Life

Use in the book

A Hermetic account distinguishes growth in the womb from animal movement and the life of thought; soul subsequently sets breath in living motion. Porphyry makes a more radical distinction: for a substance whose very being is life, death must itself be a kind of life rather than the complete removal of life. The latter claim concerns the substance under discussion, not the continuing bodily functions of a dead animal.

Places to read

1. I.41.7.4Growth is prepared as a receptacle for the life of thought.
2. I.41.7.5Soul sets breath into living movement.
3. I.49.22Porphyry distinguishes death from the complete absence of life.

Translation in this edition

“Life” is retained across these contexts, but the accompanying account determines its meaning. “Living” does not automatically mean bodily animation.

Use in the book

The early report that life circulates through veins belongs to historical physiology. The relation between life and movement is made even stronger in the claim that every movement leads back to a living being as its source. Elsewhere life is defined simply as a beginning, in a chain that also calls the body the soul’s mold. These formulations do not offer interchangeable modern definitions. The practical use of life as what theatrical morality can fail to reach supplies another register, where the word means conduct lived outside a performance.

Places to read

1. I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶8Life is represented as circulating through veins.
2. I, p. 237, entry 3, ¶4Movement is traced to living origin in a speculative account.
3. I, p. 232, entry 1, ¶1Life is called a beginning.
4. II, p. 689, entry 4, ¶1Everyday life is contrasted with theatrical moral display.

Translation in this edition

The English translation retains the historical anatomical claims and the closing lacuna of the movement paragraph. “Life” is not uniformly replaced with either biological life or moral life.

Use in the book

Motion makes invisible life discernible, but Traherne does not stop at a simple equation between movement and animation. II.22 acknowledges the movement of watches, then turns to creatures that breathe, perceive, know, and love. Their ordered service leads the argument toward a living giver and an appreciative human recipient.

The life of love gives the term its fullest evaluative meaning. Such a life delights in its objects and becomes delightful to them, finding joy in that reciprocity. III.68 accordingly describes perfected life as extended to all its objects through knowledge and love. To be fully alive is to exercise a received capacity in relation, not merely to continue existing.

Places to read

1. II.22Living motion and the ordered relations of creatures disclose the creator.
2. II.47The life of love is delighted in its objects and delightful to them.
3. III.68Perfect life is active extension to objects through knowledge and love.

In this edition

Traherne moves between biological and spiritual life, often within one argument. Alive to a benefit means responsive to it, not simply surviving beside it.

Use in the book

Life is an inward organizing efficacy, not simply bodily heat or visible locomotion. Book I argues that an indivisible power explains how nutrition transforms nonliving food into living form, moves constituents against their ordinary tendencies, and reconciles opposed elements. Ficino extends the comparison from organisms to the universe. Ordered matter points to reason, and reason subsists in life. These are steps in his ascent to incorporeal causation rather than a modern biological definition. I.3.26 explicitly appeals to life existing without sensation, identified by the supplied apparatus as vegetative life: if life can exist without the later capacity of sensing, much more can substance, prior to quantity in both origin and dignity, exist apart from quantity. Life, sensation, and intellect consequently have different ranges.

The term also names inward operation and its mode of possession. A life united at once is more complete than activity dispersed over successive acts. Soul's distinctive work is vital motion, whereas mind orders through forms, including forms of nonliving things; life and intellectual causality therefore do not have identical ranges. In Book III, life is expressly identified with inward power of motion. Plants and animals illustrate activity from within, and soul, as the first movable nature, possesses such life primarily and communicates it to bodies. Rational soul's definition combines that vivifying power with understanding through time.

Cosmic applications require further distinctions. II.1323456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930 argues conditionally that a governing world-life establishes divine providence whether it is God or a subordinate acting under God. Book IV then distinguishes the life that depends upon and governs a sphere from the self-subsistent first life. The former is not God, who stands above derivative lives as life of lives. Angelic lives are intellectual alone; sphere-lives combine intellectual and animating powers. The argument for world-soul presents one living whole as requiring one life and one soul to explain the cooperation of its diverse members.

Life thus extends beyond ordinary biological usage without making every occurrence an identical entity or function. Earth can be animated despite its asserted stillness: its life is manifested in productive activity. Different souls have different bodily relations, and absence of local motion is not equivalent to absence of life. Conversely, describing a cosmic body as living depends on Ficino's stated metaphysical and natural-philosophical premises, not on an independently established modern observation.

