Drama, landscape and people

Myth and rationalization

μυθολόγημα, mythologēma, “legend; a story told”; μῦθος, mythos, “tale”; μυθικός, mythikos, “mythic”

Socrates declines an endless project of making legends plausible, yet repeatedly tells and examines tales. Their value is tested by what they disclose and how responsibly their claims are made.

From the book

Phaedrus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordSocrates declines an endless project of making legends plausible, yet repeatedly tells and examines tales. Their value is tested by what they disclose and how responsibly their claims are made.
  • In the PhaedrusThe riverside invites local storytelling. Phaedrus asks whether this is the place where Boreas carried off Oreithyia and whether Socrates believes the legend. Socrates can supply an explanation in which a gust pushes the girl from rocks while she plays with Pharmaceia. But one correction would lead on to Centaurs, Chimaera, Gorgons, Pegasuses and an overwhelming crowd of strange natures (229b–e). To normalize each would require much leisure and a laborious wisdom he calls boorish. He lets the received account stand while turning to himself.
  • In this editionThe edition uses “legend” for mythologēma, “tale” for mythos, and “mythic hymn” for mythikon hymnon. Its note calls the treatment of rationalizers mocking and labels that an interpretation. Here the sustained contrast is secured by Socrates’ actual description of a proliferating task requiring much leisure and employing boorish wisdom, and by his stated priority of self-knowledge. The external stories named in the edition’s notes have not been independently used as proof of their historical transmission.
  • A place to readBoreas, naturalistic explanation, monstrous proliferation and self-inquiry.

Meaning

A myth is a traditional or invented story through which the dialogue can explore a question; rationalization explains a marvellous story in ordinary terms. Socrates illustrates the latter by suggesting that a gust of wind could explain Boreas carrying off Oreithyia, then declines the endless work of explaining every monster (229c–e). He nevertheless tells myths himself. Their value must be examined with their claims, rather than decided by calling every story false or every explanation wise.

Use in the book

The riverside invites local storytelling. Phaedrus asks whether this is the place where Boreas carried off Oreithyia and whether Socrates believes the legend. Socrates can supply an explanation in which a gust pushes the girl from rocks while she plays with Pharmaceia. But one correction would lead on to Centaurs, Chimaera, Gorgons, Pegasuses and an overwhelming crowd of strange natures (229b–e). To normalize each would require much leisure and a laborious wisdom he calls boorish. He lets the received account stand while turning to himself.

The sequel shows what this refusal does and does not mean. Socrates invokes the Muses to tell of a hidden lover (237a–b); he tells Stesichorus’ recovery of sight to model his own recantation (243a–b); and after an argument for immortality he distinguishes a full divine narration of what soul is from the shorter human account of what it resembles (246a). The winged team is offered under that second, explicitly analogical undertaking. A tale can organize perception and inquiry without claiming to be an exhaustive description of its subject.

The cicadas’ story redirects the men’s leisure toward wakeful conversation (259a–d). The Egyptian story introduces a test of writing’s powers (274c–275b). When Phaedrus jokes that Socrates can make stories from any country, Socrates asks whether the decisive issue is who speaks and from where, or whether what is said is true (275b–c). This changes the listener’s responsibility: neither a prestigious origin nor a suspicion about provenance replaces examination of the account.

Socrates’ later description of his palinode is correspondingly measured. In making a likeness of erotic experience they may have touched something true and may also have been carried elsewhere; they mixed a not altogether unpersuasive speech and played a mythic hymn (265b–c). He then extracts the methodological powers of collection and division. The story is neither discarded as false nor allowed to excuse every claim from scrutiny; its fruitful articulation can be retained while its reach is acknowledged.

Places to read

  1. 229b–230a2Boreas, naturalistic explanation, monstrous proliferation and self-inquiry.
  2. 237a–bInvented erotic tale and Stesichorus’ corrective song.
  3. 243a–bInvented erotic tale and Stesichorus’ corrective song.
  4. 246a–bWhat soul is contrasted with what it resembles.
  5. 258e–259d2The cicadas’ story directs the conversation.
  6. 265b–266b2Mythic play and the method extracted from it.
  7. 274c–275c2The Egyptian story and truth rather than provenance.

