From the book
Phaedrus
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordThe dialogue uses several words for sense, thought and sight. Bodily sight makes beauty vivid; intellect alone beholds the reality beyond heaven. Reasoning and perceptive judgment connect these domains without making them identical.
- In the PhaedrusThe first speech contrasts the former lover’s sense and temperance with his past senseless rule by love and madness (241a–c). The palinode does not simply discard intelligence in favour of feeling. It begins by requiring apprehension of the truth about soul, then makes intellect the only beholder of the colourless and intangible reality beyond heaven (245c, 247c). Its alternative to merely sober calculation is a divinely animated cognitive life, not the abandonment of understanding.
- In this editionThe English varies nous according to context: “sense” at 241a and “intellect” at 247c are not different Greek nouns. Dianoia can name content as well as the thinking faculty; the earlier remarks about a speech’s “thought” should not be forced into the palinode’s personification of mind.
- A place to readDianoia as thought-content and disposition before the palinode.
Meaning
The Phaedrus distinguishes bodily seeing from understanding, while allowing perception to prompt thought. The palinode says that intellect alone beholds the reality beyond heaven (247c), whereas bodily sight vividly encounters beauty but cannot see intelligence itself (250d). Elsewhere nous can mean ordinary good sense. These words take their force from the particular sentence; they are not names for an unchanging hierarchy of mental faculties.
Use in the book
The first speech contrasts the former lover’s sense and temperance with his past senseless rule by love and madness (241a–c). The palinode does not simply discard intelligence in favour of feeling. It begins by requiring apprehension of the truth about soul, then makes intellect the only beholder of the colourless and intangible reality beyond heaven (245c, 247c). Its alternative to merely sober calculation is a divinely animated cognitive life, not the abandonment of understanding.
The heavenly driver’s head rises beyond the circuit and catches sight of beings, but unevenly because the horses disturb it (248a). The image explains how cognitive access may depend on the ordering of the whole soul. At 249b–c human understanding gathers many perceptions into one by reasoning; this is identified with recollection. Reasoning therefore works upon the sensory multiplicity instead of merely shutting it out.
The passage on beauty carefully separates intellect’s object from bodily sight. Sight is the keenest bodily perception, yet intelligence is not seen by it. If intelligence supplied as clear a visible image of itself, it would inspire formidable loves; as matters stand, beauty has the distinctive portion of being most manifest and lovable (250d). The hypothesis explains a difference in visibility, not a lack of worth in intelligence.
Dianoia also admits conflict. The better parts of the lovers’ mind can lead toward philosophy, while the lesser pair’s gratification occurs without the whole mind’s approval (256a–c). Later Socrates asks that the speaker’s mind know the truth about the subject (259e). The mental vocabulary links erotic self-government with the epistemic demands of good speech.
The account of rhetoric then insists on perception in practice. A prospective rhetorician must understand kinds of soul and speech, but must also recognize their actual occurrence in actions and identify the particular person before him (271d–272a). A scheme remembered from a teacher is not enough. The sensible farmer at 276b similarly knows how to fit seed, ground, time and purpose. The everyday use of nous remains beside its exalted role as the pilot of soul.
Places to read
- 228dDianoia as thought-content and disposition before the palinode.
- 234b–cDianoia as thought-content and disposition before the palinode.
- 235aApplying the mind in attention.
- 241a–cNous as recovered sense in the first speech.
- 244cNous as sense in the prophetic name-play.
- 245cApprehension of soul and intellect as the sole beholder of the reality beyond heaven.
- 247c–248aApprehension of soul and intellect as the sole beholder of the reality beyond heaven.
- 249b–250d23Perceptions gathered by reasoning and the distinction between sight and intelligence.
- 256a–c2Mind’s internal ordering and truth in a speaker’s mind.
- 259eMind’s internal ordering and truth in a speaker’s mind.
- 270aIntellect and mind in the account of Anaxagoras; perception in rhetorical practice.
