Perfection

Use in the book

The idea of perfection is expressly said to matter more than models in both arts and conduct. Respect itself presupposes some conception of excellence. Neither claim makes every perfected artifact appropriate to its occasion: the perfection found in Balzac’s letters may be useless to that genre and too laborious for ordinary correspondence.

The late comparison of Tacitus and Cicero allows a style to be less beautiful yet perhaps more perfect. Every word has its weight, its measure, and its exact number; perfection resides in elements and whole together. The qualification “perhaps” and the distinction between beauty and perfection prevent a simplistic ranking. Duration as a means of human perfectibility supplies the corresponding vocabulary of development, without guaranteeing indefinite progress.

Places to read

1. II, p. 657, entry 7, ¶1Perfection’s idea guides arts and conduct beyond existing models.
2. I, p. 471, entry 6, ¶1Respect has as its underlying cause an opinion of excellence and an idea of perfection.
3. II, p. 515, entry 9, ¶1An achieved perfection can be unsuitable to a genre.
4. II, p. 898, entry 2, ¶1Perfect elements and a perfect whole are distinguished from comparative beauty.
5. I, p. 45, entry 2, ¶5Duration is a means of perfectibility.

Translation in this edition

“Perfection” and “perfectibility” remain separate in the English translation. The Tacitus judgment keeps “perhaps”; the lexicon should not turn its qualified comparison into an absolute literary verdict. The English “perfect whole and perfect elements” adopts a contextual shared attachment: French prints parfaits only after élémens, and a narrower attachment to elements alone remains possible.

Use in the book

Felicity requires perfection on both sides of enjoyment: the objects must be excellent, and the manner of enjoying must be adequate. III.57 gives the second a striking priority. An excellent manner of enjoyment becomes itself an additional good enjoyed, increasing rather than merely delivering the object’s value.

I.38 likewise makes the recipient’s excellence inseparable from the gift. God gives in a perfect manner by creating a soul able to enjoy nobly and generously, in divine likeness. Mere possession of the world would be inadequate if the possessor remained incapable of its good. Perfection therefore concerns an active relation between bestowed powers, suitable objects, and their fulfilment in knowledge and love.

Places to read

1. I.38Perfect giving includes making the recipient fit for generous enjoyment.
2. III.57Felicity requires excellent objects and an excellent manner of enjoying them.
3. III.61The divine image is the highest creature rather than a second deity.

In this edition

Perfect need not mean flawless by an unspecified modern standard. Ask which nature, activity, or end supplies the measure of completion in the passage.

Use in the book

Perfection ordinarily means completeness or fullness of being and activity, rather than moral faultlessness alone. Ficino argues that what is first in a kind contains that kind's perfections fully, while what possesses them incompletely depends on something more complete. This premise drives the ascent from quality to incorporeal form and from successive soul-life to simultaneous angelic life. An act completed stably at once is more perfect than one requiring time. Arguments for an abundance of separate intellectual substances likewise appeal to the fitting realization of excellent capacities in an ordered universe.

Supremacy adds purity and uniqueness. Two supposedly supreme lights, truths, or goodnesses would either coincide or differ through some additional and limiting element; in the latter case neither would be supreme. Perfection also links origin to goal: efficere, bringing into being, belongs to the same source as perficere, bringing to completion. An effect's need for an end thus indicates its dependence upon a source of essence. Divine intelligence is perfect through knowing itself, without an external object supplying what it lacks. No finite created image or collection of images can exhaust the perfection of its divine exemplar.

Ficino nevertheless distinguishes the perfection of a whole from the perfection appropriate to a part. A created world need not possess God's absolute perfection, nor does a well-ordered whole maximize every possible excellence in each component independently. A part is assessed through its fitting contribution to other parts and to the whole. This qualifies the language of cosmic fullness: the work needs the degree of perfection appropriate to indicating its maker's higher goodness. In defending providence, Ficino argues that local defects or things appearing misshapen may contribute to a wider beauty and good. This is his account of a fitting order, not a finding that particular harms cease to matter. Book III applies the same concern for a unified composition to soul's role as the bond between otherwise separated extremes.

This cosmic-order reasoning is qualified by II.12.15–18234: innumerable images of divine goodness remain possible beyond the creatures actually made. God freely produces some of these possibilities without being compelled to realize all of them. Completeness of a created order and actualization of every conceivable object of divine power are therefore different claims.