Further passage references. I.3.22–I.3.232, I.3.26; I.5.2, I.5.17; I.6.14; II.13.20–242345; III.1.23, 26, 32; III.2.23–302345678; IV.1.1–IV.1.22; IV.1.22; IV.1.31; IV.1.69–IV.1.702; IV.1.79–IV.1.8423456.

Places to read

1. I.3.26Life without sensation supplies an analogy for substance independent of quantity
2. II.6.5Goodness is argued to have a wider and more fundamental scope than life
3. II.8.3Soul gives bodily life without selecting each act by choice
4. IV.1.22A sphere’s dependent life is explicitly distinguished from God
5. IV.2.11Knowing and bodily administration have different places within celestial soul

Translation in this edition

The supplied “life without sensation” at I.3.26 should remain distinct from consciousness. At IV.1.22 life “belonging to another and existing in another” differs from life subsisting in itself. Cosmic uses are Ficino’s philosophical claims and attributions, not modern biological classifications.

cessare

cessare. Printed forms: cessaret.

To cease an activity. Removing life would stop the world’s movement in Ficino’s argument, contrasted with removing goodness and thereby being itself. References: II.6.5. See Life.

intimus / communis

intimus / communis. Printed forms: communis; intimus.

Inward / shared or general. Inward motion extending throughout a living body supplies the sign of life, and primary motion grounds life’s strongest possession. References: III.2.23, III.2.24. See Life.

mors / resolutio

mors / resolutio. Printed forms: mors; resolutione.

Death and dissolution. Ficino contrasts life’s indivisible unifying power with death through division and dissolution; the inference is part of his metaphysics of life. References: I.3.22. See Life.

planta / animal

planta / animal. Printed forms: animalis; plantarum.

Plant / animal. Life without cognition and cognition without intelligence distinguish two illustrative modes of imitation; these are Ficino’s hierarchical examples. References: II.11.17. See Life.

torpere / suscitare

torpere / suscitare. Printed forms: suscitet; torpent; torpentia.

Be inert / awaken or stir up. The mediation argument requires a mutable nature able to approach and enliven otherwise inert bodies. References: III.1.26. See Life.

vita / vivere / vivificare

vita / vivere / vivificare. Printed forms: vita; Vita; vitali; vitam; vivant; vivat; vivente; vivere; vivificando; vivificans; vivificat; vivit.

Life, living, and giving life. Goodness has wider scope than life; animating minds give life while angelic minds govern in the reported theory. References: II.6.5, II.6.23, II.6.24, II.8.3. See Life.

Life / live / give life. The third essence is life that animates bodies; its intelligent activity and its life-giving effect are both needed in the definition. References: III.2.23, III.2.24, III.2.29. See Life.

vita sine sensu

vita sine sensu. Printed forms: sine sensu; vita.

Life without sensation. The existence of nonsentient life supports an analogy from what is prior to what can exist separately; life and sensing are not treated as identical. References: I.3.26. See Life.

vita vitarum

vita vitarum. Printed forms: vita vitarum.

Life of lives. God is placed above bodily vivifying lives and purely intellectual angelic lives, rather than identified with either. References: IV.1.31. See Life.

Chrysippus (authorities and cited works)

Chrysippus. With Strato, represents an identification of the world's infused life with the highest God that Ficino rejects. IV.1.22–28234567. See World soul; Life.

Use in the book

V.1423456789 shifts from soul as self-subsisting essence to soul as life. If some part of soul were not life, Ficino argues, the whole would be an animated recipient rather than soul itself. Whatever is wholly life lives through itself, while a derivative living thing combines its own nonliving nature with received life. The soul’s unceasing animation of a prepared body confirms its proper function.

Vivification is then distinguished from conscious deliberation and appetite. If bodily life depended on cognition, everyone would know each hidden nutritive and generative operation; if on desire, one could remain embodied or depart at will. Since neither follows, Ficino identifies vivification with natural power or being. This does not mean every action of the rational soul is involuntary; it concerns the specific natural act of sustaining bodily life.

The argument permits two formulations: soul as life living through itself, or as a substance with life properly accompanying it, like fire with heat. Ficino prefers the first but says either can support the intended result. The distinction matters because the next proof examines the bearer of an inseparable form as well as the form itself.

V.15.7–82 reiterates that a recipient abandoned by life is not therefore the life that abandoned it. The departing life is the true mind; it cannot abandon itself. The thesis remains dependent on the prior rejection of the theory that life is merely the body’s temperament.

Places to read

1. V.14.1, V.14.2Wholly living essence, constant vivification and the rejection of conscious or appetitive bodily control.
2. V.14.3, V.14.5, V.14.6Two permissible formulations and the attendant image lead into the contrary/death argument.
3. V.15.7, V.15.8Life as departing soul is distinguished from the body deprived of it.