- 271d–272aIntellect and mind in the account of Anaxagoras; perception in rhetorical practice.
- 276b–cThe farmer’s practical sense and its comparison with the knowledgeable speaker.
Translation in this edition
The English varies nous according to context: “sense” at 241a and “intellect” at 247c are not different Greek nouns. Dianoia can name content as well as the thinking faculty; the earlier remarks about a speech’s “thought” should not be forced into the palinode’s personification of mind.
At 270a Burnet prints dianoias, “mind”, from V and Aristides rather than anoias, “lack of intellect”, in B and T. At 247c the edition’s “only” qualifies intellect as the beholder, not the number of realities available to it.
Lexical detail
Nous ranges from practical sense to intellect: the recovered lover in the first speech regains “sense”, while the soul’s pilot in the palinode is “intellect”. Dianoia names thought or mind; phronēsis is intelligence or understanding. These overlapping words should be interpreted in their immediate constructions rather than assigned an unchanging rank in a system imported from elsewhere.
Opsis can mean sight, the act or faculty of seeing, or a visible appearance. Aisthēsis is perception, and its plural can name the particular perceptions gathered in understanding. The dialogue’s frequent verbs of seeing can describe bodily encounters, intellectual recognition or the myth’s presentation of knowledge as a spectacle.
Earlier, Phaedrus offers to report the thought of Lysias’ speech rather than the exact expressions (228d), and Lysias uses the same noun for the disposition a boy might have toward suitors (234b–c). “Mind” and “thought-content” are connected senses, not competing translations of one invariant technical noun.
Attested forms
νοῦν (235a · Burnet p. 11) — “paying attention”. Phrase-level: τὸν νοῦν προσείχον, applying the mind; “attention” is not the noun’s sole lexical sense.
νοῦν (241a · Burnet p. 20) — “sense”.
νοῦν (244c · Burnet p. 25) — “sense”. Within the playful derivation of oionoïstikē.
νῷ (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “intellect”.
νοῦν (276b · Burnet p. 69) — “sense”.
διάνοιαν (228d · Burnet p. 3) — “thought”.
διάνοιαν (234b–c · Burnet p. 10) — “thought”.
διάνοια (247d · Burnet p. 29) — “mind”.
διάνοια (249c · Burnet p. 31) — “mind”.
διανοίας (256a · Burnet p. 40) — “of the mind”.
διάνοιαν (259e · Burnet p. 45) — “mind”.
φρόνησις (250d · Burnet p. 33) — “intelligence”.
ὄψιν (250b · Burnet p. 32) — “sight”.
ὄψις (250d · Burnet p. 33) — “sight”.
ὄψιν (254b · Burnet p. 37) — “appearance”.
αἰσθήσεων (249b · Burnet p. 31) — “perceptions”.
αἰσθήσεως (250d · Burnet p. 33) — “through the clearest of our perceptions”. Phrase-level rendering: αἰσθήσεως is singular in the superlative phrase, while τῶν ἡμετέρων supplies the comparison with our perceptions.
αἰσθήσει (271d · Burnet p. 62) — “perception”.
Research and interpretation
Middle Liddell’s noos includes mind, perception and practical sense. That range supports the entry’s contextual renderings. At 270a, mind follows the edition’s dianoias reading rather than the B/T anoias; apparatus 60-4 records the witnesses.
αἴσθησις
Perception is sensory awareness that can contribute to understanding but is not itself the whole explanation of knowledge. Socrates says that a human being gathers many perceptions into one by reasoning; later he makes sight the clearest bodily access to beauty. A rhetorician also needs perception of actual hearers, beyond memorized classifications.
aisthēsis · Perception · lemma
Sensory apprehension or a particular perception.
Human understanding gathers many perceptions into one by reasoning. Sight gives beauty its exceptional clarity. Later the rhetorician needs sharp perception of actual people and actions, not only a remembered classification of souls.
