποκρινούμεθα — What shall we answer them?
2. 216a–b

Use in the book

The command to question Menexenus introduces the extended inquiry at 211d. At 217e τοῦτο … ἐρωτῶ identifies exactly what the colour analogy is intended to ask: whether something becomes like whatever is present to it.

The noun ἐρώτημα at 221a describes the speculative question about what would remain if badness disappeared. Socrates then narrows the discussion to what they know about existing desires. Asking is thus both the method of instruction and an activity whose useful scope can itself be examined.

Places to read

1. 217eΤοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ νῦν δή — This, then, is what I am asking now.
2. 211d
3. 221a