Will

Use in the book

The formula joining firm, constant will to virtue is followed by a claim that children can possess it through honor or piety. In the light/movement pairing, intelligence supplies light while will supplies movement. The distinction becomes practical in the call for morality to give impulses to will rather than contemplation to understanding: it needs fire and ardor. Conversely, decisions made from weariness, haste or tormenting uncertainty may arise from will without intelligence. The faculty’s power therefore does not guarantee the truth of its decisions.

Places to read

1. I, p. 256, entry 3, ¶1Constant will is joined to virtue and childhood capacity.
2. I, p. 473, entry 2, ¶2Will is the starting point of movement.
3. II, p. 481, entry 7, ¶1Moral discourse needs to move will.
4. II, p. 589, entry 5, ¶1Will can decide in the absence of judgment.

Translation in this edition

The English translation preserves will against intelligence or understanding and keeps the imagery of fire and light. In the childhood fragment, “it” leaves open whether the French elle points specifically to will or virtue. This lexicon does not settle that antecedent more firmly.

Obstinacy

French: opiniâtre; entêté; obstination.

Opiniâtre holds strongly to opinions whether weak or strong, while entêté thinks strongly whatever is thought. The English translation distinguishes obstinate from headstrong. Obstination also belongs to prayer’s repeated acts in a nominal list whose promised efficacy is reported, not independently guaranteed. Strength of attachment is therefore not the same as strength of reasons.

Places to read: II, p. 743, entry 13, ¶1; II, p. 912, entry 2, ¶1.

Use in the book

The will becomes great by extending toward the goods God wills: the happiness of persons, the order of kingdoms, and redemption. Divine friendship requires more than appreciating those goods after they happen; the reader should share the reasons for desiring them. To will the same ends is an active mode of communion.

The prayers to Christ make conformity of will a gift to be sought. The human will does not acquire divine goodness merely by asserting its own desires. It needs a pattern, illumination, and transformation. Yet this dependence does not erase freedom: God gives the creature a power whose use can honour or dishonour the giver.

At the fullest point, divine and human will are said to be one. The context explains oneness through agreement, delight, and mutual presence. The creature remains the one who responds. Traherne’s ideal is a freely enacted harmony of love, not the replacement of a human agent by an irresistible external force.

Places to read

1. I.53Sharing God’s will extends the reader’s concern to the good of all.
2. I.93The speaker asks for the form of Christ’s will to be imprinted upon his own.
3. IV.52The gift of freedom obliges its recipient to noble and faithful use.
4. IV.72The oneness of wills is explained through communion in God’s works.

In this edition

Many occurrences of will are ordinary future auxiliaries, not instances of the faculty of willing. This entry concerns the substantive and deliberate verbal uses in the cited passages.

Use in the book

The storm of May 1833 reveals the will through its failure. Guérin asks why weather can disorder the soul and concludes that his will is not united with God's. Without that attachment he becomes a plaything of whatever blows. The desired firmness is therefore relational as well as self-directed: divine alignment promises an anchorage that sheer resolve has not supplied.

A year later the hidden-mission meditation gives consent a quieter efficacy. Even when he cannot see what good his life accomplishes, willing acquiescence can cultivate that imperceptible good. This is not the heroic execution of an identified plan. It is an attempt to make receptive trust morally active.

The September account restores the comic and painful division. A heavy, indolent will runs breathlessly after a soul that escapes on the wings of dreams. Serious projects keep changing, while supposedly empty dreams persist. The paradox reverses the expected contrast between stable decision and fleeting fantasy.

Reasoned independence and moments of courage show that weakness is not his only report, but no single resolution secures a permanent settlement. Will names the effort to give a life continuity amid shifting desire, thought, and circumstance. Its failures are described from within, often severely; they are not a neutral measurement of character.

Places to read

1. 1 May 1833 · ¶1Exposure to the weather becomes evidence of a will insufficiently joined to God's.
2. 26 May 1834 · ¶1Consent to an unknown providential use is treated as a form of moral cultivation.
3. 21 September 1834 · ¶1The laboring will cannot keep pace with a soul adept at imaginative flight.
4. 27 March 1835 · ¶1Resolution and effort could train the mind, but are not imagined to erase every limitation of method.

Translation in this edition

The English keeps “will” for “volonté” and “acquiescence” for “acquiescement.” The latter is more than emotional resignation in the May passage: it is the consent through which an unknown good is imagined to become fruitful.

Use in the book

Mon cœur mis à nu CIX's repeated ‘the more’ constructs a feedback loop: willing improves willing, working improves work, producing increases fertility. Mon cœur mis à nu CXVI makes the inverse equally vivid, as each retreat loses a particle of substance. Hesitation is prodigal because repeated small losses accumulate into an immense demand for repair.

The same section proposes attaching destiny to uninterrupted hours of work and invokes the power of hope. Its military figure for evening prayer gives vigilance a routine form: post sentries, then sleep. Habit is meant to reduce fear by replacing a fresh crisis of decision with a performed duty.

But absolute self-command is checked by the need to ask for strength. Mon cœur mis à nu CXVII directs prayer toward God and intercessors, and limits work by available powers. The notebook's will is therefore neither simply autonomous heroism nor mere passive dependence. It seeks help in order to act. Its renewed vows are utterances intended to make a future possible, not evidence that the future has already been secured.

Places to read

1. Mon cœur mis à nu CIXPlus on veut, mieux on veut. — Will is described as improved through use.
2. Mon cœur mis à nu CXVIPuissance de l’idée fixe, puissance de l’espérance. — Fixation is paired with hope as a source of continuity.
3. Mon cœur mis à nu CXVITout recul de la volonté est une parcelle de substance perdue. — Inaction becomes a cumulative material loss.
4. Mon cœur mis à nu CXVIIla force nécessaire pour accomplir tous mes devoirs — The final vow asks for the power required by agency.

Translation in this edition

‘A succession of small acts of will’ expands petites volontés enough to show its practical units. ‘Will to dream’ in Mon cœur mis à nu CXVI preserves the unusual transitive force of vouloir and distinguishes deliberate imaginative practice from drifting rêverie. The repaired Latin imperative ⟨Do⟩ in the same section is disclosed in note 103: French retains the printed Aye rather than silently replacing it with Age.

Use in the book

Will is mind's inclination toward the good. It both embraces a good already present and directs production toward a good to be realized. Ficino argues that knowledge of forms alone does not explain which external effects are made: intellect recognizes an end and possible routes toward it, while will assents to the end and selects a means. The assent or command of will is effective willing, rather than verbal agreement with a proposition.

The account uses inward and outward imagery. In seeing, mind folds forms inward and regards truth; in willing, it unfolds them outward and reaches good, whose characteristic is self-communication. In God these are analytical distinctions within a single being. Divine existence, understanding, and willing are identical, so their explanatory ordering does not describe successive decisions or a change in essence. God necessarily wills his own goodness while freely producing particular creatures. His willing therefore differs both from blind automatic production and from a requirement to actualize every object of his knowledge.

Human willing likewise has a necessary orientation toward good while retaining free judgment about particulars and means. People may reject a particular cognition as harmful but cannot reject goodness precisely as goodness; this leaves room for mistaken judgments about which things are good. Providence, in Ficino's account, preserves these modes of created action instead of coercively replacing them. The relation among will, good, choice, and necessity makes will more specific than arbitrary preference or external compulsion.

