From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΛόγον διδόναι, to give an account: of money, to render accounts; in argument, to give the reason for a claim and answer for it under questioning.
- In the CharmidesOnce. Critias gives up his earlier answers and offers instead: “but now I am willing to give you an account of this, if you do not agree that temperance is knowing oneself” (165b).
- In this edition“Give you an account”.
- A place to read164c–166c.
- English renderings
- διδόναι λόγον, didonai logon, “give you an account”
Meaning
Λόγος is speech, reckoning and reason; δίδωμι, “to give”. To give a λόγος is to hand over a reckoning that another may check, and the phrase keeps something of the audit in all its uses: the account is given to someone, who receives it and may question it. In Plato the giving and receiving of accounts becomes the mark of knowledge, which can say why a thing is so, as against opinion, which cannot.
Use in the book
Critias’ offer comes at the turn of his part in the dialogue. He has just said that he would sooner take back some of what he agreed than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate (164c–d; see ἀνατίθημι), read the Delphic inscription as the god’s greeting (164d–165a; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν), and given up everything said before, since none of it was clear (165b; see ἀφίημι). Then the offer: “but now I am willing to give you an account of this, if you do not agree that temperance is knowing oneself” (165b).
Socrates corrects the assumption behind the offer. Critias is treating him, he says, as though he claimed to know the answers to what he asks and would agree if only he wished to; but he inquires with Critias, each time, into whatever is proposed, because he himself does not know (165b–c; see ζητέω). Critias offers to defend a thesis to a man who, he supposes, has a thesis of his own; Socrates will say whether he agrees only when he has looked into it, and he begins at once with a question: if temperance is knowing something, it must be a kind of knowledge, and a knowledge of something (165c; see ἐπιστήμη).
The account Critias offered is then exacted by questions he did not foresee: what temperance produces (165c–e), what it is knowledge of (166a–b), whether such a knowledge is possible (167b–169a). When the questions bring him to a loss, he gives no account at all, but says nothing clear and covers up his perplexity (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι). The man who volunteered to give an account can be read as the dialogue’s example of what the phrase does not mean: not a confident speech, but answering for one’s words until they are shown to hold or to fail.
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, Socrates’ reply to it, and Critias’ perplexity when the account is tested.
Translation in this edition
Τούτου σοι διδόναι λόγον (165b3) is “give you an account of this”. The genitive τούτου is the thing accounted for, the formula “temperance is knowing oneself” that the εἰ μή clause names.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Laches Nicias warns Lysimachus what conversation with Socrates means: whoever comes close to him and talks with him, whatever subject he starts on, is led round by the argument until he has to give an account of himself, of how he lives now and how he has lived his past life; and once he is caught, Socrates will not let him go until he has tested all of it well and thoroughly (187e–188a). The account, there, is of a life.
In the Phaedo Socrates asks Simmias whether a man who knows about the things he knows can give an account of them. “He must, Socrates.” Asked whether everyone seems able to give an account of the things they have been discussing, Simmias wishes it were so, but fears that by this time tomorrow there will be no one left who can do it properly (76b). In the Symposium Diotima tells Socrates that to judge rightly without being able to give an account is neither knowledge, for how could a thing without an account be knowledge, nor ignorance, for how could what hits on the truth be ignorance; it is right opinion, between understanding and ignorance (202a). In the Theaetetus the last definition of knowledge is true opinion with an account (201c–d), and the account fails when it is taken as the thing’s difference from all others (208c–209e; see διαφέρω). In the Republic Glaucon agrees that those who cannot give and receive an account will never know anything of what we say must be known (531e), and whoever cannot give an account of a thing to himself and to another lacks understanding of it (534b; see διαλέγομαι).