Soul and divine life

Fate and choice of life

θεσμός, thesmos, “Ordinance”; μοῖρα, moira, “Portion”; κλήρωσις, klērōsis, “Allotment”; αἵρεσις, hairesis, “Choice”; Ἀδράστεια, Adrasteia, “Adrasteia”

The myth combines an ordinance governing fall and return with judgment, allotment and choosing a life. Better or worse conduct matters within every first-life rank; the ranking is not a substitute for ethical responsibility.

From the book

Phaedrus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe myth combines an ordinance governing fall and return with judgment, allotment and choosing a life. Better or worse conduct matters within every first-life rank; the ranking is not a substitute for ethical responsibility.
  • In the PhaedrusA soul following a god and seeing something true is protected until the next circuit. If it can continue to do this always, it remains always unharmed. If it fails to follow and see, meets mischance, fills with forgetfulness and vice and grows heavy, it sheds wings and falls (248c–d). The repeated conditions make an important distinction between the promise of continuing protection and the actual course of any particular soul.
  • In this editionThe list at 248d follows the edition’s printed supplements and corrections, including “or” separating the toil-loving and athletic possibilities. It does not support turning every listed occupation into a rigid moral verdict on every practitioner.
  • A place to readAdrasteia’s ordinance, first lives, just conduct, return, judgment, allotment and choice.

Meaning

The palinode places the soul’s lives within a divine ordinance while still speaking of conduct, judgment and choice. In the thousandth year, for example, souls come to an allotment and choose the next life each wants (249b). Just living brings a better share within every first-life rank. The narrative therefore does not let a rank or an allotted situation replace responsibility for how a life is lived.

Use in the book

A soul following a god and seeing something true is protected until the next circuit. If it can continue to do this always, it remains always unharmed. If it fails to follow and see, meets mischance, fills with forgetfulness and vice and grows heavy, it sheds wings and falls (248c–d). The repeated conditions make an important distinction between the promise of continuing protection and the actual course of any particular soul.

The first birth is not into a beast’s nature but into a human one. The soul that saw most enters the life of a lover of wisdom or beauty, or someone musical and erotic; the list then runs through royal, civic, practical, prophetic, poetic, productive and sophistic lives to the tyrant (248d–e). The text explicitly names degree of vision for the first rank; the edition treats its extension to the whole ordering as an inference. Within all these lives, whoever lives justly receives a better portion and whoever unjustly a worse (248e).

The usual return requires ten thousand years before wing-growth restores the place from which the soul came. The exception concerns the one who has philosophized without guile or loved boys with philosophy: after choosing that life three times consecutively, such souls depart winged in the three-thousandth year (248e–249a). Three successive choices are the stated condition, not three years or one moment of philosophical enthusiasm.

Other souls face judgment after their first life, undergoing penalties beneath the earth or dwelling in heaven according to their previous conduct. In the thousandth year both groups come to allotment and choose the next life each wants. A human soul can then enter an animal life, and a soul that was formerly human can return from an animal to human form (249a–b). The restriction on first birth and the later possibility of animal embodiment must not be conflated.

The erotic outcomes at the speech’s end apply this structure to the pair. Philosophical lovers win one of three truly Olympian bouts; the honour-loving pair still carry off a substantial prize, beginning wing-growth and avoiding the underground journey (256b–e). The damaging nine-thousand-year wandering at 257a belongs to the soul befriended by the non-lover: his affinity plants servility in that soul. It is not a sentence explicitly placed on the non-lover’s own soul.

Places to read

  1. 248b–249d2Adrasteia’s ordinance, first lives, just conduct, return, judgment, allotment and choice.
  2. 250dBeauty’s distinct portion, a non-eschatological use of moira.
  3. 256a–257a23The two lovers’ rewards and the non-lover’s harmful effect on the friend’s soul.

Translation in this edition

The list at 248d follows the edition’s printed supplements and corrections, including “or” separating the toil-loving and athletic possibilities. It does not support turning every listed occupation into a rigid moral verdict on every practitioner.

The edition marks the identification of the three wrestling bouts with the three philosophical lives as an interpretation, and likewise the explanation of nine thousand as the remainder of the usual ten thousand. The lexicon keeps these as possible connections, while treating the stated numbers and conditions as the narrative’s explicit claims.

Lexical detail

Thesmos is an ordinance; nomos, used in the same sequence, is a law. Moira is a share or portion, not always an irresistible fate. Klērōsis is allotment by lot, while hairesis is choice. Their coordination at 249b lets the narrative state both an allotted arrangement and an act of selection without explaining every mechanism between them.

Adrasteia gives the ordinance its divine name. The edition explains it as “the Inescapable”, a name of Nemesis. In the passage the name introduces consequences of vision, failure and conduct rather than a separate speaking character who settles each decision aloud.

Attested forms

θεσμός (248c · Burnet p. 30) — “ordinance”.

μοίρᾳ (244c · Burnet p. 25) — “portion”.

μοίρας (248e · Burnet p. 31) — “portion”.

μοῖραν (250d · Burnet p. 33) — “portion”.

κλήρωσίν (249b · Burnet p. 31) — “allotment”.

αἵρεσιν (249b · Burnet p. 31) — “choice”.

αἵρεσιν (256c · Burnet p. 40) — “choice”.

Ἀδραστείας (248c · Burnet p. 30) — “Adrasteia”.

Research and interpretation

LSJ’s moira includes an allotted share, not only irresistible fate. The native account distinguishes the first human birth from later possible animal lives, and requires three successive philosophical choices for the exceptional three-thousand-year return. Those conditions remain in the retained source.

