Efficient cause

Use in the book

The initial objection gathers several difficulties (pp. 29-30, I.029.1). The spirit is called efficient cause, universal matter and something enclosed in visible creatures, yet the art requires a universal rather than particular subject. The author states these tensions openly. A lexicon should not conceal them by assigning the spirit a single easy equivalent such as energy or ordinary air.

The answer first retains the denial of self-sufficient nature (p. 30, I.030.1). Speaking properly and without qualification, no nature acts. The spirit can nevertheless be called efficient cause in its own manner and in a qualified respect, specifically with regard to mineral nature. The same passage allows the name supernatural spiritual Mercury in that restricted philosophical usage. The argument is about the level and scope at which a predicate is allowed.

On p. 31 the author explains his choice of vocabulary (I.031.1). Efficient cause is common and familiar in ordinary philosophy, and he uses it so that his meaning may be better understood. Through the spirit the body is opened; the spirit is also the copulator or uniting agent through which soul rejoins body. These are the operative activities supporting the qualified designation. They are narrower than making the spirit an independent creator of all being.¹⁹

The abstract-concrete distinction immediately follows (I.031.1). Speaking abstractly, the spirit can be called efficient cause here in the mineral kingdom. Speaking concretely, when the other principles and elements are included, it is universal matter. No element is without another. The distinction explains how one subject may be described under an operative aspect and under a material aspect without a simple contradiction between the two names.

Part II places the account of agency within the doctrine of the Word. Nature possesses capacity and is the subject in which God acts (p. 63, II.063.1). The subsistent Logos is first cause, acting primarily in universal and particular natures; the uttered Logos is the subordinate second cause acting in particular natures (pp. 63-65, II.063.2-II.065.1). The two are inseparable. This gives the earlier qualification a fuller causal framework.

The criticism of ordinary philosophers returns in the three-principle account (pp. 87-88, II.087.1). Their efficient cause, form and matter are said to be definitions whose true referents they do not understand. The author interprets the world’s spirit, soul and body through air, fire and Salt, yet says the true efficient cause remains unknown to those philosophers. Familiar terminology is useful for communication but does not, in his view, guarantee correct explanation.

The earthquake discussion tests the issue against rival natural explanations (pp. 95-97, II.095.1-II.096.2). Dense, hot and dry exhalations are proposed by ordinary philosophers; the author invokes divine anger and action as a different efficient cause. He nevertheless adds that God works with nature according to its qualities and properties. Different seasons and receptive soils still affect what occurs. Primary agency and materially conditioned effect are kept in relation.

Tides introduce a related distinction between cause and concordance (pp. 104-106, II.104.2-II.105.1). The gathering command is said to cause the sea’s ebb and flow; their lunar correspondence does not defeat that claim because correspondence is not identical with cause. The example shows the author resisting an inference from regular association to a complete causal explanation. It is not a modern tide theory hidden in theological language.

The ascent from carnation to seed, earth, water and the Word finally identifies the true principle communicating being with Christ (pp. 137-139, II.137.1, II.139.1). A material ancestry is not enough for the philosopher. The efficient-cause question demands an account of the agency sustaining that ancestry and its continuing operations. The author’s answer remains theological even where it is reached through close attention to particular materials.

Places to read

1. Part I · I.029.1; I.030.1; I.031.123The author’s own problem, qualified answer and abstract/concrete distinction.
2. Part II · II.063.1; II.064.1; II.065.1; II.087.1234The Word’s causal priority and the criticism of ordinary definitions.
3. Part II · II.095.1; II.096.2; II.104.2; II.105.1234Material conditions and the distinction between causation and correspondence.

Translation

Efficient cause retains causa efficiens because the source explicitly discusses that term. A paraphrase such as active ingredient would narrow it prematurely and obscure the distinction between the abstract operative aspect and the concrete universal matter.

Copulator in I.031.1 is explained through uniting agent. The term concerns the reunion of soul and body within the work. It is not evidence, by itself, of a sexual procedure or a separate ordinary substance identified by the translator.

Connections

Nature and Logos subsistent develop the divine primary agency; Spirit of the world develops the created operative subject. Body soul and spirit explains the opening and reunion mentioned in the practical paragraph. Reading the entries together prevents efficient cause from becoming a free-floating label with no connection to the material and theological distinctions that qualify it.

Ends and purposes concerns another causal question: what the work or renewed world is for. It should not be substituted for efficient cause. The glory of God as an end and the Word as primary agency can belong to the same account while answering different questions.

Cautions

The qualified causal status of a created spirit should not be turned into equality with the divine Word. The author repeatedly retains their difference.

The critique of secondary explanations is also more specific than a refusal of every material condition. The source’s own qualifications concerning properties, seasons and receptive capacity must remain beside its polemical claims about the true cause.

causa efficiens

causa efficiens — Attested source wording in the cited passage. I.029.1; I.031.1; II.087.1.

suo modo & secundum quid

suo modo & secundum quid — Attested source wording in the cited passage. I.030.1.

Abstractivè

Abstractivè — Attested source wording in the cited passage. I.031.1.

Concretè

Concretè — Attested source wording in the cited passage. I.031.1.