From the book
Meditations
Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordΧρόνος is time, a span of it or the whole; αἰών is eternity, time without end on either side of the present; ἀΐδιος is everlasting and ἄπειρος infinite. Against them stand ἐφήμερος, "of a day", and τὸ παρόν, the present.
- In the MeditationsEternity is "a kind of river" and "a violent current" (4.43), a "yawning gulf" behind and before (4.50, 5.23), and "the whole present of time" is "a point of eternity" (6.36). Yet the present is all anyone has: "no one could lose the past or the future" (2.14.1), and "each of us lives only this present, this instant" (3.10).
- In this editionΧρόνος is "time" and αἰών always "eternity", kept apart from ἀΐδιος, "everlasting", and ἄπειρος, "infinite"; ἐφήμερος is "of a day", ὀλιγοχρόνιος "of short duration", and τὸ παρόν and τὸ ἐνεστώς "the present".
- A place to read2.14.1–2, where Marcus shows that the longest life and the shortest lose the same thing, the present.
Meaning
Χρόνος (chronos) is time, both a stretch of it, "a longer span of time or a shorter" (3.7), and time as a whole. Αἰών (aiōn) is in Homer a man's life, which leaves him with his soul when he dies;1 in philosophy it became eternity. Ἀΐδιος (aidios), from ἀεί (aei), "always", is everlasting, and ἄπειρος (apeiros), "without limit", infinite. Ἐφήμερος (ephēmeros), from ἡμέρα (hēmera), "day", is what lasts a day, and ὀλιγοχρόνιος (oligochronios) what lasts a little time. The present is τὸ παρόν (to paron), "what is at hand", or τὸ ἐνεστώς (to enestōs), "what has set in", the Stoics' word for present time.2 Marcus' eternity is not a timeless state above time: it has a past and a future, "from eternity to eternity" (9.28).
Use in the book
Marcus measures every life against eternity on both sides. Against the hope of a little fame he sets "the speed of the forgetting of all things, and the abyss of the infinite eternity on either side" (4.3.3); "the infinity of the past and the future is a yawning gulf, in which all things vanish" (5.23); of "the all-embracing eternity" "a brief and momentary interval has been marked off" for each (5.24), and "very quickly it vanishes into the everlasting" (12.32). On that scale "the whole present of time" is "a point of eternity", as Asia and Europe are corners of the universe and Athos a little clod (6.36), and each particular thing is, "in respect of time, a turn of a drill" (10.17). Even three lifetimes of Nestor, Homer's king who outlived two generations, are no exception: "For look behind at the yawning gulf of eternity, and in front at another infinity. In this, then, what difference is there between a child of three days and one who has lived three lifetimes of Nestor?" (4.50).
Eternity is not empty extent but a force that carries things off. "Eternity is a kind of river of the things that come to be, a violent current; for as soon as each thing has been seen, it has been carried past, and another is being carried by, and that will be carried away" (4.43). "Is" is, in the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, the correction of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar; the manuscripts make eternity "a kind of river out of the things that come to be". "How quickly eternity will cover everything, and how much it has covered already!" (6.59); "the memory of everything is very quickly buried in eternity" (7.10). The same course also renews: "Flows and alterations renew the universe perpetually, as the unbroken course of time keeps infinite eternity always new" (6.15). Within it all is "of a day, both what remembers and what is remembered" (4.35), and "short duration is common to all; but you flee and pursue all things as though they were to be eternal" (10.34), where Homer's leaves that the wind sheds are a man's children, those who praise or curse him, and those who will inherit his fame.
So length counts for nothing. "Even if you are going to live three thousand years, or as many times ten thousand, still remember that no one loses any other life than the one he is living, nor lives any other than the one he loses. So the longest and the shortest come to the same" (2.14.1). Marcus gives two reasons: all things "from everlasting are of one form and come round again, and it makes no difference whether one sees the same things for a hundred years or two hundred or for infinite time" (2.14.2; see Recurrence and repetition); and "it is only the present that he will be deprived of, since this is all he has; and no one loses what he does not have" (2.14.2). The years are a measure, like the body's weight: "for as you cherish the amount of substance marked off for you, so too with time" (6.49). Of a life that uses things with greatness of mind and men socially, "let it make no difference to you for how long a time you will do this; for even three hours like that are enough" (6.23; compare 12.35, see Death).