The earlier books add two contexts. The Proem joins true understanding to recta voluntas, right will, within philosophy's religious purpose. In the discussion of soul's stability, enduring will and memory serve as signs that the soul's essence remains while thoughts and bodily activities change. Memoria appears here as an example in that distinction, not as a fully developed independent theory of memory. Ficino also appeals to the mind's lack of necessary bodily dependence in understanding and willing when arguing for the suitability of separate intellectual life.

Further passage references. Proem.8; I.5.1, I.5.17; I.6.1, I.6.19; II.11.24–3823456789101112131415; II.12.1–2123456789101112131415161718192021; II.13.24–30234567

Places to read

1. Proem.8True understanding is paired with right will as philosophy’s religious orientation.
2. I.5.1 and I.5.17Enduring will and memory bear on the soul’s stability and the possibility of separate intellectual life.
3. II.11.24–3823456789101112131415The assent of will is required for external production beyond mere knowledge of possible forms.
4. II.12.1–2123456789101112131415161718192021Necessary willing of goodness and free production of particulars are distinguished.
5. II.13.24–30234567Providence preserves the created modes of judgment and action rather than replacing them with coercion.

Translation in this edition

“Assent” in the production argument is operative willing, not merely accepting a statement. Explanatory priority among understanding, end, and willing does not make God deliberate successively; recta voluntas in the Proem adds an explicitly normative human context.

velle / nolle

velle / nolle. Printed forms: nolle; velimus; velle; volumus; voluntaria; vult.

To will or wish, and not to will. The wish to be unable not to will the Good expresses Ficino’s proposed coincidence of necessity and willing acceptance, not coercion into one particular act. References: I.6.19. See Wishing, refusing and the good.

To will or refuse; willing cognition in the divine case. Opposing equal wills produce contradiction in the two-god supposition; voluntary cognition later characterizes divine action. References: II.2.14, II.9.13. See Will.

velle / nolle / malle

velle / nolle / malle. Printed forms: malle; nolle; nolunt; volunt; vult.

Will / refuse or not will / prefer. Willing good itself is distinguished from choosing particular means and from preferring the whole’s good to a part’s apparent advantage. References: II.12.19, II.13.28, II.13.29. See Will.

Mercury Trismegistus; Hermes (authorities and cited works)

Mercury Trismegistus; Hermes. Cited on formless matter, divine will, providence, and the world's old age. The Hermetic theologians frame the inquiry into grades of rational soul. Distinguish this authority from Mercury as planet or cosmic divine name. I.3.19; II.11.38; II.13.24; IV.1.1; IV.2.12. See Matter; Will; Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Great year.

Timaeus (authorities and cited works)

Timaeus. Invoked for divine will and goodness, intellectual ordering, the joining of mind to soul and soul to body, and soul's intermediate composition. II.11.26–272, II.11.38; II.13.3; III.2.22; IV.1.29. See Will; Indivisibility; Degree and mediation.

Use in the book

The rational power that moves

Understanding and will are the rational soul’s two principal powers, differing in office rather than essence: understanding apprehends and will moves. Will covets or avoids what understanding has already apprehended and judged, and Burton calls it rational appetite. Its object is good or evil; in contrast with sensitive appetite, it concerns the universal and morally honourable. This functional distinction does not make intellectual ability and willingness to act the same thing: the account of scholars says that some can understand but will not take pains.

Burton affirms freedom in the will’s essence and in some ordinary operations, such as walking or choosing whether to steal. Laws, deliberation, counsel and punishment would otherwise lose their point, and God would become the author of sin. The next passage limits freedom in spiritual matters, expressly excepting people regenerated and led by the Spirit. Fallen desire, bodily temperament, bad habits and diabolical suggestion pull in the other direction, while divine precepts and good spiritual motions can check the will. David sparing Saul supplies an example of such restraint.

“The actions of the Will are Velle and Nolle, to well and nill.” The printed “well” is preserved in the original column; its intended pairing is willing and refusing. These actions are good or bad according to their direction. Burton rejects what he describes as the Stoics’ absolute necessity, while asserting that choice is free in relation to ourselves and contingent things yet necessary in relation to God’s determined counsel. The distinction is explicitly relational; it should not be flattened into either unqualified freedom or universal absence of choice.

Lower powers execute other acts of will but may rebel. The runaway horses and the examples of Medea, Phaedra and David dramatize knowing one course while following another. Vegetative powers, by contrast, are not commanded by will at all. Later bodily causation makes the weakened will’s power of restraint small; it is not just an absence of moral instruction.

Bodily execution already appears in the anatomy. Intestinal sphincters hold waste until a person is “willing” to evacuate; the bladder’s muscle is a porter keeping urine from escaping “against our will.” These are examples of controlled release within the body’s processes. Elsewhere muscles and tendons move “as the spirits will,” rendered “as the spirits direct.” The marginal sequence places the soul before the spirits and the spirits before the nerves: the immediate directing instrument is not made an independent rational origin of the movement.

Willingness can coexist with weakness: “The spirit is willing, the flesh is weak” is quoted when passions and humours are compared. In a different moral emphasis, “self-will” and Melanchthon’s “Contumax voluntas,” a stubborn will, encourage passions and pervert judgment despite knowledge of the better course. Burton distinguishes the few who restrain themselves from the many who indulge their inclinations, and says that people act more from habit and wilfulness than from reason. Upbringing can alter this disposition: “Education is another nature altering the minde and will.” The accompanying Quintilian attribution is partly located by the supplied notes, but the opening maxim remains untraced. Neither an unchanging innate faculty nor sheer intellectual error describes all these uses.

Choice, resistance and divided wishing

The symptom description “they will and will not” is wavering: people cannot resolve upon a course, yet once fixed may become obstinate. The practical treatment presses the opposite possibility, that habits can be changed and passions disciplined. Burton’s argument even invokes whipping and compulsion as evidence that a person can act differently. Its continuation distinguishes inward desire from bodily execution: the moving faculty may refuse an impulse. If judgment and will remain overborne, a friend may supply help that the sufferer cannot provide alone. This sequence retains both the severity and the limits of Burton’s counsel.

In the discussion of adverse fortune, “will we, or nill we” introduces the proposal to suppose the worst case regardless of preference. Elsewhere the same form describes a confession made under compulsion: natural evidence makes people acknowledge divine existence, “will or nill,” though Burton then limits the clarity of natural knowledge. Neither idiom by itself states a theory of free will.

Married partners ideally “will and nill the same,” sharing desires and refusals; the continuation’s mirror image, however, particularly requires the wife to reflect her husband’s feelings. In the later account of lovers, Emilia’s reported “law of love” similarly requires pleasing the beloved, while the following verse makes the lover desire and reject only what she does. Burton then calls such lovers slaves. Shared willingness can therefore serve praise of accord or criticism of subjection according to its setting.

True friendship supplies another affirmative setting for the Latin pair: “Velle & nolle ambobus idem,” both sharing wishes and refusals. The following examples of loyal friends develop mutual help and lasting agreement. The margin attributes the verse to Statius, while the supplied note identifies a Silius parallel and retains the printed continuation’s satisfied rather than substituting the parallel’s united. In the marriage poem “good will” instead names affectionate feeling, as it does when virtue wins people’s favour. It is not another technical faculty.