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “legend” for mythologēma, “tale” for mythos, and “mythic hymn” for mythikon hymnon. Its note calls the treatment of rationalizers mocking and labels that an interpretation. Here the sustained contrast is secured by Socrates’ actual description of a proliferating task requiring much leisure and employing boorish wisdom, and by his stated priority of self-knowledge. The external stories named in the edition’s notes have not been independently used as proof of their historical transmission.

Lexical detail

Mythologēma is a legend or narrated story; mythos here is a tale, including a deliberately constructed one; mythikos describes the palinode as mythic. These words do not create a simple opposition between story and reason. The first erotic speech is introduced as a tale, the second combines argument with likeness, and the later scrutiny can assess both.

At 229c–e the activity often called rationalization is described concretely: one substitutes a wind for the divine abductor and then brings each further marvel into line with the likely. Socrates’ objection concerns the inexhaustible labour and the neglect of an inquiry he considers more urgent.

Attested forms

μυθολόγημα (229c · Burnet p. 4) — “legend”. Phaedrus asks whether the Boreas story is true.

μύθου (237a · Burnet p. 14) — “tale”. Socrates invokes the Muses before his invented lover’s speech.

μύθου (253c · Burnet p. 36) — “tale”. The palinode recalls its three-part likeness of soul.

μυθικόν (265b–c · Burnet p. 53) — “mythic”. Socrates describes the palinode as a mythic hymn.

Research and interpretation

Partenie discusses Plato’s philosophical use of myth. The native opening distinguishes a refusal to pursue exhaustive rationalization from a refusal of all stories. At 275b–c the question becomes whether an account is true, rather than which country supplied it; mythical and argumentative speech are not rigidly separated into worthless and valuable kinds.

Catalin Partenie, Plato’s Myths, §4.

Ἄγρα

Agrae is the shrine-area across the river that Socrates uses to locate the reported abduction of Oreithyia. He places the story two or three stades downstream, near the crossing towards the shrine. The name helps orient the conversation without proving that the legendary event happened.

Read: 229c.

Agra · Agrae · lemma

The shrine-area used to locate the Boreas story downstream.

Socrates places the abduction two or three stades lower down, near a crossing towards the shrine in Agrae. The supplied edition explains that the shrine noun is understood and that this wording follows Burnet’s correction. It is useful as a locator, but the present lexicon has not independently reconstructed the ancient route.

Attested: Ἄγρας (229c · Burnet p. 4) — “Agrae”. The place-name in Burnet’s printed correction.

See: Leisure and walking; Myth and rationalization

Research and sources for this word.

ἄτοπος

Outlandish means strange or outside the expected pattern. Phaedrus calls Socrates most outlandish because he behaves like a visitor in his own countryside. Elsewhere the family describes unfamiliar explanations and the lover’s bewildering experience, so it does not name a single diagnosis.

Read: 230c; 229c; 251d.

atopos · Outlandish · word family

Strange, out of the expected place or pattern.

Socrates says disbelief in the legend would not make him outlandish like someone outside the fashionable wise. Phaedrus then calls Socrates most outlandish because he behaves like a visitor in his own countryside. The palinode’s anguished lover experiences a related strangeness in himself. The word registers dislocation, not one fixed psychological diagnosis.

Attested: ἄτοπος (229c · Burnet p. 4) — “outlandish”. What Socrates would not be by joining the rationalizers.

Attested: ἀτοπώτατός (230c · Burnet p. 5) — “most outlandish”. Phaedrus on Socrates as a stranger-like guidee.

Attested: ἀτοπίᾳ (251d · Burnet p. 34) — “outlandishness”. The lover’s bewildering mixed experience.

See: Longing and yearning; Myth and rationalization; Socrates

Research and sources for this word.

Βορέας

Boreas is the North Wind named in the story of Oreithyia’s abduction. Socrates also imagines explaining the event as a gust that pushed her to her death. The dialogue distinguishes the traditional divine story from this proposed naturalizing account without turning the latter into a proven report.

