Δ Delta

able, possible

δυνατός

The able examiner, and the possibility granted for argument’s sake · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΔυνατός, the adjective of δύναμις: of persons, able, capable, powerful; of things, possible.
  • In the CharmidesNine times. Once of a person, the temperate man who will “be able to inspect others” (167a); eight times of the question whether knowledge of knowledge is possible, from Socrates’ plan (167b) to the grants that keep the argument moving (169d, 172c).
  • In this edition“Able”; “possible”.
  • A place to read169b–d.
English renderings
δυνατός, dynatos, “able”; δυνατόν, dynaton, “possible”; δυνατῷ, dynatōi, “its being possible”

Use in the book

The personal sense comes in Socrates’ summary of Critias’ claim: only the temperate man will know himself and be able to examine what he knows and does not, “and he will likewise be able to inspect others” (167a; see ἐξετάζω; ἐπισκοπέω). The first “able” renders οἷός τε, the second δυνατός. The capacity promised the temperate man is the examiner’s, and the argument of 170a–171c shows that he would not have it (see ἀληθινός).

The other eight uses are “possible”. Socrates proposes to look first whether such a knowledge is possible (167b; see εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν), and after the procession he challenges Critias: “first show this: that what I just mentioned is possible; and then, besides its being possible, that it is beneficial too” (169b–c; see ὠφέλιμος). Critias cannot, and Socrates grants it for now, putting the question off to another time (169d; see αὖθις; συγχωρέω); then he asks how, “even if this is entirely possible”, it makes one any more able to know what one knows and what one does not (169d). He grants it again at 172c, together with the definition itself (see δίδωμι).

The grants are withdrawn at the end. Socrates confesses that they conceded there was a knowledge of knowledge though the argument did not allow it (175b; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν), and made the further grant without considering that it is impossible to know in any way what one does not know at all (175c; see ἀδύνατος). The possibility on which the second half of the dialogue rests was never shown, only granted, and the able examiner of 167a was able only on that grant.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective occurs.

  1. 167aThe temperate man will be able to inspect others, to see what a person knows and what he only thinks he knows.
  2. 167bFirst whether it is possible to know what one knows and does not, and then, even if it is entirely possible, what the benefit would be.
  3. 169a–b2Socrates cannot say with confidence whether it is possible.
  4. 169b–cCritias is to show first that it is possible, and then, besides its being possible, that it is beneficial.
  5. 169dLet us grant for now that it is possible; even if it is entirely possible, how does it make one more able to know what one knows and does not?
  6. 172cGranting that it is possible to know knowledge.

Translation in this edition

Δυνατὸς ἔσται ἐπισκοπεῖν (167a3) is “will … be able to inspect”. Δυνατόν is “possible” elsewhere, and εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατόν (167b3, 169d5) “even if it is entirely possible”. Πρὸς τῷ δυνατῷ (169b8) is “besides its being possible”. Τοῦτο γενέσθαι (169a8) and δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι (169d3) are “possible for this to come about” and “possible for there to be”. Burnet brackets ἀποδεῖξαί σε, “that you demonstrate”, after Heindorf (apparatus, b8).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle separates the two senses that the Charmides uses side by side. Of the able, he says that powers are sources of change; of the possible, that something is impossible when its contrary is necessarily true, as it is impossible that the diagonal of a square be commensurable with its side, and possible when its contrary is not necessarily false, as it is possible for a man to be sitting; and these possibles, he adds, are not so called by reference to a power.1 The temperate man’s ability at 167a is a power in the first sense; the possibility of knowledge of knowledge at 167b–169d is a question in the second.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15–18, 1019b22–1020a6.