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a sense of senses and of itself

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς

The procession of powers turned on themselves · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordA perception whose objects are the other perceptions and itself, and nothing that the other perceptions perceive.
  • In the CharmidesThe summary case in Socrates’ procession of powers turned on themselves (167c–168a): sight, hearing, sense, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion, each imagined as being of itself and of its kind and of none of the usual objects. Critias denies every one. Knowledge, as he has defined it, would be the only thing of this sort.
  • In this edition“A sense of senses and of itself”, with “sight of itself and of the other sights” and its fellows on the same pattern.
  • A place to read167c–168a.
English renderings
αἰσθήσεων μὲν αἴσθησις καὶ ἑαυτῆς, aisthēseōn men aisthēsis kai heautēs, “a sense of senses and of itself”

Meaning

The phrase gives αἴσθησις (aisthēsis), “sense”, two genitives of object: the plural αἰσθήσεων, “of senses”, and the reflexive ἑαυτῆς, “of itself”. Each case in the procession has three parts: it is of itself, it is of the others of its kind, and it is of none of the things of which the others are. That is exactly the structure Critias gave to temperance, a knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, and of nothing else (166c, 167b–c; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός).

Use in the book

Socrates warns that the claim will look impossible when tried on other cases (167c; see ἀδύνατος), and tries it. A sight “which is not sight of the things the other sights are of, but is sight of itself and of the other sights, and of non-sights likewise; and which, though it is sight, sees no color” (167c–d; see ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων). A hearing that hears no sound, but only itself and the other hearings (167d; see ἀκοή; μὴ ἀκοαί). Then the summary: “taking all the senses together, see whether you think there is any sense which is a sense of senses and of itself, but which senses none of the things the other senses sense.” “I don’t think so” (167d; see συλλήβδην).

The procession turns from perception to the desires: a desire for no pleasure but for itself and the other desires, a wish that wishes for no good, a love that is “love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves”, a fear that fears “not one of the things that are dreadful”, an opinion of opinions with no opinion about anything else (167e–168a; see βούλησις; δόξα; ἐπιθυμία; ἔρως; φόβος). Critias denies them all. Then the turn: “But knowledge, it seems, we are saying there is of this kind: knowledge of no subject of learning, but knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge?” “We are.” “Then isn’t it strange, if there really is such a thing? For let’s not yet insist that there isn’t; let us go on looking into whether there is” (168a).

The procession argues by likeness, and Critias had already objected to that kind of argument: temperance, he said, is “not by nature like the other kinds of knowledge”, and Socrates was “looking for some likeness” where there was none (165e–166b). Socrates does not claim to have proved the impossible. He gives a reason in what follows: each power is defined by what it is of, so that a hearing that heard itself would have to have a sound, and a sight that saw itself would have to have a colour (168b–e; see ἀκοή; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). He sorts the cases into the impossible and the doubted, and leaves knowledge among the doubted, for “a great man” to decide (168e–169a).

The comedy of the examples “looks deliberate and deadpan”, the edition’s note at 167d says, and the note at 167e adds that a love of no beautiful thing, after the prologue, is “perhaps a pointed one”: it is offered to a company that has just watched every man in the room fall in love with a beautiful boy. The problem is not comic. A self-knowledge that had no object but knowing would be like a perception that perceived only perceiving, and whether there could be such a thing is the question the dialogue declines to settle.

Places to read

Every stage of the procession.

  1. 167b–c2Knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge looks impossible when tried on other cases.
  2. 167c–dA sight of itself and of the other sights that sees no colour; a hearing that hears no sound; a sense of senses and of itself that senses nothing the other senses sense.
  3. 167eA desire for no pleasure, a wish for no good, a love of nothing beautiful, each only of itself and the others of its kind.
  4. 168aA fear that fears nothing dreadful, an opinion of opinions; knowledge, as Critias defines it, would be of this kind, and that is strange.
  5. 168b–169a2Each power is of something; what is greater than itself would be smaller than itself; hearing that hears itself would have a sound; some cases are impossible, some doubted, and knowledge is left undecided.

Translation in this edition

The English keeps the three parts of each case in the same order and the same words: “sight of itself and of the other sights, and of non-sights likewise” (167c), “hears itself and the other hearings, and the non-hearings” (167d), “a sense of senses and of itself” (167d). “Taking all the senses together” renders συλλήβδην … περὶ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων. At 167c10 Burnet prints μὴ ὄψεων, “non-sights”, with B and W, against T’s singular μὴ ὄψεως.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Republic Socrates makes the principle explicit, as the edition’s note at 168b says: powers are a kind of thing by which we are able to do what we can, and he means sight and hearing as examples; he tells one power from another only by what it is set over and what it accomplishes (477c–d). In the Theaetetus no sense perceives the objects of another, and what is common to them is grasped by “the soul itself through itself” (184e–185e; see αἰσθάνομαι).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle takes up the same puzzle, without naming the Charmides, in his work On the Soul. Since we perceive that we see and hear, he says, it must be by sight that we perceive that we see, or by another sense; but that other sense would have to perceive both sight and its object, colour, so that there would be two senses of the same thing, or a sense of itself; and if it were another, either the series would go on without end or some sense would be of itself, so it may as well be the first. Then he states the difficulty of 168d–e: if to perceive by sight is to see, and what is seen is colour or what has colour, then if anything is to see that which sees, that which sees will itself have colour. His answer is that perceiving by sight is not one thing, since by sight we also judge darkness and light when we are not seeing, though not in the same way, and that what sees is in a way coloured, because each sense organ takes in what it perceives without its matter.1 What Socrates left to “a great man” can be read as answered by Aristotle, who changes what it is for a sense to have an object.

Source note

1. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.2, 425b12–25.