Speech, knowledge and method

Likelihood and the plausible

εἰκός, eikos, “likely; plausible; what is to be expected”; πιθανός, pithanos, “persuasive; credible”

The likely ranges from an ordinary expectation to a courtroom substitute for what happened. Socrates challenges the latter doctrine by arguing that plausible resemblance depends on truth.

From the book

Phaedrus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe likely ranges from an ordinary expectation to a courtroom substitute for what happened. Socrates challenges the latter doctrine by arguing that plausible resemblance depends on truth.
  • In the PhaedrusThe opening discussion of rationalized mythology imagines bringing strange stories into line with what is likely (229e). Socrates does not take up that endless labour: he still lacks knowledge of himself. Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ first speech repeatedly reason from what people are likely to do. Their predictions concern lovers, non-lovers, social suspicion and advantage. Because those speeches are later challenged, such likelihoods must be read as the speakers’ argumentative resources, not established psychological laws.
  • In this editionThe edition renders the substantivized form as “the likely” and the plural as “likelihoods”; this preserves the shift from a predicate to something pursued as a rhetorical standard. At 273b the identification with “what the multitude thinks” is made in Socrates’ interrogation of Tisias’ position. It must not be projected onto every εἰκός elsewhere.
  • A place to readLikelihood in myth-rationalization and predictions about lovers.

Meaning

The likely is what appears believable or reasonable, especially what an audience expects. Socrates attributes to Tisias a courtroom example in which a weak but brave attacker argues that he could hardly have assaulted a strong man, while the strong but cowardly victim conceals his own cowardice (273b–c). Neither tells the whole truth. Socrates answers that convincing likenesses themselves depend on knowing the truth they resemble (273d).

Use in the book

The opening discussion of rationalized mythology imagines bringing strange stories into line with what is likely (229e). Socrates does not take up that endless labour: he still lacks knowledge of himself. Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ first speech repeatedly reason from what people are likely to do. Their predictions concern lovers, non-lovers, social suspicion and advantage. Because those speeches are later challenged, such likelihoods must be read as the speakers’ argumentative resources, not established psychological laws.

In the technical catalogue Tisias and Gorgias are said to honour likelihoods more than truths and to make small things appear large and large things small by the strength of speech (267a). At 272c–d Socrates deliberately gives the opposing side a hearing, calling this “the wolf’s part”. Its advocates say the rhetorician need not know truth about just or good things or the relevant people. Even events that really occurred should sometimes be replaced by likelihoods when the events are implausible.

The example attributed to Tisias is carefully specified (273b–c). A weak but manly person beats a physically mighty but cowardly person and takes his cloak or something else. Neither party is to tell the whole truth. The victim denies being assaulted by the man alone; the attacker disproves that claim but asks how someone of his physique could have attempted such a victim. The victim’s unwillingness to admit cowardice may lead him into further lies and expose him to refutation. The argument exploits a public expectation about physical strength while concealing the qualities that made the event possible.

Socrates replies that likelihood arises for the many through similarity to truth, and that the person who knows truth best discovers similarities (273d). Consequently this alternative does not exempt the speaker from knowledge, collection and division, or the study of hearers’ natures. The labour is long, but shortcutting it does not supply a genuine craft.

Ordinary εἰκός continues to be usable after this criticism. Phaedrus says that it is not likely that the knowledgeable person will seriously entrust his seeds to ink (276c). The target is therefore not all reasonable expectation but a doctrine that declares truth dispensable while claiming complete expertise.

Places to read

  1. 229eLikelihood in myth-rationalization and predictions about lovers.
  2. 231c–233a23Likelihood in myth-rationalization and predictions about lovers.
  3. 238eLikelihood in myth-rationalization and predictions about lovers.
  4. 266e–267b2Likelihood as a handbook technique and a preferred standard.
  5. 272c–273c2The opposing doctrine and the weak man’s courtroom argument.
  6. 273d–274aDependence on truth; an ordinary later use of the likely.
  7. 276cDependence on truth; an ordinary later use of the likely.

Translation in this edition

The edition renders the substantivized form as “the likely” and the plural as “likelihoods”; this preserves the shift from a predicate to something pursued as a rhetorical standard. At 273b the identification with “what the multitude thinks” is made in Socrates’ interrogation of Tisias’ position. It must not be projected onto every εἰκός elsewhere.

Lexical detail

Εἰκός is a participial form used as an adjective or substantively: what is likely, plausible or fitting to expect. It need not signify a calculated probability. The dialogue uses it in conversational judgements, in speeches predicting conduct, and in the rhetorical technique that prefers likely appearances to an unlikely actual event. Πιθανός is persuasive or credible; the rhetoric teachers’ reported account equates what persuades the court with the likely. That equation is one position under examination, not the definition of every possible persuasion.

Attested forms

εἰκότα (266e · Burnet p. 55) — “likelihoods”. An item in the handbook catalogue.

τὸ εἰκὸς (273b · Burnet p. 64) — “the likely”. Tisias’ likely is identified with what the multitude thinks.

