Proof

Use in the book

At 106b Socrates promises to show why Alcibiades needs him through the short service of answering. At 111d–e2 disagreement functions as evidence that proposed teachers lack the relevant knowledge. At 118d the production of another knowledgeable person supplies evidence for a teacher's competence. These are diagnostic signs drawn from practice, not interchangeable with a deductive chain of propositions.

At 113e–114b2 Alcibiades anticipates the earlier acquisition argument and wants something new. Socrates ridicules the demand as though proofs were garments worn out by use or food no longer pleasant to taste. An argument's validity does not expire merely because it is familiar. He nevertheless offers a new route and invites Alcibiades to prove his own position either by questioning or by speech.

At 130c Socrates asks whether the soul identification needs to be proved more clearly. Alcibiades says it is sufficient, but Socrates distinguishes sufficient showing from precision and postpones the larger inquiry. The proof vocabulary therefore does not itself certify final certainty. The content, premises, and expressly stated limits of each demonstration must be inspected.

The range matters for translation. To “turn out” another knowledgeable person at 118d is a practical result described with ἀποδεῖξαι, whereas proving a claim at 114b is argumentative. Both are forms of making something manifest, but the lexicon should not force one English sense onto every occurrence.

Places to read

1. 106bSocrates offers a showing through responsive inquiry
2. 111d–111e2Disagreement is evidence against competence
3. 113e–114b2The demand for new proofs is mocked; alternative forms of demonstration are offered
4. 118dA knowledgeable pupil supplies evidence of expertise
5. 130c–130dA proof may suffice without achieving precision

Translation in this edition

The edition distinguishes “prove,” “demonstrate,” and “show” according to construction, and uses “evidence” for τεκμήριον. At 113e Burnet retains the references to different proofs and fresh evidence while recording proposals to delete them.

ἀπόδειξις

Attested: ἀποδείξεις (apodeixeis; 113e). At 113e: Proofs Alcibiades is said to demand as new and unworn, although a sound earlier argument would remain applicable. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπόδειξις. See Proof.

δῆλος

Attested: δῆλον (dēlon; 117a). At 117a: Evident from the conflicting answers that Alcibiades lacks knowledge, a claim of inferential disclosure. Lexical identification: lemma: δῆλος. See Proof.

ἐνδείκνυμι

Attested: ἐνδείξασθαι (endeixasthai; 106b). At 106b: Show Alcibiades the point by obtaining answers, rather than providing the long speech he expects. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐνδείκνυμι. See Proof.

τεκμήριον

Attested: τεκμήριον (tekmērion; 111d). At 111d: An evidential sign of lack of competence, here the proposed teachers' disagreement about expert judgments. Lexical identification: lemma: τεκμήριον. See Proof.

Use in the book

The fragment demanding “show, and do not prove” distinguishes modes of presenting something, while leaving the proposition uncompleted. The approximate Aristotle report contrasts a dialectician satisfied with proof with a philosopher seeking inspection and self-evidence. In reported instructions on I.165, proof can even make what is believed seem doubtful, because argument rehearses its problematic status. These forceful cautions are local claims about argument, belief and duty, not a license for the lexicon to reject verification. In the loss-and-sorrow passage, preuve instead names conduct that manifests judgment or reason; no formal deduction is supplied.

Places to read

1. I, p. 115, entry 10, ¶1Showing and proving are expressly opposed in an unfinished formulation.
2. I, p. 180, entry 4, ¶1Proof is distinguished from inspection and self-evidence in an approximate report.
3. I, p. 165, entry 8, ¶2Argument may habituate a hearer to treating a proposition as doubtful.
4. I, p. 165, entry 8, ¶3Reported rules distinguish believed, certain, and practical matters.
5. I, p. 59, entry 1, ¶1Proportionate responses to loss count as evidence of judgment and reason.

Translation in this edition

The English translation translates preuve as evidence in the grief comparison and proof in the argumentative passages. The Aristotle account remains explicitly approximate, with its printed bibliographical reference; it is not certified as a verbatim quotation. Believed and certain remain separate terms in the reported prescriptions.

Use in the book

Book I’s prospectus distinguishes common reasons, arguments proper to soul, signs and resolutions of questions. They are announced routes of support, not four synonyms for one proof. Throughout the ascent, rhetorical confidence coexists with qualifications: soul’s mind is “in a certain way” part of higher mind; embodied minds generally look to sensible things; the number of celestial movers is calculated by a probable argument. Promises to demonstrate matters elsewhere preserve the limits of the present exposition. Attributions matter equally: Haec Platonici closes a stated Platonist account, and Ficino explicitly defers what others say about angelic immobility. A lexicon that drops these small expressions can turn a comparison, conjecture or reported view into a stronger universal assertion.

Places to read

1. I.1.3, I.1.7The proposed demonstration and fourfold plan of support
2. I.5.11; I.5.16Qualifications govern the relation of mind to soul and embodied cognition
3. I.5.20–2223Probable counting, deference and Ficino’s conjectural reconstruction
4. I.6.1Complete angelic immobility is attributed to the Platonists; other positions are deferred

Translation in this edition

“Seems,” “in a certain sense,” “for the most part,” “perhaps,” and “elsewhere” should be indexed where they restrict a claim. Alias is not permission to import an unchecked later demonstration into the present unit. Signis in the prospectus and signum in geometry have different local senses.

addo / accedo

addo / accedo. Printed forms: Accedit; Adde.

To add, or a further consideration is added. These argumentative transitions accumulate support; the appended reason need not repeat the preceding proof or introduce a new ontological grade. References: I.2.9, I.2.16, I.3.14. See Proof, signs and qualification.

alias / mitto

alias / mitto. Printed forms: alias; Mitto.