Attested: αἰσθήσεων (249b–c · Burnet p. 31) — “perceptions”.
Attested: αἰσθήσεως (250d · Burnet p. 33) — “through the clearest of our perceptions”. Phrase-level rendering: αἰσθήσεως is singular in the superlative phrase, while τῶν ἡμετέρων supplies the comparison with our perceptions.
Attested: αἰσθήσει (271e · Burnet p. 62) — “perception”.
See: Intellect and seeing; Recollection
The 249 witness preserves the move from many perceptions to a reasoned unity.
Plato, Phaedrus 249, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).
Citation note: The supplied native source places the inline249c marker inside αἰ249cσθήσεων. The complete word is present; treat249b–c as the phrase range, without changing the original Greek surface or inventing an extra occurrence.
The selected dative form appears after the native271e marker, in the requirement to recognize the actual hearer. The271d marker introduces the preceding theoretical classifications.
ἀναφής
Intangible means inaccessible to bodily touch. Socrates applies it to the reality beyond heaven, together with colourless and shapeless, and says that intellect alone beholds it. The description therefore distinguishes intellectual apprehension from ordinary contact with a distant physical object.
Read: 247c.
anaphēs · Intangible · lemma
Not accessible to touch.
The adjective completes the sensory exclusions surrounding the reality beyond heaven. Its beholder is intellect, not a bodily organ extended into a distant region.
Attested: ἀναφὴς (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “intangible”.
ἀχρώματος
Colourless means without colour. In Socrates’ description of reality beyond heaven, the adjective excludes a feature of ordinary visible bodies, alongside shape and touch. Although the myth describes a vision, the beholder of this reality is intellect rather than bodily eyesight.
Read: 247c.
achrōmatos · Colourless · lemma
Without colour.
The reality beyond heaven is colourless, shapeless and intangible, although narrated through a vision. The adjective prevents the myth’s scenic surface from being confused with ordinary coloured objects.
Attested: ἀχρώματός (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “colourless”.
διάνοια
Dianoia can mean a thought’s content or the mind that thinks. Phaedrus offers to summarize Lysias’ thought rather than reproduce his exact words; in the palinode, the philosopher’s mind grows wings through memory of reality. These uses distinguish the message conveyed from a thinking power.
dianoia · Mind and thinking · lemma
Thought or its content; also the mind as a thinking power.
Phaedrus offers the thought of Lysias’ speech rather than its exact expressions at 228d; in the speech the word also means the thought or disposition one is asked to have toward suitors (234b–c). The palinode then speaks of a god’s mind being nourished and the philosopher’s mind growing wings; at 256c the lesser pair act without the whole mind’s decision. These contexts distinguish content, disposition and faculty.
Attested: διάνοιαν (228d · Burnet p. 3) — “thought”.
Attested: διάνοιαν (234b–c · Burnet p. 10) — “thought”.
Attested: διάνοια (247d · Burnet p. 29) — “mind”.
Attested: διάνοια (249c · Burnet p. 31) — “mind”.
Attested: διανοίας (256a · Burnet p. 40) — “of the mind”.
Attested: διάνοιαν (259e · Burnet p. 45) — “mind”.
See: Intellect and seeing; Philosophy
The 249 witness explicitly links the philosopher’s mind and memory.
Plato, Phaedrus 249, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).
λογισμός
Reasoning is the activity that gathers many perceptions into one intelligible understanding. In the palinode, Socrates identifies that understanding with recollection.
At 249b–c many perceptions are brought together into one by reasoning.
logismos · Reasoning · lemma
Reasoning or calculation.
At 249b–c many perceptions are gathered into one by reasoning; Socrates immediately identifies this understanding as recollection. The instrumental dative makes reasoning the means of gathering, not a separate visible object.
Attested: λογισμῷ (249b–c · Burnet p. 31) — “by reasoning”.
See: Intellect and seeing; Recollection
The instrumental λογισμῷ names the means of gathering.