Read: 229b; 229c.

Boreas · Boreas · lemma

The North Wind, named as Oreithyia’s abductor.

The story gives the landscape a remembered divine action; the proposed rationalization uses the same name for a gust of wind that could push the girl to her death. Phaedrus asks both where it happened and whether Socrates is persuaded of its truth, joining topographical and interpretive questions.

Attested: Βορέας (229b · Burnet p. 4) — “Boreas”. Subject of the reported abduction.

Attested: Βορέου (229c · Burnet p. 4) — “Boreas”. The gust in the proposed alternative account.

See: Leisure and walking; Myth and rationalization

Research and sources for this word.

Ἑλένη

Helen is the subject of the slander and retraction in Socrates’ story about Stesichorus. He recounts that the poet lost his sight after speaking badly of her and recovered it through a palinode denying that she went to Troy. The story models Socrates’ own retraction concerning Love.

Read: 243a.

Helenē · Helen · lemma

The subject of the slander and retraction in Socrates’ Stesichorus story.

Socrates says Stesichorus was deprived of sight through his evil-speaking of Helen. The quoted recantation denies that she sailed in the ships or came to Troy. Her role here is to establish an analogy for retracting evil-speaking of Love, not to make the dialogue itself narrate a full alternative Trojan history.

Attested: Ἑλένης (243a · Burnet p. 23) — “Helen”. Genitive naming the person slandered; Stesichorus loses sight for speaking badly of her.

See: Myth and rationalization; Palinode and purification

Jowett retains Helen in the retraction.

Plato, Phaedrus, Benjamin Jowett translation (MIT Classics).

εὐήθεια

Simple-mindedness changes its force with the occasion. Socrates mocks the early speeches for confidently pretending to be sound, then praises the older willingness to accept truth even from an oak or rock. The second example challenges Phaedrus’ concern with who tells a story, rather than simply calling the earlier hearers foolish.

Read: 242e; 275b.

euētheia · Simple-mindedness · lemma

Uncritical simplicity or complacent naïveté, with different local values.

The early speeches dignify themselves despite saying nothing healthy or true; Socrates calls their simplicity urbane. Later he evokes the simplicity of people content to hear an oak or rock if it spoke truly. The second use does not simply repeat the insult: it can expose a sophisticated listener’s misplaced concern with provenance.

Attested: εὐήθεια (242e · Burnet p. 22) — “simple-mindedness”. The complacency of the two speeches.

Attested: εὐηθείας (275b · Burnet p. 67) — “simple-mindedness”. The earlier hearers’ simple concern for truth.

See: Myth and rationalization; Palinode and purification; Truth

Jowett distinguishes truth from provenance.

Plato, Phaedrus, Benjamin Jowett translation (MIT Classics); Plato, Phaedrus 275, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

Ἰλισός

The Ilissus is the river that gives the conversation its setting. The men turn to walk beside it, and Phaedrus asks whether this is where Boreas took Oreithyia. It later marks the crossing Socrates is about to make when his sign stops him; these dramatic uses do not establish an exact modern walking route.

Read: 229a; 229b.

Ilisos · Ilissus · lemma

The river beside which the conversation takes place.

Socrates proposes turning aside along the Ilissus before the men choose a resting-place. The river gives Phaedrus a setting for the Boreas question and later becomes the threshold Socrates is about to cross when the sign checks him. The edition locates it outside the south-eastern walls.

Attested: Ἰλισὸν (229a · Burnet p. 3) — “Ilissus”. Accusative after the phrase “along”.

Attested: Ἰλισοῦ (229b · Burnet p. 4) — “Ilissus”. Genitive in the question about Oreithyia’s abduction.

See: Leisure and walking; Myth and rationalization; The daimonic sign

Research and sources for this word.

κόρη

In the Phaedrus, this word means a girl, including a carved figure of one. Its referent changes between the stream-side scene and the nearby shrine.

At 229b Phaedrus imagines girls playing beside the water; at 230b Socrates takes the girls and statues as evidence of a sanctuary.

korē · Girls and votive figures · lemma

A girl, or a figure representing a girl.