Further passage references. I.3.1–I.3.323, I.3.15, I.3.25–I.3.262; I.5.2–I.5.62345, I.5.16, I.5.25–I.5.2723; I.6.6, I.6.17; II.2.5–11234567; II.3.3–6234; II.7.16; II.9.7–82; II.10.5; II.12.19–2123; II.13.16–2423456789; III.2.6–823; II.12.15–18234

Places to read

1. I.3.15The ascent distinguishes freedom from decrease and from remission of intensity.
2. II.9.7–82Divine intelligence is argued to be perfected through its own proper object.
3. II.12.15–18234Possible images exceed actually produced creatures.
4. II.13.23–242The perfection of parts is assessed by concord with and benefit to the whole.
5. III.2.6–823A unified composition requires a fitting bond between extremes.

Translation in this edition

The supplied “perfection” is broader than moral faultlessness. Pro viribus at II.13.23 limits the created work’s representation of its author; quanta sufficit specifies sufficiency rather than maximal possible excellence in every part. The repeated “most perfect” remains part of Ficino’s ranked argument.

commodum / apparens

commodum / apparens. Printed forms: apparens; commodum.

Apparent / advantage or benefit. The apparent advantage of a single part is distinguished from the good of the universe’s order. References: II.12.19. See Perfection.

concinere / conducere

concinere / conducere. Printed forms: concinat; conducat.

Harmonize / contribute or benefit. A part’s fitting perfection is what harmonizes with other parts and benefits the whole, not every possible excellence in isolation. References: II.13.23. See Perfection.

exigo / condicio

exigo / condicio. Printed forms: condiciones; exiguntur.

To require; a condition necessary for an operation. The three stated conditions of perfect natural action structure the case against bodily bulk; the argument is relative to this model of perfection. References: I.2.2, I.2.3. See Perfection.

intrinsecus / extrinsecus

intrinsecus / extrinsecus. Printed forms: extrinseca; extrinsecum; extrinsecus; intrinseca; intrinsecos; intrinsecum; intrinsecus.

Inward and outward. Ficino distinguishes life as inward operation from temporal outward work; the shared temporal dispersion does not erase the distinction. References: I.5.2. See Act and operation.

Inward or outward in relation to a thing’s own perfection and spread. In the reported account, enduring always is inward and superior to the outward achievement of presence everywhere. References: II.6.19, II.6.20. See Perfection.

From outside / from within. God’s government acts inwardly in things he made, unlike an artisan working upon alien matter from outside. References: II.13.12. See Indwelling and presence.

merus / verus / perfectus

merus / verus / perfectus. Printed forms: mera; perfecta; vera.

Pure, true and complete or perfect. The first form must meet all three descriptions; separate arguments address purity, truth and completeness rather than treating the adjectives as synonyms. References: I.3.1, I.3.2, I.3.3. See Perfection.

perfectio / perfectus

perfectio / perfectus. Printed forms: perfecta; perfectio; perfectionem; perfectionemque; perfectionis; perfectionisque; perfectiores; perfectissima.

Perfection or completion, with degrees and modes depending on the being considered. The source is most perfect in itself, and no finite imitation possesses the infinite exemplar’s entire perfection. References: II.3.3, II.7.16, II.9.8, II.10.5. See Perfection.

perfectus / perficere

perfectus / perficere. Printed forms: perfecit; perfectio; perfectionem.

Complete or perfect / bring to completion. The completion appropriate to a created work falls below the author’s unrestricted perfection. References: II.13.23, III.1.12. See Perfection.

perficere / efficere

perficere / efficere. Printed forms: efficere; efficit; efficiuntur; perficere; perficiuntur.

To perfect or complete, contrasted with bringing an effect into being. Ficino argues that the same good is source and end, responsible for producing and perfecting. References: II.7.16, II.7.21, II.7.25. See Perfection.

plenitudo

plenitudo. Printed forms: plenitudinem.

Fullness. The sun comparison distinguishes the first luminous source’s fullness from what subordinate luminous beings receive. References: I.3.3. See Perfection.

praestantior

praestantior. Printed forms: praestantiore; praestantissimo.

More excellent or superior in mode. Effects are said to exist more excellently in higher causes, so substantial effects cannot become mere accidents in God. References: II.11.6. See Perfection.

proficio / adipiscor

proficio / adipiscor. Printed forms: adipiscatur; proficere; proficiendi.

To advance or improve, and to attain. A moving thing seeks a better state it does not yet possess and receives completion from a richer source; the verbs specify directed change. References: I.5.5. See Perfection.

summus / summum

summus / summum. Printed forms: summa; summae; summum; summus.

Supreme, at the summit of a kind or of all things. The argument combines uniqueness with purity: supreme light is one light and light alone. References: II.2.5, II.2.6, II.2.7. See Perfection.