Plato, Phaedrus 249b, 249c — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).
νοῦς
Nous means intelligent apprehension or sense. Its range includes ordinary judgement and the intellect that guides the soul toward realities beyond bodily perception.
At 247c intellect alone beholds the colourless reality; at 276b the sensible farmer supplies an everyday comparison.
nous · Sense and intellect · lemma
Intelligent apprehension; practical sense, or intellect as the soul’s pilot.
The first speech’s recovered lover has “sense”; the prophetic wordplay also speaks of sense. In the vision, intellect alone beholds the colourless reality. Later the sensible farmer shows that the ordinary sense remains active beside the more exalted one. At 235a Socrates applies his mind to the rhetorical side of Lysias’ speech: the English “paying attention” renders the whole construction with prosechein.
Attested: νοῦν (235a · Burnet p. 11) — “paying attention”. Phrase-level: τὸν νοῦν προσείχον, applying the mind; “attention” is not the noun’s sole lexical sense.
Attested: νοῦν (241a · Burnet p. 20) — “sense”.
Attested: νοῦν (244c · Burnet p. 25) — “sense”. Within the playful derivation of oionoïstikē.
Attested: νῷ (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “intellect”.
Attested: νοῦν (276b · Burnet p. 69) — “sense”.
See: Intellect and seeing
Fowler uses mind and sense according to context. The attention phrase at 235a includes a verb of applying the mind; “attention” is not the noun’s only meaning.
Plato, Phaedrus 235a, 241a, 244c, 247c, 276b — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).
ὄψις
Sight means seeing or what comes into view. The dialogue distinguishes bodily sight, a former vision of reality, and a beloved’s visible appearance.
At 250d bodily sight is the keenest sense, yet cannot see intelligence as it sees beauty.
opsis · Sight and visible appearance · lemma
The faculty or act of seeing; also what is presented to sight.
The pre-bodily procession enjoys a blessed sight; bodily sight is the keenest perception, yet does not see intelligence. At 254b the darling’s flashing appearance moves the charioteer’s memory toward beauty.
Attested: ὄψιν (250b · Burnet p. 32) — “sight”.
Attested: ὄψις (250d · Burnet p. 33) — “sight”.
Attested: ὄψιν (254b · Burnet p. 37) — “appearance”.
See: Beauty; Intellect and seeing
φρονέω
To think or be minded can express understanding or, in a different construction, high self-estimation.
At 257e politicians who think most highly of themselves are called proudest; at 266b Socrates wants to speak and understand through collection and division.
phroneō · Think, understand and be proud · lemma
To think or be minded; with an intensifier, to think highly of oneself.
The proudest politicians are those thinking the greatest things of themselves at 257e. At 266b Socrates pursues collection and division so that he can speak and be intelligent. The same verb’s construction distinguishes boastful self-estimation from the aspiration to understanding.
Attested: φρονοῦντες (257e · Burnet p. 42) — “are proudest”. The phrase includes μέγιστον: literally those thinking most highly.
Attested: φρονεῖν (266b · Burnet p. 54) — “to be intelligent”.
See: Intellect and seeing
Fowler preserves the contrast. The intensifying μέγιστον is part of the proud self-estimation; pride is not the verb’s only meaning.
Plato, Phaedrus 257e, 266b — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).
φρόνησις
Intelligence is understanding, which Socrates distinguishes from what bodily sight directly perceives.
At 250d he says that intelligence is not seen, adding that it would arouse powerful love if it offered a visible image as clear as beauty’s.
phronēsis · Intelligence · lemma
Intelligence or understanding.
At 250d Socrates denies that intelligence is seen by bodily sight. The formidable loves it would cause if it supplied an equally clear visual image are hypothetical; the sentence explains beauty’s exceptional visibility.
Attested: φρόνησις (250d · Burnet p. 33) — “intelligence”.
See: Beauty; Intellect and seeing