Soul and divine life

Justice and virtue

δικαιοσύνη, dikaiosynē, “Justice”; ἀρετή, aretē, “Virtue and excellence”; κακία, kakia, “Vice and badness”

Justice is both an object of the soul’s former vision and a standard for the lives it chooses. Virtue names excellence in a power or person, and requires more than praise from the crowd.

From the book

Phaedrus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordJustice is both an object of the soul’s former vision and a standard for the lives it chooses. Virtue names excellence in a power or person, and requires more than praise from the crowd.
  • In the PhaedrusLysias’ speaker had already claimed virtue for the non-lover: such men obtain what they need through virtue and will display their virtue when the boy’s youth has ended (232d,234a–b). These are claims within his solicitation, not a verdict delivered by the dialogue. The later contrast between real virtue and publicly praised servility makes the earlier self-description worth testing.
  • In this editionThe edition’s “virtue” for aretē retains the same English noun in the good horse’s excellence and in moral formation. The shift in subject must remain visible: “the virtue of the good one” at 253d is first a question about the horse within the likeness.
  • A place to readVirtue claimed for non-lovers in Lysias’ speech.

Meaning

Justice and virtue concern both what the soul understands and how it lives. The palinode makes justice itself an object of vision, but also says that in every ranked human life just conduct brings a better portion and unjust conduct a worse one (248e). Virtue can also name the good horse’s excellence. The word’s subject matters, and praise from a crowd is not a sufficient test of genuine excellence.

Use in the book

Lysias’ speaker had already claimed virtue for the non-lover: such men obtain what they need through virtue and will display their virtue when the boy’s youth has ended (232d,234a–b). These are claims within his solicitation, not a verdict delivered by the dialogue. The later contrast between real virtue and publicly praised servility makes the earlier self-description worth testing.

In the divine circuit the mind sees justice itself, temperance and knowledge among the things that really are (247d). After embodiment, however, justice and temperance lack the conspicuous brightness beauty has in present likenesses; a few discern their kind with difficulty through dim instruments (250b). The contrast makes moral discernment difficult, not unnecessary.

The ordinance gives that discernment practical weight. Across all the ranked first lives, just living gives a better share and unjust living a worse one (248e). Subsequent judgment sends some souls below to discharge a penalty and lifts others through Justice to a fitting place of heaven (249a). The catalogue of occupations is not sufficient on its own to determine the worth of how a particular life is lived.

The chariot scene asks what the excellence of the good horse is and what the vice of the bad one is (253d). The answer is behavioural as well as visual: the good one loves honour with temperance and modesty, accompanies true opinion and heeds command and speech without blows. The bad one accompanies insolence and boastfulness and resists correction. Excellence is disclosed through the form of responsiveness that allows a composite soul to be guided.

When the better powers bring the lovers into ordered living and philosophy, they enslave what generated vice and free what generated virtue (256a–b). The reversal of slavery and freedom is internal: becoming masters of themselves is the means of living together in concord. By contrast, the non-lover’s thrifty affinity can plant servility in his friend’s soul, even though the multitude praises that servility as virtue (256e–257a). Social approval is thus explicitly separable from the thing approved.

The second half of the dialogue brings justice into the standard for speech. Phaedrus reports the view that an orator need learn only what seems just to the judging crowd, not what really is just (259e–260a). Socrates’ ensuing inquiry contests that separation. Medicine’s analogy requires rhetorical knowledge of soul if discourse and lawful practices are to convey virtue (270b). At the end, just, beautiful and good things are the matters about which serious, responsive teaching must be written in soul (276c–278a).

Places to read

  1. 232dVirtue claimed for non-lovers in Lysias’ speech.
  2. 234a–bVirtue claimed for non-lovers in Lysias’ speech.
  3. 247d–249b23Justice itself, just conduct, judgment and the better or worse portion.
  4. 250bJustice’s dim earthly likenesses.
  5. 253d–254a2The excellence and vice of the horses.
  6. 256a–257a23Virtue-producing self-government and falsely praised servility.
  7. 259e–260aReality rather than mere seeming, and virtue as a purpose of speech.
  8. 270bReality rather than mere seeming, and virtue as a purpose of speech.
  9. 276c–278a23Just, beautiful and good things as the subject of serious teaching.

Translation in this edition

The edition’s “virtue” for aretē retains the same English noun in the good horse’s excellence and in moral formation. The shift in subject must remain visible: “the virtue of the good one” at 253d is first a question about the horse within the likeness.

Justice is personified as Dike in the judgment scene, where she lightens certain souls into heaven. The ordinary noun dikaiosynē names the quality seen at 247d. Their relation is evident within the moral narrative, but they are not the same printed form or grammatical subject.

Lexical detail

Dikaiosynē is justice; dikaios and dikaiōs name what is just and acting justly. Aretē is excellence or virtue, while kakia is badness or vice. A horse can have an aretē within the soul-likeness; a human soul can acquire virtue; a false social judgment can also call servility virtue.