Phaedrus describes waters fit for girls to play beside; Socrates then infers a sanctuary from the girls and statues at their stopping-place. The edition explains the latter girls as votive figures. The change from living children to representations is a local change of referent, not a new philosophical meaning of the noun.

Attested: κόραις (229b · Burnet p. 4) — “girls”. Those imagined playing by the stream.

Attested: κορῶν (230b · Burnet p. 5) — “girls”. The figures from which Socrates infers a sanctuary.

See: Leisure and walking; Myth and rationalization

Research and sources for this word.

νᾶμα

Streams are flowing waters used metaphorically for things Socrates has heard from other people.

At 235c–d he says his hearing has filled him like a jar from others’ streams, although he has forgotten the source.

nama · Streams received through hearing · lemma

Flowing water used as an image for material received from other speakers.

The streams belong to others, and hearing is the channel by which Socrates says he was filled. The qualification that he has forgotten how and from whom he heard prevents the image from identifying a source. Phaedrus wants the performance and dismisses the question of provenance.

Attested: ναμάτων (235c–d · Burnet p. 12) — “streams”. Plural, qualified as other people’s.

See: Memory and reminding; Myth and rationalization; Socrates

Research and sources for this word.

νομίζω

To hold or believe means taking something to be the case or valuing it in a certain way. The word does not by itself guarantee that judgement’s truth.

At 279c Socrates prays that he may regard the wise person as rich.

nomizō · Hold or believe · lemma

To regard something as so, including a socially accepted valuation.

Lysias’ speaker opens by saying how he holds the proposed relationship advantageous. Socrates later accepts what is customarily held about the local legends while pursuing self-inquiry. In the final prayer he asks to regard the wise person as rich. The verb records a stance; it does not itself prove the stance true.

Attested: νομίζω (230e · Burnet p. 6) — “I hold”. The interested speaker’s estimate of advantage.

Attested: νομιζομένῳ (230a · Burnet p. 5) — “what is held”. Received belief about the legends.

Attested: νομίζοιμι (279c · Burnet p. 73) — “may I hold”. Socrates’ wished-for valuation of wealth.

See: Benefit and harm; Myth and rationalization; Opinion and seeming; Prayer and inner beauty

Research and sources for this word.

πνεῦμα

Pneuma means moving air: a breeze, gust or rebounding breath according to the scene.

At 229b a moderate breeze makes the stopping-place pleasant; at 229c an imagined gust explains Oreithyia’s fall.

pneuma · Breeze and breath · lemma

Moving air: a moderate breeze, a violent gust or a rebounding breath.

Phaedrus welcomes a moderate breeze. The proposed rationalization of Oreithyia’s abduction makes a gust of Boreas push her from the rocks. In the palinode a breath rebounding from a solid surface illustrates the return of beauty’s stream. The word’s local force follows the motion described.

Attested: πνεῦμα (229b · Burnet p. 4) — “breeze”. The pleasant moderate air.

Attested: πνεῦμα (229c · Burnet p. 4) — “a gust”. The imagined natural cause of Oreithyia’s fall.

Attested: πνεῦμα (255c · Burnet p. 39) — “a breath”. One term of the rebounding-stream comparison.

See: Counter-love and mirror; Leisure and walking; Myth and rationalization

Research and sources for this word.

Στησίχορος

Stesichorus is the poet whose recantation provides Socrates with a model for correcting a speech that has offended a divine power.

At 243a Socrates tells how the poet answered his blinding for speaking against Helen with a palinode and recovered his sight.

Stēsichoros · Stesichorus · lemma

The poet whose recanting song provides Socrates’ corrective model.

In Socrates’ story Stesichorus understands why speaking badly of Helen cost him his sight, composes a palinode and sees again. Socrates then playfully assigns the coming speech to Stesichorus son of Euphemus of Himera. The story grounds the dramatic act of recantation; it is not offered here as independently verified biography.

Attested: Στησίχορος (243a · Burnet p. 23) — “Stesichorus”. Subject contrasted with Homer in recognizing the purification.

Attested: Στησιχόρου (244a · Burnet p. 24) — “Stesichorus”. The name to which the corrective speech is attributed.