What remains is the present. Marcus is to remember "that each of us lives only this present, this instant; the rest is either lived already or unclear" (3.10). He is not to gather in thought all the painful things that are likely to have followed, but to remember "that neither the future nor the past weighs on you, but always the present; and this is made small if you mark its bounds alone" (8.36). The understanding "is concerned only with the present; for its future and past acts are themselves already things that make no difference" (6.32), and "Circumscribe the present of time" is one of seven commands (7.29; see Impression). What he prays for he can have now, "if you leave behind all the past, and entrust the future to providence, and direct the present alone towards holiness and justice" (12.1.1); and if he separates from his ruling centre what is fastened to it and "of time what lies beyond or what is past", makes himself like the sphere of Empedocles, the philosopher-poet of fifth-century Acragas, and practises "living only what you live, that is, the present", he will be able to live out what remains untroubled (12.3.2; see Mind and reason).
The rational soul can take this view: it "stretches out into the infinity of eternity" (11.1.2; see Soul). To comprehend "everlasting eternity" and to conceive "how short from birth to dissolution, how yawning the gulf before birth", Marcus says, will "make much room" (9.32); there the "by" that joins the room to the comprehending is a supplement of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints, and "everlasting" is the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, for the manuscripts' "own". The thought of eternity is not a counsel of despair. It can be read as a way of setting the present free: past and future cannot be had, so the present is at every moment the whole of a life, and the only place where it is lived well.
Places to read
The passages where time, eternity or the present is discussed or carries the argument, in the order of the book; every place of the words treated here is given in the sub-entries, with the other senses of πάρειμι.
- 2.2GreekThe ruling centre is no longer to resent what is fated in the present or look askance at it in the future (see Ruling centre).
- 2.12GreekAll things vanish quickly, the bodies into the universe, the memory of them into eternity.
- 2.14.1GreekHowever long a man lives, he loses only the life he is living, and no one could lose the past or the future.
- 2.14.2GreekAll things from everlasting are of one form and come round again, and it makes no difference whether one sees them for a hundred years or for infinite time; and each is deprived only of the present.
- 2.17.1GreekIn human life the time is a point (see Soul).
- 3.7GreekWhether he will have the use of a soul in the body for a longer span of time or a shorter is no concern of the man who has chosen his own mind and daimon.
- 3.10GreekEach lives only this present, this instant, the rest being lived already or unclear, and even the longest fame after death is small.
- 4.3.3GreekAgainst a little fame Marcus sets the speed of the forgetting of all things and the abyss of the infinite eternity on either side.
- 4.21.1GreekIf souls live on, Marcus asks how the air has held them from everlasting, and how the earth holds the buried through so long an eternity (see Soul).
- 4.26GreekOne must make gain of the present with sound reasoning and justice (see Justice).
- 4.35GreekEverything is of a day, both what remembers and what is remembered.
- 4.43GreekEternity is a kind of river of the things that come to be, a violent current in which each thing is carried past as soon as it is seen.
- 4.48.2GreekHuman things are of a day, and Marcus is to pass through this instant of time according to nature (see Death).
- 4.49.1GreekMarcus is lucky to go on free from distress, neither crushed by the present nor afraid of what is coming (see Tranquillity).
- 4.50GreekAgainst the yawning gulf of eternity behind and another infinity in front, Marcus asks what difference there is between a child of three days and one who has lived three lifetimes of Nestor.
- 5.10.1GreekThe underlying things are of short duration and cheap.
- 5.10.2GreekIn so great a flow of substance and of time and of motion Marcus cannot conceive what could be valued, and waits for the natural release (see Daimon).
- 5.13GreekEvery part of Marcus will be posted by change to another part of the universe, and so on to infinity, as by such change he came to subsist, and so back into another infinity.
- 5.23GreekThe infinity of the past and the future is a yawning gulf in which all things vanish, and it is folly to be puffed up or to complain among them.
- 5.24GreekOf the all-embracing eternity a brief and momentary interval has been marked off for each.
- 5.32GreekThe skilled soul knows the reason that pervades all substance and through all eternity, by appointed periods, manages the totality.
- 6.2GreekIt is enough, in dying as in all else, to settle the present well (see Present action).
- 6.15GreekFlows and alterations renew the universe perpetually, as the unbroken course of time keeps infinite eternity always new; life itself is something of this kind, like the breathing in of air (see Breath).
- 6.23GreekIt is to make no difference to Marcus for how long a time he will use things with greatness of mind and men socially, for even three hours like that are enough.