Favour can become willingness to receive a suitor. Euryalus asks Lucretia’s “good will” by his eyes, and the story describes mutual attraction and her assent. A few units later, however, men merely infer “she is willing” from a smile: the following verse calls that observer a fool. The alleged consent belongs to his interpretation. At the opposite extreme, Jupiter “had his will” after intercourse with the sleeping Leda. Here the idiom means that he achieved his own sexual desire; the woman’s consent is absent. These three scenes distinguish narrated mutuality, a mistaken inference and one person’s gratification at another’s expense.

The Ausonius epigram makes wishes conflict across three people: the speaker wants one woman who does not want him and refuses another who does. Burton’s English expands Venus’s conquest of hearts into Love’s torture of souls. The ensuing proverb contrasts refusing when one may with wishing later and being told no; its next paragraph separates those who wish but cannot succeed. Legal or customary restraints on marriage sharpen the distinction: “Velle licet... potiri non licet,” one may desire but may not possess. Burton concedes that some formally can marry, yet only by forfeiting their livelihoods. A choice available at that cost is not the same as an unconstrained opportunity.

Voluntary celibacy also explains “voluntas” in the twelfth pro-marriage proposition attributed to Jacobus de Voragine. Its argument says that if involuntary nature is punished through childlessness, deliberate will will not escape. Burton then writes an opposing parody praising virginity before finally advising the reader to risk marriage. The allegation about Mosaic punishment belongs to this argumentative exchange, not to an independently established theological rule.

Preference, compulsion and practical limits

“By his good will” has a different sense from affection. The person who would neither see nor be seen if left to himself follows a frightened preference for darkness. In persistent melancholy, by contrast, thoughts recur “against their wills”; the list includes pleasant fantasy as well as distressing ideas, with the latter especially difficult to escape. Burton’s more severe image of “tyrannizing wils” depicts sufferers swept along by impulses and misery. His bleak assertion that only divine intervention can help is later followed by the treatment opening’s possibility of cure or at least relief. These are different rhetorical and therapeutic moments, not a uniform claim that every sufferer can simply choose recovery or is incurable.

The Latin “si volet,” if he is willing, conditions Montanus’s alternatives of cure or diminished suffering. “Velle sanari,” wishing to recover, is called part of recovery in a Senecan maxim originally spoken by the Nurse in Phaedra. Burton generalizes that dramatic counsel, while later distinguishing being eased from being cured. Conversely, “volens nolens” describes a student’s obligation to work under penalties if voluntary tasks fail; the exception for intense interest and extraordinary delight remains. In the sleep discussion “voluntas,” the will itself, may help, but the continuation distinguishes people helped by noise from those helped by silence, darkness and willing. The practical effects are qualified by person and setting.

Refusal can be commendable. Burton’s Chrysostom quotation says that “nolle inebriari,” refusing to become drunk, is shamefully treated as cowardice by drinkers. In consolation the Senecan “nolle” means choosing not to want what one does not have: the inability to possess everything desired is answered by an attempted change of desire. The paired “volens nolens” also occurs in the argument that eventual death is unavoidable whatever one wishes. That argument belongs to the case for voluntary death explicitly repudiated a few paragraphs later; the idiom does not make every claim in that debate Burton’s final judgment.

Intention, testament and responsibility

“Non deerat voluntas sed facultas” means that the will was not lacking, only the means. It punctures a consolatory claim that poverty or melancholy keeps people honest: restraint may come from inability rather than virtue. The testamentary noun is more concrete. Cortesio’s “last will” orders an unusual funeral with music and green-clad bearers; his “will and testament” is reportedly performed. It is the instrument expressing his wishes, not a faculty in the soul.

The same will–means distinction changes force elsewhere. Under neglectful patronage, some scholars lack means, others will, and all encouragement; the three quantifiers are not interchangeable. The original margin beside the erotic catalogue says that people who restrain themselves often lack the means rather than the desire, preserving both the condition and “many times.” Neither passage makes every failure to act proof of a virtuous or vicious intention.

Burton refuses to let astrological predictions compel a marital choice: stars incline but do not enforce, and a person should follow free will “in this case.” The religious section then says that an uncorrupted human will would have sought God as the supreme good and other goods for God’s sake. Later disputes over free will and grace appear among the speculations that torment consciences. The appealing doctrine attributed to Arminians and others is a reported response to those troubles; Burton marks some answers as another extreme and rejects particular inferences in the ensuing debate. This is not a blanket adoption of everything he reports.

The earlier astrological discussion makes the condition explicit: if people “will be ruled by reason,” the stars have no power over them; following sense instead exposes them to the influence attributed to beasts. In the theological continuation Burton ultimately rejects universal restoration and the alternative of disappearance into nothing. His confessional account distinguishes universal invitation from only the elect being “apprehended,” taken hold of, and refuses to identify anyone, including oneself, as finally rejected. He closes the dispute under the stated ecclesiastical restriction on speculative controversy.

The final consolations give intention protective importance. God “accepts the will for the deed” in an argument about a heart earnestly desiring faith and repentance. Conversely, an act done under the force of illness may be done less from the person’s will; Burton calls for a favorable judgment under the conditions he states. In unwanted blasphemous thoughts, resistance and lack of consent matter more than the mere occurrence of the thought. He extends this distinction even to some temporary assent subsequently rejected: it has not proceeded from a “confirmed will,” a settled disposition. The desire to think otherwise is therefore evidence within his consolatory argument, not further guilt.

The preceding “willing minde” is sufficient in God’s acceptance: desire for repentance is not said to be repentance in its nature. The later “præter voluntatem,” against the will, first appears inside the sufferer’s imagined accusation that religious duties have always been performed reluctantly. Keeping that speaker boundary matters, since Burton is answering the accusation rather than certifying it. “Nolentes,” unwilling, elsewhere describes reluctant acknowledgment of God under natural evidence, before the stated limits of that evidence.

God’s will, human commands and ordinary idioms

Divine will can be what obedience fulfils, as in the contrast between passing worldly lust and the person who does God’s will. In consolation over fortune, the Pauline “volentis” names the person who wills: the result depends neither on that person nor on the one who runs, but on the God who shows mercy. Burton’s shorter English application then makes God the willing agent and human means subordinate to his appointed end. Later “unrevealed will” identifies fortune with divine purpose beyond human expectation, while “express will” makes even the falling hair subject to particular providence. The words distinguish human knowledge and divine government; they do not assign the sufferer responsibility for choosing the affliction.

“Gods good will” is benevolence offered to each person and to all. The following “I will not the death of a sinner” means do not desire death, contrasted with repentance and life, not merely a prediction. Burton’s question about “contradictory wils” is an appeal for assurance, followed by the sufferer’s objection and the further distinctions about invitation and election. In contrast, the margin’s “non vult, non potest” presents unwillingness or inability to help as Caecilius’s anti-Christian challenge; it is not Burton’s own claim about God. Reported objection, consolatory appeal and confessional conclusion must retain their separate speakers and functions.

Human will may be a demand with power behind it. Subjects depend on a conqueror’s “will and command,” while the irreligious worldling makes “their will their law.” To have the world “at will” is to have it at one’s disposal: Burton voices this as the apparent advantage of riches, then counters it with fears and disorders. His later verse denies that wealth and command themselves make a person happy.

Ordinary verbal constructions likewise carry distinct acts. At the book’s opening “si noluero” is the authorial persona’s conditional refusal to answer; the following English restatement and his eventual explanation keep the playful assertion of freedom visible. “Velis, nolis” before the love discussion addresses the reader: Burton will enter the arena whether that reader wishes it or not. In the world-as-war image “velis nolis” instead makes fighting compulsory for its general addressee, with conquer or succumb as alternatives. The person whose preference is overridden must be identified each time.

