Universal

Use in the book

The epistemological passage contrasts the universal judged by intellect with the particular judged by perception. A difficult Hermetic fragment instead speaks of essential being described in general as common to existing things. The shared expression does not make these two discussions a single theory of universals.

Places to read

1. I.58.1.3Intellect and perception are assigned universal and particular objects.
2. I.41.11.1Essential being is discussed generally in a damaged Hermetic passage.

Translation in this edition

Use “the universal” where the article makes the expression a substantive; “in general” or “generally” preserves the adverbial use.

Use in the book

Ficino refuses to restrict God's knowledge to genera and species. The intellect that knows the origin of being and every mode in which it can be communicated also knows what distinguishes one individual from another. Knowledge of universal order requires knowledge of the different relations among higher and lower particulars. Hence even things ordinarily called base or unattractive belong to the scope of divine cognition. Ficino directs this polemic against Epicurus and Averroes as he presents their positions here; the chapter speaks in the terms of his own controversy. The cognitive comparison with human powers is also significant: intellect does not merely abandon individuals when it apprehends universal principles, but sees particulars more clearly than imagination. Divine knowledge unites all these scopes in one power. Greater universality in this ascent consequently does not entail less awareness of individual detail.

Further passage references. II.2.7–82; II.9.13–222345678910; II.10.1

Places to read

1. II.2.7–82Species provide specific unities for multiple individuals without exhausting the first unity.
2. II.9.13–16234Divine knowledge extends with divine operation to individuals and the least things.
3. II.9.20–2223Knowledge of lowly particulars is defended against named opponents without treating it as a distracting inspection.
4. II.10.1The argument’s announced scope extends from individuals and lowly things to infinite things.

Translation in this edition

The English “least” and “lowest” retains Ficino’s evaluative scope in the polemic about divine cognition. The claims assigned to Epicurus and Averroes are his presentation of opponents, while “in himself” at II.9.20 explains how particulars can be known without external distraction.

omnis / cunctus / singulus

omnis / cunctus / singulus. Printed forms: cuncta; omnium; singula; singulorum.

Every or all / all together / each severally. Universal governance reaches each thing through its own nature; the quantifiers do not erase differentiated particular modes. References: II.13.26. See Universals and individuals.

particularis / universalis

particularis / universalis. Printed forms: particularia; particularibus; universales; universalia.

Particular and universal. The mind rises from particular forms to universal ones; later their widening in thought supports an argument about intelligible abundance. References: I.3.12, I.5.24. See Universals and individuals.

protendo / amplifico

protendo / amplifico. Printed forms: amplificari; protenduntur.

To extend or enlarge in mental scope. The mind’s ability to extend bodily numbers and dimensions without their physical limits is used as a premise for intelligible abundance, not as a declaration that imagined bodies physically exist. References: I.5.24, I.5.25. See Universals and individuals.

res

res. Printed forms: rebus; rerum; rerumque; res.

A thing, reality or matter under discussion. The Proem distinguishes shadows of things from true realities; the broad noun leaves the kind of thing to its modifiers and the argument. References: Proem.9. See Being.

Thing or reality, capable of referring to individuals or the objects of causal and cognitive claims. The argument’s scope includes every smallest thing and even what is said to exist in potency; res is not restricted to bodies. References: II.1.1, II.9.14, II.10.3. See Universals and individuals.

singulus / minimus / infimus

singulus / minimus / infimus. Printed forms: infima; infimarum; minimarum; minimas; singula.

Individual, least, or lowest, with number and rank distinguished. Divine operation and knowledge reach individuals and the lowest things rather than only genera and species. References: II.9.13, II.9.14, II.10.1. See Universals and individuals.

species / genus

species / genus. Printed forms: generum; genus; speciem; specierum; specierumque; species.

A kind or intelligible determination; a genus grouping kinds. Species-unities remain determinate and multiple; divine knowledge also reaches the individuals belonging to them. References: II.2.7, II.2.8, II.9.15. See Universals and individuals.

universalis / universalia

universalis / universalia. Printed forms: universale; universalem; universales; universali; universalia; universalis.

Universal in causal scope or in the principles known. Intellect adds universal principles without losing clearer knowledge of individuals; universal cause is present to universal effect. References: II.6.2, II.7.30, II.9.16, II.9.17. See Universals and individuals.

Averroes (authorities and cited works)

Averroes. A source for celestial form having dimension without matter, and later a target of Ficino's polemic against restricting divine knowledge of particulars. These are two distinct uses of his name. I.3.27–282; II.9.20–2223. See Incorporeal and immaterial; Universals and individuals.

Epicurus and the Epicureans (authorities and cited works)

Epicurus and the Epicureans. Appear at the bodily stopping point of the ascent, in the objection that divine activity would entail burdensome deliberation, and in the polemic about divine knowledge of lowly things. I.1.3; I.2.8; II.8.1; II.9.20. See Body and bulk; Choice and deliberation; Universals and individuals.