From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordA Greek construction in which the subject of a clause becomes the object of the verb before it: “he does not know himself, that he is temperate”, for “he does not know that he is temperate”.
- In the CharmidesSocrates tests Critias’ definition, that temperance is the doing of good things, with a doctor who benefits his patient, and so acts temperately, without knowing that he has done so (164a–c). Critias would rather take back what he has granted than “concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate”, and turns the phrase round into his next definition: temperance is knowing oneself, as the inscription at Delphi, the seat of Apollo’s oracle, bids (164c–d).
- In this editionThe English keeps the doubled object with a dash, “does not know himself—how he has acted”, so that the reader hears “know himself” before Critias seizes on it.
- A place to read164a–d, from the doctor to the inscription at Delphi.
- English renderings
- ἀγνοεῖ δ’ ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ, agnoei d’ heauton hoti sōphronei, “but does not know himself—that he is temperate”; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν, ou gignōskei heauton hōs epraxen, “does not know himself—how he has acted”; ἀγνοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν … σωφρονεῖν, agnoounta auton heauton … sōphronein, “that a man who does not know himself is temperate”
Meaning
Ἀγνοεῖν (agnoein), “not to know, be unaware of”, takes here an accusative of the person and a clause introduced by ὅτι, “that”, saying what about him is not known (164c6); its positive partner, γιγνώσκειν, does the same with ὡς, “how”, a few lines earlier (164c1). Grammarians call the figure prolepsis: the subject of the clause is anticipated as the object of the main verb, as in the English of the King James Bible, “I know thee who thou art” (Mark 1:24). In ordinary Greek the figure means no more than “he does not know that he is temperate”. In the Charmides it sets “himself” beside the verb of knowing three times in a few lines.
Use in the book
Critias has just given his “plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things” (163e). Socrates lets it stand and asks another question: “But this I do wonder at … whether you think that people who are temperate do not know that they are temperate.” “But I don’t think so,” Critias says (164a). Socrates reminds him that he allowed craftsmen to be temperate “even when they make other people’s things” (164a; see δημιουργός), and takes the doctor. In making someone healthy he “makes something beneficial both for himself and for the patient he is treating”; he does what he ought; “And isn’t the man who does what he ought temperate?” “Temperate indeed” (164a–b; see τὰ δέοντα).
The next question opens the gap: a doctor need not know when his treatment benefits, and so sometimes “does not know himself—how he has acted” (164b–c; see οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν); and so, “sometimes, having acted beneficially, he acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself—that he is temperate?” (164c).
Critias refuses the conclusion outright: “But that, Socrates … could never happen. If you think that this necessarily follows from anything I agreed to earlier, I would sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly, than ever concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate” (164c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι; ἀνατίθημι). Then, without a pause: “In fact I would almost say that this very thing is temperance, knowing oneself”, and he appeals to the inscription at Delphi (164d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; Γνῶθι σαυτόν).
The construction carries the argument across. Twice the doctor “does not know himself” with a clause to say what about himself (164b–c); the third time the clause has gone, and the phrase stands alone, “a man who does not know himself” (164d). A doctor unaware of the outcome of a treatment has become a man ignorant of himself, and Critias’ new definition is the denial of that phrase. The edition’s note at 164c takes the wording as preparing, perhaps by design, the “know thyself” on which Critias is about to seize. What the doctor lacked, though, was knowledge of benefit, and the dialogue returns to that lack at 174c–d (see ὠφελίμως).
Places to read
Every passage in the argument of the doctor.
- 164aSocrates wonders whether Critias thinks the temperate do not know that they are temperate; Critias says he does not.
- 164a–b2A doctor who makes a patient healthy benefits himself and the patient, does what he ought, and is temperate; perhaps he need not know when his treatment benefits.
- 164b–cThe doctor sometimes does not know himself, how he has acted; acting beneficially, he is temperate, but does not know himself, that he is temperate.
- 164c–dCritias would rather retract than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate, and says that temperance is knowing oneself.
Translation in this edition
The edition’s note at 164c explains that the Greek is literally “does not know himself, how he acted”, that it makes the doctor himself the object of “know”, and that “the same construction recurs just below”. The dashes keep both parts in the English without smoothing them into “does not know how he has acted”. Stobaeus, the anthologist of the fifth century AD, quotes 164d–165a; Burnet follows him in one word at 164d1 (see αἰσχύνομαι), and records his different order of the words for “a man who does not know himself” (164d3).
Elsewhere in Plato
The First Alcibiades, a dialogue whose authorship has been doubted since the nineteenth century, closes the same loop from the other side. Socrates leads the young Alcibiades to agree that whoever knows something of the body knows what is his, not himself; so “no doctor knows himself, insofar as he is a doctor”, nor any trainer insofar as he is a trainer, and “if temperance is knowing oneself, none of these is temperate by his craft” (131a–b). The Charmides’ doctor, temperate in Critias’ sense though he does not know himself, becomes in the Alcibiades a man whose craft gives him no claim to temperance at all.