Crato “will have” the four humours to be sustaining juices: he maintains that classification, rather than wishing for a future transformation. “Quid sibi vult” asks the purpose of cosmetic boxes, and “Noli irritare crabrones” prohibits stirring up hornets before Burton applies it to opposing a multitude. A preparation-name, “Pillulæ sine quibus esse nolo,” means pills I would not be without; its first person belongs to the name, not to an autobiographical report of Burton’s medication. Even ordinary “velle” need not mark a special faculty: the comparison of sight and hearing renders it as longing aroused by hearing, within a local account of imagined beauty.

Related entries

Faculty; Reason; Intellect; Appetite; Concupiscence; Impotent; Voluntary; Conscience; Synderesis; Temptation; Despair; Love

Places to read

1. The right to refuse an answerConditional noluero and the authorial persona
2. Compulsory worldly combatVelis nolis and the alternatives of conquest or defeat
3. An imperious commandSubjects dependent on another’s will
4. What an authority maintainsCrato will have the humours classified as juices
5. Bodily retention and releaseWillingness, sphincters and the bladder’s porter
6. Directing spiritsAs the spirits will and the soul–spirit–nerve sequence
7. The rational soul’s powersFunctional distinction between understanding and will
8. Willing and refusingFreedom, spiritual qualifications, lower powers and limits of command
9. Consent to rational governmentThe condition for resisting the stars
10. Refusing drunkennessNolle inebriari and the drinkers’ inverted values
11. Willing but weakThe scriptural contrast amid the passions–humours question
12. Obstinacy and knowing betterSelf-will, Contumax voluntas and the few–many distinction
13. Ability without willingnessThe learner who can understand but will not work
14. Means, will and encouragementDifferently quantified effects of neglected patronage
15. Education shaping willHabit, upbringing and the qualified Quintilian attribution
16. A weakened willBodily conditions and restricted restraint
17. Preference for darknessBy his good will means if he had his choice
18. Wavering and obstinacyThey will and will not
19. Repeated thoughts against preferencePleasant and distressing ideas, with the latter especially persistent
20. Impulses figured as tyrantsMisery and tyrannizing wils in the severe prognosis
21. The disputed case for voluntary deathVolens nolens, explicit repudiation and the subsequent call for pity
22. Willingness and possible reliefSi volet conditions alternatives, not a guaranteed full cure
23. Wishing to recoverVelle sanari and the dramatic source of the treatment maxim
24. Work with consequencesVolens nolens, penalties and the exception for intense voluntary interest
25. The will and sleepVoluntas, noise, silence and differing people
26. Cooperation and reliefWillingness and the distinction between easing and curing
27. Discipline and assistanceStrong commands, coercive analogy and the recourse to a friend
28. Choosing not to wantNolle in the Senecan consolation
29. The world at one’s commandAt will as an objection answered by wealth’s troubles
30. Command does not establish happinessBurton’s English verse and its separate Latin source
31. Willing, striving and mercyRomans 9:16 and Burton’s application to fortune
32. Willing or unwillingAn idiom introducing a supposed worst case
33. A last willA reported testament and its funeral directions
34. Do not stir up hornetsNoli as prohibition and the application to a multitude
35. Will without meansThe ironic qualification of involuntary virtue
36. A remedy-name in the first personPills I would not be without
37. Whether the reader likes itVelis, nolis addresses the addressee
38. Favour gained by virtueGood will as benevolent feeling
39. Friends with common wishesVelle and nolle, shared mind and the printed verse qualification
40. Conjugal agreement and its poemsLatin source, English good will, shared wishes and an unequal mirror image
41. Desire lacking the meansThe original margin’s conditional, often-qualified voluntas on
42. Longing through hearingVelle and cupere in a local sensory comparison
43. Assent and its mistaken inferenceGood will, narrated reciprocity and the fool’s interpretation
44. What is its purpose?Quid sibi vult and the satire of adornment
45. The lover’s submissionThe law of love, a Latin verse and the subsequent slavery judgment
46. Obtaining one’s own desireJupiter had his will while Leda slept
47. Wishes that fail to meetVolo and nolo, missed opportunity and wishing without ability
48. Permission at a costVelle licet, marriage restrictions and livelihoods forfeited
49. Choice and astrologyStars incline but do not compel
50. Voluntary celibacy in argument and replyVoluntas, nature, counter-parody and the eventual recommendation
51. The corrupted willThe counterfactual proper order of love
52. Reluctant acknowledgmentNatural knowledge and its limits
53. Making desire one’s lawWill within the moral allegory
54. An objection about divine willingnessCaecilius’s non vult in the composite margin
55. Fortune as undisclosed purposeUnrevealed will in the reply about providence
56. Illness and responsibilityA qualified call for charitable judgment
57. Desire, acceptance and self-accusationWilling mind, not identity in nature; earnest desire for faith and repentance accepted for the deed; præter voluntatem in the sufferer’s objection
58. Unwanted thoughts and settled willCompulsion, resistance, consent and later rejection
59. Benevolence offered to individuals and allGood will, negative willing and the question about contradictory wills
60. Controversy over freedom and graceReported responses and Burton’s stated objections
61. The doctrinal and practical conclusionRejected alternatives, universal invitation, only the elect apprehended and limits on judgment
62. A particular providential purposeExpress will, permitted trial and compassionate support

In this edition

“Velle and Nolle, to well and nill” is rendered together as “willing and refusing”; the four original expressions are not four separately translated acts. The original retains well. In the fortune passage, “will we, or nill we” becomes “willing or unwilling”; in marriage, “will and nill the same” becomes “wishing and refusing the same things.” “Confirmed will” becomes “settled will,” preserving the difference between a stable disposition and an unwanted or temporarily assented-to thought.

In the scholar passage, “all mens wills are not answerable to their wits” means that not everyone’s willingness matches their ability. The modern “their will does not always match their intelligence” recasts this with frequency wording.

The noun in “will and testament” is compressed to “will.” Original Latin “voluntas” in the means-versus-intention maxim remains “will,” while the original plural “wils” in the compulsion passage becomes “wills.” These ordinary uses are kept apart from technical faculty definitions. The philosophical and theological sources are represented through Burton and the supplied editorial apparatus, without fresh collation.

These idioms preserve differences in grammatical scope. “Will have” becomes considers; “as the spirits will,” as the spirits direct; “by his good will,” willingly; and “at will,” at his command. In the Latin comparison of seeing and hearing, the infinitive “velle” becomes the noun longing, with comes supplied in both balanced clauses. The preparation-name’s “nolo” belongs to its quoted first person. “Noli” plus an infinitive is rendered as do not plus a verb.

Printed “no man... but” in the mortality sentence becomes “No one... who... must not,” preserving the universal necessity across a redistributed negative. In the disputed divine-power margin, the editorial English makes “non vult, non potest” an explicit alternative with or. Burton’s Latin and his separate English glosses remain distinct; the editor’s translation inside a Burton-labelled note is not another original attestation. The marriage proverb’s closing future will is distinct from its two volitional uses. Sequence page 149 is printed 145 in the upbringing passage, the mortality debate crosses to the leaf numbered 454, and the marriage proverb stands on the unnumbered verso after 576.

against one’s will

Printed “against their wills” (English; prepositional idiom).

