Power and capacity

Use in the book

Socrates first mentions the charm's power when describing his difficulty explaining it to Charmides (156b). The question is what the charm can accomplish, rather than a technical ontology of capacities.

At 168b the notion becomes central. Knowledge has a certain power such that it is of something; the greater has a power such that it is greater than something. Socrates asks what follows if a thing directs its own power toward itself. It must have the object-character the power requires: the relatively greater must be relatively smaller, self-hearing must have sound, self-seeing colour (168b–d2).

The contrast between dynamis and ousia is thus operational within a relation. The first is what the thing does or is capable of in relation to something; the second is what the related object must be like. At 169a the unanswered question is which powers can relate to themselves. Socrates does not assert a universal ban or guarantee.

Later ability-language marks the practical stakes: could the temperate person actually distinguish a doctor from a pretender (170d–171c2)? The possession of an impressive name for a power does not establish that it can perform the promised task.

Places to read

1. 156bPower of the charm
2. 168b–169b23Relational power and the character required of its object
3. 170d–171c2Claimed ability to certify expertise tested

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “power” for dynamis and “character” for ousia at 168d. Translating the latter by the same word as the former would erase the conditional claim that exercising a power on oneself requires an appropriate object-character.

δύναμις

Attested: δύναμιν / δύναμις (dynamin / dynamis). Power or capacity; first the charm’s therapeutic efficacy, then the object-directed ability by which knowledge or a relative is what it is and which might or might not apply to itself. References: 156b, 168b, 168d, 168e, 169a. Lexical identification: lemma: δύναμις. See Power and capacity.

δύνασθαι (dynasthai)

Be able; the charm’s supposed power extends beyond healing the head alone. References: 156b. Lemma: δύναμαι. See Power and capacity.

Use in the book

The first δύναμις belongs to Socrates' divine opposition, whose power Alcibiades will learn later (103a). Alcibiades' presumed source of worldly power is Pericles, who can do what he wants in Athens and far beyond it (104b). At 105b–c Socrates attributes even larger hopes to the young man: greatest power at home, then among Greeks and barbarians, and a name and influence extending to practically everyone.

Socrates answers with an initially parallel claim. As Alcibiades expects greatest power in the city, Socrates expects greatest power with Alcibiades by proving indispensable to him (105d–e2). The teacher's claim exploits the aspirant's vocabulary, but the conversation gradually changes what that power would need to accomplish. Being able to address the Assembly does not entail knowing what should be advised.

The final argument explicitly subordinates command to virtue. Unrestricted capacity to implement one's wishes can produce ruin when those wishes lack knowledgeable direction (134c–135b23). In the last line, however, Socrates does not say that rational understanding automatically overcomes all competing power. He fears the city's ῥώμη will get the better of both speakers. The work of education remains exposed to political influence.

This trajectory distinguishes effective capacity, beneficial capacity, and capacity to resist corruption. Alcibiades originally assumes their coincidence; the dialogue makes him examine it. “Power” is accordingly not a uniformly negative term, but its value cannot be determined apart from knowledge, character, and the object toward which it is exercised.

Places to read

1. 103aPower is predicated of the divine opposition
2. 104b–105e234Pericles’ influence, Alcibiades’ ambitions, and Socrates’ claimed influence are compared
3. 134c–135b23Unrestricted agency without virtue is challenged
4. 135eThe city’s strength threatens both speakers

Translation in this edition

The translation's “power” chiefly represents δύναμις and its verbal family. “Strength” at 135e preserves the different ῥώμη. The parallel at 105e is power “with you” against power “in the city,” not Socrates' claim to hold the same civic office Alcibiades desires.

δύναμις / δύναμαι

Attested: δύναμιν (dynamin; 104b); δυνήσεσθαι (dynēsesthai; 105b). At 104b: Pericles as the political power available to Alcibiades. At 105b: Will have greatest power, Alcibiades’ hoped-for position in the city. Lexical identification: family label: δύναμις / δύναμαι. See Power.

δυναστεύω

Attested: δυναστεύειν (dynasteuein; 105b). To exercise dominant power; hypothetical command of Europe would still leave Alcibiades' imagined appetite unsatisfied. Lexical identification: lemma: δυναστεύω. See Power; Ambition and hope.

ῥώμη

Attested: ῥώμην (rhōmēn; 135e). At 135e: The city’s strength, feared as capable of defeating the educational undertaking. Strength, the city’s power that Socrates fears will overcome both of them. Lexical identification: lemma: ῥώμη. See Power; Dramatic time and setting.

