Minos and the disputed good lawgiver

Use in the book

Minos enters after the discussion has already sought a definition of law, distinguished right prescriptions from merely apparent law, and identified the king as the best distributor for souls. He therefore supplies a proposed historical or traditional exemplar of a description already constructed. The companion accepts Rhadamanthys' reputation for justice but objects to Minos. Socrates replies that this is an Attic and tragic story, opening a contest over the sources from which the judgment comes (318d–e2).

The defense has several different supports. Socrates interprets Homer's verse as testimony that Minos alone among the heroes received education from Zeus; explains a Cretan drinking law as consistent with educational rather than convivial association; distinguishes Minos' full kingly expertise from Rhadamanthys' judicial service; interprets Hesiod's scepter as education; and attributes the hostile Athenian reputation to poetic revenge. Finally the persistence of the laws is called the greatest sign of their maker's goodness (319b–321b234). These steps should not be compressed into a single independent proof. They depend on a reading of poetry, reported institutions, assumptions about good character and an explanation of hostile testimony.

Socrates does not deny that Minos fought Athens or compelled it to pay tribute. His claim is that making enemies of such powerful makers of reputation explains the adverse report. The “mistake” is consequently described through its reputational consequences; the passage does not investigate the justice of that war or tribute. The Minotaur and the identities of the tribute's victims are supplied by the edition's contextual note, not narrated in the dialogue.

Nor does the praise settle every question raised by the opening definition. The companion calls Socrates' account reasonable, and Socrates' next question retains the condition “if what I say is true” (321b). After the exemplary lawgivers have been called shepherds of men, the partners still cannot identify what the good distributor supplies to souls. Minos' example directs the inquiry toward education while leaving its decisive content unformulated.

Places to read

1. 318dΜίνως καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς, οἱ Διὸς καὶ Εὐρώπης παῖδες — Socrates identifies the two Cretan rulers and their parentage
2. 318dτὸν δὲ Μίνων ἄγριόν τινα καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἄδικον — The companion reports the hostile characterization
3. 319cὑπὸ Διὸς πεπαιδεῦσθαι — Education by Zeus is the privilege Socrates finds in Homer
4. 321a–bκακοδοξότερος γέγονεν — The outcome is worse reputation, not an admission that Minos became morally worse
5. 321bεἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω — Socrates explicitly makes the next inference conditional on his account being true

Translation in this edition

The title names Minos, but he never speaks. “Savage,” “harsh,” and “unjust” preserve three distinguishable charges. The introduction and notes distinguish the account actually given from later mythographic parallels. No historical biography of one securely identifiable Cretan king is established here.

Harsh — χαλεπός (chalepos)

χαλεπός (chalepos)

Harsh. Difficult or harsh in character; part of the adverse report about Minos, not a settled judgment shared by both speakers. Attested: χαλεπὸν (318d). Minos and the disputed good lawgiver.

Minos — Μίνως (Minōs)

Μίνως (Minōs)

Minos. The Cretan king whom Socrates defends as a good lawgiver educated by Zeus; his hostile Athenian reputation is disputed, not silently accepted. Attested: Μίνως (318d). Minos and the disputed good lawgiver.

Savage — ἄγριος (agrios)

ἄγριος (agrios)

Savage. Wild or savage; one of the companion's reported charges against Minos, which Socrates calls an Attic tragic tale. Attested: ἄγριόν (318d). Minos and the disputed good lawgiver.