Contrary to their wishes; the complete phrase marks involuntary repetition of thought.

Context: Mercurialis’s reported generalization concerns recurring ideas, not exclusively religious blasphemy. The continuation stresses especially distressing thoughts; the preceding list also includes pleasurable fantasy. A thousand times gives rhetorical insistence, not a measured count.

Source: original body

Source wording: against their wills they must think of it a thousand times over

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

at will

Printed “at will” (English; adverbial idiom).

At one’s disposal or command, according to one’s wishes.

Context: The apparent advantage of wealth is voiced as an objection; the reply lists accompanying dangers and disorders. Burton’s later English verse explicitly denies that worldly command makes a person happy.

Source: original body

Source wording: he hath the world at will that is rich

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

by one’s good will

Printed “by his good will” (English; adverbial idiom).

If his own preference governed; willingly or of his own choice.

Context: A particular sufferer avoids light and being seen through shyness, suspicion and fear. Good will here expresses preference, not kindness toward someone. The attached margin contrasts people who seek darkness with those who avoid it.

Source: original body

Source wording: he will neither see, nor be seen by his good will

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

confirmed will

Printed “confirmed will” (English; phrase).

An established and deliberate disposition, distinguished from temporary assent later rejected.

Context: Burton extends consolation even to some partial assent and delight; no complete absence of assent is required by this paragraph.

Source: original body

Source wording: a confirmed will in thee

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

contumax voluntas

Printed “Contumax voluntas” (Latin; qualified noun phrase).

Printed form, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Contumax voluntas

An obstinate or disobedient will; the adjective qualifies the power of willing.

Context: Burton attributes the designation to Melanchthon, then says it perverts judgment despite knowing what ought to be done. His moral-causal argument differs from later descriptions of thoughts occurring against a sufferer’s wishes.

Source: original body

Locator qualification: Do not remove bracketed or repeated-page qualifier.; This source group includes repeated printed 96–97 and supplied 98–99; see SUPPLIED_OPENING and SOURCE_DJR_040.

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: A stubborn will

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Supplied words: A (English article supplied)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

express will

Printed “express will” (English; qualified noun phrase).

God’s explicit, particular purpose or permission governing the event.

Context: In the consolation about affliction, not even a hair falls outside this will. The passage names permission and providence and presents the trial as limited and for the sufferer’s good; it does not make the sufferer the willing agent of the affliction.

Source: original body

Source wording: without the express will of God

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

free will

Printed “free will” (English; phrase).

Freedom to choose one’s course regarding the marital predictions at issue.

Context: In this case limits the scope; stars incline but do not compel in the preceding claim.

Source: original body

Source wording: follow his own free will in this case

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

good will · local use 1

Printed “good will” (English; noun phrase).

Affectionate or benevolent feeling toward another; here enduring marital affection.

Context: Burton’s English quatrain develops the preceding Ausonius passage. Good will is his English wording, not a word-for-word rendering of a matching Latin voluntas in that poem. The nearby account of virtue winning people’s good will similarly means favour.

Source: original body

Source wording: As hitherto we have in all good will

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

good will · local use 2

Printed “good will” (English; noun phrase).

Favour or receptive consent toward a suitor.

Context: The reported Euryalus–Lucretia scene asserts mutual attraction and follows with her assent. The later fool’s inference from a smile is separately exposed as unreliable; the story does not establish that any smile proves consent.

Source: original body

Source wording: he asked her good will with his eye

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

good will · local use 3

Printed “good will” (English; noun phrase).

Benevolent disposition or favour directed toward human beings.

Context: Burton invokes a universal offer reaching every individual. His following scriptural sequence includes the condition of belief and desire for repentance; the later conclusion distinguishes all invited from only the elect taken hold of and forbids deciding who is finally rejected.

Source: original body

Source wording: Gods good will toward men

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

have one’s will

Printed “had his will” (English; verbal idiom).

Obtained what he desired; here satisfied his sexual desire.

Context: Jupiter is the desiring agent and Leda is asleep when he has intercourse with her. The supplied note makes the lack of consent explicit and identifies Burton’s combination of mythic versions. Having his will must not be glossed as mutual agreement.

Source: original body

Source wording: by which means Jupiter had his will

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

nolle inebriari

Printed “nolle inebriari” (Latin; verb with complement).

To refuse or be unwilling to become drunk; inebriari supplies what is refused.

Context: The Chrysostom quotation satirizes drinkers who shame refusal. Burton condemns this social reversal of virtue and vice; the quoted insults are the drinking culture’s values, not his endorsement.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Ut effeminatæ ridendæque ignaviæ loco habeatur, nolle inebriari

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: where refusing to get drunk is treated as effeminate, laughable cowardice

Alignment convention

Qualification: The clause aligns the object of the social judgment and its insulting characterization. Nolle itself means refusal; getting drunk is supplied by inebriari.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

nolo · noluero

Printed “noluero” (Latin; inflected verb).

Choose not to or be unwilling; the future-perfect form occurs in a condition governing refusal to answer.

Context: Democritus Junior borrows the Senecan narrator’s assertion of independence before giving his own English restatement. The next unit partly satisfies the reader despite his preference for anonymity.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Primum si noluero, non respondebo, quis coacturus est?

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: First, if I choose not to, I shall not answer; who will compel me?

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

nolo · nolle

Printed “nolle” (Latin; infinitive).

Not to wish for or desire; here the refusal concerns something one lacks.

Context: The Senecan maxim opposes inability to possess everything desired with the capacity to stop wanting what is absent. Burton uses it as counsel to accept one’s fortune, not a declaration that nobody can obtain anything desired.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Illud potest nolle quod non habet

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: He can choose not to want what he does not have

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

nolo · Noli

Printed “Noli” (Latin; imperative form).

Do not; the imperative of nolle with an infinitive forms a prohibition.

Context: Burton follows the literal hornets with his own application, do not oppose a multitude. It counsels avoiding retaliation and, if possible, bearing injury patiently; the idiom is not a report that hornets lack desire.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Noli irritare crabrones

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: Do not stir up hornets

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

nolo · Nolentes

Printed “Nolentes” (Latin; participial form).

Unwilling; the plural participle describes people knowing despite reluctance.

Context: Maximus of Tyre is reported as making knowledge and confession unavoidable. Burton separately repeats the point as will or nill, then limits pagan philosophers’ natural knowledge to a confused glimpse rather than Christian revelation.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Nolentes sciunt, fatentur inviti

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: Unwillingly they know it; reluctantly they confess it

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Supplied words: it (object understood from the surrounding discussion, supplied in both clauses)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

Pillulæ sine quibus esse nolo

Printed “Pillulæ sine quibus esse nolo” (Latin; quoted preparation-name).

Citation key, Printed form, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Pillulæ sine quibus esse nolo

Pills without which I do not wish to be: a preparation-name built around nolo, I am unwilling.

Context: The first-person declaration belongs to the Latin remedy-name in Burton’s list attributed to Mesue and the Florentine Antidotary. It is not an autobiographical confession that Burton personally uses the pills.

Source: original body

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: pills I would not be without

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

præter voluntatem

Printed “præter voluntatem” (Latin; prepositional phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: præter voluntatem

Against or contrary to the will; the prepositional phrase expresses reluctance.