Use in the book

Theages’ initial confidence is expressed through ability: if Socrates wishes, he too will be able to become like the improved companions. Socrates redirects the explanation to the daimonic. The emphatic wording at 129e joins noun and verb: “this power … has all power” over associations. Its scope here is the relevant companionships, not universal omnipotence over every event. The immediately following distinctions explain that scope through prohibition, absence of benefit, assisted progress and differing permanence.

At 130c Socrates asks Aristides whether “this power” left him suddenly or gradually. The referent is now the capacity Aristides had displayed when he could converse with anyone and appear inferior to no one in argument. The lexical repetition connects the two parts of the story, but it does not explicitly identify a transferable divine substance that moved from Socrates into Aristides. The narrative has given the daimonic power an enabling role; Aristides then describes his own gained and lost ability. The relationship is asserted through the story, not analysed causally.

The distinction also clarifies responsibility. Socrates speaks and keeps Timarchus back, but does not claim personal mastery over the signal. He is able to associate only under its conditions, and he warns Theages that ordinary teachers may offer greater security because they control their educational benefit. Lack of control is not the same as complete inactivity: Socrates can question, relate cases, advise caution and agree to a trial. His account restricts what he can guarantee.

Places to read

1. 128cοἷός τ’ ἔσομαι — Theages expects to become capable through Socrates’ willingness
2. 129eἡ δύναμις αὕτη … τὸ ἅπαν δύναται — the power has decisive scope over association
3. 129eοὐχ οἷόν τέ μοι … συνδιατρίβειν — opposition limits Socrates’ ability to spend time with particular people
4. 129eἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις — the helped group is defined through the power’s participation
5. 130cοἷός τ’ ἦ διαλέγεσθαι — Aristides describes his former conversational ability
6. 130cπρούλιπεν αὕτη ἡ δύναμις — Socrates asks how that ability departed

Translation in this edition

The repetition of “power” at 129e and 130c is deliberate, as the Key Words explain. It enables comparison without inserting an explanatory mechanism. The strong “has all power” should be read with its stated domain, “over being with those who spend time with me”, and the carefully differentiated outcomes that follow.

Have power — δύνασθαι

Have power. To be capable or effective; with ‘the whole’, the daimonic power’s decisive scope over the specified associations. Attested: δύναται (129e). Power and its uncertain bearer.

Able — οἷός τε (hoios te) · οὐχ οἷόν τέ (129e).

οἷός τε (hoios te)

Able. An idiom of capacity; negated here because divine opposition prevents Socrates from spending time with certain people. Attested: οὐχ οἷόν τέ (129e). Power and its uncertain bearer.

Power — δύναμις

Power. The effective capacity attributed to the daimonic phenomenon in governing the results of association. Attested: δύναμις (129e). Power and its uncertain bearer.

Ability; power — δύναμις

Ability; power. The conversational capacity Aristides gained and then lost; repetition of the divine-power noun does not prove material transfer. Attested: δύναμις (130c). Power and its uncertain bearer.

Turning away never turning toward (contextual phrase)

128d: προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε. The voice never prompts Socrates toward an action. This contrasts with its stated signaling of a turning away. It does not mean the larger daimonic power never assists anyone: the account of association later includes positive assistance. The voice's directive function and the power's effect on progress should be described separately. See Voice and sign and Power.

Use in the book

Porphyry’s survey announces an inquiry into the powers of the soul, including the relation between powers and parts. The report on perception distinguishes capacity from activity. Aristotle’s statue example makes the potential use concrete: bronze can be a statue before it is one in actuality.

Places to read

1. I.49.24.1The powers of the soul are the announced subject of a historical survey.
2. I.50.1Perceptual capacity is distinguished from perceptual activity.
3. I.12.1b.2Bronze is potentially a statue before receiving its form.

Translation in this edition

“Power” suits an active faculty or explanatory force; “capacity” often makes a contrast with activity clearer. “Potentially” translates the adverbial dative where the argument requires it.

Use in the book

The distinction enables Traherne to describe both divine fullness and human vocation. III.64 presents God as power wholly and eternally exerted, not a being with unused potential awaiting improvement. The argument joins divine simplicity, love, and immutability.

Human powers, by contrast, need objects and exercise. Their great reach shows what the creator has enabled them to become, while failure to employ them leaves the gift incomplete in practice. IV.98 argues expansively from divine power and love toward the soul’s contemplative capacity. This is more than coercive power over other beings: the ability to know, esteem, and love is itself an excellent strength. Power is rightly measured by the good it brings into activity.