See: Myth and rationalization; Palinode and purification

Fowler preserves the story’s role in Socrates’ decision. The tale and the playful attribution at 244a should remain distinct from independently established biography.

Plato, Phaedrus 243a, 244a — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).

Τυφών

Typhon is the monstrous comparison through which Socrates turns from explaining myths to examining his own nature.

At 230a he asks whether he is more intricate and fuming than Typhon or a gentler creature with a divine, unfuming portion.

Typhōn · Typhon · name and contextual wordplay

The monstrous comparison through which Socrates poses his question about himself.

Socrates asks whether he is a more intricate and more fuming beast than Typhon or a gentler and simpler animal sharing a divine portion. The edition explains the monster and the wordplay on fuming and unfuming. The comparison makes myth serve self-examination instead of merely becoming its object.

Attested: Τυφῶνος (230a · Burnet p. 5) — “Typhon”. Genitive after the comparatives.

Attested: ἐπιτεθυμμένον (230a · Burnet p. 5) — “fuming”. The participial adjective in the name-play.

Attested: ἀτύφου (230a · Burnet p. 5) — “unfuming”. The contrary quality in the divine portion.

See: Myth and rationalization; Self-knowledge

Fowler preserves the opposed self-descriptions. The edition explains the name-play with fuming and freedom from vanity; the comparison asks a question rather than diagnosing Socrates.

Plato, Phaedrus 230a — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).

ὑδάτιον

The little stream or little waters are the small, inviting waters through which the barefoot friends walk.

At 229a they plan to wet their feet; at 229b Phaedrus admires the water’s cleanness and suitability for girls’ play.

hydation · Little stream and little waters · lemma

A diminutive water-word for the river’s small, accessible waters.

Phaedrus proposes wetting their bare feet in the little stream, then admires its clean, transparent waters as a place where girls could play. The diminutive suits the intimacy of the walk and the local question; it does not itself carry the later philosophical significance of beauty’s streams.

Attested: ὑδάτιον (229a · Burnet p. 3) — “little stream”. Accusative in the route along the water.

Attested: ὑδάτια (229b · Burnet p. 4) — “little waters”. Plural describing their inviting appearance.

See: Leisure and walking; Myth and rationalization

Research and sources for this word.

Φαρμάκεια

Pharmaceia is the named companion in Socrates’ possible natural explanation of Oreithyia’s abduction.

At 229c he imagines Oreithyia playing with Pharmaceia when a gust of Boreas pushes her from the rocks.

Pharmakeia · Pharmaceia · lemma

The companion with whom Oreithyia plays in the proposed explanation.

Socrates’ hypothetical account places Oreithyia beside Pharmaceia when the gust strikes. The edition calls Pharmaceia a local nymph and notes the name’s connection with drugs or spells. The occurrence is a proper name; it should not be substituted for the common noun pharmakon in claims about writing.

Attested: Φαρμακείᾳ (229c · Burnet p. 4) — “Pharmaceia”. Dative after “with” in the hypothetical story.

See: Drug, remedy and enchantment; Myth and rationalization

Research and sources for this word.

Ὠρείθυια

Oreithyia is the girl whose reported abduction by Boreas prompts the friends’ discussion of local myth.

At 229b Phaedrus asks whether she was carried off near their stream; Socrates places the traditional site farther downriver and offers a possible natural explanation.

Ōreithyia · Oreithyia · lemma

The girl carried off by Boreas in the story Phaedrus asks about.

Phaedrus links her story to the inviting stream-side place. Socrates relocates the traditional site farther downriver and then supplies a possible natural explanation without undertaking to establish it. The edition identifies her as the daughter of Erechtheus; that biographical detail belongs to its note.

Attested: Ὠρείθυιαν (229b · Burnet p. 4) — “Oreithyia”. Accusative: the person reported as carried away.

See: Myth and rationalization

Fowler preserves the reported story and hypothetical explanation. Her identification as Erechtheus’ daughter is supplied by the edition’s note, not stated in this exchange.

Plato, Phaedrus 229b — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).