Context: This is part of the sufferer’s imagined self-accusation about reluctant religious observance. Burton later answers the fears and distinguishes unwanted thoughts from settled rejection; the second-person accusations are not established facts about the reader.

Source: original body

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: contrary to your will

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Supplied words: your (possessor supplied from the second-person context)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

quid sibi vult

Printed “Quid sibi vult” (Latin; interrogative idiom).

What does it mean or intend; idiomatically, what is its purpose?

Context: The Lucianic question challenges cosmetic paraphernalia before Burton’s intensified punitive satire. Vult participates in an idiom about purpose, not a literal claim that boxes possess a rational will.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Quid sibi vult pixidum turba

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: What is the purpose of this crowd of boxes?

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

self-will

Printed “self-will” (English; compound noun).

Obstinate insistence on one’s own inclination, contrasted with rational government.

Context: Burton distinguishes a few who govern their emotions from most who encourage them. More, rather than exclusively, marks the stated predominance of habit and wilfulness.

Source: original body

Locator qualification: Do not remove bracketed or repeated-page qualifier.; This source group includes repeated printed 96–97 and supplied 98–99; see SUPPLIED_OPENING and SOURCE_DJR_040.

Source wording: do more out of custome, self-will, than out of Reason

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

si volet

Printed “si volet” (Latin; conditional verb phrase).

If he is willing; a future form of velle used in a condition.

Context: The Montanus margin offers the alternatives of cure or at least diminished suffering, conditional on willingness. Neither the Latin nor the body promises every willing patient a complete cure.

Source: original marginal wording in Burton-labelled note

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: aut curabitur, aut certè minus afficietur, si volet

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: He will either be cured or at least suffer less, if he is willing

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original marginal quotation aligned with its separately identified editorial translation, not with the modern body.

Supplied words: He (subject understood in the Latin verbs)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

tyrannizing wills

Printed “tyrannizing wils” (English; qualified noun phrase).

Wills or impulses depicted as dominating their possessors, like tyrants.

Context: Burton’s bleak prognosis portrays sufferers as driven by both inner impulses and misery, with an exception for divine intervention. The later treatment opening allows cure or relief; this rhetoric must not become a universal clinical prognosis or a claim of uncoerced deliberation.

Source: original body

Source wording: carried headlong by their tyrannizing wils

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

unrevealed will

Printed “unrevealed will” (English; qualified noun phrase).

A divine purpose not disclosed to human understanding; Burton identifies fortune with it.

Context: Burton’s reply to deniers of providence distinguishes God’s ordinary power or order, called nature, from events outside human reason and expectation, called fortune. The cited Scaliger and Calvin passages remain unlocated in the supplied apparatus.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Fortune his unrevealed will

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: Fortune is his unrevealed will

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Supplied words: is (copula understood in the original)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

velis nolis

Printed “velis nolis” (Latin; paired idiom).

Whether you wish it or not; the paired second-person verbs express indifference to preference.

Context: Burton portrays the world as compulsory warfare. Pugnandum supplies the obligation to fight; the following alternatives are conquer or succumb. His separate English kill or be killed is a compressed amplification, not the complete lexical translation of velis nolis.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: ubi velis nolis pugnandum, aut vincas aut succumbas

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: in which you must fight, willing or unwilling, and either conquer or succumb

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

velis nolis · velis, nolis

Printed “velis, nolis” (Latin; paired idiom).

Whether you wish it or not; the paired verbs address a singular you.

Context: Burton’s speaker resolves to enter the literary arena despite the reader’s possible disapproval. The unwilling party is the addressee, not necessarily the author who has just declared his resolve.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: velis, nolis, audacter stadium intrare

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: whether you wish it or not, to enter the arena boldly

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

velle and nolle · Velle and Nolle

Printed “Velle and Nolle” (Latin and English; phrase).

Willing and not willing: the two basic acts of the rational will.

Context: Burton says their moral quality depends on direction and some are freely performed; printed well is retained.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Velle and Nolle, to well and nill

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: willing and refusing

Alignment convention

Qualification: The modern pair renders both the Latin pair and Burton’s English repetition together, not four separate acts.

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

velle and nolle · velle & nolle

Printed “velle & nolle” (Latin; phrase).

To desire and not desire or refuse; the complete verse restricts the lover to what the beloved desires and rejects.

Context: Latin verse attributed to the younger Strozzi; the following characterization calls the lovers slaves.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Tantum velle & nolle, velit nolit quod amica

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: To desire and reject only what the beloved desires and rejects

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase alignment; the entire phrase, not each component separately, carries the stated rendering.

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

velle and nolle · Velle & nolle

Printed “Velle & nolle” (Latin; paired infinitives).

To will and not will, desire and refuse; ambobus idem makes these acts common to both friends.

Context: The verse characterizes true friendship before the marital and erotic applications. The margin names Statius; the supplied note identifies a Silius parallel and a different printed continuation, satiataq;, which is retained rather than silently replaced.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Velle & nolle ambobus idem

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: Both have the same wishes and refusals

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

velle licet

Printed “Velle licet” (Latin; permission construction).

It is permitted to desire; licet grants wishing while the opposing clause denies possession.

Context: Laws and customs obstruct marriage. Burton then concedes that some can marry freely but only at the cost of forfeiting their livelihoods. This distinction separates formal choice from a practicable opportunity; the supplied note identifies an adapted verse, not an exact quotation.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Velle licet in such cases, potiri non licet as he said.

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: In such cases, as the poet said, “You may desire, but you may not possess.”

Alignment convention

Qualification: The full mixed Latin–English unit is redistributed in the modern sentence; as the poet said, originally after the Latin, is moved before it. The Latin opposition is may desire / may not possess.

Supplied words: the poet (explicit referent supplied for original he); You (general addressee supplied for the impersonal licet construction)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

velle sanari

Printed “velle sanari” (Latin; verb with infinitive).

To wish to be healed or recover; velle supplies wishing and sanari the desired recovery.

Context: The source is the Nurse’s dramatic counsel in Seneca’s Phaedra, repurposed by Burton as a general maxim about cooperation and prompt help-seeking. It makes wishing a part of recovery, not the whole cure.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Pars sanitatis velle sanari fuit

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: The wish to recover is part of recovery

Alignment convention

Qualification: The complete maxim is aligned: the infinitive construction becomes the noun phrase the wish to recover, and printed past fuit is rendered as a general present is.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

volens nolens · local use 1

Printed “volens nolens” (Latin; paired participial idiom).

Willing or unwilling; the participles make preference irrelevant to eventual mortality.

Context: This belongs to the argument for voluntary death that Burton subsequently rejects. The whole sentence’s no man... but construction is recast as no one... who... must not; this is not an independent negative assertion about death.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: no man so voluntarily dies, but volens nolens, he must die at last

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: No one dies voluntarily in this way who, “willing or unwilling,” must not die in the end.

Alignment convention

Qualification: The whole sentence retains its scope across a redistributed negative: original no man... but is modern no one... who... must not. The paired idiom itself corresponds exactly to willing or unwilling; the complete sentence supplies the universal necessity.

Notes: Read the complete sentence and the later explicit rejection. This historical debate supplies no present recommendation.

volens nolens · local use 2

Printed “volens nolens” (Latin; paired participial idiom).

Citation key, Printed form, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: volens nolens

Whether willing or unwilling; preference does not remove the obligation.