The words therefore do not all refer to one fixed object on every occasion. Seeing justice itself, living justly and asking what makes a good horse good are related but different uses that the surrounding construction must identify.

Attested forms

δικαιοσύνην (247d · Burnet p. 29) — “justice”.

δικαιοσύνης (250b · Burnet p. 32) — “justice”.

δικαιοσύνης (276e · Burnet p. 70) — “justice”.

ἀρετὴν (232d · Burnet p. 8) — “virtue”. Lysias’ speaker claims virtue as the non-lovers’ means of obtaining what they need.

ἀρετὴν (234a–b · Burnet p. 10) — “virtue”. The speaker promises a display of virtue after the boy’s youth has ended.

ἀρετὴ (253d · Burnet p. 36) — “virtue”.

ἀρετή (256b · Burnet p. 40) — “virtue”.

ἀρετὴν (256e · Burnet p. 41) — “virtue”.

ἀρετὴν (270b · Burnet p. 60) — “virtue”.

κακίᾳ (248b · Burnet p. 30) — “vice”.

κακίας (248c · Burnet p. 30) — “vice”.

κακία (253d · Burnet p. 36) — “vice”.

Research and interpretation

Middle Liddell allows aretē excellence in animals and crafts as well as moral virtue. The native distinction between seeing justice and living justly keeps that lexical breadth from becoming moral indifference. Dike in the judgment scene remains a separate personification.

Middle Liddell, ἀρετή.

ἀρετή

Virtue or excellence is the good condition of a person or power. In the palinode, the philosophical lovers free the source of virtue within themselves while restraining the source of vice. Earlier speakers also claim virtue for their own preferred attachments, so a claim or public compliment does not settle whether it is present.

Read: 256b; 232d; 234a–b; 256e.

aretē · Virtue and excellence · lemma

The excellence of a being or power; morally, virtue.

Lysias’ speaker claims virtue for non-lovers and promises its enduring display (232d,234a–b). Socrates later asks what makes the good horse good; the philosophical lovers free the source of virtue, and rhetoric’s analogy with medicine includes conveying virtue. At 256e servility can instead be praised as virtue by the multitude: neither a speaker’s claim nor public praise settles the distinction.

Attested: ἀρετὴν (232d · Burnet p. 8) — “virtue”. Lysias’ speaker claims virtue as the non-lovers’ means of obtaining what they need.

Attested: ἀρετὴν (234a–b · Burnet p. 10) — “virtue”. The speaker promises a display of virtue after the boy’s youth has ended.

Attested: ἀρετὴ (253d · Burnet p. 36) — “virtue”.

Attested: ἀρετή (256b · Burnet p. 40) — “virtue”.

Attested: ἀρετὴν (256e · Burnet p. 41) — “virtue”.

Attested: ἀρετὴν (270b · Burnet p. 60) — “virtue”.

See: Justice and virtue

The friendship account connects philosophical love with strengthened rational direction.

C. D. C. Reeve, Plato on Friendship and Eros, §5 (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

δικαιοσύνη

Justice is one of the realities Socrates’ souls behold beyond heaven. Earthly likenesses of it lack beauty’s conspicuous visual brightness, although justice remains a subject for serious teaching and dialectic. For example, the divine circuit includes seeing justice itself, not merely accepting a popular judgement about it.

Read: 247d; 250b; 276e.

dikaiosynē · Justice · lemma

Justice, seen itself in the divine circuit and approached through imperfect earthly likenesses.

At 250b justice’s likenesses lack beauty’s visible brightness. At 276e it becomes a subject of speech and serious dialectical planting. Its lack of sensory brilliance does not remove it from human ethical concern.

Attested: δικαιοσύνην (247d · Burnet p. 29) — “justice”.

Attested: δικαιοσύνης (250b · Burnet p. 32) — “justice”.

Attested: δικαιοσύνης (276e · Burnet p. 70) — “justice”.

See: Justice and virtue

The 247 witness likewise distinguishes justice itself from variable earthly instances.

Plato, Phaedrus 247, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

κακία

Badness or vice can describe the soul’s failed guidance as well as its moral condition. Bad charioteers damage wings in the heavenly struggle, and forgetfulness with vice weighs a soul down. The later contrast between the horses explains excellence and vice through their different responses to guidance.

Read: 248b; 248c; 253d.

kakia · Vice and badness · lemma

Badness or defect, including moral vice and failed guidance.

Vice of charioteers damages souls in the heavenly struggle. Forgetfulness and vice weigh a soul down. The good and bad horses are defined through their excellence and vice, and the philosophical pair subdue the source of vice within themselves.

Attested: κακίᾳ (248b · Burnet p. 30) — “vice”.

Attested: κακίας (248c · Burnet p. 30) — “vice”.

Attested: κακία (253d · Burnet p. 36) — “vice”.

See: Charioteer and horses; Justice and virtue

Research and sources for this word.