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I don’t know whether I have it or whether I don’t

οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχω

I don’t know whether I have it or not: the boy’s last answer about temperance, and the dialogue’s verdict on itself · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΟὐκ οἶδα, “I don’t know”, with two indirect questions joined by οὔτε … οὔτε: neither whether I have it nor whether I do not.
  • In the CharmidesOnce: “But by Zeus, Socrates, I don’t know whether I have it or whether I don’t. For how could I know, when not even you two are able to discover what it is, as you say?” (176a–b).
  • In this edition“I don’t know whether I have it or whether I don’t”.
  • A place to read175d–176b.
English renderings
οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχω, ouk oida out’ ei echō out’ ei mē echō, “I don’t know whether I have it or whether I don’t”

Meaning

The double negative construction refuses both alternatives: the speaker cannot affirm that he has the thing, nor that he lacks it. It is the form of a suspended judgement, given with a reason.

Use in the book

Socrates has ended the inquiry by telling the boy to see whether he has temperance and so needs no charm; if he has it, he should think Socrates a babbler and himself the happier the more temperate he is (176a; see ὅσῳπερ … τοσούτῳ). The boy answers with an oath and a reason: he cannot know whether he has temperance, since not even Socrates and Critias “are able to discover what it is” (176a–b; see ἐξευρίσκω; μὰ Δία). Then he adds that he is not altogether persuaded by Socrates, and thinks he very much needs the charm (176b; see ὅσαι ἡμέραι).

The answer takes the dialogue’s question at its word. Socrates had begun by asking the boy whether he had temperance, and proposed to find out by asking what he thought it was (158e–159a; see ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι). The boy now reverses the order: he cannot know whether he has it until he knows what it is. His “I don’t know” can be read as the knowledge Critias’ definition demanded and the argument could not supply, a man who knows what he does not know (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν): he answered at 158d that he could not say, from modesty (see οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαι), and he answers at 176a that he cannot know, from understanding.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the advice it answers and the request it leads to.

  1. 176aSocrates: if the boy has temperance, he should think himself the happier for it.
  2. 176a–b2The boy does not know whether he has it, since not even Socrates and Critias can discover what it is.
  3. 176bHe is not altogether persuaded, and thinks he very much needs the charm.

Translation in this edition

“I don’t know whether I have it or whether I don’t” renders οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχω (176a7), the English “whether … or whether” for the Greek’s two clauses with οὔτε. The first οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω is the reading of a later hand in T; B has εἴτι ἔχω and T εἴτ’ εἰ ἔχω.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Lysis ends in the same place. As the boys’ attendants, like spirits, come to call Lysis and his closest friend Menexenus home, and the company, beaten by them, breaks up, Socrates says to the two boys: “Lysis and Menexenus, we have turned out laughable just now, I an old man and you as well. For as they leave, these people will say that we suppose ourselves friends to each other, since I put myself among you, and yet we have not proved able to discover what the friend is” (223a–b). The Lysis ends with Socrates owning the ignorance; the Charmides gives it to the boy.