Context: Burton wants work enforceable by loss, penalty or shame if voluntary diversion fails. The preceding exception for a student’s intense interest and extraordinary pleasure remains; he does not say voluntary work never absorbs anyone.

Source: original body

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: willing or unwilling

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

volentes nolentes

Printed “volentes nolentes” (Latin; phrase).

Citation key, Printed form, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: volentes nolentes

Whether willing or not; a paired expression of compulsion overriding preference.

Context: Describes some sufferers’ unwanted blasphemous thoughts; subsequent paragraphs distinguish consent.

Source: original body

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: willing or unwilling

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase alignment; the entire phrase, not each component separately, carries the stated rendering.

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

volo · volentis

Printed “volentis” (Latin; substantival participle).

Of the person who wills or wishes; the participle is part of a contrast between human striving and divine mercy.

Context: Burton uses Romans 9:16 in consolation over worldly fortune, then gives his own shorter as God will paraphrase. The Latin’s running and mercy are not simply meanings of volentis; his ensuing distinction makes means subordinate to an appointed end.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Non est volentis nec currentis, sed miserentis Dei

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: It depends neither on the one who wills nor on the one who runs, but on God who shows mercy

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Supplied words: It depends (supplied English subject and governing verb)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

volo · velle

Printed “velle” (Latin; infinitive).

To wish or long; here the infinitive names desire excited through hearing.

Context: The balanced comparison concerns sensory routes into imagined love, with examples of loving someone never seen. It does not establish that every use of cupere is visual and every use of velle auditory, or replace the rational-appetite definition with a universal sensory taxonomy.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Ut cupere ab aspectu, sic velle ab auditu

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: As desire comes from seeing, so longing comes from hearing

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Supplied words: comes (understood relation supplied in both parallel clauses)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

volo

Printed “volo” (Latin; contrasted verb construction).

I want or desire; the full line contrasts the speaker’s desire for one woman with his rejection of another.

Context: The Ausonius epigram distributes incompatible wishes across three people: the desired woman refuses him, while he refuses the willing woman. Burton’s ensuing English expands the second line differently, turning Venus’s conquest into Love’s torture.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Hanc volo quæ non vult, illam quæ vult ego nolo

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: I want this woman who does not want me; that one who does, I do not want

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Supplied words: me (understood object of the woman’s non vult); woman (understood referent of hanc)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

volo · non vult

Printed “non vult” (Latin; negated verb).

Does not wish or is unwilling; non negates velle.

Context: Caecilius’s anti-Christian challenge in the composite margin presents unwillingness or inability as alternatives. It is an objection introduced among arguments the apologists answer, not Burton’s assertion that God lacks mercy or power. The English makes the alternatives explicit with or, which is not printed between the Latin verbs.

Source: original marginal wording in Burton-labelled note

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: non vult, non potest opitulari suis

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: is unwilling or unable to help his own

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original marginal quotation aligned with its separately identified editorial translation, not with the modern body.

Supplied words: or (the editorial translation explicitly marks the alternative between non vult and non potest)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

voluntas · local use 1

Printed “voluntas” (Latin; lemma).

Intention or willingness, opposed to the means or ability to execute it.

Context: Ironically qualifies the claim that poverty and melancholy keep people from wrongdoing.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Non deerat voluntas sed facultas

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: The will was not lacking, but the means were

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase alignment; the entire phrase, not each component separately, carries the stated rendering.

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

voluntas · local use 2

Printed “voluntas” (Latin; lemma).

Willing or intention itself, proposed as one means that can bring sleep.

Context: The Latin list joins will to gentle motion, silence and darkness. Burton’s next unit explicitly differentiates people: gentle noise helps some, while silence, darkness and will are effective for others, citing Telesio.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: tum & ipsa voluntas somnos faciunt

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: and even the will itself, bring sleep

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

voluntas · local use 3

Printed “voluntas” (Latin; lemma).

The desire or intention to act, distinguished from ability or opportunity.

Context: This original Latin margin is preceded by original English saying that restraint often does not arise from love of virtue. The often and conditional if they contain themselves prevent treating every abstention as secretly lustful. The note is on page 449 although its attached body crosses into 450.

Source: original marginal wording in Burton-labelled note

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: non deest voluntas sed facultas

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: the will is not lacking, only the means

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original marginal quotation aligned with its separately identified editorial translation, not with the modern body.

Notes: Attestation is in original marginal Latin, printed page 449; the note’s later English is editorial translation.

voluntas · local use 4

Printed “voluntas” (Latin; lemma).

Deliberate choice, here the choice of celibacy contrasted with involuntary childlessness.

Context: The twelfth pro-marriage proposition attributed to Jacobus de Voragine argues from punishment of nature to punishment of will. Burton supplies an English repetition, then a counter-parody praising virginity, before his eventual recommendation to risk marriage. The alleged Mosaic curse is not independently established.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Si natura pœnam non effugit, ne voluntas quidem effugiet

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: If nature does not escape punishment, neither will the will escape it

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will · local use 1

Printed “will” (English; lemma).

The rational power directing action, distinguished in function from apprehending understanding.

Context: The two powers differ in office, not essence.

Source: original body

Source wording: the will, which is the Rational power moving

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

will · wills

Printed “wills” (English; lemma).

Willingness to exert oneself, as distinct from intellectual ability.

Context: Not all: some teachable students will not work; this is not a denial of every student’s motivation.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: all mens wills are not answerable to their wits

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: their will does not always match their intelligence

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original not all is a qualification over persons; the supplied modern recasts it as not always, a frequency qualification. Both actual phrases are recorded; they should not be cited as a strictly identical quantifier construction.

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

will · local use 2

Printed “will” (English; lemma).

Personal intention, comparatively diminished under the force of illness.

Context: Conditional charitable judgment concerning an act arising from madness or melancholy with prior evidence of regeneration.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: not so much out of his will, as ex vi morbi

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: less from his own will than under the force of illness

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope mixed-language construction: the indexed will is English; ex vi morbi is a separate Latin phrase rendered under the force of illness.

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

will · wils

Printed “wils” (English; lemma).

Wishes or preferences; against their wils marks thoughts imposed contrary to those preferences.

Context: Burton’s combined demonic and humoral explanation attributes coercion, not settled assent.

Source: original body

Source wording: against their wils

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

will · willing · local use 1

Printed “willing” (English; lemma).

Desirous or ready to act; willing governs the decision to evacuate the bowels.

Context: In Burton’s anatomy the sphincter muscles retain waste until the person wishes to release it. The construction concerns bodily control, while the subsequent faculty account excludes vegetative powers from the will’s command.

Source: original body

Source wording: until such time a man be willing to go to the stool

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will · local use 3

Printed “will” (English; lemma).

Wish or intention; against marks an occurrence contrary to it.

Context: The bladder’s constricting muscle is compared to a porter that prevents unintended escape of urine. This is historical anatomy describing continence, not a moral judgment of the person.

Source: original body

Source wording: against our will

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will · local use 4

Printed “will” (English; lemma).

Direct or determine; the verb gives the bodily spirits the immediate directing role in movement.

Context: The spirits move muscles or nerves, which draw the tendon and joint. Melanchthon’s marginal sequence makes the spirits themselves moved by the soul; the spirits are intermediaries rather than an independently originating rational will.

Source: original body

Source wording: as the spirits will

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will · local use 5

Printed “will” (English; lemma).

Consent or choose to submit; the conditional construction means letting reason govern.

