Learning and much learning

Use in the book

At 147a the man of what is called much learning and much craft is imagined as an orphan of the knowledge of the best. Each of his other kinds of knowledge can lead him, leaving him without a pilot in a storm. The criticism targets learning deprived of ordering judgment. The text does not claim that knowing many subjects necessarily harms, or that a smaller stock of information by itself constitutes wisdom.

The transition to Margites sharpens the point: according to Socrates’ reinterpretation, knowing many works was bad for him, rather than all his knowing being technically poor. Alcibiades resists the relevance of the quotation before accepting the argument. The poetic example therefore reinforces a contestable valuation of many things known; it is not independent evidence that all learning is an obstacle to living well.

At 150d the positive need to learn is explicit. Alcibiades must wait until he learns how he should be disposed toward gods and people, and asks who will educate him. The answer requires removal of the soul’s mist before the materials enabling discrimination of bad and good can be supplied. Learning is accordingly sequenced by the pupil’s condition and the character of the object, rather than opposed to an ideal of permanent ignorance.

Places to read

1. 147aMuch learning without knowledge of the best is compared with being unguided at sea.
2. 147b–d2The Margites interpretation connects many things known with possible harm.
3. 150dAlcibiades asks when the necessary learning will occur and who will educate him.
4. 150eRemoval of the mist must precede instruction enabling moral discrimination.

Translation in this edition

Burnet prints polymathia from T at 147a, while B has philomathia, “love of learning”. The edition’s “much learning” follows the printed text; it is not evidence that the dialogue condemns a love of learning. The accompanying polytechnia has a parallel manuscript variation.

Use in the book

The first proposed account of philosophy begins with lifelong learning and becomes learning as much as possible. Socrates names the result polymathia; the cultured lover accepts the name and later repeats the equation. It is therefore a jointly fixed thesis, not an accusation the respondent rejects. The ensuing physical analogy asks whether much labor likewise constitutes the love of exercise.

The athlete supplies the missing alternative: moderate exertion rather than either much or little produces good condition. Once this is accepted for food and other bodily inputs, Socrates asks about things supplied to the soul, including subjects of learning. The interlocutor again agrees that moderation benefits. On his own premises, mere quantity can no longer identify the beneficial pursuit he praised.

The strongest reading of the refutation is accordingly limited and precise. It undercuts “the more the better” as a sufficient criterion. It does not determine the right number of subjects, prove that extensive learning always harms, or vindicate ignorance as an ideal. Indeed, the next question asks what subjects a philosopher should learn. Learning remains necessary enough to be discussed after much learning has failed as a definition.

Near the end Socrates again excludes learning much from the account under challenge and closes by saying philosophy is far from polymathia and busyness about crafts. Calling the athlete amathēs then makes the narrative’s irony audible: formal cultural advantage has not secured the better account. But the athlete’s agreement does not alone supply a positive definition, and the dialogue never gives him an alternative comprehensive curriculum.

Places to read

1. 133cεἰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολυμαθίαν ἡγοῖτο — Socrates proposes the quantitative restatement of the lover’s answer.
2. 133eτὴν πολυμαθίαν φιλοσοφίαν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι — The lover expressly owns the identification.
3. 139aὁ δὲ ἀμαθὴς ἔφη ἐκείνως εἶναι — The unlearned man assents to the closing result.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps the plain rendering “much learning,” avoiding a more flattering “encyclopedic education” or a more condemnatory “pedantry.” Its note invokes Heraclitus’ reported rebuke, “Much learning does not teach one to have sense,” citing DK 22 B 40 through Diogenes Laertius 9.1. That is an editorial parallel, not an explicit citation by Socrates. The edition also distinguishes the didaskomenos of Solon’s verse from the manthanein of the lover’s explanation and the mathēmata, subjects of learning, in the subsequent argument. At 139a4 Burnet prints polymathia, “much learning,” with B, while the apparatus reports T’s philomathia, “love of learning.” The translation follows the quantitative term Burnet prints; the variant must not be silently substituted to make the conclusion reject love of learning itself.