Power to act

Use in the book

The expression appears at the end, but it answers the ambition Socrates described at the beginning: Alcibiades wants power enabling him to do anything at all (105e). At 134c Socrates says neither the young man nor the city should procure license or rule to do whatever they wish; they should procure justice and temperance. The issue is not whether the wish is intense or the power effective, but whether the agent can judge and act well.

At 134e–135a2 the contrast is tested in accessible cases. A sick man with no medical understanding can ruin his body when his power prevents rebuke. Someone aboard ship who lacks piloting sense and excellence can destroy himself and his companions if free to do whatever seems right to him. These examples distinguish being unimpeded from being benefited. The consequences extend beyond the person exercising the license.

At 135a–b the conclusion generalizes to the city and forms of rule: without virtue, license leads to doing badly. The argument does not deny every permission to act or demand that competence requires no freedom of operation. It rejects making unrestricted choice the goal independently of the knowledge and virtue that would orient choice. The alternative is first acquiring virtue and, until then, being ruled by someone better.

This is why translating ἐξουσία simply as “freedom” can be misleading alongside ἐλευθεροπρεπές, free-person-befitting virtue. The dialogue is able to criticize unchecked liberty of action while recommending a different freedom constituted by not being mastered by defective judgment or desire.

Places to read

1. 134cLicense and rule to do whatever one wishes are displaced by justice and temperance
2. 134e–135a2The unchecked patient and unskilled controller aboard ship exemplify license without understanding
3. 135a–135bRule and license lacking virtue lead to doing badly

Translation in this edition

“License” consistently distinguishes ἐξουσία from “rule” and from the free/slave vocabulary. The phrase at 134e contains an ἄν supplied in Burnet from a later Laurentian manuscript; this is a local textual supplement, not a separate substantive claim about authority.

ἐξουσία

Attested: ἐξουσίαν (exousian; 134c); ἐξουσία (exousia; 135a). At 134c: Unrestricted authority to do whatever one wishes, rejected as the primary aim for self and city. At 135a: Permission to act without restraint aboard ship despite lack of piloting competence. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξουσία. See License.

Use in the book

In the Hermetic divine assembly, Fire is first given leave to speak after the elements approach their maker to complain of human violence. Exousia concerns the right or opportunity to address the assembly. Translating it simply as strength would confuse permission with force.

Places to read

1. I.49.44.65Fire has the first permission to speak before the creator.

Translation in this edition

“Leave” or “permission” fits this construction; “authority” suits broader granted competence.