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examine

ἐξετάζω

The examination of oneself and others that temperance was to make possible · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo examine closely, to test, to scrutinise; of an officer, to review troops.
  • In the CharmidesFour times in three passages: the temperate man will be “able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not” (167a); he will not after all “be able to examine someone else who claims to know something” (170d); perhaps “he will examine others better about the things he himself has learned, while those who examine without it will do so more feebly and poorly” (172b).
  • In this edition“Examine”. The Glossary adds that “examine” also renders compounds of σκοπεῖν “where a person is examined, 171b, 171d” (see ἐπισκέπτομαι).
  • A place to read170d–171c.
English renderings
ἐξετάσαι, exetasai, “to examine”; ἐξετάσει, exetasei, “will examine”; ἐξετάζοντες, exetazontes, “who examine”

Meaning

The verb is ἐτάζειν, “to test, to examine”, with ἐκ, “out”: to examine thoroughly, to try out. In Athenian life it was the word for reviewing troops under arms,1 and in Plato it is the word Socrates uses for what he does to the people he questions.

Use in the book

The verb’s three passages trace the shrinking of Critias’ definition. At first the examination is universal and goes both ways. Once Critias has granted that temperance is knowledge of knowledge and of its lack, Socrates draws the consequence: the temperate man alone will know himself and “be able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not”, and inspect others as well (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐπισκοπέω; μόνος). The edition’s note there records the common reading of this as a portrait of Socrates (see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη).

Then the examination of others is taken away. A knowledge of knowledge tells only that a man knows, not what (170c–d; see γιγνώσκω). “Nor, then, will this man be able to examine someone else who claims to know something, to see whether he knows what he says he knows or does not know it. He will know only this much, it seems, that the man has some knowledge; but of what, temperance will not make him know” (170d; see φάσκω). To examine a doctor one must examine him in the healthy and the diseased, and that is medicine’s work (171b; see ἀληθινός; ἐπισκέπτομαι).

At last the examination survives only as a better version of an ordinary skill. Perhaps the good of knowing knowledge is that its possessor learns more easily and “will examine others better about the things he himself has learned”, while others examine more feebly (172b; see ἀσθένεια; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην). The examiner who was to judge everyone now judges only within what he has learned.

The verb can be read as the dialogue’s question about Socrates himself. In the Apology he examines men who claim to know and finds that they do not, without claiming to know their crafts; the edition’s note at 170d says that on the account the argument reaches, temperance could not do what Socrates does (see διαγιγνώσκω). The argument proves that a knowledge of knowledge cannot examine a doctor in medicine. It does not prove that no one can examine a man’s claim to know by what he says when he is questioned, and that is the examination the Apology describes.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 167aThe temperate man alone will be able to examine what he knows and does not know, and to inspect others.
  2. 170dHe will not be able to examine someone else who claims to know, to see whether he knows what he says he knows.
  3. 172bPerhaps he will examine others better about what he has learned, while those who examine without it do so more feebly and poorly.

Translation in this edition

“Examine” renders ἐξετάσαι (167a2, 170d5), ἐξετάσει (172b6) and ἐξετάζοντες (172b7), and also renders the compounds of σκοπεῖν at 171b and 171d. The neighbouring verb at 167a, ἐπισκοπεῖν, is “inspect”.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Apology examining is the life the god assigned. Socrates stayed where his commanders stationed him at Potidaea, at Amphipolis on the Thracian coast and at Delium in Boeotia; it would be a dreadful thing, he says, to desert his post when the god, as he understood it, stationed him to live philosophising and examining himself and others (28e–29a). The examination has imitators: the young men of leisure who follow him enjoy hearing people examined, imitate him, and try to examine others, and they come on plenty of people who believe they have some knowledge and have little or none, so that those they examine are angry with Socrates (23c). A life without examination, he tells the jury, is no life for a human being (38a; see βίος).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle’s account of examination can be read as an answer to the question of 170d–171c. He names a kind of argument, the examining, πειραστική, whose premises come from what the answerer believes and from what anyone who claims a knowledge must know, and he counts the art a part of dialectic.2 Examination, he says, is not like geometry but an art that even someone without the knowledge can have: one who does not know a subject can test another who does not, if the other grants premises drawn not from what he knows or from the subject’s own principles but from what follows on them, things a man may know without knowing the art but cannot fail to know without being ignorant of it. So examination is knowledge of nothing determinate and is concerned with everything, since all the arts use certain common things; and that is why everyone, even laymen, uses it up to a point, trying to put to the question those who profess to know.3 Critias’ examiner without medicine could not tell a doctor from a pretender. Aristotle’s examiner can, up to a point, because he tests not medicine but the claim.

Source note

1. Thucydides 4.74.3 and 6.96.3.

2. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 2, 165b4–6, and 8, 169b25.

3. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 11, 172a21–34.