Context: Burton approves John of Indagine’s claim: stars do not compel and have no power under the stated condition, whereas following nature and sense lets their influence work as in beasts. The condition must accompany the denial of power.

Source: original body

Source wording: if we will be ruled by reason, they have no power over us

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will · willing · local use 2

Printed “willing” (English; lemma).

Ready or desirous to act rightly; the adjective is opposed to the flesh’s weakness.

Context: Burton quotes Matthew 26:41 while discussing the power of passions and humours. Willingness is affirmed even where resistance fails; it is not equivalent to successful control.

Source: original body

Source wording: The spirit is willing, the flesh is weak

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will · local use 6

Printed “will” (English; lemma).

Motivation or willingness to pursue learning; it can be absent even where resources are the separate problem.

Context: Burton attacks patrons’ deliberate impoverishment of scholars. Some lack means, others willingness, and all encouragement: these are three differently quantified claims, not a judgment that every scholar lacks both means and will.

Source: original body

Source wording: some want meanes, others will, all want incouragement

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will · local use 7

Printed “will” (English; lemma).

The power and disposition of willing, here capable of being shaped by upbringing and habit.

Context: Burton assigns the saying to Fabius and criticizes indulgent education. The supplied note locates related Quintilian material but leaves the opening second-nature maxim unidentified; the attribution is not newly verified.

Source: original body

Locator qualification: Preserve sequence and printed-number distinction exactly.

Source wording: Education is another nature altering the minde and will

Notes: The supplied locator is sequence page 149, printed 145; both must remain visible.

will · willing · local use 3

Printed “willing” (English; lemma).

Ready or consenting to respond to a suitor; here willingness is what observers suppose.

Context: The lovers attribute a woman’s pleasant expression to themselves. The following Latin calls such an observer a fool; Burton’s separate English verse additionally accuses the woman of deception. The supposed willingness is not independently established by the narrative.

Source: original body

Source wording: sure she loves them, she is willing, coming

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will · will not · local use 1

Printed “will not” (English; proverbial contrast).

Is unwilling or refuses; the proverb contrasts refusal during opportunity with later wishing when opportunity has passed.

Context: The context separates those who may but will not from the many who will but cannot. The modern second will becomes wishes, while the final will is a future auxiliary; the identical spelling does not give each occurrence the same function.

Source: original body

Source wording: He that will not when he may, When he will he shall have nay.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will · will not · local use 2

Printed “will not” (English; negated transitive verb).

Do not desire or intend; will takes death as its object, rather than serving as a future auxiliary.

Context: Burton quotes Ezekiel in consolation addressed to the sinner. The contrast positively desires repentance and life, and the surrounding debate continues to distinguish invitation, belief and election. Printed but he that he is irregular and retained in the original quotation.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: I will not the death of a sinner, but he that he repent and live

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: I do not will a sinner’s death, but that he repent and live

Alignment convention

Qualification: The modern preserves the intended contrast while transparently resolving the printed but he that he to but that he; it is not a verbatim grammatical match.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will · contradictory wils

Printed “contradictory wils” (English; qualified plural noun).

Mutually incompatible purposes or intentions; the plural does not name several psychological faculties.

Context: Burton asks rhetorically how willing all to be saved and not all could coexist, then urges trust. The sufferer objects in the next unit, and the doctrinal continuation distinguishes universal invitation from election; the question is not a completed systematic resolution.

Source: original body

Source wording: there cannot be contradictory wils in God

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will · would have

Printed “would have” (English; volitional would-have construction).

Wills or desires a specified outcome; here the outcome is salvation.

Context: Burton’s confessional conclusion immediately says all are invited but only the elect apprehended, a passive meaning taken hold of. He then forbids determining who is reprobate or condemning oneself or others. These qualifications prevent treating the phrase as a declaration that all are actually saved.

Source: original body

Source wording: God cals all and would have all to be saved according to the efficacy of vocation

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will and command

Printed “will and command” (English; coordinated phrase).

The ruler’s arbitrary wishes and orders, on which his subjects’ lives depend.

Context: Burton’s hostile account of Ottoman rule depicts political domination, not subjects sharing their ruler’s wishes. The preceding Latin speaks of the conqueror’s nod; the original English restates it more broadly.

Source: original body

Source wording: his insolent will and command

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will and nill

Printed “will and nill” (English; phrase).

To wish and to refuse; the following the same makes the partners share these wishes and refusals.

Context: Prescriptive ideal of married concord; following paragraph assigns the wife special adaptive duties.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: will and nill the same

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: wishing and refusing the same things

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase alignment; the entire phrase, not each component separately, carries the stated rendering.

Supplied words: things (English noun making the nominal same explicit)

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

will and testament

Printed “will and testament” (English; phrase).

A testamentary direction expressing wishes for after death.

Context: Scardeone’s anecdote as reported by Burton; not Burton’s own funeral plan.

Source: original body

Source wording: His will and testament was accordingly performed

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

will and will not

Printed “will and will not” (English; phrase).

Alternate between wishing and refusing, or remain undecided.

Context: Symptom description followed by the contrasting possibility of obstinacy once resolved.

Source: original body

Source wording: they will and will not

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

will as law

Printed “their will their law” (English; elliptical nominal construction).

Printed form, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: their will their law

Their own desire serving as their rule of conduct.

Context: Burton’s moral allegory of irreligious worldlings personifies the flesh, ambition and other governing powers. The phrase blames self-authorized conduct, not the existence of a rational will as such.

Source: original body

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: their own will their law

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Supplied words: own (the modern emphasizes the possessive their)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will for the deed

Printed “will for the deed” (English; phrase).

Earnest intention accepted in place of completed performance.

Context: God is the accepting agent; the surrounding application concerns heartfelt desire to believe and repent.

Source: original body

Source wording: he accepts the will for the deed

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

will have

Printed “will have” (English; verbal idiom).

Maintains or considers to be; will have introduces Crato’s asserted classification.

Context: The named authority holds that all four humours are sustaining juices, opposing the preceding division into useful and waste fluids. This reporting idiom need not mean that he wants them to become juices.

Source: original body

Source wording: Crato out of Hippocrates will have all four to be juyces, and not excrements

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will of God

Printed “will of God” (English; noun phrase).

What God desires or commands people to do; the object of obedience.

Context: Burton’s scriptural sequence opposes passing worldly desire to enduring obedience. This divine requirement is distinct from the human rational faculty whose corruption was described immediately before.

Source: original body

Source wording: he that fulfilleth the will of God abideth for ever

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

will or nill · will we, or nill we

Printed “will we, or nill we” (English; phrase).

Printed form, Source wording: will we, or nill we

Whether we wish it or not; a concessive idiom independent of preference.

Context: Introduces a supposed extreme case in the consolation about fortune.

Source: original body

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

will or nill

Printed “will or nill” (English; phrase).

Whether willing or unwilling; describes unavoidable acknowledgment.

Context: Part of the natural-theology argument, followed by a limitation of natural insight.

Source: original body

Source wording: will or nill, they must acknowledge it

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

willing mind

Printed “willing minde” (English; qualified noun phrase).

A mind earnestly desiring repentance and to please God.

Context: Burton calls desire repentance in God’s acceptance, explicitly not an identity in nature. The preceding capacity-versus-act comparison and the ensuing grief about lack of grief preserve the distinction between inward intention and completed performance.

Source: original body

Source wording: a willing minde is sufficient

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.