- 6.32GreekThe understanding is concerned only with the present, for its future and past acts already make no difference.
- 6.36GreekThe whole present of time is a point of eternity, as Asia and Europe are corners of the universe.
- 6.37GreekHe who has seen what is now has seen all things, those that came to be from everlasting and those that will be to infinity.
- 6.49GreekMarcus asks whether he resents weighing so many pounds and not three hundred; so too with living so many years and not longer, for as he cherishes his measure of substance, so too with time.
- 6.59GreekEternity will very quickly cover everything, and has covered much already.
- 7.1GreekNothing is new; all things are both usual and of short duration.
- 7.10GreekThe memory of everything is very quickly buried in eternity.
- 7.19GreekEternity has already swallowed many a Chrysippus, the Stoic school's third head, many a Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, and many an Epictetus, the Stoic teacher whose lectures Arrian recorded.
- 7.29Greek"Circumscribe the present of time" is the third of seven commands (see Impression).
- 7.35GreekIn words of the Republic of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, to the man whose understanding has the contemplation of all time and all substance human life seems nothing great (see Death).
- 7.46GreekIn Plato's Gorgias, living for however long a time is perhaps a thing the true man must let be, and he must look at how he may best live the time he is going to live (see Death).
- 7.64GreekThe saying of Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, helps in most pains, that pain is neither unbearable nor eternal, if one remembers its limits and adds no opinion (see Pain and pleasure).
- 7.68GreekTo the understanding the present is always material for rational and civic virtue (see Tranquillity).
- 7.70GreekThe gods do not resent bearing with base men through so long an eternity, and Marcus asks whether he, on the point of ceasing, gives up.
- 8.11GreekOf each thing Marcus is to ask how long a time it subsists.
- 8.36GreekNeither the future nor the past weighs on Marcus, but always the present, which is made small if he marks its bounds alone.
- 8.44GreekMarcus is to make a gift of this time to himself; those who pursue fame after death do not reckon that the men to come will be like those they find burdensome now.
- 9.14GreekAll things are usual in experience, of a day in time, filthy in material.
- 9.25GreekOf each thing Marcus is to mark the bounds of the time, the longest for which it can by nature subsist.
- 9.28GreekThe cycles of the universe are the same from eternity to eternity, and the earth and what it becomes will change to infinity.
- 9.32GreekComprehending eternity and the yawning gulf before birth and after dissolution, Marcus will make much room for himself.
- 9.35GreekIn the nature of the whole all things came about in one form from eternity, and to infinity there will be others of the same kind.
- 10.5GreekWhatever happens to Marcus was being prepared for him from eternity, and the interweaving of causes was spinning it together from everlasting (see Fate and allotment).
- 10.7.2GreekA dissolved body is scattered into its elements or turned into earth and air and taken up into the reason of the whole, whether the whole is periodically consumed by fire or renewed by everlasting exchanges (see Change).
- 10.17GreekMarcus is to keep continually an impression of the whole of eternity and the whole of substance, and each particular thing is, in respect of time, a turn of a drill.
- 10.31GreekSeeing the dead in the living makes human things look like smoke and nothing, especially if Marcus remembers that what has once changed will no longer be in infinite time; he asks why it is not enough to pass through this brief span in good order.
- 10.34GreekShort duration is common to all, men like the leaves of Homer's line, yet Marcus flees and pursues all things as though they were to be eternal.
- 11.1.2GreekThe rational soul stretches out into the infinity of eternity and comprehends the periodic rebirth of the whole (see Soul).
- 11.16GreekThe heedfulness that treats indifferent things as indifferent is needed only for a short time, and then life will have ceased.
- 12.1.1GreekIf Marcus leaves behind all the past, entrusts the future to providence and directs the present alone to holiness and justice, he can have now all that he prays for.
- 12.3.2GreekIf Marcus separates from his ruling centre what is fastened to it, with what lies beyond and what is past, makes himself like Empedocles' sphere and practises living only the present, he will be able to live through what remains untroubled (see Mind and reason).
- 12.7GreekMarcus is to consider the shortness of life and the yawning gulf of eternity behind and before.
- 12.24GreekRaised aloft, one would see the same things each time, uniformity, short duration.
- 12.26GreekAmong the things a man has forgotten when he is aggrieved is that each lives only the present and loses this (see Mind and reason).
- 12.32GreekEach has a fraction of the infinite and yawning eternity, which very quickly vanishes into the everlasting.