LSJ, μοῖρα, indexed principal sense.

Printed textual evidence

The supplied edition’s reported readings can be checked in its Greek apparatus: 248d (apparatus).

Ἀδράστεια

Adrasteia names the divine authority of the ordinance governing the soul’s vision and fall. In Socrates’ myth, a soul that follows a god and sees truth is protected until the next circuit; continued protection depends on its continuing to see. Adrasteia does not appear as a speaking character.

Read: 248c.

Adrasteia · Adrasteia · proper name

The divine name attached to the ordinance governing the soul’s vision and fall.

The edition glosses the name as “the Inescapable” and identifies it with Nemesis. In the speech her ordinance supplies the structured consequences of seeing or failing to see, not a speaking dramatic character.

Attested: Ἀδραστείας (248c · Burnet p. 30) — “Adrasteia”.

See: Fate and choice of life

The independent 248 witness renders the ordinance as a law of Destiny.

Plato, Phaedrus 248, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

αἵρεσις

Choice is selecting a course or life. In Socrates’ myth, souls choose their next lives after the first thousand-year period. The word also names the lesser lovers’ sexual decision, which the narrative says their whole mind has not approved. Choosing therefore does not by itself establish that a decision is wise.

Read: 249b; 256c.

hairesis · Choice · lemma

A choosing or the option chosen.

Souls choose subsequent lives. The same noun at 256c names the sexual choice the many count blessed, made when the lesser pair’s souls are unguarded. That decision is not approved by the whole mind, which explains its rare repetition.

Attested: αἵρεσιν (249b · Burnet p. 31) — “choice”.

Attested: αἵρεσιν (256c · Burnet p. 40) — “choice”.

See: Fate and choice of life

The 249 witness explicitly pairs drawing lots with choosing another life.

Plato, Phaedrus 249, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

θεσμός

An ordinance is a binding rule within the palinode’s account of the soul’s journey. Adrasteia’s ordinance protects the soul that follows a god and sees something true. That protection continues as long as the soul can keep doing so; the narrative then explains what follows when it fails.

Read: 248c.

thesmos · Ordinance · lemma

An authoritative enactment or ordinance.

The ordinance of Adrasteia assigns protection to a soul that follows a god and sees something true; its continuing protection is conditional on continuing ability to do so. The next conditions describe failure, descent and first embodiment.

Attested: θεσμός (248c · Burnet p. 30) — “ordinance”.

See: Fate and choice of life

The independent primary ordinance also makes continued protection conditional on continued vision.

Plato, Phaedrus 248, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

κλήρωσις

Allotment is an allocation by lot within the soul’s cycle of lives. At the thousandth year, souls come to the allotment and choice of a second life. Socrates names both the allotted setting and each soul’s choosing, without explaining every detail of how the two operate together.

Read: 249b.

klērōsis · Allotment · lemma

An allocation by lot.

At the thousandth year souls come to the allotment and choice of a second life. The paired nouns preserve both an allotted framework and each soul’s choosing; the passage does not explain every detail of their relation.

Attested: κλήρωσίν (249b · Burnet p. 31) — “allotment”.

See: Fate and choice of life

The independent primary account likewise joins allotment with choosing the next life.

Plato, Phaedrus 249, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

μοῖρα

A portion is an allotted share, whose significance changes with what is being shared. It can name divine inspiration, a life’s outcome or beauty’s special privilege.

At 248e just and unjust ways of living lead to better or worse portions.

moira · Portion · lemma

An allotted share or portion.

Madness may come by divine portion; just or unjust life changes a soul’s share for better or worse; beauty receives the special share of being conspicuous and lovable. The noun does not always name an inexorable destiny independent of conduct.

Attested: μοίρᾳ (244c · Burnet p. 25) — “portion”.

Attested: μοίρας (248e · Burnet p. 31) — “portion”.

Attested: μοῖραν (250d · Burnet p. 33) — “portion”.

See: Beauty; Fate and choice of life

Research and sources for this word.

ὁμόπτερος

Alike-winged describes the lesser lovers’ eventual shared winged condition. It does not say that their wings are already fully grown when they leave the body.

At 256d–e they depart wingless but beginning to grow wings, and are promised like plumage when they obtain it.

homopteros · Alike-winged · lemma

Having wings alike or together.

The lesser pair’s promise is not that they are already fully winged. They travel together in a bright life and, when they acquire wings, acquire them alike for love’s sake.

Attested: ὁμοπτέρους (256e · Burnet p. 41) — “have them alike”. The English supplies “wings” from the adjective’s context.

See: Fate and choice of life; Wing and flight

Fowler explicitly retains the future reception of wings. The conditional timing distinguishes this pair from the philosophical lovers’ completed outcome.

Plato, Phaedrus 256d, 256e — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).

πάλαισμα

A wrestling bout is one contest within the palinode’s image of a philosophical pair’s achievement.

At 256b the pair have won one of three truly Olympian bouts when they leave this life winged.

palaisma · Wrestling bout · lemma

A wrestling action or bout; here one of three truly Olympian contests.

The philosophical pair have won one of three at death. The edition suggests that the three may correspond to the repeated lives of 249a, but marks that connection as interpretation rather than the sentence’s express explanation.

Attested: παλαισμάτων (256b · Burnet p. 40) — “bouts”.

See: Fate and choice of life; Philosophy

Fowler preserves the athletic metaphor. The edition suggests a connection with the three lives of 249a, but marks that identification as interpretation.

Plato, Phaedrus 249a, 256b — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).