τοῦ πιθανοῦ (272d · Burnet p. 64) — “what is persuasive”. Object of attention in the reported courtroom doctrine.

Research and interpretation

Middle Liddell records reasonable and probable senses of eikos. The native court example concerns believable narrative, not numerical probability. Socrates challenges the separation of likelihood from truth without forbidding every ordinary judgement about what is likely.

Liddell and Scott, Intermediate Greek–English Lexicon, εἰκός.

Γοργίας

Gorgias is a rhetorical teacher whom the dialogue associates with powerful control of appearances. Socrates credits him and Tisias with making small things seem great and great things small, and with varying the length of speech. These are reported capacities, whose sufficiency for a complete art is subsequently questioned.

Read: 267a.

Gorgias · Gorgias · proper name

The teacher named in connection with powerful manipulation of speech and likelihood.

Phaedrus suggests that Socrates’ Nestor may mean Gorgias (261c). The catalogue later credits Gorgias and Tisias with magnifying small things, diminishing great ones, and commanding both compressed and extended speech. The attributions identify capacities; the later argument questions whether such capacities constitute the complete art.

Attested: Γοργίαν (267a · Burnet p. 56) — “Gorgias”.

See: Craft and expertise; Likelihood and the plausible

Research and sources for this word.

ἱμάτιον

A cloak is the ordinary garment that conceals Phaedrus’ copy of Lysias. Socrates notices what he holds beneath it and exposes his planned rehearsal. In the later example attributed to Tisias, a stolen cloak becomes evidence in a hypothetical court dispute: the garment moves from playful concealment to forensic argument.

Read: 228d; 273b.

himation · Cloak · lemma

The garment concealing Phaedrus’ copy of Lysias.

Socrates asks what Phaedrus holds under his cloak with his left hand, exposing the book and frustrating the planned rehearsal. In Tisias’ later example a cloak is what the attacker takes from his victim. An ordinary object serves first the play of concealment and later a forensic hypothetical.

Attested: ἱματίῳ (228d · Burnet p. 3) — “cloak”. Dative after “under”.

Attested: ἱμάτιον (273b · Burnet p. 64) — “cloak”. The object stolen in the imagined court case.

See: Likelihood and the plausible; Lysias; Phaedrus

The independent court example retains the stolen cloak and the proposed lies about the assault.

Plato, Phaedrus 273, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

λύκος

The wolf supplies two different comparisons: predatory affection in the first speech, and an opposing party whose case deserves a hearing later.

At 241d a lover’s fondness for a boy is likened to wolves’ fondness for lambs; at 272c Socrates proposes hearing the wolf’s side.

lykos · Wolf · lemma

The predatory animal in the first speech’s final comparison.

Lovers’ apparent affection is compared with wolves’ fondness for lambs: the intended good is food for the lover, not the beloved’s flourishing. Later Socrates asks to hear the wolf’s side too before examining a shortcut to rhetoric. That proverb grants an opposing case a hearing rather than erasing the earlier image’s accusation.

Attested: λύκοι (241d · Burnet p. 20) — “wolves”. Subject of the comparison with lovers.

Attested: λύκου (272c · Burnet p. 63) — “wolf”. The proverbial opposing side that should be heard.

See: Friendship; Likelihood and the plausible; Love and the lover

Research and sources for this word.

ὁδός

A road is a route of travel, extended later to the route by which an art is acquired.

At 227a Acumenus recommends walking on roads; at 272b–c Socrates asks whether a shorter road to rhetoric exists.

hodos · Road · lemma

A road or route, literal and methodological.

Acumenus recommends walking along roads rather than running-tracks. Later Socrates asks whether a shorter and smoother road to rhetoric can replace the long rough one. This is an intelligible extension from travel to procedure: the relevant question is whether the supposed shortcut reaches the destination.

Attested: ὁδοὺς (227a · Burnet p. 1) — “roads”. The doctor’s walking advice.

See: Craft and expertise; Leisure and walking; Likelihood and the plausible

Research and sources for this word.

Τεισίας

Tisias is the rhetorical teacher whose appeal to likelihood is examined as a proposed shortcut around knowing the truth.

At 273a–c Socrates attributes to him the court case in which a weak but brave attacker and a strong but cowardly victim avoid telling the truth.

Teisias · Tisias · proper name

A teacher whose account of rhetorical likelihood receives explicit examination.

He is first paired with Gorgias as preferring likelihoods to truths. Later Socrates attributes to his writing the case of the weak but manly attacker and mighty but cowardly victim. The reply rejects the alleged shortcut because finding plausible resemblances itself requires knowledge of truth.

Attested: Τεισίαν (267a · Burnet p. 56) — “Tisias”.

Attested: Τεισίας (273a · Burnet p. 64) — “Tisias”. The teacher named in the likelihood example.

See: Likelihood and the plausible; Rhetoric and soul-leading

Fowler confirms the asymmetric example and the reply at 273d: knowing truth helps one identify the likenesses on which plausibility depends. The attribution remains Socrates’ report.

Plato, Phaedrus 267a, 273a, 273b, 273c, 273d — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).