- 12.35GreekFor one to whom only the timely is good, to whom more right actions or fewer are all one, and to whom a longer or a shorter time of observing the universe makes no difference, not even death is a thing to fear (see Death).
Translation in this edition
Χρόνος is "time" at thirty-one of its thirty-four occurrences, in the plural "times" (8.7), and "span of time" at 3.7; it is "periods" in "records of periods" (4.32.2); at 1.17.2 ἐπιλαβεῖν τοῦ χρόνου is "put it off", and at 3.11.2 πόσον χρόνον πέφυκε παραμένειν is "how long it is its nature to last". The compound πολυχρονιώτατος is "the longest-lived" (2.14.2), and the verb χρονίζειν "the lasting" (7.33). Αἰών is "eternity" at all twenty-two of its occurrences, and αἰώνιος "eternal" (7.64, 10.34). Ἀΐδιος is always "everlasting", "from everlasting" in ἐξ ἀιδίου (2.14.2, 4.21.1, 6.37, 10.5); at 9.32 it is Meric Casaubon's correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' ἴδιον, "own". Ἄπειρος is "infinite" as an adjective (2.14.2, 4.3.3, 6.15, 9.32, 10.31, 12.32) and "infinity" as a noun (4.50, 5.13, 5.23), "to infinity" for εἰς ἄπειρον (5.13, 6.37, 9.28, 9.35); ἀπειρία too is "infinity" (11.1.2). Ἀπειρόκαλος, "tasteless" (1.16.3), belongs to the other ἄπειρος, "without experience". Ἀχανής is "the yawning gulf" (4.50), "a yawning gulf" (5.23), "how yawning the gulf" (9.32) and "yawning" (12.32), and ἀχάνεια "the yawning gulf" (12.7); χάος is "abyss" (4.3.3). Ἐφήμερος is always "of a day", and ὀλιγοχρόνιος "of short duration" (5.10.1, 7.1) or, as a noun, "short duration" (10.34, 12.24); βραχύβιος, "short-lived" (8.21), is kept apart. Ἀκαριαῖος is "instant" (2.14.1, 3.10, 4.48.2) and "momentary" (5.24, 6.25, 11.18.3). Τὸ παρόν is "the present" (2.2, 2.14.1, 2.14.2, 3.10, 4.26, 6.2, 6.32, 7.68, 8.36, 12.1.1, 12.3.2, 12.26), and so are the participle without the article at 4.49.1 and the plural at 4.32.1; at 3.12 τὸ παρόν is "the work in hand". Τὸ ἐνεστώς is "the present" in "the present of time" (6.36, 7.29; see Obstacle and reservation). "Eternity" in the English renders nothing but αἰών; "everlasting remembrance" at 4.33 renders ἀείμνηστον (aeimnēston).
Greek forms and English renderings
The present against infinite time · Meditations
χρόνος, chronos, "time", "span of time", "periods"; αἰών, aiōn, "eternity"; αἰώνιος, aiōnios, "eternal"; ἀΐδιος, aidios, "everlasting"; ἄπειρος, apeiros, "infinite", "infinity"; ἀπειρία, apeiria, "infinity"; ἀχανής, achanēs, "yawning", "yawning gulf"; ἀχάνεια, achaneia, "yawning gulf"; χάος, chaos, "abyss"; ἐφήμερος, ephēmeros, "of a day"; ὀλιγοχρόνιος, oligochronios, "of short duration", "short duration"; ἀκαριαῖος, akariaios, "instant", "momentary"; τὸ παρόν, to paron, "the present", "the work in hand"
Epictetus and the Stoics
The Stoics made time incorporeal. Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers, reports that they called it the interval of the motion of the universe, and that of time the past and the future are infinite, the present limited.2 The Stoics' word for the present, ἐνεστώς, is Marcus' in "the present of time" (6.36, 7.29), and their word for infinite, ἄπειρος, Marcus' in "the infinity of the past and the future" (5.23). Chrysippus, the school's third head, went further, as Diadumenus, the Academic speaker of the dialogue On Common Conceptions by Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, reports in its attack on the Stoics: in his book On the Void and elsewhere Chrysippus said that the past and the future of time do not exist, ὑπάρχειν (hyparchein), but subsist, and that only the present exists, though in another work, Diadumenus objects, he divided the present itself into a part to come and a part gone by.3 Marcus' "no one could lose the past or the future: how could anyone take from a man what he does not have?" (2.14.1) can be read as this doctrine turned against the fear of death. Seneca, the Roman Stoic and adviser of Nero, opens his Letters to Lucilius with a thought that can be read beside it. We deceive ourselves, he writes, in looking forward to death, for a great part of it has already passed: whatever of our life lies behind, death holds; and "All things, Lucilius, are another's; time alone is ours."4
Other ancient sources
In Plato's Timaeus, Timaeus of Locri, who gives the dialogue's account of the making of the world, says that the god devised a moving image of eternity: while eternity abides in one, he made, as he ordered the heaven, an image of it that is eternal and goes according to number, and this we have named time. Days and nights, months and years are parts of time, and "was" and "will be" are forms of time that came to be, which we wrongly carry over to everlasting being; of it only "is" can truly be said.5 Marcus uses the same words, αἰών, αἰώνιος and ἀΐδιος, of the other kind of eternity. His has a "was" and a "will be": all things "from eternity came about in one form, and to infinity there will be others of the same kind" (9.35), and what happens to him "was being prepared for you beforehand from eternity" (10.5; see Fate and allotment). And time does not imitate it; time renews it (6.15).
