Perception and knowledge

Presentation and imagination

φαντασία; φανταστικόν

phantasia; phantastikon

Phantasia concerns what appears or is presented to a subject, and in some passages the activity of presenting images.

From the book

Stobaeus, Volume I

John Stobaeus · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordPhantasia concerns what appears or is presented to a subject, and in some passages the activity of presenting images.
  • In StobaeusA Stoic report allows impressions to be true or false while treating perceptions differently.
  • In this edition“Presentation” or “impression” often suits a cognitive occurrence; “imagination” suits the image-presenting activity.
  • A place to beginImpressions are distinguished from perceptions and can be true or false.
English renderings
presentation; impression; imagination

Meaning

Phantasia concerns what appears or is presented to a subject, and in some passages the activity of presenting images. The English “imagination” must not imply that every phantasia is invented or false.

Use in the book

A Stoic report allows impressions to be true or false while treating perceptions differently. Porphyry discusses the relation of presentation to assent; another passage links imagination to acts of intellection and distinguishes it from the resulting image, phantasma.

Places to read

  1. I.50.20Impressions are distinguished from perceptions and can be true or false.
  2. I.49.25.1Presentation is considered in relation to assent.
  3. I.49.19.2Imagination accompanies intellection, while phantasma names an image.
  4. I.49.24.6The imaginative capacity is contrasted with perception using organs.

Translation in this edition

“Presentation” or “impression” often suits a cognitive occurrence; “imagination” suits the image-presenting activity. Phantasma is “image,” preserving the distinction between activity and what accompanies it.

The imaginative capacity

Phantastikon names the imaginative capacity. I.49.24.6 distinguishes perception using organs from imagination operating without their immediate use. The surrounding classification also asks how opinion relates to discursive thought. Its concluding alternatives are difficult, so the adjective’s clear reference should not conceal the uncertainty of the whole scheme.

Source note

Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 344, 349, 475. The concluding analogy at I.49.19.2 is textually difficult. The edition follows the printed references to soul and intellection and explains the uncertainty in its footnote.