Places to read

1. II.84Human knowing powers become divine likeness through conversion into act.
2. III.64God is described as infinite power wholly and eternally exerted.
3. IV.98Divine power grounds the possible greatness of the soul’s contemplative ability.
4. V.4Almighty power implies a corresponding infinite capacity for its gifts.

In this edition

Power and act are technical partners in several passages. Do not read power there only as authority or force, or act only as a single outward deed.

Use in the book

The notebook repeatedly juxtaposes expansive perception with a felt inability to produce an equivalent result. A mind can anticipate a thousand things without making corresponding progress. Conviction of intellectual powerlessness becomes so oppressive in July 1833 that the sun no longer reaches the speaker as an enlivening force. This is the experience of a disabled relation to the world, not merely disappointed ambition.

Power is nevertheless not distributed in a simple hierarchy. At Le Val a child's smallest gestures command affection, and the apparent weakness becomes an extraordinary influence. Love for father and friends supplies courage for journalistic work that self-confidence cannot sustain. The question is not just how much isolated force an individual owns, but what relations enable it to act.

The later account of the faculties draws a further distinction. Some capacities feel absent; others survive but cannot accomplish the operations required. The nearly useless remainder may still support intense inward contemplation. Power is consequently uneven across functions, and its expenditure matters: a modest task can consume disproportionate energy.

These differences prevent “powerlessness” from becoming an all-purpose key to the notebook. Natural force, imaginative amplitude, moral strength, social influence, and practical efficacy may coexist in strikingly unequal proportions. Guérin's language registers that inequality rather than resolving it.

Places to read

1. 22 March 1833 · ¶2Intimations of many things produce torment without assured intellectual advance.
2. 17 July 1833 · ¶1The conviction of powerlessness accompanies a failure to receive the sun's accustomed benefit.
3. 20 December 1833 · ¶2The child's slight movements exemplify the power residing in apparent weakness.
4. 16 March 1834 · ¶1Father and friends become the source of effective courage in writing for publication.
5. 30 April 1835 · ¶2The distinction between missing faculties and nearly unusable remaining power sharpens the self-analysis.

Translation in this edition

The supplied English usually gives “powerlessness” for “impuissance.” This is a broad inability in the cited intellectual and vocational contexts, not a specifically sexual meaning that modern readers might attach to “impotence.”

Use in the book

At A332 Aëtius lists four elements and two original powers, Love and Strife. The one unifies and the other divides. This is a compact analytical account of how persistent materials can participate in change: the inventory of constituents does not itself suffice without a description of their moving relations.

The distinction resembles Simplicius’ A28 account of Love and Strife as principles by which the elements are moved. Yet both witnesses organize the material in later prose categories. One should not turn “power” into an exact quotation from Empedocles, or assume the modern distinction between force and matter resolves the ancient problem. Simplicius himself reports difficulty because the powers can be given active status and also ranked alongside the roots.

Aristotle at A37 adds the problem that each apparent operation entails its opposite at another level: uniting unlike roots separates like portions, and dividing unlike roots combines like portions. Thus a “unifying power” needs its object specified. The vocabulary establishes a causal role but does not eliminate the interpretative question of how consistently that role operates across the cycle.

Places to read

1. A 33 (testimony)2Aëtius I 3,20. Names Love and Strife as two original powers, identifying their unifying and dividing functions.
2. A 28 (testimony)Simplicius, Physics 25,21, from Theophrastus. Provides the corresponding distinction between moved bodily elements and moving principles.
3. A 37 (polemical)Aristotle, Metaphysics A 4, 985a21. Challenges a simple one-operation account of each power through the reciprocal effects of combination and separation.

Translation in this edition

Keep this cosmological use separate from bodily faculty-language. Shared dynamis vocabulary across witnesses does not demonstrate that a sense faculty and Love or Strife are the same kind of entity.

Use in the book

“Power” translates several related Latin words. Virtus frequently means efficacy or operative capacity rather than moral virtue; vis likewise names force or capacity. Potentia can name an active ability, a receptive capacity awaiting actualization, or a possibility of being. The immediate contrast determines its sense. In particular, passive potency is the capacity to undergo an actuality, as water can receive heat; what does not exist at all has no underlying receptivity of that kind. Creation without a prior subject therefore requires a different scope of power from altering an existing body.

