Trust

Use in the book

The experts at 146a and the many at 146c have missed the best because they have trusted opinion without sense. The fault is not merely having an opinion available, but allowing it to support action and allocation of power without adequate judgment. Trust turns a seeming into a practical guide, which is why the subsequent discussion concerns eagerness and harm.

At 147d the interpretation of Margites depends on trusting the arguments already stated. Socrates’ reconstructed meaning is that knowledge of many works was bad for him; the inference to his being a sorry fellow is warranted only if the earlier account of knowledge and benefit is accepted. The poem is thus interpreted through the argument as much as offered in support of it. Treating the quotation as wholly independent corroboration would conceal that dependence.

Alcibiades responds at 147e that he could hardly trust other arguments if he could not trust these. In the edition’s reading, his next words nevertheless signal another reversal. Strongly expressed trust is therefore not the same as stable comprehension. The closing good opinion of Socrates’ advice is encouraging, but it cannot by itself show that Alcibiades now possesses the missing knowledge.

Places to read

1. 146aThe specialist has relied on opinion without sense.
2. 146cThe same explanation is extended to the many.
3. 147dThe Margites conclusion is made dependent on the foregoing arguments.
4. 147eAlcibiades expresses strong trust before the possible renewed reversal.

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “trusted” for the perfect participles and “trust” for the later arguments. Its note on palin at 147e acknowledges that the supposed reversal is an interpretive choice; on the alternative reading, Alcibiades gives further assent, while Socrates still describes his instability.

Use in the book

The early maxim claims that great trust can make deception impossible for its recipient. This is an assertion about the obligation trust can create, not a practical guarantee against deception. A fragment records resentment toward those who inspire more trust than they deserve. The passage on experience then prevents either trusting or distrusting from claiming automatic authority: experience can produce both, and must be joined with other people’s experience for sound judgment. Trust thus concerns both conduct between persons and the correction of one’s standpoint.

Places to read

1. I, p. 33, entry 4, ¶1Trust is represented as binding another person against deception.
2. II, p. 629, entry 12, ¶1Excessive inspired trust occasions resentment.
3. II, p. 656–657, entry 12, ¶1Experience can support confidence or distrust; comparison is needed.

Translation in this edition

The English translation uses trust in the interpersonal maxims and confidence alongside distrust in the experience argument. The latter preserves the attribution to Hippocrates without locating an ancient source. The torn-word annotation associated with the early unit does not expand its intact maxim.

Use in the book

Traherne sets trust in divine loving-kindness beside the folly of trusting accumulated wealth. The difference is not simply that one object is invisible and another visible. Wealth cannot ransom a soul or prevent death, whereas God’s goodness is the foundation through which all gifts become secure and meaningful.

Trust also has a practical form. David remains confident among enemies while keeping promises and caring for others. The later meditation on frustrated benefits distinguishes a benefactor’s intention from external success: the knowledge that God truly intended good sustains confidence even when malice or one’s own perverseness blocks enjoyment. Trust therefore supports fidelity amid uncertainty without requiring the pretence that every intended benefit has already been received.

Places to read

1. III.76Trust is figured as shelter under divine wings.
2. III.80The psalm exposes the failure of wealth as ultimate security.
3. III.93Trust in God accompanies David’s public and charitable conduct.
4. IV.88Divine intention grounds confidence despite impediments to receipt.

In this edition

Confidence here is principally reliance on a benefactor, not self-assurance. The argument of IV.88 deliberately distinguishes intended good from successful outward delivery.