Ε Epsilon

knowledge of oneself

ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ

Knowing oneself turned into a knowledge, for one page · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordA knowledge whose object is the knower himself: the reflexive of a person.
  • In the CharmidesThree times in one exchange. Critias answers that temperance is knowledge “of oneself” (165c); Socrates twice puts the phrase into his question of what such a knowledge produces (165d, 165e).
  • In this edition“Knowledge of oneself”.
  • A place to read165b–166c.
English renderings
ἑαυτοῦ γε, heautou ge, “(knowledge) of oneself”; ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, heautou epistēmēn, “knowledge of oneself”; ἐπιστήμη οὖσα ἑαυτοῦ, epistēmē ousa heautou, “being knowledge of oneself”

Meaning

Ἑαυτοῦ is the masculine (or neuter) reflexive genitive, “of himself”, which the English renders impersonally, “of oneself”. The phrase is Critias’ third definition, knowing oneself (164d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν), restated as a noun with an object: the self that knows is the self that is known.

Use in the book

The phrase is born of Socrates’ translation and lasts a page. Asked whether temperance, if it is knowing something, is a knowledge of something, Critias answers: “It is … knowledge of oneself” (165c; see ἐπιστήμη τινός). The Greek has no noun, only Ἔστιν … ἑαυτοῦ γε, “It is … of oneself, yes”, a short answer that accepts the question’s form. Socrates at once applies the craft model. Medicine, being knowledge of the healthy, produces health; house-building produces houses; so Critias, since he says it is knowledge of oneself, ought to say what fine work temperance produces, “being knowledge of oneself” (165d–e; see ἀπεργάζομαι; καλὸν ἔργον). Critias does not answer for the self. He answers for the knowledge: it is unlike the others, and is knowledge “of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself” (166c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς).

What the person-phrase would have required the dialogue never examines: what the self is that a man would know in knowing himself. The person returns only as the owner of the knowledge. “Then only the temperate man will know himself” (167a), and at 169e Critias argues that whoever has a knowledge that knows itself will know himself, as whoever has speed is fast (see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει). The self of 155d, which Socrates lost at the sight of the boy and recovered in argument, and the self the boy was asked to look into at 160d (see ἐμβλέπω; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι), drop out of the definition at the moment the definition names them.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

  1. 165cCritias: temperance is a knowledge, and of oneself.
  2. 165d–eSocrates: since Critias says it is knowledge of oneself, he should say what fine work it produces.

Translation in this edition

“Knowledge of oneself” at each place: for ἑαυτοῦ γε at 165c7, where the English supplies the noun, for ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην at 165d7 and for ἐπιστήμη οὖσα ἑαυτοῦ at 165e1. The impersonal “oneself” keeps the person-reflexive of the Greek apart from the “itself” of 166c. On the reading at 165c4, γιγνώσκειν against B’s γιγνώσκει, see γιγνώσκω.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Laws names what stands in the way of a knowledge of oneself. The greatest evil inborn in most men, the Athenian stranger says, is the love of self that everyone excuses: the lover is blind about what he loves, and so judges the just, the good and the fine badly, thinking that he must always honour his own above the truth. From this same fault everyone takes his own ignorance for wisdom; and so, knowing practically nothing, we think we know everything, and will not hand over to others what we do not know how to do (731d–732b). The obstacle to knowing oneself, on this account, is not a logical one, as in the Charmides, but love. The Philebus’ ridiculous man, who does not know himself and thinks himself richer, handsomer and better than he is (48c–49a), is told under ἀγνοέω.