From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἈδύνατος is what lacks δύναμις, power: of a thing, impossible; of a person, unable.
- In the CharmidesSocrates’ first question about Critias’ knowledge of knowledge is whether it is possible (167b), and his parallels make it look impossible (167c, 168e). Critias will not admit that he cannot make the distinctions Socrates asks for (169c). At the end Socrates recalls that they conceded something impossible (175c), and tells the boy that, if he has temperance, he should regard Socrates as a babbler, “unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument” (176a).
- In this edition“Impossible” of things, “cannot possibly” in the medical rule, “could not” and “unable” of persons.
- A place to read168e–169a, where Socrates sorts the impossible cases from the merely doubted.
- English renderings
- ἀδύνατον, adynaton, “impossible”, “cannot possibly”; ἀδύνατα παντάπασι, adynata pantapasi, “altogether impossible”; ἀδύνατος εἶναι, adynatos einai, “could not”; ἀδύνατον λόγῳ … ζητεῖν, adynaton logōi … zētein, “unable to inquire … by argument”
Meaning
Ἀδύνατος (adynatos) is the negative of δυνατός, “able, possible”, from δύναμις (dynamis), “power, capacity”. Said of things, the neuter ἀδύνατον is “impossible”; said of persons, the adjective means “unable, powerless”. The Charmides uses both, and the first is at home in an argument about powers, since what is impossible is what nothing has the power to be or do (168b–169a; see δύναμις).
Use in the book
The word enters as medical doctrine. The Thracian teaches that the Greek doctors neglect the whole, “and when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well” (156e; see τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος).
In the argument it frames the first of Socrates’ two questions, “first whether it is possible or not for this to be, to know what one knows and what one does not know” (167b). He warns at once: “Then see what a strange thing we are trying to say, my friend. For if you look at this same thing in other cases, it will seem to you, I think, to be impossible” (167c). After sight, hearing, desire, wish, love, fear, opinion, the greater and the double (167c–168d), he sorts the cases: “some appear to us to be altogether impossible, while others are very strongly doubted ever to have their own power in relation to themselves? For with magnitudes and numbers and such things it is altogether impossible, isn’t it?” (168e). The impossible cases are magnitudes and numbers, such as a greater that would have to be smaller than itself (168b–c); the doubted ones are “hearing and sight, and indeed motion moving itself and heat burning itself”, which “would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others” (168e–169a; see ἀπιστία; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Knowledge stands with the doubted, and the question is left to “a great man” (169a).
The personal sense follows. Socrates confesses, “I, for my part, don’t trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions” (169a), and Critias, caught by the same perplexity, “was not willing to concede to me that he could not make the distinctions I was challenging him to make” (169c; see αἰσχύνομαι). Socrates grants for now that knowledge of knowledge is possible (169d), and the argument goes on to its benefit.
The end recalls both senses. Among the concessions that did not follow, they agreed that the temperate man knows of what he does not know that he does not know it, “without even considering that it is impossible to know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all” (175c; see ἄλογος). And Socrates, aggrieved for the boy, says that if Charmides has temperance he would sooner advise him “to regard me as a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument”, and to think himself the happier the more temperate he is (176a; see λῆρος).
The two senses divide the inquirers. Critias will not say that he cannot; Socrates says so of himself at 169a, and at 176a invites the boy to think it of him; and it is he who keeps the inquiry going. The admission of inability can be read as the dialogue’s mark of the man who still has a way through.
Places to read
Every passage in which the word occurs.
- 156eWhen the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well.
- 167cKnowledge of itself, looked at in other cases, will seem impossible.
- 168eSome cases are altogether impossible, others strongly doubted; with magnitudes and numbers it is altogether impossible.
- 169cCritias will not concede that he could not make the distinctions Socrates asked for.
- 175cThey conceded, without considering it, that one could know what it is impossible to know.
- 176aSocrates would sooner be thought a babbler, unable to inquire by argument.
Translation in this edition
The edition renders by sense: “cannot possibly be well” for ἀδύνατον … εὖ ἔχειν (156e), “impossible” at 167c, 168e and 175c, “could not make the distinctions” for ἀδύνατος εἶναι διελέσθαι (169c), and “unable to inquire” for ἀδύνατον λόγῳ ὁτιοῦν ζητεῖν (176a). Its positive, δυνατός, is “possible” in Socrates’ first question and in the grant that follows (167b, 169d).
Elsewhere in Plato
The rule behind the impossible cases can be read in the Republic: “plainly one and the same thing will not consent to act or be acted upon in opposite ways, in the same respect and towards the same thing, at one time” (436b). A greater that is greater than itself would also be smaller than itself, and so would undergo opposites in relation to the same thing (Charmides 168b–c). One of the doubted cases is settled elsewhere. Self-motion, which the Charmides leaves among the things some would disbelieve (168e), becomes in the Phaedrus the definition of soul: “only what moves itself, since it does not abandon itself, never ceases moving” (245c–e), and the Laws says the same (895e–896a), as the edition’s note at 169a points out.