Elsewhere; I pass over or leave aside. Ficino expressly defers further arguments about the infinite interval above souls and about motion’s source; a promise is not a demonstration supplied in the present unit. References: I.3.32, I.5.15. See Proof, signs and qualification.

appareo / pateo

appareo / pateo. Printed forms: appareat; apparet; patet.

To appear, become evident or be manifest. These verbs introduce what Ficino takes an argument or comparison to show; their evidential force depends on the surrounding support, not the verb alone. References: I.1.3, I.1.7, I.2.2. See Proof, signs and qualification.

collige

collige. Printed forms: collige.

Collect or infer from the preceding considerations. Unlike gathering material power into a point, this imperative asks the reader to draw together the causal argument’s conclusions. References: I.3.24. See Proof, signs and qualification.

conor / pro viribus

conor / pro viribus. Printed forms: conabimur; pro viribus.

To attempt, and to the extent of one’s powers. Ficino announces an attempt to demonstrate the ascent, qualifying his authorial capacity without retracting the proposed conclusions. References: I.1.3. See Proof, signs and qualification.

demonstro / assevero

demonstro / assevero. Printed forms: asseverabimus; demonstrare.

To demonstrate; to affirm or maintain firmly. The prospectus promises support by reasons, proper arguments, signs and resolutions; the future tense announces work rather than claiming every result is already established. References: I.1.3, I.1.7. See Proof, signs and qualification.

forte / suspicor / vaticinor

forte / suspicor / vaticinor. Printed forms: forte; suspicabatur; vaticinabatur.

Perhaps, to suspect, and to foresee or divine. Ficino conjecturally interprets Aristotle’s deference as hinting that understanding, not bodily movement, should determine the count of minds. References: I.5.22. See Proof, signs and qualification.

Haec Platonici

Haec Platonici. Printed forms: Haec Platonici.

“So say the Platonists,” an attribution marker. Complete angelic immobility in essence, power and action is explicitly assigned to this account, with other positions deferred. References: I.6.1. See Proof, signs and qualification.

mirus / mirabilis / mirabiliter

mirus / mirabilis / mirabiliter. Printed forms: mirabiliter; mirabilius; miro.

Wonderful or marvellous; wonderfully or marvellously, with comparative mirabilius meaning more marvellous. Lorenzo’s ability, heaven’s efficacy and digestion are praised in different registers; admiration marks rhetorical force rather than supplying an additional proof. References: Proem.11, I.2.5, I.3.23. See Proof, signs and qualification.

physici

physici. Printed forms: physici; physicis.

Natural philosophers, as a collective authority. They are reported as calling form act and as favouring existing realization of cosmic possibilities; these are specific attributed views, not claims about every philosopher of nature. References: I.3.1, I.3.25. See Proof, signs and qualification.

postponing and returning

postponing and returning. Printed forms: Sed de his alias; Sed de hoc alias.

This is deferred for discussion elsewhere. These transitions delimit the present claim and prevent a promised later discussion of material causation or angelic orders from being counted as completed here. References: I.3.19, I.5.28. See Proof, signs and qualification.

qua ratione / quantum / quatenus

qua ratione / quantum / quatenus. Printed forms: qua ratione; quantum; quatenus.

In the respect in which, insofar as, or so far as. Body acts in the respect by which it has its determinate form, while body precisely as body does not act; these restrictions prevent apparent contradiction. References: I.2.1, I.2.9, I.3.6. See Proof, signs and qualification.

quamvis / licet

quamvis / licet. Printed forms: licet; quamvis.

Although or even though. A form can remain superior while undergoing a specified limitation: soul changes in a certain respect yet is indivisible, and bodily substantial form decreases without remission of intensity. References: I.1.4, I.3.15. See Proof, signs and qualification.

quodammodo

quodammodo. Printed forms: quodammodo.

In a certain way or respect. This qualification restricts quality’s indivisibility and mind’s partial relation to higher mind; it must not be erased in categorical summaries. References: I.2.17, I.5.11. See Proof, signs and qualification.

ratio / argumentatio / signum

ratio / argumentatio / signum. Printed forms: argumentationibus; rationibus; signis.

Reasons, articulated arguments, and signs as distinct kinds of support. Ficino’s fourfold programme also includes resolving questions; signs here are evidential, unlike the geometrical point called signum elsewhere. References: I.1.7. See Proof, signs and qualification.

si / sin

si / sin. Printed forms: Si; Sin.

If; but if or if instead. The alternatives about matter’s possessing productive form are hypothetical branches used to test a proposed explanation, not assertions that both branches obtain. References: I.3.6. See Proof, signs and qualification.

solutio quaestionum

solutio quaestionum. Printed forms: solutionibus quaestionum.

Resolutions of questions or difficulties. This is the fourth announced way of supporting the soul’s character, not a synonym for the first three modes. References: I.1.7. See Proof, signs and qualification.

ut plurimum

ut plurimum. Printed forms: ut plurimum.

For the most part. Embodied minds generally turn to sensible things in order to understand; the qualification prevents making this an exceptionless dependence claim. References: I.5.16, I.5.17. See Proof, signs and qualification.

videtur

videtur. Printed forms: videantur; videtur.

It seems or appears, with the claim qualified by its construction. The opening immortality conclusion “seems necessary,” while the reported historical stopping point of Anaxagoras and Hermotimus “seems” to be angelic mind; retain the differing evidential force. References: I.1.1, I.1.5. See Proof, signs and qualification.