From the book
Alcibiades II
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordThe phrase specifies ignorance by its object: what is best.
- In Alcibiades IIOrestes furnishes the initial test.
- In this editionThe doubled formulation at 143e should not be abbreviated away: it joins the named condition and the activity of being ignorant.
- A place to readKnowledge of the best is set against Orestes’ deed; its absence is called bad for everyone.
Meaning
The phrase specifies ignorance by its object: what is best. The noun and the substantivised infinitive are deliberately paired at 143e, “ignorance of the best, and being ignorant of the best”. This is the fundamental deficiency against which ignorance of a particular identity or technique must be assessed.
Use in the book
Orestes furnishes the initial test. Socrates asks whether he would have dared his terrible action if he had been intelligent and known what was best for him to do. Alcibiades says no; Socrates extends the denial to anyone else and then declares ignorance of the best bad for all. The conclusion is presented as general, but it is reached through a shared judgment about the example, not through an independent definition of the best or a complete proof of its universal effects.
The hypothesis concerning Pericles shows how this deficiency works. A person ignorant of the best can come to think even the worst action best at some time. The text does not claim that every such person must become murderous; it says that nothing in his condition prevents such an opinion from arising. Socrates expressly disavows attributing the willingness to Alcibiades himself before exploring what would follow from the hypothetical mistake.
The protective failure to recognise Pericles does not remove ignorance of the best. It blocks the execution of one purpose formed under it. Thus the dialogue can call one ignorance bad and another ignorance comparatively beneficial without inconsistency at the level of their specified objects. The eventual requirement for education aims beyond mere obstruction: Alcibiades must become capable of knowing bad and good, not simply remain unable to carry out his wishes.
Places to read
- 143d–eKnowledge of the best is set against Orestes’ deed; its absence is called bad for everyone.
- 144aIgnorance of the best leaves room for thinking the worst best.
- 144b–cNon-recognition prevents an act without correcting its governing opinion.
- 150d–eFuture education is to make discrimination of bad and good possible.
Translation in this edition
The doubled formulation at 143e should not be abbreviated away: it joins the named condition and the activity of being ignorant. The edition’s “best” consistently retains the superlative; “good” alone would weaken the contrast with “worst” at 144a.