ἀΐδιος
Attested: ἀιδίου (aidiou; 2.14.2, 4.21.1, 6.37, 10.5), ἀίδιον (aidion; 9.32), ἀιδίοις (aidiois; 10.7.2), ἀιδίῳ (aidiōi; 12.32). Everlasting, without beginning or end; with ἐκ, "from everlasting". "All things from everlasting are of one form and come round again" (2.14.2); the interweaving of causes "was spinning together, from everlasting, both your subsistence and the occurrence of this" (10.5); of each man's fraction of eternity Marcus writes, "for very quickly it vanishes into the everlasting" (12.32). At 9.32, "comprehending everlasting eternity", ἀίδιον is Meric Casaubon's correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' ἴδιον, with which the phrase would be one's own span of eternity. Lemma: ἀΐδιος.
αἰών
Attested: αἰῶνι (aiōni; 2.12, 7.10, 7.70), αἰῶνος (aiōnos; 4.3.3, 4.21.1, 4.50, 5.24, 5.32, 6.36, 9.28, 9.35, 10.5, 10.17, 11.1.2, 12.7, 12.32), αἰών (aiōn; 4.43, 6.59, 7.19), αἰῶνα (aiōna; 6.15, 9.28, 9.32). Eternity, time without end before and after. "The whole present of time: a point of eternity" (6.36); "How quickly eternity will cover everything" (6.59); "The cycles of the universe are the same, up and down, from eternity to eternity" (9.28). At 4.43, "Eternity is a kind of river of the things that come to be", "is" is Nauck's correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' "out of". Lemma: αἰών.
αἰώνιος
Attested: αἰώνιον (aiōnion; 7.64), αἰώνια (aiōnia; 10.34). Eternal, lasting for ever. In Epicurus' saying, pain is "neither unbearable nor eternal" (7.64); men "flee and pursue all things as though they were to be eternal" (10.34). Lemma: αἰώνιος.
ἀκαριαῖος
Attested: ἀκαριαῖον (akariaion; 2.14.1, 3.10, 4.48.2, 5.24, 6.25), ἀκαριαῖος (akariaios; 11.18.3). Momentary, lasting no longer than a moment. What is lost at death "is thus shown to be a mere instant" (2.14.1); "each of us lives only this present, this instant" (3.10); "So pass through this instant of time according to nature" (4.48.2); "human life is momentary" (11.18.3). Lemma: ἀκαριαῖος.
ἀπειρία
Attested: ἀπειρίαν (apeirian; 11.1.2). Infinity, boundlessness. The rational soul "stretches out into the infinity of eternity" (11.1.2). Lemma: ἀπειρία.
ἄπειρος
Attested: ἀπείρῳ (apeirōi; 2.14.2, 10.31), ἀπείρου (apeirou; 4.3.3, 12.32), ἄπειρον (apeiron; 4.50, 5.13 twice, 5.23, 6.15, 6.37, 9.28 twice, 9.32, 9.35). Without limit, infinite; as a noun, infinity. "The abyss of the infinite eternity on either side" (4.3.3); "the infinity of the past and the future is a yawning gulf" (5.23); "those things will change to infinity, and those again to infinity" (9.28); "what has once changed will no longer be in infinite time" (10.31). Lemma: ἄπειρος.