Translation in this edition

Ipso esse in V.14.2 is immediately glossed naturali virtute. It must not be turned into the claim that a creature’s substance is its own unmediated operative act, contrary to V.13.13. The edition’s coniectura is an “indication,” preserving the local status of this supporting argument.

animatum

animatum. Printed forms: animatum; animatum quiddam.

A thing made alive by soul, as distinct from the source of animation itself. If a supposed soul contained a nonliving part, Ficino says the whole would be an animated recipient; a life-abandoned recipient is not the departing life. References: V.14.1, V.15.7, V.15.8. See Life and vivification.

carere / privari

carere / privari. Printed forms: careat; carere; caret; privari; privatur.

To lack or be deprived of a defining possession. God lacks causal dependence; soul lacks matter; a body deprived of life is distinct from the life-source that cannot lack itself. References: V.5.4, V.5.9, V.14.8, V.15.6, V.15.7, V.15.8. See Life and vivification.

coniectura

coniectura. Printed forms: coniecturam.

An indication or supporting inference. Ficino introduces the prepared body's immediate animation as a further indication, then tests cognition, appetite and being as possible causes. References: V.14.2. See Life and vivification.

consilium

consilium. Printed forms: consilio.

Deliberation or counsel, a proposed but rejected immediate basis of bodily animation. If every hidden bodily process required such cognition, everyone would know its workings; Ficino instead locates vivification in natural power. References: V.14.2. See Life and vivification.

domina / dominari

domina / dominari. Printed forms: domina; Domina; dominatur.

Mistress or ruler, and ruling, describing causal superiority rather than legal ownership. Soul's rule over matter supports independence from its subject; mistress of life expresses the inseparability of life from soul. References: V.4.10, V.5.9, V.14.6. See Life and vivification.

habere

habere. Printed forms: habeant; habeat; habent; habere; haberet; habet; habuerit.

To have or possess a property, capacity or received act. Having life as a proper attendant is allowed as an alternative to being life itself; the distinction matters in the death argument. References: V.1.5, V.4.1, V.5.9, V.6.1, V.13.17, V.14.3, V.14.5, V.14.8. See Life and vivification.

inanimis / mortuus

inanimis / mortuus. Printed forms: inanime; mortua; mortuum.

Without soul and dead, here applied to what can receive life but is deprived of it. The distinction keeps the recipient of life separate from the life that leaves it. References: V.15.7. See Life and vivification.

pedisequa

pedisequa. Printed forms: pedisequam.

A female attendant following another, figuratively life's inseparable accompaniment of soul. The image allows the argument even under the alternative formulation that soul has life properly rather than simply being life. References: V.14.5, V.14.6. See Life and vivification.

semet ipsum deserere

semet ipsum deserere. Printed forms: deserat semet ipsam; se ipsam non deserit; se ipsum.

To abandon oneself, an impossible separation of soul from the source of its own living activity in these arguments. The body's abandonment by life is contrasted with life never abandoning itself. References: V.1.1, V.14.8, V.15.8. See Life and vivification.

vita

vita. Printed forms: vita; vitae; vitam.

Life, identified with the soul's essence in the argument rather than merely an acquired property. The soul gives life while a body receives it; the distinction between life and its recipient drives the immortality proof. References: V.14.1, V.14.2, V.15.7. See Life and vivification.

vivere

vivere. Printed forms: vivant; vivat; vivendi; vivens; vivent; vivente; viventem; viventium; vivere; vivit; Vivunt; vivunt; vixerat; vixit.

To live, the actuality corresponding to soul's essence as life. For soul, being is living; loss of life would therefore not leave the same soul as a lifeless thing. References: V.11.3, V.11.8, V.12.12, V.12.14, V.13.18, V.14.3, V.14.7, V.14.8. See Life and vivification.

To live, with the source of life under dispute. Living fragments motivate a Platonist replacement account; all composites would live if mere harmony were soul, a rejected consequence. References: VII.5.2, VII.5.4, VII.11.1. See Severed animals and replacement souls.

vivificare / vivificatio

vivificare / vivificatio. Printed forms: vivificando; Vivificare; vivificare; vivificat; vivificatio; vivificationemque; vivificet.

To give life and the giving of life, soul's proper activity toward body. Its constancy and independence from conscious bodily knowledge support Ficino's identification of soul with natural life. References: V.14.1, V.14.2, V.14.8. See Life and vivification.