Power also occupies the middle place in Ficino's essence–power–operation analysis. Soul remains in essence while changing in activity because its power has both a persistent natural vigor and a changeable acquired aspect. Acquired power can pass between potency, present act, and habitus, an attained disposition rather than merely an everyday routine. The hierarchy consequently cannot be reduced to a binary contrast between having no ability and presently exercising it.

Union strengthens power and dispersion weakens it, supporting the argument against bodily bulk as a sufficient source of effective action. Supreme undivided power lacks limits imposed by a receptive subject or superior cause; divine power is therefore infinite. Incorporeal presence is also explained through power rather than dimensions. God's self-knowledge includes the entire range of his productive ability, while the human intellect's ability to exceed any finite numerical bound becomes evidence that its divine source cannot be narrower. These arguments distinguish active efficacy, passive receptivity, and potential infinity. Ficino's earlier appeals to excellent unrealized capacities concern the fitting order he is defending; they do not turn every conceivable possibility into a necessary actual creature.

Book IV uses virtus for the extraordinary capacities attributed to plants and stones. Ficino reports that hierobotanum aids physicians' divination, attributing the claim to the Magi. Agate strengthens sight, blunts poison, and confers strength and fertility. A nearby diamond deprives a magnet of what it attracts. Carnelian checks blood flow and calms anger; onyx provokes anger and terror in dreams. Coral banishes mad terrors and repels lightning and hail, according to the testimony Ficino attributes to Metrodorus and Zoroaster. These are historical natural-philosophical claims, not remedies or verified physical effects. Their argumentative role is to make a mixed body's extraordinary efficacy evidence of a higher animating nature. A consequential variant concerns agate: the edition follows fecundiam, fertility, where later witnesses read facundiam, eloquence. The readings attribute different powers.

The scope of possibility is clarified in II.12.15–18234. God can produce whatever involves no contradiction, but many possible things never occur in the created order; Ficino mentions number, magnitude, and distances between stars. God makes some things he can make and leaves others unmade through free choice. The earlier arguments from excellent capacities within a fitting cosmic order therefore cannot be generalized into a requirement that every divine potency be actualized.

Further passage references. I.2.2–I.2.723456; I.3.25; I.4.1–I.4.52345; I.5.1, I.5.4, I.5.25; II.4.1–82345678; II.6.1; II.7.23–322345678910; II.10.2–723456; IV.1.19–IV.1.22234; apparatus; II.12.15–18234

Places to read

1. I.4.1–52345Essence, power, and operation differentiate persistent and acquired capacities.
2. II.4.1–82345678Unlimited effective power is contrasted with receptivity and externally imposed limits.
3. II.12.16–1823Noncontradictory possibility exceeds what is actually made.
4. IV.1.19–22234Reported plant and stone powers support an argument for animating causes.

Translation in this edition

A single English “power” must not erase the active–receptive distinction. The edition’s IV.1.20 agate note reports fecundiam, fertility, against facundiam, eloquence: these would attribute different powers. The extraordinary medicinal and natural effects remain Ficino’s historical claims. II.12.17 keeps effectrix distinct from machinatrix.

amplificare / porrigere

amplificare / porrigere. Printed forms: amplificare; amplificari; porrigere.

Extend or enlarge / stretch out. The spatial verbs figuratively express the range of possible being and divine productive power. References: II.12.15, II.12.17. See Power and potency.

ascisco

ascisco. Printed forms: asciscat.

To claim or appropriate for oneself. A more excellent cosmic potency is said to claim actuality more fully and earlier; the personal verb portrays realization rather than a literal political vote. References: I.5.25. See Power and potency.

capacitas / capax

capacitas / capax. Printed forms: capacitas; capacitatem; capax.

Capacity or receptivity, with cognitive and metaphysical senses. Unlimited capacity is initially conceived without bounds; intellect is capable of an object through kinship; matter receives forms. References: II.6.12, II.9.1, II.10.3. See Power and potency.

dispersio / imbecillitas

dispersio / imbecillitas. Printed forms: dispersione; imbecillitas.

Dispersion and weakness. Supreme dispersion is opposed to supreme unity as weakness to unlimited power. References: II.4.1. See Power and potency.

efficax

efficax. Printed forms: efficacior; efficacissimam; efficax.

Effective or capable of producing an effect. Comparative efficacy in humans, angels, and God supports the claim that divine activity must be intellectual. References: II.11.11. See Power and potency.

efficax / efficacia

efficax / efficacia. Printed forms: efficacem; efficacia; efficacissimus; efficax.

