Knowing and thinking one knows · Lexicon

From the book

Alcibiades II

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Orientation

At a Glance

The wordThe dialogue distinguishes knowing, thinking that one knows, seeming to know and really knowing.
In Alcibiades IIAt 144d–e Socrates proposes that before we readily act or speak we must either think we know or actually know what we are about to do.
In this editionThe edition keeps “think we know, or really know” and “what he knows or seems to know” distinct where the Greek varies.
A place to readReal or believed knowledge is proposed as preceding ready action.

Meaning

The dialogue distinguishes knowing, thinking that one knows, seeming to know and really knowing. Eidenai supplies knowledge; oiesthai supplies the agent’s belief; dokein supplies seeming, whose perspective depends on the construction. Their common practical effect can be readiness to act, but that does not make their claims to truth equivalent.

Use in the book

At 144d–e Socrates proposes that before we readily act or speak we must either think we know or actually know what we are about to do. Orators instantiate the alternative: some may know how to advise, while others only think they do. This is a claim about the states supporting confident action. It is not a demonstration that every action, including reflexes or hesitant conduct, requires a prior explicit judgment of knowledge.

The argument then makes a more surprising move than merely exposing false confidence. Even genuine expertise can be harmful without knowledge of the best. The expert and the pretender are different epistemically, yet both may act more eagerly because of their respective assurance. At 146d both are included in the warning, under the condition that acting makes the agent more often harmed than benefited.

This means that the usual contrast between ignorance and pretended knowledge is insufficient to state the dialogue’s complete claim. Correcting a false belief about one’s technical ability may remove one source of danger; acquiring genuine technical skill without judgment can introduce another. The necessary distinction is also between knowledge of an operation and knowledge of its proper employment. Socrates’ argument relies on preserving both distinctions, not collapsing belief into knowledge.

Places to read

144d–eReal or believed knowledge is proposed as preceding ready action.
144e–145aThe orators exemplify the alternative in civic advice.
145b–e2Real specialist knowledge can still fall short of intelligence.
146bThe earlier condition is recalled and supplemented by beneficial action.
146dBoth knowing and thinking one knows can encourage harmful activity.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps “think we know, or really know” and “what he knows or seems to know” distinct where the Greek varies. “Really” renders tōi onti. The repeated formula at 146b should be read back against 144d, while preserving the stronger point that genuine knowledge can also be misdirected.