From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Charm
ἐπῳδὴ (epōidē); ἐπῳδῆς (epōidēs); ἐπᾴδοι (epāidoi); ἐπᾴδεσθαι (epāidesthai); ἐπῳδαῖς (epōidais)
Epōidē is an incantation, a song or utterance sung over someone; the related verb is epāidein.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordEpōidē is an incantation, a song or utterance sung over someone; the related verb is epāidein.
- In the CharmidesThe charm is the dialogue's most persistent framing image.
- In this editionThe edition distinguishes “charm” from “remedy” throughout.
- A place to readThe medical pretext develops into a remedy dependent upon a charm.
Meaning
Epōidē is an incantation, a song or utterance sung over someone; the related verb is epāidein. The active verb describes administering the charm, while the middle-passive can describe being charmed. It is distinct from pharmakon, the material remedy with which it is first paired. “Charm” therefore does not initially mean merely pleasing manners or personal attractiveness.
Use in the book
The charm is the dialogue's most persistent framing image. Critias suggests that Socrates pose as a doctor who knows a remedy for Charmides' head. Asked what that remedy is, Socrates names a leaf but immediately adds an indispensable incantation. Used together they produce health; without the charm the leaf does no good. The spoken requirement exceeds the excuse that brought the young man over.
Charmides at first treats the charm as a transferable text that he can copy down. Socrates asks whether he means to do so by persuasion or without it. The question makes the would-be patient a participant whose approach matters; the prescription is not simply an object he can appropriate. Once Charmides acknowledges Socrates' identity and acquaintance with Critias, Socrates explains its power through an extended medical analogy.
Good doctors treat the eyes with the head and the head with the whole body. The Thracian doctor from whom Socrates says he learned the charm teaches, on Zalmoxis' authority, that the body must in turn be treated with the soul. The crucial identification occurs at 157a: the charms for the soul are beautiful words, logoi kaloi, and from such words temperance comes to be in souls. This gives the incantation philosophical content without specifying a fixed verse, sacred name, tune, or ritual formula. The dialogue never prints a separate charm for recitation.
It is consequently natural to interpret the ensuing conversation as the treatment promised by the medical story. The identification should nevertheless be made with care. “Beautiful words” can include discourse and arguments; the passage does not explicitly say that every refutation is curative or that the exact conversation which follows has successfully generated temperance. The story supplies an educational aspiration and a mode of encounter, while the argument leaves the central virtue undefined. The failure of a definition need not entail the failure of every benefit from continued examination, but neither is benefit demonstrated merely by calling the examination a charm.
The oath protects the priority of this treatment. Wealth, birth, and beauty are not reasons to give the bodily remedy first. Conversely, if Charmides already has adequate temperance, charms of Zalmoxis or Abaris would be superfluous. The required inquiry into his condition therefore motivates the question of what temperance is. Charm and definition are linked by the problem of diagnosis, rather than by a declaration that knowing a definition is itself the whole cure.
After the argument's apparent defeat, Socrates remembers the charm with special concern: he would have learned it earnestly for something worthless if temperance brought no benefit. He refuses that conclusion and blames his own investigation. Charmides then asks to be charmed every day until Socrates says that it is enough. Critias interprets this as proof of temperance and commands adherence, while the young man threatens force if Socrates resists. The charm thus closes the work as an undertaking still to continue, not a completed medical success. The passage renews philosophical attachment while leaving the tension between persuasion, obedience, and coercion unresolved.
Places to read
- 155b–eThe medical pretext develops into a remedy dependent upon a charm
- 156a–bCharmides proposes copying the charm; Socrates insists on persuasion and explains its power
- 156d–157c2The Thracian provenance, beautiful words, priority of the soul, and oath
- 157d–158c2Reputed existing temperance might make charms unnecessary
- 175e–176b2Socrates revisits the charm’s value and Charmides requests daily treatment
Translation in this edition
The edition distinguishes “charm” from “remedy” throughout. The remedy and headache do not reappear at the ending; it is specifically the charm that returns. At 157c4 the infinitive for charming depends on a corrected reading, recorded in the apparatus, but the priority of submitting the soul to treatment is clear in the surrounding passage.
ἀπογράφω
Attested: Ἀπογράψομαι (apograpsomai). I shall copy it down; Charmides initially treats the charm as transferable written words. References: 156a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπογράφω. See Charm.
ἐπᾴδω
Attested: ἐπᾴδοι / ἐπᾷσαι / ἐπᾴδειν (epaidoi / epaisai / epaidein). Sing or utter a charm over someone; accompanies the material remedy and later becomes the proposed continuing treatment. References: 155e, 157c, 176b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπᾴδω. See Charm.
ἐπῳδή
Attested: ἐπῳδὴ / ἐπῳδῆς (epōidē / epōidēs). An incantation or spoken charm; later identified with beautiful words that bring temperance to the soul. References: 155e, 156b, 156d, 175e, 176a, 176b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπῳδή. See Charm.
δεῖσθαι (deisthai)
Be in need of; Charmides says he still needs the charm despite the unsuccessful search for a definition. References: 176b. Lemma: δέομαι. See Charm.
ἐγγίγνεσθαι (engignesthai)
Arise or come to be within; beautiful words produce temperance in souls in the healer’s account. References: 157a. Lemma: ἐγγίγνομαι. See Charm.
ἡμέραι (hēmerai)
Days; in the idiom ὅσαι ἡμέραι, day after day, marking Charmides’ proposed continued attendance. References: 176b. Lemma: ἡμέρα. See Charm.
τρόπῳ (tropōi)
Way or manner; Socrates wonders how to make the charm’s power clear to Charmides. References: 156b. Lemma: τρόπος. See Charm.
Source note
The pairing of spoken incantation and physical treatment has an early literary parallel in Odyssey 19.457–458, where Odysseus’ wound is bound and its bleeding checked with an incantation. The parallel supplies context without proving that Socrates’ reported recipe was an actual medical prescription.
From the book
Stobaeus, Volume I
John Stobaeus · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Incantation
ἐπῳδή
epōdēEpōidē is a sung or spoken charm, an incantation.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordEpōidē is a sung or spoken charm, an incantation.
- In StobaeusIn Diotima’s account, the intermediary role of daimons encompasses practices including sacrifices, initiations, prophecy, and incantations.
- In this edition“Incantation” conveys the ritual use; “song” alone would be too general.
- A place to beginIncantations belong to the ritual practices associated with daimonic mediation.
- English renderings
- incantation; sung charm; spell
Meaning
Epōidē is a sung or spoken charm, an incantation. The word can name the verbal component of ritual without supplying any particular formula.
Use in the book
In Diotima’s account, the intermediary role of daimons encompasses practices including sacrifices, initiations, prophecy, and incantations. Incantation is one member of a varied list illustrating communication between human and divine realms. The passage does not identify every listed practice as the same art.
Places to read
- I.9.17.2Incantations belong to the ritual practices associated with daimonic mediation.
Translation in this edition
“Incantation” conveys the ritual use; “song” alone would be too general.
Source note
Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 118. The excerpt preserves a discourse within Plato’s Symposium. Its classification should not be treated as Stobaeus’s own first-person account of ritual practice.