Effective or efficacious, and efficacy. Fire’s force and form’s active nature are compared with bulk’s impediments; efficacy is subsequently distinguished from the sufficiency of a first cause. References: I.1.3, I.2.5, I.2.13, I.3.1. See Power and potency.

efficax / validus

efficax / validus. Printed forms: efficacior; efficax; validius.

Efficacious or powerful in producing an effect. An agent’s power is measured by the remoteness of receptive potency from the act it produces. References: II.4.1, II.4.5, II.6.19. See Power and potency.

fortis / vehementia / valere

fortis / vehementia / valere. Printed forms: fortius; valet; vehementior; vehementius.

Strong or vigorous; to have effective ability. Power is assessed relative to its effect, while the first cause is called more forceful through its prior and enduring contribution. References: II.2.6, II.2.12, II.7.32, II.10.7. See Power and potency.

habere / tenere / possidere

habere / tenere / possidere. Printed forms: habeat; habet; tenet.

To have, hold, or possess a power, object, or knowledge. Having potential cognition is distinguished from actually understanding everything within its reach in the argument about God. References: II.2.10, II.9.4, II.9.14, II.10.7. See Power and potency.

naturalis / acquisitus

naturalis / acquisitus. Printed forms: acquisita; naturalis.

Natural and acquired power. Natural vigour remains, while acquired capacity passes between potency, act and habit; the distinction explains how the intermediate power partly changes. References: I.5.1. See Power and potency.

ne frustra / ne inane

ne frustra / ne inane. Printed forms: inane; ne frustra.

Lest a capacity be vain or empty. The realization principle is expressly applied to the principal order of the universe; it does not say every imaginable particular event must occur. References: I.3.25. See Power and potency.

posse / nequire

posse / nequire. Printed forms: nequit; potest.

Be able or possible / be unable. The scope of divine productive ability exceeds actual production, while the natural agent’s fixed limits constrain its mode of acting. References: II.11.9, II.11.25, II.12.17. See Power and potency.

possum

possum. Printed forms: posse; potest.

To be able, or for something to be possible. The verb can concern a mind’s capacity to know or a substance’s possible separate existence; ability, logical possibility and actual realization require the local argument. References: Proem.1, I.3.25, I.3.29. See Power and potency.

potentia / potestas / virtus

potentia / potestas / virtus. Printed forms: potentia; potentiae; potentiam; potestas; Virtus; virtus; virtute; virtutem.

Power or capacity; potentia also names receptive possibility, while virtus commonly means efficacy. Passive potency receiving act differs from divine active power and from moral virtue-habits in the presence analogy. References: II.4.1, II.4.5, II.7.23, II.10.2. See Power and potency.

susceptivus / passivus

susceptivus / passivus. Printed forms: passiva; passivam; susceptiva; susceptivam.

Receptive / capable of undergoing. Potency is predicated of body, soul, and angel in different respects; soul’s acquisition through change is one receptive mode. References: III.1.9, III.1.10. See Power and potency.

valere / praestare

valere / praestare. Printed forms: valeant; valeat; valere.

To be capable or effective. The mind’s ability to break mortal confinement and quality’s inability to originate itself require different grounds; “can” is not one technical causal relation in every sentence. References: I.1.3, I.3.2, I.3.5. See Power and potency.

vigeo / prodo

vigeo / prodo. Printed forms: proditur; viget.

To flourish or be vigorous; to bring forth or make manifest. Passive proditur means is brought forth into act. A greater power is said to appear in act more fully and quickly; the inference moves from human mental ability to the order of the universe. References: I.3.13. See Power and potency.

vis / vires

vis / vires. Printed forms: vi; vim; vis.

Force or power, in singular or plural. A received force would compromise unity’s simplicity; divine universal force is differentiated through narrower agents. References: II.1.3, II.4.3, II.7.30. See Power and potency.

vis / virtus / potestas

vis / virtus / potestas. Printed forms: potestas; virtus; vis.

Power, efficacy, or capacity. The context distinguishes receptive capacity from active power; vis in the soul’s presence argument replaces quantitative breadth as the mode of contact. References: III.1.9, III.2.12, III.2.24. See Power and potency.

Metrodorus (authorities and cited works)

Metrodorus. Cited with Zoroaster for coral's alleged effects on terrors, lightning, and hail within the historical natural-lore argument. IV.1.21. See Power and potency.