ἀχάνεια
Attested: ἀχάνειαν (achaneian; 12.7). A yawning, a gulf. Among the things to consider is "the yawning gulf of eternity behind and before" (12.7). Lemma: ἀχάνεια.
ἀχανής
Attested: ἀχανές (achanes; 4.50, 5.23, 9.32), ἀχανοῦς (achanous; 12.32). Gaping, yawning; as a noun, a yawning gulf. "For look behind at the yawning gulf of eternity, and in front at another infinity" (4.50); "how yawning the gulf before birth" (9.32); "the infinite and yawning eternity" (12.32). Lemma: ἀχανής.
ἐφήμερος
Attested: ἐφήμερον (ephēmeron; 4.35), ἐφήμερα (ephēmera; 4.48.2, 8.25, 9.14), ἐφημέρου (ephēmerou; 6.47). Lasting a day, short-lived. "Everything is of a day, both what remembers and what is remembered" (4.35); "always look at human things as of a day and cheap" (4.48.2); the famous dead are "All of a day, long dead" (8.25); and men such as Menippus, the Cynic satirist, are "perishable and of a day" (6.47). Lemma: ἐφήμερος.
ὀλιγοχρόνιος
Attested: ὀλιγοχρόνια (oligochronia; 5.10.1, 7.1), ὀλιγοχρόνιον (oligochronion; 10.34, 12.24). Lasting a short time. "All things are both usual and of short duration" (7.1); "And short duration is common to all" (10.34); raised aloft, one would see "the same things, uniformity, short duration" (12.24). Lemma: ὀλιγοχρόνιος.
πάρειμι
Attested: παρόντων (parontōn; 1.16.4, 7.27, 8.36), παρόν (paron; 2.2, 2.14.1, 2.14.2, 3.10, 3.12, 4.26, 6.2, 6.32, 7.68, 8.2, 8.36, 10.12, 12.1.1, 12.3.2, 12.26), παρούσῃ (parousēi; 3.12, 7.54 twice, 10.1), παρῇ (parēi; 4.12, 7.27), παροῦσιν (parousin; 4.32.1, 7.54), παρόντος (parontos; 4.49.1), παρόντας (parontas; 6.44.2), παρόντα (paronta; 7.8), παρῆν (parēn; 7.27), παροῦσα (parousa; 9.6 three times), παρεῖναι (pareinai; 9.40 twice), παροῦσι (parousi; 10.1), πάρεστι (paresti; 10.1), παρούσας (parousas; 10.12). To be present, be at hand; τὸ παρόν, the present. In time: "For it is only the present that he will be deprived of, since this is all he has" (2.14.2); "neither the future nor the past weighs on you, but always the present" (8.36); "each lives only the present and loses this" (12.26). The participle is "present" with a noun, as in "the present impression" (7.54) and "the present action" (9.6; see Present action); τὸ παρόν is "the work in hand" at 3.12; and at 10.12 the impersonal παρόν is "it is possible". Lemma: πάρειμι.
χάος
Attested: χάος (chaos; 4.3.3). A gaping void, an abyss. Against a little fame Marcus sets "the abyss of the infinite eternity on either side" (4.3.3). Lemma: χάος.
χρόνος
Attested: χρόνου (chronou; 1.17.2, 2.4, 3.7, 4.6, 4.48.2, 5.10.2, 6.15, 6.18, 6.36, 6.49, 7.29, 7.35, 8.5, 10.1, 11.16, 12.3.2), χρόνῳ (chronōi; 2.14.2, 5.23, 6.23, 9.14, 10.31, 12.35), χρόνος (chronos; 2.17.1), χρόνον (chronon; 3.11.2, 6.25, 7.46 twice, 8.11, 8.44, 9.25, 10.17, 12.17), χρόνων (chronōn; 4.32.2, 8.7). Time, a span of it or the whole. Marcus must perceive "that a limit of time has been set for you" (2.4); "the time a point" (2.17.1); "as you cherish the amount of substance marked off for you, so too with time" (6.49). It is one of the heads under which each thing is analysed: "how long a time does it subsist?" (8.11; also 3.11.2, 9.25, 12.17; see Definition and analysis). Lemma: χρόνος.
Source note
1. Homer, Iliad 16.453.
2. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.141.
3. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions 41, 1081f–1082a.
4. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 1.2–3.
5. Plato, Timaeus 37d–38a.